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3Abstract
A complex shared Polish-Lithuanian past, subject to diverse interpretations, continues to
raise historical as well as political controversy. The tensions manifest in the divergent
narratives, maintained by the two nations, of their shared past, in school-history education.
An incapacity to engage effectively with contradictory narratives obstructs the potential
for mutual understanding and contributes to the ongoing state of latent resentment.
Teaching about the controversial past begins from ontological and epistemological
assumptions  about  what  the  past  is  and  how it  can  be  known –  especially  when there  is
more than one account of what happened. This research undertakes to examine the
conceptual roots of the manner in which the past, that is shared, but remembered
differently, has been taught in school-history education in Poland and Lithuania. This task
is implemented by analyzing the metaphorical models that shape textbook presentation of
the past.
The conceptual metaphor theory of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher
Mark Johnson provides the framework within which to examine metaphors that shape an
understanding of cognition and the past on a meta-theoretical level. Visual metaphors,
which structure the textbook presentation of the past, receive a particular focus in this
dissertation, because these metaphors participate in conceptualizing cognition as the
making of representations by a disembodied mind, separate and distanced from the world;
in other words, our own bodily perceptions intervene to map one mode of perception
(seeing) as the metaphorical model for all cognition in a subtle form of deception. Visual
metaphors have prevailed in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greek
philosophy. The prevalence of the sense of sight in Greek art, philosophy, and religion
permitted the Greeks to conceive of a distinction between an object and its representation,
reality and knowledge, world and image, body and mind. The simultaneity, stasis, and
distance evoked by the sense of sight afford a disembodied model of cognition, which
implicitly continues to persist in Western thought.
In contrast to a disembodied and distancing model of cognition, I adopt a theoretical
approach, which posits a radically different understanding of cognition – enactive
embodiment. Through developments in neurobiology over the last decades, a new
understanding of cognition has emerged. Knowledge in this model is conceived not as
internal  snapshots  of  a  static,  distanced,  pre-given  reality,  but  as  a  process  of  coming to
know, which is inseparable from the lived, embodied experience of a dynamic being-in-
the-world. This process of learning is coupled with and co-creates reality in a mutual
interaction with the environment. Cognition is a self-modifying, self-organizing process,
implying embeddedness in an environment, rather than a passive representation of a fixed,
externalized world. Even though evidence for the embodiment of mind abounds, the
implications of this research have not yet entered the public consciousness. There is a lack
of understanding of the practical implications of research on embodied cognition, which
this research aims to address. The research materials – Polish and Lithuanian school-
history textbooks and interviews with their authors – serve as a “laboratory” for
application and further development of these theoretical insights.
4The disembodied model of cognition, which is at odds with the most recent findings of
cognitive science and neurobiology, can be observed in the following features of
textbooks: 1) the exclusive focus on veracity, accuracy, bias and subjectivity in discussion
of truth and objectivity; 2) adjudication between competing accounts by separating pattern
and process; 3) a sharp dichotomy between fact and fiction; 4) the focus on political and
military  history  of  the  state/nation  and  an  exclusion  of  lived,  experiential  past  from  the
textbook narratives; 5) the arrangement of narrative as a linear sequence of static states.
It is argued that we need to move past  the vocabulary of static,  vision-based thinking
about truth in terms of atomistic, subjective perspectives vis-à-vis the objective world of
reality. Visual metaphorical models lead either to a static, relativist polarization of
disparate perspectives or, alternatively, to attempts to transcend the lived dimension
altogether, reducing truth to what can be claimed to be objectively shared facts. Neither of
these options can offer effective tools for navigating the diversity of interpretations,
because they fail to take into account the lived, ever-changing experience that is at the root
of different perspectives.
When ways of thinking about knowledge and truth are framed by dualist metaphysics,
divergent experiences of people, both individuals and groups, become a confounding
problem. The metaphysical notion of truth does not accommodate varied and often
conflicting  narratives  of  experience.  It  fails  to  make  sense  of  the  truth  in  relation  to  the
divergent lived past. The contribution of this dissertation is, therefore, to specifically show
how  the  rethinking  of  the  truth  of  the  past  in  embodied  terms  opens  up  potential  new
avenues for conceiving of historical truth and for teaching it in school-history.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Thinking about history begins from making sense of what past reality is. How do we
imagine it? How do we conceptualize it? What models structure our idea of the past? Is
past reality a separate plane detached from us, as observers, who inspect it at a distance?
What  metaphor  would  we use  to  make  sense  of  it?  Are  we looking  at  the  past?  Can we
touch it? Can we have a bodily connection to past reality? Does the past perhaps live
through us in some ways? Can reality of the past be engaged, encountered or experienced
in the present? Is it present or absent, static or dynamic? Epistemological choices
inevitably follow from ontological assumptions about past reality, which are themselves
shaped by implicit metaphorical models that reveal as much as they may hide with respect
to certain important aspects of reality. These metaphorical models of cognition have
concrete implications for how we deal with the controversial past, or the past, which is
shared, but understood and remembered differently.
I  demonstrate  in  my  thesis  that  metaphors,  which  condition  orientations  towards  the
past, should not be taken for granted, because such metaphors lie at the root of conflicts
about what happened in the past. This aim is carried out by examining meta-theoretical
assumptions of school-history textbooks in Lithuania and Poland, which implicitly
organize how textbooks introduce and make sense of the controversial Polish-Lithuanian
past.
Metaphors, which we use to understand, make sense of and conceptualize our
experience of reality, in turn shape our ways of thinking and being. They can highlight
certain aspects of reality and of our experience, but also hide others. Metaphor is,
however, not merely one way of seeing reality. Unconscious reliance on a certain
metaphor has implications for what inferences we make about what kind of actions we can
take on the grounds of our understanding of a given situation. The conceptual metaphor
theory of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1980, 1999),
who were the first to propose that our thought is metaphorically structured, provides the
framework within which to examine metaphors that shape an understanding of cognition
and the past on a meta-theoretical level. In other words, I examine how metaphors serve as
models or templates, which transfer attributes from a source domain that are imposed onto
the target domain of theoretical concepts.
The Polish-Lithuanian dispute over shared history serves as a specific case meant to
illustrate how metaphorical models of cognition shape the knowledge of the past in school
history and can encourage or foreclose the possibility of mutual understanding between
nations. Adam Michnik, a Polish historian, essayist, and editor-in-chief of Poland’s largest
newspaper “Gazeta Wyborcza,” remarked that Polish-Lithuanian relations, despite the
long-shared history of these two nations, are complicated. Lithuanians tend to view their
Polish neighbors with distrust and suspicion, whereas the Poles, according to him,
disregard the Lithuanians (K?pi?ski & Kun?ius 2016, 7). The roots of the Polish-
Lithuanian historical controversy stem from the 19th–early 20th century, when the
Lithuanian national movement emerged from the intelligentsia of peasant origin. For the
representatives of the Lithuanian national movement, the 1569 union of Poland and
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Lithuania1 symbolized defeat of sovereignty and loss of political elites through
Polonization (Milosz 2006). In Lithuanian historiographical accounts of the 19th and 20th
centuries, the joint Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was primarily identified as an act of
coercion, inaugurating a period of decline, which eventually led to the disintegration of the
state at the end of the 18th century (Buchowski 2012). In Polish historiography, on the
other hand, the 1569 Union of Lublin was perceived as a benevolent act on the part of
Poland and a salvation for Lithuania, which could adopt Christianity, Western civilization,
and a higher culture from Poland (Buchowski 2012).
Mutual antagonisms, which first emerged in the 19th century, reached their peak after
World War I, when Poland took over the city of Vilnius and its surrounding region in
1920. Lithuania, for which Vilnius was a historical capital of the Lithuanian state, refused
to acknowledge Poland’s annexation of the city. The two countries officially remained in a
state of war until 1938. Soon afterwards, World War II began, bringing about the terrors of
totalitarianism and the Soviet occupation in the case of Lithuania, while Poland became a
Soviet Satellite state. The mutual dialogue on the shared historical past remained frozen
for fifty years. The contestation of the two national narratives of the past, buried under the
ideological dogmatism of the “friendship of the socialist nations” during the Soviet era, re-
emerged to the surface of political discussions, once the processes of nation-state building
had begun to gain momentum.
The tensions became likewise manifest in the divergent narratives, maintained by the
two nations, of their shared past, in school-history education. A complex shared past,
subject  to  diverse  interpretations,  raises  an  epistemological  conundrum,  if  and  when  the
truthfulness of competing narratives needs to be adjudicated. An incapacity to engage
effectively and meaningfully with contradictory narratives obstructs the potential for
mutual understanding and contributes to the ongoing state of latent resentment.
However, the implications of this project extend well beyond the cases of Poland and
Lithuania by bringing attention to: 1) how metaphors shape human understanding of the
past and lived experience; and 2) how metaphors can create or diminish a potential of
openness to a different narrative of experience. Metaphor analysis of historical knowledge,
thus, holds important insights for processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation.
Awareness  of  different  interpretations  does  not  readily  offer  clear  guidelines  for  how
to engage with multiple narratives and make sense of them. The scholarship, which
engages with controversial past in history textbooks, focuses on representations as well as
political and ideological debates that surround the treatment of contentious past in
textbooks (e.g., Carretero, Jacott & López-Manjón 2002; Torsti 2003; Crawford & Foster
2008; Schneider 2008; Maoz, Freedman & Mccauley 2010; Repoussi & Tutiaux-Guillon
2010; Foster 2011; Romanowski & Alkhateeb 2011; Müller 2013). On the other hand,
scholarship that reflects on the meta-theoretical orientations of school-history education in
the way textbooks deal with the (controversial) past is relatively rare (e.g., Ahonen 1990;
Seixas 2000; VanSledright 2008; Parkes 2011, 2013, 2014; Jonker 2012). This project
aligns with the latter area of history textbook research by focusing on how school-history
1 The shared history of Lithuania and Poland ensues from the unification process of the two states in the Middle Ages,
which culminated in the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569.
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textbooks instruct students to think about ontological and epistemological quandaries:
what the past is and what it means to know the past – especially when there is more than
one account of what happened.
Political  scientists,  who  engage  with  the  issues  of  history  and  memory,  have  studied
how historical narratives and memories are deployed and function in forging collective
identification, shaping political processes, policies, and legislation (e.g., Nyyssönen 1999;
Berger 2002; Deighton 2002; Müller 2002; Neumann 2002; Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä
2008; Mälksoo 2009; Langenbacher 2010). In my own analysis, I diverge from these
approaches by focusing, rather, on the meta-theoretical assumptions that shape the way the
past  and  historical  knowledge  are  conceived  of  and  depicted,  and  that,  in  turn,  hold
implications for social integration and mutual understanding within and between diverse
societies, which share a past. The question of how politics shape memory and vice versa
inevitably enters my discussion. However, my primary concern is to comprehend the
conceptual roots of a particular manner in which the past, that is shared, but remembered
differently, has been taught in school-history education in Poland and Lithuania.
The key problem, which has preoccupied me ever since I started this project, was the
question of how to think in a meaningful way about truth in school-history lessons, when
we encounter different narratives of the shared past in those lessons. In the process of
carrying out my research, I interviewed Polish minority members in Lithuania, whose
narratives of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past fell beyond the official school-history
curriculum. Polish minority members, whom I interviewed, often pointed out that the way
they or their ancestors experienced the past did not match the textbook representation of
the past, attesting to the idea that textbooks inevitably convey selective accounts of the
past rather than any kind of “objective” knowledge.
Postmodern theory of historiography, which I was avidly reading at the time,
suggested viewing all historical narratives as forms of literary artwork, whose truthfulness
or falsity cannot be established, since narratives do not mirror the past reality. Herein was
the source of my research problem. It seemed obvious to me that truthfulness of narratives
could not be explained in terms of a static match between an image or representation and
the past as a complex reality. In other words, there cannot be one truth that can be known
as the static core of an event that historians can “objectively” extract. However, in the
condition of postmodernity, truth was replaced by a conception of relative figural
language, which appeared to me as “lifeless” as the objective static truth. I felt conflicted
about giving up the notion of truth along the lines of the postmodern argument: The
narratives of Polish minority members appeared in certain ways more truthful than, for
example, the textbook representation. They were contingent on lived experiences that
could not be reduced to mere subjective appearances expressed from relative, rhetorical
points of view. As I struggled to make sense of these insights, I became painfully aware
that the theories, which were available to me, failed to provide relevant concepts and
models of thinking for addressing this problem.
A helpful hint as to where I should look for a solution to this quandary came from my
engagement with the art of David Hockney, an English painter, printmaker, stage designer
as well as a theoretician of art. Over the past few decades, one of Hockney’s passionate
interests has been the different ways of seeing the world, which, in turn, translate into
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different ways of depicting. The underlying purpose of depicting, according to Hockney,
is that the act of depicting enables us to see “things we might not otherwise see” (Gayford
2011, 85). A picture entails a certain way of seeing and engaging with reality. What
captured my attention was Hockney’s persistence in seeking after ways to depict the world
that escape the way a camera lens sees it, because, as he argued, the photograph-like
geometric representation of the world employs a single-point perspective, which leaves the
viewer fixed outside the picture and distances him or her from what is depicted.
Hockney’s analysis illuminated how a form of representation, modeled upon geometrical
optics, entailed a way of seeing reality that is curiously disembodied – an immaterial and
fixed point of vision hovering in detachment from the world.
Hockney’s insights were all the more relevant, taking into account that perspective and
distance are deeply embedded cognitive metaphors in the Western intellectual tradition
that have shaped how philosophers over the centuries made sense of cognition and
knowledge (Ginzburg 2000, 29). The prevalence of vision-based metaphors in Western
philosophy, beginning with ancient Greek philosophy, meant that attributes of visual
experience had been metaphorically transposed to explain how we know the world in the
abstract domain of conceptualization. Philosopher Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) has notably
demonstrated that ocularcentrism, or the prevalence of the sense of sight in Greek art,
philosophy and religion, permitted the Greeks to conceive of a distinction between an
object and its representation, reality and knowledge, world and image, body and mind.
The simultaneity, stasis, and distance evoked by the sense of sight enabled Greeks to
conceptualize cognition as making representations by a disembodied mind, distanced from
the world. It allowed theorizing knowledge as a static image that is detached from the
object of sight, a “form” that is abstracted from its “content,” or an “essence” that is
isolated from its “existence.” The body, paradoxically, was hidden in this
conceptualization: The metaphorical transfer of the experience of sight into abstract
conceptualization hid the very bodily process, which gave rise to this concept (Johnson
2007). In other words, while visual metaphors derive from embodied experience, they hide
the bodily source of metaphor and contribute to a disembodied understanding of reality.
Metaphors highlight certain aspects of reality, but they can likewise hide other significant
dimensions of experience.
My focus on metaphors, particularly visual metaphors, has meant that, in order to
understand  implicit  metaphorical  models  that  condition  the  notions  of  what  the  past,
knowledge, objectivity, truth and multiperspectivity are, I needed to approach distinct
theoretical approaches as metaphorical image-schemas to which they (unconsciously)
adhere. In other words, I needed to figure out what image-schema shapes a particular way
of seeing, knowing and depicting the past.
In contrast to a disembodied, distancing model of cognition, I have embraced a
theoretical approach, which posits a radically different understanding of cognition –
enactive embodiment. Through developments in neurobiology over the last decades
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 1998 [1987]), a new understanding of cognition has emerged.
Knowledge in this model is conceived not as internal snapshots of a static, distanced, pre-
given reality, but as a process inseparable from lived, embodied experience of a dynamic
being-in-the-world, which is coupled with and which co-creates reality in a mutual
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interaction with environment (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Thompson 2007,
2015; Noë 2009; Di Paolo et al. 2010). Cognition is a self-modifying process implying
embeddedness in an environment rather than a passive representation of a fixed,
externalized world. Through this process of self-modifying cognition, or sense-making,
the cognizing subject is enacting or bringing forth a world and itself simultaneously.
Instead of dividing cognition into objective (static and distanced) and subjective (static
and isolated), enactive embodiment highlights how cognition is contingent on a dynamic
moving body and the context of lived experience in engagement with the world.
Even though evidence for the embodiment of mind abounds, the implications of this
research have not entered the public consciousness. There is a lack of understanding of the
practical implications of research on embodied cognition, which forms the gap this project
aims  to  address.  As  I  demonstrate  in  the  analysis  of  textbooks,  school  historical
knowledge still tends to be based on Greek metaphysics and its disembodied model of
cognition, which are at odds with the most recent findings of embodied cognitive science
and neurobiology. My analysis shows that the metaphorical models implicit in the
epistemology of textbook authors lead them to a disembodied understanding of historical
knowledge. On the other hand, enactive embodiment and its model of cognition, when
applied to history and school-history education, open up new ways of thinking about
historical  knowledge.  Lived  experience  becomes  a  crucial  dimension  of  the  past  and
history writing. My research materials – school-history textbooks and interviews with
their authors – serve as a “laboratory” for application and further development of
theoretical insights from cognitive science.
Eelco Runia (2014) proposed an idea of “proactive discontinuity,” which occurs when
people, at the level of ideas, “flee forward” to insights, approaches and books and find
themselves in situations they could not foresee when they had initially engaged in a
particular undertaking. These sorts of situations, as Runia notes, “confront us with the task
to ‘catch up’ with the history, or the view of history, we ourselves have somehow created”
(Runia 2014, 56). It is precisely this work of catching up with an embodied approach to
history that remains a task requiring further research and imagination.
1.1 Synopsis of the thesis
In Chapter 2, I explore connections of school-history education to two distinct ways of
knowing the past: history and memory. The distinction between objective, critical history
and subjective, affirmative memory leads to tensions between the universalizing
commitment of historians to the historical truth and the particularizing identity claims
(e.g., Halbwachs 1992; Nora 1989; Novick 1999; Megill 2007). The distinction raises a
problem: What is, for example, the truth status of the narratives of experience of social or
cultural groups? Since they are steeped in particularizing memory, does it follow that such
narratives are inherently removed from truth?
Jan Assmann’s (2010, 2011) discussion of cultural and communicative memory is
useful in this context, for it reveals that the distinction between cultural and
communicative memory is linked to the difference between the eternal and the ephemeral,
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the  fixed  and  the  changing,  the  sacred  and  the  everyday.  Rituals  and  textual  canons
(cultural memory), in this understanding, are expected to remain as fixed as they can
possibly be and each consecutive ritual re-enactment or textual interpretation should not
stray from the original meaning. Reproduction of meaning can then be ensured to be as
accurate and, thus, as truthful as possible since the accuracy of the match ensures the
continuity of identity.
Hence, stasis becomes linked to truthfulness at the expense of lived, changing,
embodied experience, producing an epistemological tension between a universalizing,
disembodied commitment to fixed, static truth and shifting embodied experience.
Conceptualizing memory and historical knowledge, in metaphorical terms, as static,
mental images of the past leads, in effect, to understanding the truth of the past as the
‘accuracy’ between a static image and a distanced, externalized reality. However, in
conceptualizing the past in such a fixed, unmoving way, one overlooks relational and
processual dimensions of the past. This tension between history and memory likewise
unfolds in debates on school-history education (Levesque 2016; Seixas 2016). When
school educators argue in favor of more disciplinary thinking in school history at the
expense of memory, by “memory” they usually have in mind cultural memory, which is
formalized, static, ritualized and externalized (Gardner & Boix-Mansilla 2006; Levesque
2009, 2016; Seixas 2000, 2016). What remains obscured in these debates is, however,
memory of embodied and dynamic lived experience, memory as a potential source of lived
knowledge, which can offer a significant contribution to understanding the past processes
of life in different times and places.
In order to comprehend why embodied lived experience has been devalued in
cognition (Jonas 1982 [1966]), it is necessary to discuss the role of vision-based
metaphors in shaping the philosophical conceptualization of cognition. I take up this task
in Chapter 3. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, in particular, I trace the roots of dominant ways of
seeing the past in the dualist Greek metaphysics and its vision-based omission of the body,
which are embedded so firmly in the Western intellectual tradition. The ocularcentrism of
Greek thought, or the prevalence of vision over the rest of the body, enabled the mimetic
theory  of  truth  and  the  disembodied  distinction  between  a  static  image  and  the  world,  a
representation and reality. The modern idea of objectivity can be derived from
ocularcentrism, or the dominant position of sight in Greek thought, art, and religion.
I embrace the insight of philosopher Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) that the effects of
simultaneity, stasis, and distance elicited by the experience of sight enabled the Greeks to
conceive of the distinction between the disinterested, objective knowledge of “the thing as
it is in itself” and the subjective “thing as it affects me.” I trace several important visual
metaphors, which are used to express what it means to know objectively and which also
shape dominant epistemological models of cognition. In particular, I focus on the
metaphors of perspective, the camera obscura, and the eye of the mind. These metaphors
highlight the relation between the knower and knowledge, between the seer and the seen.
Optics and the camera are powerful metaphorical models, which structure meta-theoretical
assumptions of the Western tradition of philosophy.
In effect, it calls for an analysis of historians’ modes of seeing and cognizing the past,
which  I  take  up  in  Section  3.3.  My  analysis  reveals  that  the  self-effacing,  disembodied,
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detached historical gaze, modeled upon the metaphor of the camera, even though it has
met  serious  challenges,  especially  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century,  still  retains
influence in structuring notions of historical truth and knowledge. Historians are well
aware that they can no longer unproblematically use notions of objectivity and truth (e.g.,
Braudel 1980, 1999; Febvre 1973; Davis 2010; Pallares-Burke 2002), but the ingrained
ocularcentric metaphorical models, as my analysis reveals, still exert an influence on how
historians make sense of themselves, their practices, and ways of approaching the past.
Inasmuch as disciplinary history and its “ways of seeing” are adopted as a cognitive model
for school history, this is an important factor in shaping how pupils are taught “to see” the
past.
In  Section  3.4,  I  shift  the  discussion  to  show that,  even  in  the  wake  of  the  linguistic
turn, the characteristic disembodied distinction between image and reality, language and
world, as well as between (static) pattern of perception and (dynamic) process of
perception endured. Postmodern philosophers of history proposed to reverse the
dominance of content (the past/world/reality) over form (historical
narrative/language/word), but they retained the distinction itself between the content (past
reality)  and  the  form  (language  of  historical  narratives),  between  world  and  word
(Munslow 2003, 2006a, 2006b; White 1974, 1978, 1999, 2005b, 2014 [1973]). Their
claim is that past reality cannot be known or accessed other than through the historian’s
textual rendition of the past and remnant textual traces of the past. Crucially, however,
truth is still implicitly articulated by postmodernists in terms of an optical match between
an externalized world and word, which implies disembodied metaphysics. The world does
not shape the image in the mind; the disembodied mind shapes an image we impose onto
the world that itself bears no non-arbitrary links to reality. In order to conceive of such an
idea of knowledge as a mentalistic image, it is necessary to ignore the body and embodied
experience and interaction with the world, out of which meaning emerges. Mimesis as
sameness is replaced by mimesis as difference, but the crucial conceptual mimetic
vocabulary, which posits a distinction between reality and representation, is retained.
In Section 3.5, I introduce the model of cognition of enactive embodiment (Maturana
& Varela 1980, 1998 [1987]; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]) which seeks to
bypass the mimetic distinction and its two key features: internalism and static
representationalism. The theory of enactive embodiment proposes to regard cognition as
embodied action – “an enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the
variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993
[1991], 9). The process, or history of (inter)action, shapes the cognizing self and is
reflected in how the self makes sense of the world. Put differently, the process of
cognition or interaction with the world is embodied in the pattern of perception. Enactive
embodiment emphasizes that we are conscious through and in our living bodies and that
perception and action are inseparable in lived cognition. Perception is not a passive
internalization of information, but an active process – it implies a dynamic process of
doing and acting. Embodied cognition depends on the experiences that arise from having a
body with various sensorimotor capacities, which are themselves embedded in a broader
biological, psychological, and cultural context.
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In Section 3.6, I discuss what an embodied approach to making sense of the past could
mean in practice for the discipline of history and school-history education. Since the
notion of lived experience is crucial in enactive embodiment, I begin by examining what it
entails to know lived experience of other people in Section 3.6.1. Research on mirror
neuron systems illuminates in what ways knowing other people’s mind is an embodied,
rather than strictly mentalistic, process. These insights from research on embodied
cognition and empathy provide clues as to why the notion of historical empathy, as R.G.
Collingwood (1946) has formulated it, retains features of disembodied metaphysics. In
Section 3.6.2, I attempt to provide the contours of a more encompassing approach to doing
history in an embodied way. I suggest that the understanding of larger-scale processes and
structures requires the additional contribution of experiential, relational, empathetic
knowledge of lived experience of these processes. On the other hand, the past as lived
experience needs to be complemented and juxtaposed with the knowledge of larger-scale
processes and structures. The aim becomes to understand “how it is that humans are able
at  one and the same time to have a world in common and to live it  as a function of their
own particular histories” (Toren 1999, 16). I propose a metaphor of the weave to make
sense of the complexity of past life.
In  the  empirical  part  of  the  thesis,  I  apply  my theoretical  insights  to  the  study  of  the
selected school-history textbooks and interviews with their authors. In Chapter 4, I
describe my research materials and method of analysis. I introduce the conceptual
metaphor theory of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson
(1980, 1999), which serves as the basis of my methodological approach, explicating how I
applied it to my subject matter. I describe the different stages of analysis: identification of
relevant  metaphors;  reflection  on  why  they  were  used  in  terms  of  context  and  topic
discussed; analysis of the entailments of metaphors; detection of patterns of metaphor use
in and between textbooks and interviews; and identification of connections between
metaphor use and inclination to empathically understand a different experience.
In Chapter 5, I provide a contextualization of the analysis. I outline an overview of the
shared Polish-Lithuanian past, focusing on the main events that have provoked
controversy in Polish and Lithuanian historiography, and provide an overview of the
Polish and Lithuanian school history curricula from the 1990s onwards.
Chapters  6  and  7  comprise  the  analysis  of,  respectively,  Lithuanian  and  Polish
interview and textbook materials, followed by a discussion of the main findings in Chapter
8 and a conclusion in Chapter 9. The discussion of findings draws attention to enactive
embodiment as a productive source of conceptual tools for history teachers and history
textbook authors seeking new ways to handle the diversity of interpretations of the past in
school narratives. As my analysis reveals, textbook authors are generally willing to
include divergent accounts of the past into textbooks. However, an implicit adherence to a
disembodied, vision-based and vision-generated metaphorical model of cognition as well
as curricular restrictions limit their capacity to engage properly with different narratives of
experience. The implicit adherence to a disembodied, ocularcentric model of cognition in
textbooks educates pupils how to perform a critical scrutiny of truth-claims in sources,
but, on the other hand, leaves them incapable of making sense of divergent interpretations
in relation to the lived process of experience. Pupils do not receive the tools for thinking
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about the complexity of the past process of life, in which diverse lived experiences
intermingle, intermesh, and constitute a crucial dimension of the past. By drawing
attention to the underlying metaphorical models in textbooks and authors’ ways of
thinking about the past, this thesis not only charts the multiplicity of ways of engaging
with the past in Poland and Lithuania, but likewise opens up new paths for methodological
innovation in history teaching.
21
Chapter 2. History education between history and
memory
My choice to focus on school-history education offers a productive context for addressing
an  epistemological  issue  of  how  we  can  know  the  past.  I  will  show  in  this  chapter  that
history education, being situated between history and memory, is in a good position to
reveal how problematic the extreme version of this dichotomy is. In fact, what appears to
be  a  clash  of  opposites  may,  rather,  turn  out  to  be  a  fruitful  coexistence  of  two ways  of
knowing the past, which are different, but not opposed. In this chapter, I argue that a sharp
distinction between history and memory originates from conceptualizing these two ways
of knowing the past in terms of reductive analysis. If memory and historical knowledge
are metaphorically conceived of as static and mentalistic images of the past, this leads to a
conception of truth that highlights the accuracy between such static images and a
distanced,  externalized  reality.  In  other  words,  truth  is  here  understood  as  a  mimetic
correspondence entailing a static conception of knowledge. On the other hand, such a
concept of truth neglects the relational and process dimensions of the past. That is, such a
conception neglects how the parts relate to the whole at various levels of relational
complexity in an ongoing process of dynamic interaction. Once we conceptually redefine
this focus from static objects to dynamic processes and relations, the possibility opens
toward thinking of memory and varied, even clashing memories, not as an impediment to
truth, but as a productive challenge, inviting us to try to integrate those into a more
encompassing explanation.
The past reveals its significance when people of different backgrounds, cultures,
values, heritage, of different pasts live side by side (e.g., Kattago 2009, 2010, 2012a,
2012b). In these circumstances, a question can be raised: Whose history should be taught
in school? (Levesque 2009). This is a universal problem, which manifests particularly
acutely, if there is a legacy of social fragmentation and conflict. But even where threre is a
high degree of social integration, the issue of which narrative should be taught is bound to
arise because of the heterogeneity of populations in terms of ethnicity, class, gender, etc.
This question already bears a certain attitude to and a way of handling parallel narratives
that coexist side by side: It suggests that we need to adjudicate and select a single narrative
to be taught. In other words, it is reductive rather than synthetic. This question becomes
ever more pertinent during transitional periods when borders shift, empires collapse,
different beliefs and identities (re)emerge and are asserted. Conflicting memories and
experiences in the case of a shared past elicit the urge to know “what actually happened”
in the past. The lack of a memorial agreement over the past causes memory to be viewed
with  distrust,  especially  when  one  is  faced  with  manipulation  of  the  past  in  official
accounts of the past and the use of the past for political purposes. This way of approaching
the issue of a controversial past tends to translate into a dichotomy between history and
memory (e.g., Halbwachs 1992; Nora 1989; Novick 1999; Megill 2007), where they are
conceptualized as opposites of each other. But is this (metaphorical) conceptualization
justified?
The relationship between history and memory is an old and controversial topic
(e.g.,Wertsch 2002, 18–20, 30–46; Misztal 2003, 99–108; Cubitt 2007; Assmann 2008;
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Erll 2011, 38–66; Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi & Levy 2011, 43–45). Traditionally dismissed
by  historians,  memory  has  risen  over  the  last  few  decades  to  become  a  potent  rival  to
history in approaching the past (e.g., Assmann 2006). However, although the boundary
between history and memory may have become more permeable or blurry, the tendency to
oppose memory and history as mutually exclusive has far from disappeared. Pierre Nora,
for example, suggests a distinction between “memory-history” and “disciplinary-history”:
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, are thus in many respects opposed.
Memory is life, always embodied in living societies and as such in permanent evolution,
subject to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of the distortions to
which it is subject, vulnerable in various ways to appropriation and manipulation, and
capable of lying dormant for long periods only to be suddenly reawakened. History, on the
other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer.
Memory is always a phenomenon of the present, a bond tying us to the eternal present;
history is a representation of the past. […] Memory is absolute, while history is always
relative. (Nora 1996, 3)
However, Nora (1989, 10) acknowledges that “when history began to write its own
history,” a growing realization occurred that history writing, in aiming to denounce
mythologies of the past, is equally susceptible to alien impulses within itself, that is,
history writing is not exempt from the possibility of being “the victim of memories which
it has sought to master.”
Allan Megill (2007) adopts a sharper juxtaposition of history and memory. He is
critical of the memory-oriented historiography and labels it as an affirmative
historiography, which is essentially uncritical and has to accept the tradition of the group
whose memories it is addressing:
But  my  argument  here  is  that  history  ought  rather  to  counter  the  harmful  effects  of  an
excessive preoccupation with memory. […] However we define memory […] it does seem
to have, as Collingwood has suggested, the character of being “immediate”. In other
words, if a person sincerely asserts “I remember that P”, we have no adequate grounds for
challenging the assertion: we pretty much have to accept that this is indeed what the person
remembers. History is different, for here we must bring evidence into play. […] Memory is
an image of the past constructed by a subjectivity in the present. It is thus itself subjective;
it may also be irrational, inconsistent, deceptive, and self-serving. It has long been clear
that, without independent corroboration, memory cannot serve as a reliable marker of the
historical past. […] In its demands for proof, history stands in sharp opposition to memory.
History reminds memory of the need for evidence coming from eyewitnesses (autopsy) and
from material remains. (Megill 2007, 22, 35)
Two assumptions are embedded in Megill’s understanding of the relationship between
history and memory. Firstly, a historian who does memory-oriented history cannot be
critical of it. Memory and critique are incompatible, for, in the case of memory research,
there is a total identification between a historian and the person who remembers.
Secondly, memory in Megill’s understanding is mentalistic and disembodied. It is
conceived, metaphorically, as an “image” constructed in the mind, which is evaluated
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according to how well it corresponds to past reality. The accuracy of a match between the
remembered image and the past reality is the key criterion for the scholarly value of
memory. The role of remembering is primarily evaluated in terms of repetition of the past
or mimetic ability of memory (Keightley and Pickering 2012). The worth of a remembered
image as an evidential source is assessed in isolation from the person remembering, to the
extent that it can accurately depict the external events. Since memory can hardly give in to
such separation from the lived experience of the person remembering (including the way
in which this memory has been shaped in the aftermath of the remembered event),
memory is problematized or even denied as being a reliable source due to its lack of
objectivity. Memory is regarded as fabricated, ideologically framed, imagined rather than
real. For Megill (2007, 27), history is and must be critical and objective, whereas the
subjective and uncritical nature of memory is exemplified, to him, by memory conflicts
between different ethnic groups, which share the past. He points out that the weakness of
memory is that, being uncritical, it cannot adjudicate between different accounts in
memory conflicts (Megill 2007, 28). This implies the role of critical historical science – to
bypass the memory conflicts, to provide an account that rises above the subjective
memorial perspectives and, thus, identity.
So even if Megill (2007, 24) claims that history should deal with “existents” in the
past, rather than “essences” in the eternal present, the kind of objective evidence, which he
takes to constitute the “existents,” is derived from the third-person, detached, static,
external observation of actions of the people in the past. The spectator claims to seek after
the past process of life, but instead adopts a “dead,” eternalized, objective vision. In light
of my subsequent argument laid out in Chapter 3, it is noteworthy that Megill invokes the
etymological connection between the historian’s procedure of gathering eyewitness
evidence and autopsy –  from  Ancient  Greek ??????? , autopsí?,  “seeing  with  one’s  own
eyes.” Evidential scrutiny is akin to the observation and dissection of a dead body. It
implies a distanced spectator who views his or her object of study as a lifeless thing (a
static object) rather than a living human being, whose memory reflects and is itself a
record of history (process) of interaction with environment.
As the above examples illustrate, there are strong polarities that define the relationship
between memory and history. Notable, here, is the emphasis on memory being subjective
because  it  is  prone  to  manipulation  and  distortion,  whereas  history  is  associated  with  a
rational, third-person, distanced, cool, circumscribed approach to reconstructing the past.
This reflects, as Olick and Robbins (1998, 110) argue, the position held by “traditional”
historians who would place history and memory in a clear-cut distinction, making a claim
that only history is interested in the pursuit of truth. The distinction is far from being neat
or unproblematical. Questioning the sharp delineation between history and memory,
Burke (1989, 98) observes: “Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer. In
both cases we are learning to take account of conscious or unconscious selection,
interpretation and distortion. In both cases this selection, interpretation and distortion is
socially conditioned.” Megill (2007, 41) argues that the tension between affirmative,
subjective memory and critical, objective history results from an unresolved “dialectic that
characterizes all truthful history.” Kansteiner (2002, 184) also seems to uphold a similar
position when he points out that the relation between history and memory remains one of
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the interesting challenges in the field. In Megill’s words, there is not a way to square the
circle: Historical research and writing are caught up between the critical commitment to
the universals (objective) and the claims made by particular identities (subjective) (2007,
41).
The complexity of the epistemological distinction between memory and history
increases even more when we take into account that memory can be conceptualized in a
number of related ways (cf. Draaisma 2000). An important conceptualization has been
offered by Jan Assmann (2010, 2011) who distinguishes between communicative and
cultural  memory  and  attempts,  in  this  way,  to  get  a  grip  on  an  extremely  diverse
vocabulary in the field of memory studies. Cultural memory is characterized by Assmann
as fixed, exteriorized, objectified, static, institutionalized, and disembodied. It is
formalized and requires institutions of mnemonic preservation, such as archives,
monuments, libraries, museums. It encompasses both ritual and textual forms of
preservation of the past. Cultural memory stores away information about the remote past,
but it “reaches back into the past only so far as the past can be reclaimed as ‘ours’”
(Assmann 2010, 113). Cultural memory has its experts, who serve the function of passing
it on to the next generation. Ways of sharing and participating in cultural memory are
ceremonial and hierarchically structured. Cultural memory requires commemorative
practices, ceremonies, and rituals in order for it to be re-embodied, enacted, and
experienced. Communicative memory, on the other hand, is not stable and formalized. It is
not supported by any institutions caring for its preservation and transmission. As it lives in
everyday verbal interaction, it is much more transient and diffuse. It has a limited temporal
horizon of three interacting generations, or up to about eighty to one hundred years.
Because participation in communicative memory is not formalized, it constitutes the
unofficial memory of the group and consists of historical experiences in the framework of
individual biographies (Assmann 2011, 41).
Assmann (2011, 43) takes notice of the fact that the distinction between cultural and
communicative memory is linked to the difference between the eternal and the ephemeral,
the  fixed  and  the  changing,  the  sacred  and  the  everyday.  Rituals  and  textual  canons
(cultural memory) are meant to remain as fixed as they can possibly be and each
consecutive ritual re-enactment or textual interpretation should not stray away from the
original meaning. Reproduction of meaning is expected to be as accurate and, thus, as
truthful as possible since the accuracy of the match ensures the continuity of identity.
Hence, stasis or fixity becomes metaphorically linked to truthfulness. The source domain
of concrete experience of ritual re-enactment is metaphorically mapped onto the abstract
epistemological  concept  of  truth  (See  Chapter  4  on  Lakoff  and  Johnson’s  conceptual
metaphor theory). In Section 3.3, I will examine how this conceptual distinction between
the eternal and the ephemeral, the fixed and the transient translated into a theory of
knowledge in Platonic metaphysics, which distinguished between what lasts and, hence,
what is real and what changes and, hence, is impermanent and not real. The latter – “the
thing as it affects me” – was deemed partial and subjective, whereas “the thing as it really
is” became viewed as objective knowledge. Truthfulness of knowledge as faithfulness to
the original was metaphorically linked to the fixed and the eternal. The conceptual
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distinction between objectivity and subjectivity was based on mind-body dualism. In other
words, knowledge of the thing could only be grasped by the mind detached from the body.
To the extent that historical knowledge and cultural memory are expected to rise above
the fleeting, impermanent apparitions and impressions, their understanding reveals shared
conceptual roots. In both cases, conceptualization preserves the focus on knowledge as a
static  object  rather  than  on  the  process  of  relations  and  interactions  that  are  reflected  in
such knowledge. History fulfills the functions of cultural memory in consolidating and
preserving the most important, foundational, knowledge about a group’s past (Tamm
2008, 2013, 463). History, like cultural memory, also has its special carriers and experts
who need to be initiated through special training, its institutions and formalized
procedures before they can be trusted in the task of reconstructing the past faithfully.
The faithful repetitive continuity is particularly emphasized in the ritual component of
cultural memory. Useful in making sense of Assmann’s conceptualization in this regard is
Connerton’s (1989) discussion of social memory. What interests Connerton (1989) is how
social memory is transmitted from one generation to the next and, in particular, how
(cultural) memory gets incorporated in the ritual performance. Rituals are characterized by
bodily performance of gestures, postures, dress codes, movements, which develop over
time into habitual bodily practices. The habitual aspect of bodily performance is what
sustains the group memory and its power to shape the ways of being of its members.
Commemorative ceremonies and celebrations stand out from other rituals because they
explicitly refer to a certain prototypical event or actions of a prototypical person, which
are then ritually re-enacted, relived in embodiment in the present (Connerton 1989, 61).
This kind of embodied memorial re-enactment in commemorative ceremonies implies a
static, fixed understanding of memory, which prioritizes enduring foundations, identifies
and  establishes  shared  origins,  collective  beliefs  and  core  values  in  the  past.  The
participants of commemorative ceremonies feel as if they are able to re-experience the
past through ritual re-enactment. Yet, what is embodied in a formalized and ritualized
commemorative practice is not so much the past as lived, continuously unfolding
experience, but an ideal, exemplary, eternalized, symbolic past of an event or person. The
ritual gives the body an appropriate pose, prescribed and determined movements, gestures
and actions (Connerton 1989, 59). It does not give space for an imaginative,
transformative engagement with the past. The symbolic “historical events transfigured by
mythicisation into unchanging and unchangeable substances” (Connerton 1989, 42) are
not open to or even resist change and recontextualization, for change indicates a danger of
losing a stable group identity. The utterances made in a commemorative re-enactment are
encoded in a canon, formalized and exactly repeatable (Connerton 1989, 58). To the extent
that the prototypical past resists reshaping of its meaning in light of changing
circumstances and experiences, it is formal, restrictive, and static.2 It is mimesis, or
representation as sameness.
2 Connerton (1989) distinguishes between myth and rituals by asserting that myths have much more potential for
variance, change, and interpretation. Myth constitutes more like a reservoir of meaning which is available for use and
subsequent modification. Rituals and rites, on the other hand, have a stronger tendency for invariance and stasis. The
fixity of rituals enables a group to prevent a too fast and potentially dangerous evolution of its identity.
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In a textual form of cultural memory, the static past is fixed in a canon. Canonical texts
must not be changed or modified in any way (Assmann 2011, 78–81). Assmann (2011)
notes, however, that change in communication of textual cultural memory comes about
through interpretation. As texts become increasingly temporally removed from the
contemporary context, a class of experts specializing in interpreting the meanings of these
texts is required. The interpreters need to actualize the meaning of the text, to bridge the
gap between a fixed text and changing contexts while at the same time remaining faithful
to the original text. So despite inescapable variation, an interpretation is meant to be
faithful in word and meaning to the original text. It has to be a truthful reproduction of the
original meaning.
Assmann’s (2010, 2011) communicative memory, on the other hand, is transient,
impermanent and fluid, unless it becomes institutionalized or canonized. The sharing and
communication of communicative memory is, however, limited to one’s own memory
group(s). A typical instance of communicative memory for Assmann (2011) is
generational memory, which accumulates and disappears together with its carriers.
Communicative  memory  is  by  default  assumed  to  be  confined  to  one’s  own  memory
community, partial, and subjective. It is the past “as it appears to me or as it affects me”
and hence its truthfulness to reality is suspect. Assmann further maintains the difference
between history and memory by asserting that historical knowledge “has a universalist
perspective, a tendency towards generalization and standardization,” whereas “memory,
even cultural memory, is local, egocentric, and specific to a group and its values” (2010,
113). Assmann’s conceptualization therefore espouses the same distinction between
universalizing, objective history and particularizing, subjective memory. Memory is
regarded as suspect in relation to its adherence to “the real.” My argument up to this point
can be summarized in Figure 1 below. It reveals a curious connection between
maintenance of ritualized continuity for preservation of group identity and notions of
truth. Truth is associated with the faithful, accurate reproduction of meaning, whereas that
which, by contrast, is transient and not static is deemed to be removed from the truth (or
not real in the Platonic understanding, which will be discussed in Section 3.3). The threat
of losing one’s identity is what motivates safeguarding of invariance, uniformity,
precision, and truth-seeking preservation of the original meaning.
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Figure 1 Conceptual distinctions
This extended attention to conceptual distinctions underlying Assmann’s (2010, 2011) and
Connerton’s (1989) notions of memory serves to elucidate the meanings of “memory” in
debates on school-history education. When a relationship between the past and a nation
state is discussed, the meaning of memory as cultural memory – or formalized, static past
– seems to prevail. Engagement with the past is conceived as an institutional instrument of
states, communities, and schools, used for inculcating traditions, values and setting
foundations (Levesque 2009). What is embodied is an institutionalized form of the past
rather than shifting and varied lived experiences. Levesque, for instance, uses the term
“memory” in this way, when he describes the activities of “memory fashioners,” who
demand a nationalist curriculum, memorials and preservation of heritage, promote
patriotic commemorations, and glorify national heroes:
This is no surprise, considering that public schooling has traditionally been justified for
nation-building purposes. As people do not instinctively grow into fellow patriots, the task
of creating citizens was too important to be left to private or religious organizations. So
nationwide educational systems gradually became the norm, and soon governments
regarded history as an important builder of national consciousness. (Levesque 2009, 9)
Such kind of conservative “memory fashioning” stands opposed to disciplinary historical
thinking. Grounding his argument on Gardner and Boix-Mansilla’s (2006) appraisal of
disciplinary historical thinking, Levesque states:
Disciplinary thinking, as Howard Gardner and Veronica Boix-Mansilla contend,
constitutes the most advanced way of approaching and investigating issues within the
various domains of knowledge. Although disciplines sometimes prove to be incomplete,
[…] they nonetheless represent the best scientific means available for answering
‘generative essential questions’ in human affairs. Disciplines such as history have their
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own modes of inquiry, networks of concepts and principles, theoretical frameworks,
symbolic systems, vocabularies, and modes of self-regulation. […] [D]isciplines offer
people formidable ‘ways of knowing’ about past or current issues of significance. ‘Shorn
of disciplinary knowledge,’ as Gardner and Boix-Mansilla put it, ‘human beings are
quickly reduced to the level of ignorant children, indeed to the ranks of barbarians.’
(Levesque 2009, 7)
The distinction between history and memory is replicated in debates on history education.
Memory is reduced to re-enactment of the static past and associated with backward,
immature, irresponsible, ill-informed “ways of knowing” the past by those who prioritize
disciplinary thinking. Disciplinary thinking, on the other hand, is regarded as more
intellectually demanding and refined: “Not only do people need to acquire established
knowledge within their respective disciplines (e.g., facts and accounts), they must also
(and perhaps above all) learn to employ their methods, procedures, and ways of thinking
and inquiring” (Levesque 2009, 8).
As I will, for example, show in the analysis of textbooks, textbooks enact this
distinction by stressing the scientific basis of history as a discipline. Disciplinary ways of
knowing the past are, accordingly, opposed to assessment of the past that is guided by
feeelings. Scientific assessment is explained to depend on concrete data and source
material, rather than feelings. Similarly, the reminiscences of contemporaries of certain
historical events are identified as “subjective historical sources,” whereas original
documents, especially legal documents, are identified as more important because they are
not subjective (for example, Section 6.4.2.1). In other words, the subjective, affective,
lived dimension is regarded as below the scientific standards both in relation to historians
as cognizing selves and the past reality.
One challenge to teaching disciplinary historical thinking is the lack of agreement
among professional historians and history educators as to what exactly constitutes or
defines disciplinary thinking in the discipline of history, if one considers the diversity of
approaches to studying the past in the discipline. Nevertheless, Levesque (2009) suggests
that, despite these internal disciplinary differences, one can discern peculiar features of the
disciplinary approach to the past. He contends that memory and history offer two different
ways of knowing and approaching the past.
The memory-approach is about unconscious intuitive thinking, accumulation of
information, memorization of facts and master narratives for the purpose of nation-
building and identity orientation. By contrast, the disciplinary approach is about critical
thinking and investigation, application of methods, practices and procedural concepts
(such as evidence, continuity and change, significance, progress and decline, historical
empathy) to the evidence of the past for the purpose of learning how to think as a
historian, how to practice history as a craft (Levesque 2009).3 Levesque is convinced that
teaching students the application of the above-mentioned procedural concepts, which are
fundamental to the discipline of history, should be the goal of school-history education,
3 These particular features of disciplinary thinking can even be regarded as cultural memory of the discipline of history
that is passed on through formal university training where young students learn to embody the exemplary form of doing
history.
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because these concepts provide the structural basis for the disciplinary way of thinking.
The substantive knowledge of history – the content of factual information – becomes
valuable to learn only in relation to this more encompassing, structuring procedural
knowledge.
With this distinction between history and memory in mind, a question may be raised as
to the roles that history and memory play in school-history education. Peter Seixas (2016)
and Stéphane Levesque (2016) propose two interrelated history/memory matrices for
history education, which are loosely based on Jörn Rüsen’s disciplinary matrix, as re-
interpreted by Allan Megill (1994). The conceptual scheme of Seixas (Figure 2) identifies
“blue,” “red,” and “purple” forms of history education. According to him, the “blue” type
of school-history education focuses on competencies in the disciplinary practices of
history, such as source analysis and criticism, construction of historical accounts, and
critical thinking. The disciplinary approach in history education, in effect, understates the
importance of identity building or the use of history for the present (Seixas 2016). The
“red” approach, by contrast, places the emphasis on a well-defined narrative, highlights
events and important actors, and provides more or less unambiguous value orientations
and meanings to be taken from the narrative. Such a form of history education outlines the
origins, victories, defeats, enemies, core beliefs, values, and even important character
traits which permitted the group to flourish or persist. The main purpose in this case is to
strengthen a shared identity of the group, its sense of collective memory. What Seixas
(2016) regards as the more sensible approach is the third possibility of “purple” history
education, which integrates aspects of both “red” and “blue” forms of school-history. It
blends  both  disciplinary  practices  and  memorial  beliefs,  so  that  public  memories  are
subjected to critical historical scrutiny, while the disciplinary approach is simultaneously
accompanied by the memorial input.
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Figure 2 Seixas 2016. © Peter Seixas 2016. Reprinted with permission of the author.
Responding to Seixas’s scheme, Levesque (2016) proposes a revised history/memory
matrix for history education (Figure 3), which places history education at the intersection
of disciplinary history and culture and life practice, but also embeds these in the “white”
zone of the wider historical culture, or the totality of historical discourses which operate in
society and shape its self-understandings and interpretation of the past. The blue zone, for
Levesque, is characterized by historical research, which raises research questions based on
personal and cultural interests and theories, and uses different methods to produce
evidence-based narrative interpretations. The red area defines experiences and memory
practices by which stories are generated for orientation and identity formation, which, in
turn, shape public memories and collective identity. Hence, history education needs to be
contextualized in paying attention to all three influences shaping it and feeding into each
other.
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Figure 3 Levesque 2016. Image in the Public Domain.
Both of these conceptual schemes aim to transcend the dichotomy between an exclusive
focus in school history either on competencies or narrative, “telling the story” or “teaching
historical thinking.” Levesque’s scheme is, however, more nuanced in at least two regards.
Firstly, it emphasizes the interplay between historical culture, practice of disciplinary
history, experiences, public memory, and school history. Secondly, it offers a broader
understanding of “culture and life practice,” which not only includes collective identity
and public commemorative practices (foundational and static cultural memory), but also
experiences and memory practices of individual persons. Although Levesque himself
never explicitly discusses it, this is an important shift. It allows for potentially overcoming
the tendency to conceive of the relation to the past in fixed, static, and disembodied terms
– either as a distanced, mentalistic, universalizing pursuit of knowledge (disciplinary
history), or as public commemoration of the canonized past (cultural memory), and to
broaden it to encompass engagement with embodied lived experience. It also potentially
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allows questioning whether it is justifiable to regard memory as untruthful in principle,
because it is changing and cannot be detached from the experiencing self.
What the above two schemes by Seixas and Levesque share, however, is the distinction
between history and memory. The discipline of history is conceptualized as a third-person,
objectifying, evidence-based narrative representation generated by applying historical
method  in  pursuit  of  a  theory-  and  interest-guided  question.  It  is  a  scientific/scholarly
pursuit of knowledge about the past. Memory, on the other hand, is relegated to a separate
domain, characterized by a subjective relation to the past (in a static and mentalistic
sense), and practical orientation and identity needs. History is supposed to rise above the
fleeting personal impressions and this way come closer to the faithful reconstruction of
what happened, whereas memory is an internal and hence likely distorted interpretation of
the external reality rendered into a myth at the group level. The dualism between history
and memory is a pervasive and deep-rooted distinction, which shapes discussions about
how one should approach and “see” the past.
My understanding is that the sharp distinction between history and memory stems from
an emphasis on reductive analysis of these two ways of engaging the past. If memory and
historical knowledge are metaphorically conceived of as static and mentalistic images of
the past, then this leads to a conception of truth that depends on accuracy between the
static image and reality. On the other hand, the relational and process dimensions of this
past are overlooked. Once we conceptually redefine our focus from static objects to
dynamic processes and relations, we can begin to think of memory and varied, even
clashing memories, not as an impediment to truth, but as a productive challenge, inviting
us to try to integrate them into a more encompassing explanation. Such an explanation
inevitably would have to preserve some of the critical methodology of historical research,
in order to tackle omissions and identify distortions. Memory can and does distort, but the
point, in terms of a dynamic and synthetic focus on processes and relations, is how
memories and experiences may potentially convey a history of interactions with the
environment (e.g., Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Capra 2003). In other words,
memories and experiences can be valuable resources when comprehending past life.
Therefore, the critical, reductive way of knowing would have to be integrated with a
synthetic approach that emphasizes how lived experiences are interrelated and how a
particular pattern of interpretation reflects a history of interactions with one’s social and
material environment. Therefore, I believe that history education, being at the intersection
of disciplinary history and memory, is a fertile ground for a more nuanced conception of
truth of the past to emerge, if we pay closer attention to the role of metaphors in abstract
theoretical conceptualization and redefine our focus to include not just an emphasis on
static objects, but likewise relations and processes.
It  is  in  a  similar  vein  that  David  Middleton  and  Steven  Brown  elucidate  the  relation
between memory and experience, when they describe memory as “the centre of lived
experience – not as the storehouse of that experience, but, instead, as a relational process
at the intersection of different durations of living” (2005, viii) and as “the site at which the
singularity and collectivity of experience intersect” (2005, 15). The self, for Middleton
and Brown, in this regard, is “a movement that is continuously refracted back through the
stabilities it creates” and “the shifting intersection of experiences of which our present
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consciousness is only the leading edge” (2005, viii). The self is thus a process;
paraphrasing Thompson (2015), the self is continuously enacted in mutually co-arising
circumstances in which the relation between the past and the present is negotiated and
redefined as the self engages with others and the world. Edward Casey (1987), similarly,
defines the memory of lived experience as something, which is enacted in our living,
embodied engagement with other people, with objects and the places in which we dwell.
Lived experience as embodied memory is inseparable from bodies, practices, and places as
relational aspects of remembering. It is not just a mentalistic “fabrication,” a
representation of the past willfully constructed in a permanent, static form. The past as
lived experience is a “verb” rather than a “noun”: Lived experience is embodied in the
ways of being, relating to others, world, and self. Reflective imaginative remembering,
which seeks to make sense of past experience, is what enables one to arrive to a form of
more general knowledge, and yet the latter needs to be constantly reconsidered in light of
ongoing experience. Abstracted, generalized knowledge cannot be detached from the
process of life and the change that the ongoing experience elicits. Knowing the past entails
an amalgamation of critical, comparative analysis and empathic, imaginative engagement
with a process of lived experience. These points might not seem clear or persuasive just
yet, but I will elaborate on the embodied, experiential way of making sense of the past and
how it can be combined with a critical, detached way of seeing in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
I will show in Chapter 3 that the sharp distinction between history and memory rests
on the ocularcentric metaphors at the root of the Western philosophical tradition. The
impact of these metaphors is the ensuing disregard of embodied lived experience in
epistemology, which means that knowledge of the past is understood as essences and/or
images, contained in a disembodied mind and removed from past reality. In turn, these
images can only be shown to be truthful by virtue of corresponding to the past reality “out
there.” I will argue that ocularcentrism introduces into the Western philosophical tradition
the mimetic distinction between an image and reality, language and the world, paving the
way for an ocular theory of truth, which prioritizes reductive ways of knowing.
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework
The distinction between memory and history highlights two ways of knowing and
approaching the past, two ways of seeing the past and engaging with it. In this chapter, I
seek  to  demonstrate  how this  differentiation  of  the  ways  of  seeing  the  past  has  emerged
and how it has shaped, via different metaphorical models of vision and of an observer, the
ontological and epistemological orientations towards the past. KNOWING IS SEEING is  a
well-entrenched conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Table 4.1, 53), so deeply
embedded in our thought about knowledge that it is often invisible to ourselves. It is
notable that commentators, such as Levesque (2009), appraise the disciplinary approach in
teaching  history  at  school,  but  do  not  consider  the  need  to  examine  the  ontological  and
epistemological assumptions implicit in the disciplinary historical thinking and its
procedural concepts – the ways of seeing and knowing the past, and the metaphorical
models which shape the latter.
It is useful to examine the underlying, implicit metaphors because they can reveal the
ways in which our thinking and actions are organized. According to philosopher Alva Noë
(2015), art and philosophy belong to the same genus of human activities, because both of
them display, make manifest, the ways in which human beings are organized. Philosophy
makes manifest the ways in which ideas organize us. Art makes manifest the ways in
which engagement with the world organizes us: “They are practices – methods of research
– aiming at illuminating the ways we find ourselves organized and so, also, the ways we
might reorganize ourselves” (17). For example, picture making presupposes the use of
certain crafts, tools, and technologies. A pattern in a picture can embody a process of
human experience that is linked to these crafts, tools, and technologies, to particular ways
of being, thinking, and feeling. The technologies may become so habitual that we do not
notice them anymore. Yet, they guide and shape our approach to picture making; they
organize our thinking and practices: “technologies are organized ways of doing things”
(Noë 2015, 25). Art and philosophy can enable one to investigate these modes of our
organization, of how we are embedded in different modes of organization, and, eventually,
give us the opportunity to reorganize ourselves.4 Metaphors, or metaphorical models, in
my view, are akin to organizing technologies: they shape our thinking and acting, our
ways of seeing and making sense of the world and ourselves. When we examine a pattern
of conceptualization, we can identify in it the use of particular organizing metaphors.
Metaphors, which people both unconsciously and consciously use to make sense of
their experience, organize and shape what they are able to see. As a result, we should pay
attention to, usually implicit, ways of seeing, knowing and the metaphorical models of
vision that guide these. Seeing can be conceived of in many different ways. Important in
this respect is how we form concepts, categories; how we understand and make sense is
grounded in our seeing and being in the world and is shaped by bodily experience (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Nuñez 2000; Johnson 2007).
4 In this sense, painting, for example, displays what it means to see; picture makers put picture making and vision itself
on display, and, by doing so, may enable us to become aware of the ways of seeing we have been taking for granted and
reorganize those ways of seeing (Noë 2015, 45).
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I  will  gradually  elaborate  my  theoretical  argument  in  subsequent  sections  of  this
chapter. I will show that, if one does not examine these metaphorical models of vision
implicitly embedded in how we approach and make sense of the past, one cannot notice
that the division between objectivity and subjectivity needs to be reconsidered. Indeed,
such a division is based on a disembodied epistemology, at odds with the most recent
findings of embodied cognitive science.
3.1 Hans Jonas’ discussion of ocularcentrism
Departing from the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, it is, firstly, necessary to reflect on the
sense  of  sight  itself.  Before  there  are  models  of  vision  and  of  an  observer,  there  is  a
particular experience of sight, which contributes to our ways of thinking about knowledge
and  cognition.  In  this  section,  I  discuss  the  distancing  and  static  effects  of  sight,  as
characterized in biologically inspired philosophy of Hans Jonas, and illustrate how
particular ocular metaphors form the basis of the epistemic virtue of objectivity.
Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) reflects on vision in his classic phenomenological study of
mind by pointing out three aspects of the experience of sight: its simultaneity, stasis, and
distancing effect. Sight, he asserts, is a sense of the simultaneous, enabling the
comprehension of many things at the same time with just one glance (Jonas 1982, 136).
When people open their eyes, they can see multiple co-existent things in an instant. Sight
is therefore less temporal than touch or hearing, which tend to construct perception on the
basis of a temporal sequence of sensations (Jonas 1982, 136–138, 140–141). Touch and
hearing are experienced temporally, where succeeding data are bound together into one
temporal unity of experience with the help of memory. Touch and hearing are dynamic
events accentuating change and movement. By contrast, even just a glance allows us to
collect manifold, co-existent data related in their mutual proportion, accentuating the
present state as more than just the passing experience of now:
The present, instead of being a pointlike experience, becomes a dimension within which
things can be beheld at once and can be related to each other by the wandering glance of
attention. This scanning, though proceeding in time, articulates only what was present to
the first glance and what stays unchanged while being scanned. The time taken in taking-in
the view is not experienced as the passing away of contents before new ones in the flux of
event, but as a lasting of the same, an identity which is the extension of the instantaneous
now and therefore unmoved, continued present – so long as no change occurs in the objects
themselves. (Jonas 1982, 144)
“The simultaneity of sight, with its extended ‘present’ of enduring objects, allows the
distinction between change and the unchanging and therefore between becoming and
being” (Jonas 1982, 144–145). Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) would point out in this
regard that the source domain of a particular experience of sight is metaphorically
transposed to form an abstract ontological concept of being and the eternal. Jonas argues
that, because of the elevation of sight in Greek thought, Greek philosophy could conceive
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of the distinction between dynamic becoming and static being, between the temporal and
the eternal. “The very contrast between eternity and temporality rests upon an idealization
of ‘present’ experienced visually as the holder of stable contents as against the fleeting
succession of nonvisual sensation” (Jonas 1982, 145).
Moreover, sight does not require active engagement with the seen object, whereas in
hearing and, in particular, touch there is a dynamic interaction (Jonas 1982, 145–146). The
sense  of  sight  neutralizes  the  dynamic  content.  It  allows  the  capture  of  an  image  that  is
detached from the object of sight, the capture of a “form” that is detached, abstracted from
its “matter,” or an “essence” that is isolated from its “existence.”5 To put it  another way,
ocularcentrism permits one to conceive of a distinction and a gap between an object and
its representation, between reality and knowledge. Restating Jonas’ argument, it could be
argued that ocularcentrism enables the principle of mimesis, understood as imitation or
representation. The abstract concept of mimesis and representational theory of mind derive
from a metaphorical conceptualization on the basis of a concrete bodily experience of
sight. Paradoxically, the qualities of the experience of sight hide the very bodily process,
which gives rise to this experience (Johnson 2007).
The notion of mimesis, originating in Greek antiquity, was primarily discussed by
Plato in relation to art and aesthetics, since art was assumed to imitate or represent reality.
The visual, ocularcentric significance of the mimetic principle is not accidental: Plato used
the term “mimesis” primarily in the visual sense, invoking a visual image being imitated
or represented (Melberg 1995, 10). Vernant contends that Plato’s theoretical knowledge of
pure forms is “the elaboration of the category of the image in Western thinking” (Vernant
in Melberg 1995, 23). Plato’s “way of seeing” rendered him critical of art: Because it
imitated only the mundane, fleeting appearances, art, therefore, created mere imitations or
copies of illusory sensations and could not offer any reliable knowledge. Artistic creation,
for Plato, was completely removed from reality and cognition (Rockmore 2013, 21). In
Plato’s theory of knowledge, only the ideal, eternal, unchanging forms were true by virtue
of their correspondence to reality. They are true for Plato precisely because they are
detached from any concrete experiential quality and corporeality, wherein the latter are
regarded as changing and, thus, unreal. As Rockmore (2013) explains,
Plato is at pains to show that imitation always fails for three related reasons as concerns the
perspectival nature of appearance, the fact that imitation imitates appearance only but not
reality, and the further claim that imitation is deceptive in presenting mere appearance as
reality. The claim that imitation is always perspectival suggests that the forms appear to
one who imitates from different perspectives, as if there were different things when there is
in fact only one. (30)
In other words, multiperspectivity equals falsehood. The artists only imitate because they
cannot “see” the invisible, unchanging forms. To know the real means to grasp the fixed,
stable essence and not merely to imitate appearances (Rockmore 2013). Hence, the
5 The form-matter distinction of Greek metaphysics serves as the basis for Saussurean linguistics, its first principle being
the arbitrariness of the binary sign. This holds important implications considering that Saussure’s work influenced much
of structuralist and post-structuralist thought. I am indebted to Lisa Muszynski for this insight.
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particular metaphorical conceptual distinction between the eternal and the ephemeral leads
to an array of logical inferences.
It  needs  to  be  emphasized  that  the  mimetic  distinction  between  reality  and
representation, world and image, on the one hand, forms the basis for the correspondence
theory of truth, where truth is defined in terms of correspondence between an object and
its representation, between a pre-given, fixedworld and its image. On the other hand, as I
argue in Section 3.4, even when the notion of mimesis as sameness or correspondence is
criticized in the 20th century by deconstructionist and poststructuralist thinkers, the
mimetic gap between a representation and reality remains in place. Whereas, in
deconstruction and poststructuralism, mimesis as sameness and identity is merely replaced
by mimesis as difference and alterity. The disembodied, static dualism between world and
word, reality and representation endures after the linguistic turn.
According to Jonas (1982, 147), the simultaneity, stasis, and distancing evoked by the
sense of sight permitted the Greeks to differentiate between disinterested, neutral
contemplation of “the thing as it is in itself” (Being/eternal) and “the thing as it affects
me” (Becoming/temporal). This distinction is illustrated in Figure 4. Contemplation with
the “eye of the soul” provided the neutral knowledge of eternal, clear, ideal forms, i.e. the
theoretical knowledge of pure forms underlying individual appearances. On the other
hand, sensing with the eyes of the body offered merely fleeting temporal sensations, which
needed to be contemplated, beheld, and looked at attentively in order to attain the eternal
theoretical truth. Sensory experience provided merely individual, subjective
“perspectives,” which were not real because they were multiple, changing and could not
be conveyed in abstracted, pure form. The ultimate reality was only knowable in the
intellectual realm, through the mind, distanced from the body, which only deceived the
soul  (Rockmore  2013,  41).  Theoretical  contemplation  offered  eternal,  disinterested  truth
of the thing as it is. This distinction between knowledge of “the thing as it is in itself” and
knowledge of “the thing as it affects me” paved the way for the development of the idea of
objectivity (Jonas 1982, 147).
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Figure 4 Sight in Greek thought
To conclude, Jonas presents an argument that the modern idea of objectivity can be
derived from ocularcentrism, or the dominant position of sight in Greek thought, art, and
religion. The simultaneity, stasis, and distancing effected by the experience of sight
enabled the Greeks to conceive of the distinction between the disinterested, objective
knowledge of “the thing as it is in itself” and the subjective “thing as it affects me.”
Concrete bodily experience shaped abstract conceptualization. Contemplation with the eye
of the soul gave access to the knowledge of the underlying pure, ideal forms that were real
because they were unchanging, irreducible, and untainted by the impermanent sensations
offered by the bodily eyes. Knowledge came to be conceived as essences detached from
existence, forms detached from matter: as incorporeal, detemporalized, static essences.
Embodied, dynamic, temporal, and interactive experience is excluded from this type of
knowledge. Crucially, objective knowledge, conceived in ocularcentric terms, relies on the
principle  of  mimesis  as  sameness.  Truth  is  sameness  between  an  object  and  its
representation; it is representational verisimilitude between an ideal form and its thing-like
copy.
As I  will  show in the following section, ocularcentric visual metaphors,  invoking this
principle  of  “mimesis  as  sameness”  inform  the  notions  of  objectivity,  truth,  and
knowledge in the Western tradition of philosophy. These visual metaphors shape not only
the understanding of what it means to know, how one is to know or what knowledge is,
but they likewise imply a certain model of the cognizing self.
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3.2 Ocularcentric visual metaphors in models of cognition
In this section, I will examine several visual metaphors, which are used to express what it
means to know objectively, or to see objectively. Objectivity, as an epistemic virtue, is
particularly  apt  for  shaping  scholarly  ways  of  seeing.  The  reason  why  it  is  necessary  to
examine the scholarly ways of seeing of historians is that professional historiography
constitutes a significant source for school textbook authors. Textbook authors use
historians’ conceptualizations, models and metaphors, making them part of textbook
knowledge. In this sense, history textbooks implicitly or explicitly prescribe certain
metaphorically structured ways of seeing the past. This is because historians not only
shape the ways of seeing by which they are, in turn, themselves modified, but they also
shape how the readers of their historiographical accounts see themselves and their pasts.
One of the key metaphors for reflecting on how we see the past is the visual concept of
perspective, for it highlights the relation between the knower and knowledge, between the
seer and the seen. Perspective, as a cognitive metaphor, is particularly deeply embedded in
the Western intellectual tradition (Ginzburg 2000, 29; cf. Jay 1993). In fact, we certainly
notice upon inspection that the vocabulary of cognition in English is saturated with visual
and, in particular, perspectival metaphors. We “acquire insights,” “observe,” “reflect,”
“inspect” (from Latin specere, to look at); we adopt “standpoints” and “points of view”;
we “draw parallels”; we “approach,” “sketch,” and “project” (Elkins 1994, 29). Visual
metaphors structure our thought about cognition and knowledge, the relation between the
knower and the known, between reality and representation.
Perspective is a highly elusive concept. It encompasses a broad array of different fields
and disciplines. As such, it is ridden with contradictions and discordant associations. It is
not my intention to offer an overview of the long and multilayered history of perspective. I
employ  it,  however,  as  a  conceptual  tool  to  help  me  think  about  ways  of  seeing  in  the
discipline of history. Perspective is typically defined as the technical innovation in the
Renaissance art that allowed the rendering of three-dimensional space onto the two
dimensions of the flat canvas.6 Based on geometry and mathematical calculations,
Renaissance perspective enabled artists to show depth by converging all lines on a central,
fixed point in the distance. The Latin word perspective derives from perspicere, which
means “to see clearly, to examine, to ascertain, to see through” (Jay 1993, 53).
There are two major contradictions inherent to the concept of perspective. Firstly, it
bears an internal dissonance because it encompasses both geometric and literary
discourses.  As  a  branch  of  mathematics,  Euclidean  and  Cartesian  geometry,  it  is  formal
and precise. But it is also deeply prevalent in philosophical thought, literary, and political
texts as a cognitive metaphor that describes the vantage point from which we see the
world. In this metaphorical sense, the concept of perspective continues to shape ways of
seeing and knowing. Elkins (1994, 19) contends that it was G. W. von Leibniz, who first
6 Rebekah Modrak (2011) suggests that Renaissance artists newly privileged rather than invented the linear perspective.
The principles of perspective were known to earlier cultures, such as in Egypt or China, which, however, refused to
apply them. David Hockney explains that the Chinese rejected the use of linear perspective because it evoked a fixed,
static, and, as such, dead, viewer (as opposed to living, embodied viewer) (Gayford 2011).
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used the concept of perspective in a metaphorical sense, referring to the imperfect points
of view of the individual monads and metaphorically comparing them to the perspective
views of a town. In this respect, perspective is a pervasive concept that highlights the
subjectivity of our sight, of how we constitute ourselves as the viewing subject.
For example, Carlo Ginzburg (2000, 26–27) provides convincing evidence to assume
that Machiavelli’s concern for “the truth of the thing as it is” was inspired, or at least
reinforced, by Leonardo da Vinci’s use of perspective in his approach to depicting reality.
Perspective employed by Leonardo in his landscape sketches taught Machiavelli that
“different points of view lead to different representations of political reality,” that “none of
these representations […] can be considered as more truthful than the other”; and, hence,
“the only way to achieve objectivity is to be […] a distant observer: an outsider”
(Ginzburg 2000, 27). This is a case of how a concrete metaphorical conceptualization,
based on experience of engagement with art, led to specific philosophical conclusions.
Since Machiavelli’s model of reality was based on the idea of conflict and the
assumption that human nature was inevitably conflictual, this implied that the
representations of reality must also be necessarily conflictual. In order to acquire the
knowledge of reality as it is, one needed to become a detached observer because
individual points of view could not be reconciled into a single objective view of the world.
Machiavelli’s metaphorical model taken from perspectival vision is based on the
metaphysical juxtaposition of the objective truth, which is detached, fixed, singular,
disembodied, and a multitude of subjective individual points of view, which do not rise
above mere impure appearances.
Figure 5 Canaletto, Campo di SS. Giovanni e Paola, c. 1735. An example of a linear
perspective. Image in the Public Domain.
The Leibnizian appropriation of perspectival metaphors, by contrast, permitted the
reconciliation and harmonious coexistence of multiple viewpoints in the similarly
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disembodied and detached idea of one Great World, or God (Ginzburg 2000, 29). The
plurality of perspectives and their individual inadequacies were merely a faulty apparition
rather than the ultimate reality, but they could be overcome when each was seen as part of
one Great World. What is, however, shared by both Machiavelli and Leibniz is the
distinction between “the thing as it is” and “the thing as it affects me,” between the
disinterested and the subjective. This distinction being lodged at the core of their ontology
leads to the assumption that individual points of view are irrelevant,  faulty,  and compels
them to seek an objective view, which omits the role of embodiment in cognition.
On the other hand, the difference between Machiavelli and Leibniz consists in the
difference between realism and idealism. Realism, predicated on Greek metaphysics, has
been construed as a detached, static, disembodied vision that defies reciprocity and
objectifies what is seen. In this understanding, it is based on the ocular correspondence
theory of truth that assumes the truth to be dependent on the congruence between a mental
image/representation and the world. Idealism, by contrast, claims a timeless, universal,
spiritual  truth  that  exists  beyond human history  as  some kind  of  ideal  essence.  Both  are
founded on the idea of the disembodied viewing subject.
To return to the visual metaphor of perspective, the second discordance in the concept
of perspective is that, whereas metaphorically it is frequently assumed to connote
subjectivity of sight, the linear, single-point perspective in visual arts is thought to evoke a
detached, remote, self-effaced, objective sight. The linear, single-point perspective with a
vanishing point in the horizon enhances the effect of externality of sight. This technical
development of the Renaissance art leaves the observer fixed, static at a distance from the
object of her gaze. Reciprocity between the viewer and the viewed is eliminated. The
observer does not need to directly engage with the object, which is viewed at a distance
from a single vantage point.7
The viewpoint of perspectival vision implied “a monocular, unblinking fixed eye (or
more precisely, abstract point), rather than the two active, stereoscopic eyes of embodied
actual vision” (Jay 1993, 54–55). The vision of the living body was replaced by an eternal,
static, disembodied eye that saw the object “as it really is.” It is not surprising then that the
linear perspective was elevated by philosophies that valued rational thought, which
exemplified this kind of detached contemplation.
7 Picture making, thus, reveals the ways in which our vision is organized by implicit metaphorical conceptualization. The
application of linear perspective signified a break with medieval representational practices. If in the medieval art, a scene
could be portrayed from multiple vantage points, in the Renaissance it was meant to be painted from a single vantage
point (Jay 1993, 54). “What had previously been a confusing jumble of receding lines fell into place and became fixed at
one point on the horizon.[…] Linear perspective supplied a fixed relationship between viewer and world” (Modrak 2011,
18, 21). John Berger makes a pertinent point about the implications of this change in representational practices: “The
convention of perspective, which is unique to European art and which was first established in the early Renaissance,
centers everything on the eye of the beholder. It is like a beam from a lighthouse – only instead of light travelling
outwards, appearances travel in. The conventions called those appearances reality. Perspective makes the single eye the
centre of the visible world. Everything converges on to the eye as to the vanishing point of infinity. The visible world is
arranged for the spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God.” (Berger 1972, 16)
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Figure 6 Camera Obscura. Image in the Public Domain.
The new regime of relations between observer and the world was also made evident in the
15th-century Renaissance invention of the camera obscura, an optical device that consists
of a dark room or a box with a hole on one side. When light passes through the hole into a
dark, enclosed interior, an inverted image appears on the wall opposite the hole. Crary
(1990, 38–40) provides two reasons why the appearance of the camera obscura indicated
a new model of subjectivity, of the cognizing self. Firstly, it defined “an observer as
isolated, enclosed, and autonomous within its dark confines.” It implied an observer’s
withdrawal from the world in order to clarify one’s relation to the external world.
Secondly, it separated the act of seeing from the physical body of the observed; it
decorporealized vision. Additionally, unlike a perspectival construction, the camera
obscura mechanism did not restrict the site or area from which the image is presented in a
most coherent way and, thus, prevented “the observer from seeing his or her position as
part of the representation” (Crary 1990, 41). It only amplified the effect of a disembodied,
detached, objectively ordered representation enabled by the monocular, fixed eye of the
mind.
The metaphor of the mind’s eye turned out to be persistent in the Western intellectual
tradition. Richard Rorty (1979, 49–50) notes, for example, how both Descartes and Locke,
each standing for epistemologies of rationalism and empiricism, conceived of “the human
mind as an inner space in which both pains and clear and distinct ideas passed in review
before  an  Inner  Eye.”  This  was  the  novelty  of  Descartes,  according  to  Rorty  (1979,  50):
“the notion of a single inner space in which bodily and perceptual sensations,
mathematical truths, moral rules, the idea of God, moods of depression, and all the rest of
what we now call “mental” were objects of quasi-observation.” Rorty (1979, 38)
comments that the metaphor of the Eye of the Mind became the model for the better,
higher kind of cognitive powers, which give access to the knowledge of the purest,
universal things and which, thus, distinguish men from beasts. Mind, as an internalized
essence of a human being, was the source of universal knowledge.
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What this implied was that the description of the world could be objective, only if it
was made from a point outside the world. The separation between an interiorized,
disembodied subject and an external world became a precondition of objective knowledge
about the world. The mind was conceived by the rationalist Descartes as an enclosed
space,  separate  from the  body and  the  external  world,  much like  the camera obscura: “I
will  now shut my eyes,  stop my ears,  and withdraw my senses.  I  will  eliminate from my
thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I will regard
all such images as vacuous, false and worthless.” (Descartes [1641] 1984, 24).
For René Descartes, the eye of the intellect was prior to sense experience provided by
the  eyes  of  the  body.  It  was  the  mind,  not  the  eyes,  that  really  sees.  He  alluded  to  the
evidence of perspectival art to make his point: mind, like the perspectival construction of
reality on the picture plane, “produces the experience of correct vision by devices that
eschew perfect resemblance”; mind seeks after clear and distinct representations of the
external  world  that  are  not  perfect  reproductions  of  this  external  reality,  that  are
representations rather than perfect similitudes (Jay 1993, 76). The rationalized mental
representations are the knowledge of true reality, while vision of the bodily eyes can be
deceptive. Also, mind could be stimulated by words and signs that “do not in any way
resemble the things which they signify” (Descartes 2001, 89–90).
Although Martin Jay considers this hint of a shift in Descartes8 from perfect
similitudes  to  imperfect  representations  of  the  external  world  in  the  mind  to  be  an  early
sign of an emerging non-visual, linguistically oriented epistemology, I tend to disagree
with him. As indicated in section 3.1, Hans Jonas shows that the dichotomy between an
image and the object of sight, between representation and reality arises from the
ocularcentrism of ancient Greek philosophy. Neutralization of the dynamic content in
sight enables one to conceive the possibility of capturing an image that is detached from
the object of sight, a form detached from contents, essence from existence. Linguistically
oriented epistemology, which refutes perfect resemblance, is therefore still dependent on
the ocular metaphor and the distancing, static effect of sight, which neutralize the dynamic
content  in  the  act  of  seeing  and  allow  for  the  separation  between  reality  and  its
representations, world and a mental image of the world. There is a continuity of
metaphorical conceptualization, based on visual-optical distinction between the world and
the image, whether the image of the external world is a perfect resemblance or imperfect
representation.
As opposed to Descartes’s deductive primacy of the mind, the empiricist advocates of
the scientific method prized intersubjective visual witnessing as a source of knowledge
and held faith in the primacy of sensory experience (Jay 1993, 64). However, as indicated
above, Lockean empiricism and Cartesian rationalism shared the ocular metaphor of the
Inner  Eye,  or  the  eye  of  the  mind.  For  empiricists,  such  as  Locke, real essences can  be
known only by close empirical observation. The deductive theoretical vision was held to
be suspicious, prone to subjective speculation, unable to give access to the knowledge of
8 Jay (1993, 80) adds that despite this allusion to signs and words, Descartes remained a firm ontological realist
subscribing to a correspondence theory of truth; he also believed that the mind’s natural geometry corresponded to that
of the natural world.
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the  thing  as  it  is.  All  truth  claims  needed  to  be  verified  with  empirical  tests.  The  sense
experience preceded any ideas in the mind. Yet, this empiricist inductive gaze was
similarly decorporealized in that it was modeled upon the ocular-optic metaphors. For
Locke, knowing was possible because the unblinking eye of the Mind observed the images
of the external world imprinted on it (Rorty 1979, 143–144).
Metaphors play an important role in structuring Locke’s view of the mind. M.H.
Abrams characterizes this view as follows:
The mind in Locke’s Essay is said to resemble a mirror which fixes the objects it reflects.
Or […] it is a tabula rasa on which sensations write or paint themselves. Or (employing the
analogy of the camera obscura, in which the light, entering through a small aperture,
throws an image of the external scene on the wall) external and internal senses are said to
be “the windows by which light is let into this dark room. (Abrams 1953, 57)
Hence, the bodily eyes through which the impressions were acquired functioned like the
aperture of the camera obscura, while the mind was understood as the mirror of the
external world or a tablet on which imprints are made. In Locke’s own words:
For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with
only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things
without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly
as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in
reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.” (Locke in Abrams 1953, 57)
The empiricist way of seeing placed the ocular apparatus outside the cognizing self,
allowing for the detachment and noninvolvement of the observer with what is seen. Eyes
registered images as purely passive sensation that mirrored the external world onto the
mind as a white sheet of paper, void of any innate ideas. Mind, conceived as a mirror,
cannot  “refuse,  alter,  or  obliterate  the  images  or  ideas  which  the  objects  set  before  it  do
therein produce” (Locke in Abrams 1953, 345). Rorty is convinced that the metaphor of
mind as mirror bears particular influence in the Western philosophical tradition:
It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine
most of our philosophical convictions. The picture which holds traditional philosophy
captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations – some
accurate, some not – and capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without
the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation
would not have suggested itself. (Rorty 1979, 12)
I would add that both deductive rationalist and inductive empiricist models of vision and
of  the  knowing  self  undermined  the  body  and  distanced  the  embodied  knower  from  the
world.  Although they  prioritized  either  the  monocular  eye  of  the  mind  or  the  eyes  as  an
opening/lens through which the light passes in, they nevertheless both sought out the
knowledge envisioned as a disembodied truth out there in the world or underlying the
subjective appearances, separate from embodied, temporally extended experience of the
subject. The disembodied eye only needed to replicate the world out there, not engage
45
with it. As Norman Bryson (1988, 11) notes, an image of the world, which departs from
fidelity in replication of the world, is viewed exclusively negatively: “the painter has
misperceived the optical truth, or has been unable, through lack of skill, or through excess
of ‘style’, to match optical truth on canvas.” Personal style is a deviation:
The  Essential  Copy,  if  it  were  ever  achieved,  would  possess  no  stylistic  features  [...].[...]
Idiosyncrasies of the palette, habitual deformations of the figures, the characteristic
signature brushwork, these reflexes that spring from the body and from the past history of
the painter are therefore consigned to an underside of the official ideology. [...] Indifferent
to the exalted mission with which the image has been entrusted, style emanates from the
residue of the body which its optical theorization has thought to exclude. (Bryson 1988, 7)
The empiricist vision found its expression in the art movement of Impressionism.
Impressionists replaced the Cartesian, idealized, geometricalized space seen from afar
with the aim to capture the experience of light and color on the retinas of their  eyes (Jay
1993, 154). Therefore, for example, Cézanne could proudly state that “being a painter I
attach myself first of all to visual sensation” (Chipp 1968, 13). The subject of the painting
was not very important for Impressionists. Instead, they sought to paint the experience of
sight itself, the experience of stimulus on the retinas: pure sensation was their topic (Jay
1993, 154).
As indicated in Table 1 below, the visual modes of depiction in art are closely related
to dominant epistemological models of the era (Abrams 1953, 69). It could be argued that
painting, due to its embrace of optics and optical devices, served as a perceptual model for
the knowledge of the world (Gregori in Hockney 2001, 222). As Lapucci takes note, the
ambition to invent
a means to achieve the perfect imitation of nature seems to have been a phenomenon that
developed in Northern Italian culture during the late Renaissance, through the use of three
different types of instruments: perspective instruments, optical systems (they formed
reduced representations of the world in its form of light, chiaroscuro, and colour through
the use of mirrors and lenses), and magic games. (Lapucci in Hockney 2001, 223–224)
Hockney (2001) provides ample evidence on how painters starting from the end of the
15th century were very likely using optical devices to aid in their work, most prominently
the camera obscura.  Pictures  have  ways  of  seeing  and  tools  of  craft  built  into  them
(Hockney 2001). The camera obscura offered a view of nature represented with complete
truth, and it became a metaphorical model of cognition both in art and science. Therefore,
it  makes  sense  that  the  same  metaphorical  models  inform  the  ways  of  seeing  both  in
philosophy and art. Despite the differences between Cartesian rationalism, Lockean
empiricism  and  poststructuralist  linguistic  epistemology,  what  these  different  ways  of
knowing share is the ocularcentric metaphors which inform their conceptualization of
knowledge, truth, cognition. These visual metaphors enable a certain understanding of
what a cognizing subject is, what constitutes knowing, and how the cognizing subject can
know, by way of what dispositions, rules, attitudes towards the world and the self. In
perspectival, geometricalized construction, rationalized mental representations, as pure
essences, constitute the real, objective knowledge, echoing a Platonic distinction between
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pure forms and impermanent sense experience (see the left-hand column of Table 1).
Knowledge is a theoretically deduced mental abstraction achieved by taking distance from
temporal, embodied experience of the cognizing self. This theoretical, abstract knowledge
corresponds to the external world and is, hence, truthful.
Impressionism captures what amounts to an epistemological departure from the
Cartesian theoretical deduction. The latter is mistrusted and instead pure sensation
acquired by empirical observation is prized as the source of reliable knowledge. An
inductive gaze reconceives the importance of bodily eyes, but in isolation from the rest of
the body: empiricist eyes are like an opening or the lens of an optical device, through
which images of the external world pass into the mind (see the middle column of Table 1).
Lastly, the shift to 20th-century abstract art coincides with the emergence of linguistic
theories,  which  refute  an  empiricist  mimesis  of  the  world  (see  the  right-hand  column  of
Table 1). It is argued that the correspondence truth of representations of the world cannot
be ascertained and, therefore, all representations are arbitrary, subjective, fleeting
appearances. Yet, in all these three broad epistemological inclinations, the argumentation
relies on the ocularcentric tradition by way of static, disembodied metaphorical models
and their neglect of the dynamic body of the viewer in the act of seeing.
Table 1.
Perspectival
construction
Perspective,
camera obscura
Impressionism
Camera obscura,
mirror
Abstractionism
Descartes,
rationalism
Locke,
Enlightenment,
Empiricism
Structuralism and post-structuralism
Rationalized
mental
representations as
pure essences, pure
forms
Mimetic images,
imprints,
reproductions, facts by
way of pure sensation,
pure data
Representations, images, and words
are arbitrary, subjective appearances, not
related to the external world; no
underlying transcendental truth; abstract
form appreciated by itself with no
grounding in the viewing subject or
environment
Passive,
detached reflection,
theoretical
deduction
Passive
observation,
registration
Theoretical
deduction mistrusted: a
shift to empiricism
Return to the mind; empiricist
mimesis mistrusted, a shift to linguistic
theories;
Still a disembodied ocularcentric
framework
Thus, ways of seeing the world matter, in that ways of seeing are closely linked to ways of
knowing and depicting the world. This relation between ways of seeing, knowing and
depicting produces a way to be in the world.  It  results in a particular concept of the self
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and its relation to the world, which, conversely, shapes our ways of seeing, knowing, and
depicting. At first, this seems quite self-evident, yet the implication of this relationship is
important. It means that the self cannot be metaphorically conceptualized as a thing; it is
not something you can place in front of yourself, possess or own in the material sense. Nor
is it some kind of spiritual essence existing beyond space and time. The self does not exist
outside ourselves: it is necessarily embodied. Ways of seeing, knowing, and depicting
shape the self. However, one can also choose to see, to know, and to depict the world in
alternative ways, in effect changing the self. That is what artists seek after when they
question the taken for granted ways to see and depict the world and strive to reconceive
what it is to see or how one is to see. As Noë (2015) contends, art affords us opportunities
to explore how we engage with the world: painters can put the activity of picture making,
or vision itself, up for exploration. Paintings do not just represent the world; paintings put
on display how and what we see, what it means to depict, what and how we seek to depict
or express. Noë, thus, argues that “painting as an art, like poetry and fiction, is in the
business of writing us, or writing us again or anew” (2015, 45).
As professional practitioners of their field, historians are also trained in particular ways
of seeing, knowing and depicting, in particular modes of organization of their activities.
This interplay of seeing, knowing and depicting the past implies a way of being a
professional historian – a certain professional self as a regulative ideal for both aspiring
trainees and experienced practitioners in the profession. Noë (2015, 8) argues, for
example, that the critical level at which the emergent process of self is taking place is not
the sub-personal level – the level of neural structures, for example – or the personal level –
the level of deliberate, authoritative decisions and actions, but “the embodiment level.” In
this understanding, historians co-evolve together with the environments in which they are
embedded, and which are partially of their own making.9 It  is  an  emergent,  enactive
process, meaning that the historian’s self and ways of seeing arise through a process of
dynamic interaction between the historian and his or her lived environment (Varela,
Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]).
Not only do historians shape themselves and shape the practices by which they are, in
turn,  themselves modified; historians also shape how the readers of their  accounts of the
past come to view themselves and their respective individual and collective pasts.
Academic historiography produced by historians is used by school textbook authors,
rendering historians’ conceptualizations, models and metaphors part of textbook
knowledge (cf. Repoussi & Tutiaux-Guillon 2010, 157; Jonker 2012). As a result, history
textbooks offer not just facts about the past, but they enable pupils to view the past in
certain ways, to make sense of it in certain ways rather than others; they highlight certain
aspects and hide others. History textbooks may teach pupils to regard the past in an
exclusively detached, fixed, and distancing way in order to render the past knowable in
objective terms, or they may also teach them to make sense of the past as a process of life.
Moreover, as the context in which historians and textbook authors write shifts and
9 See, for example, Section 3.3, where I discuss how Leopold von Ranke and his generation, shaped the discipline of
history and the historical seminar.
48
changes, so do the narratives and interpretations of the past. New experience elicits change
in our relation to the past, as this applies equally to history and memory:
The redrafting of memories of our past experience is always in process, always a
cumulative assemblage of what was recalled at different stages of our lives by successive
versions of the person whose memory was thereby revised, but it is nevertheless around
these relative consistencies, and what we try to hold onto in our ongoing revaluations of
experience, that our sense of ourselves across the particular times in our lives hangs
together and perdures. (Keithley and Pickering 2012, 16)
Hence, history textbooks not only elucidate the “what” and “why” of the past but, in equal
measure, they expand or narrow down the possibilities of seeing the past in certain ways.
History textbooks regulate vision by prescribing certain metaphorically structured ways of
seeing the past without making pupils aware of alternative possibilities in how to attend to,
conceptualize, and explain the past. The way textbooks depict the past can tell much about
their authors and the cultural context in which they are written.
I understand cultural ways of doing things, routinized practices, prescriptive rules and
styles as particular forms of “entanglement” (Hodder 2012) rather than as established,
rigid  “wholes”  that  completely  determine  what  and  how  we  do  what  we  do.  By
entanglements, British archaeologist Ian Hodder (2012) means specific and non-arbitrary
linkages between human experience, things, and abstract ideas. Following Hodder’s
(2012) approach, one can comprehend and appreciate connections between ways of seeing
in Western philosophy and visual art as cross-domain metaphorical associations that
emerge between different fields and practices, as people are tangled up in specific ideas
and build metaphors across domains. In this sense, a tradition can function not just by
imposing homogeneous ways of seeing, but by affording or bestowing metaphorical
associations for specific and varied entanglements of a human being. I believe this applies
to historians, too, whose cognizing selves emerge and are enacted in relation to concrete
entanglements in which they find themselves. Historians’ ways of seeing are the products
of their particular entanglements of lived experience, things, and ideas they encountered,
which leads to a question: What are these particular forms of entanglement? How do they
teach the cognizing self – in this case, the historian – to see and relate to the past?
In what follows, I will examine how the abstract epistemic idea of objectivity as well
as experience shaped the ways of seeing of concrete professional historians. I want to
examine their understandings of what it means to be objective, how one is to approach and
view the past in order to be objective, and what concept of the professional self this
implies. Section 3.3 serves as an illustration of how metaphorical models of cognition can
shape historians’ ways of seeing.
3.3 Objectivity and knowing selves in history
In  this  section,  I  explore  how  historians’  scholarly  work  might  have  been  influenced  by
their personal experiences and life trajectories. Interaction with lived environment and the
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specific “entanglements” that ensue from such interaction shape historians’ vision,
highlighting the importance of lived experience to scholarly work. Lived experience
becomes a source of metaphors, which organize historians’ ways of engaging with the
past. The impact of lived experience on historians’ work can be regarded as one of the
ways in which embodiment manifests in scholarly work, which I will elaborate more on in
Section 3.6.2.
As indicated in the previous section, objective knowledge of the “thing as it is” in the
modern scientific order implied an empiricist vision, where the embodied self of the
knower is eliminated. Theoretical deduction was rendered suspect as a hindrance to the
knowledge of the external world. As a solution to this problem, a detached, disembodied,
self-effacing  way  of  seeing  was  adopted  as  the  role  model  of  scholarly  vision.  An
empiricist  vision,  although it  seems to  rely  on  the  bodily  eyes  rather  than  the  eye  of  the
mind, is, in fact, similarly detached, disembodied, because the eyes that register images of
the external world are metaphorically modeled on the “eyes” of optical devices rather than
on those of living people. The body being excluded, the mechanical eyes can let in images
of the world that both mirror it in the mind and have little to do with the lived experience
of the person, who makes them and who interacts with the world. These images, following
the mimetic principle of truth, are faithful reproductions of the distanced world out there.
Examples  of  such  an  “objective”  gaze  can  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  natural  and
physical sciences, where objectivity has been equated with the perspective of mechanical
photography (e.g., Daston & Galison 2010). The monocular, disincarnated eye of the
camera seems to allow for a perfect reproduction of reality without any creative
intervention of the person taking such a picture.
Photography came to be prized in the second half of the 19th century by many
scientists coming from a wide range of disciplines as enabling the coveted “objective
view” of reality, the representation of reality as it really is (e.g., Daston & Galison 2010;
Tucker 1997, 2005). One could argue that it became the new metaphorical model for
cognition in the long line of optical devices. Mechanical photography (to be distinguished
from aesthetic photography, which was not considered objective in its representation)
seemed to allow scientists to overcome their biggest challenge and fear – the intrusion of
the willful self in the process of investigation (Daston & Galison 2010, 133–135),
considered to be the main enemy of objectivity. The lure to aestheticize, schematize,
simplify, and theorize was to be countered by any means: the aim was to scrupulously
depict the surface of reality rather than deduce the characteristic, the general, the typical.
The photographic image could offer a direct, faithful reproduction of the seen world.10 An
10 As Jay (1993, 128–130) notes, however, photography’s ability to offer verisimilitude and accurate reproduction of
“the real” was not without its critics. By the late 20th century, the realist paradigm and its mimetic claims were mostly
obliterated. But what needs to be highlighted here is that the critique of photography was still focused on the accuracy,
on the resemblance between the image and the real world. The critics of the mimetic claims of photography denounced it
by emphasizing why it was a subjective representation, intruded on by the willful self, rather than because a
photographic image expressed the lived, embodied experience of the relation between self and world. What they sought
to emphasize was how the photographic image only offered appearances, fleeting sensations that prevented access to the
“really real,” the objective truth. They underlined how photographs could be retouched, doctored, altered – fictionalized.
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important feature of the camera was that it could “create a temporality of pure presentness
in which the historical becoming of narrative time was stripped away” (Jay 1993, 134). A
photographic image, as the truthful reproduction of reality, turned knowledge into a
disembodied, eternalized essence, absolute Being, evoking the Greek metaphysics: “In the
illustrated newspapers, the world is turned into a photographable present and the
photographed present is completely eternalized. It seems to be snatched from death; in
reality, it surrenders itself to it” (Kracauer 1993 [1927], 433). Although historical
knowledge as disembodied, detemporalized reproductions of the past are seemingly set in
time, their temporal and experiential quality is overshadowed.
Other techniques, besides photography, could also help the scientist in the quest for
self-effacement, such as wood engravings and tracings, which were also considered
appropriate for objective representation (Daston & Galison 2010, 138). The epistemic
virtue of objectivity demanded that the projections of the self, its preconceptions, theories,
interpretations be controlled and effaced. What must be underlined is that the epistemic
virtue of objectivity simultaneously expressed an ethical norm. It not only guided the
scientists by determining ways of knowing and securing knowledge, but likewise molded
the self of the scientist. The conception of objectivity defined the right way to see and to
depict reality as well as the right way to be a scientist. The new scientist self, compatible
with the ethics of objectivity,  had to practice self-restraint  from temptations to intervene,
to interpret, to theorize (Daston & Galison 2010, 122). The mechanical objectivity of a
machine was held to be the metaphorical model of scientific virtue: it was patient, tireless,
and selfless.
The discipline of history likewise did not escape the impact of scientific empiricism
with its ethics of scholarly self-effacement and restraint. The first comprehensive manual
of history on these new scientific principles, “Introduction aux Études Historiques,” by
Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, published in 1898 in France, and later
translated into English in 1909, aimed to render history as accurate and scientific as were
the natural sciences. It turned out to be the most influential manual of its kind for aspiring
historians  in  the  decades  to  come,  both  in  Europe  and  in  the  United  States.  It  listed  the
following virtues, necessary for a proper scholar:
The  true  scholar  is  cool,  reserved,  circumspect.  [H]e  never  hurries.  [...]  [H]e  ought  to  be
gifted with prudence, an exceptionally powerful attention and will, and, moreover, to
combine a speculative turn of mind with complete disinterestedness and little taste for
action [...]. (Langlois & Seignobos 1932, 126–127)
In  the  tasks  of  textual  criticism,  investigation  of  sources,  description  and  compilation,  a
historian, above all, needed to practice reserve and perseverance and not permit
involuntary imagination to intrude upon the intellectual work. Imagination needed to be
mastered, conquered, overcome, in order to attain scrupulous evidentiary, factual
accuracy. Langlois and Seignobos (1932, 125–126) refer to inaccuracy as a disease, the
defeat  of  which  requires  historians  to  embrace  and  cultivate  self-restraint  at  all  times  as
part of their professional identity. The self itself becomes the object of mastery, control,
and improvement.
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The virtue of disinterestedness and cool, reserved, controlled pursuit of truth
epitomized the qualities of the ideal historian, thus, imitating the mechanical objectivity of
a tireless, patient, and selfless machine. Peter Novick (1988), depicting the development of
the idea of objectivity among American professional historians, offers the following
definition of historical objectivity as the raison d‘être of the craft in the American context
which is worthy of being quoted at length:
The assumptions on which it rests include a commitment to the reality of the past, and to
truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known,
between fact and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are
seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an interpretation is judged
by  how well  it  accounts  for  the  facts;  if  contradicted  by  the  facts,  it  must  be  abandoned.
Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are “found”, not “made”.
[…] The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or disinterested, judge; it must never
degenerate into that of advocate or, even worse, propagandist. The historian’s conclusions
are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and evenhandedness. As
with the judiciary, these qualities are guarded by the insulation of the historical profession
from social pressure or political influence, and by the individual historian avoiding
partisanship or bias […] [H]istorians, as historians, must purge themselves of external
loyalties: the historian’s primary allegiance is to “the objective historical truth” and to
professional colleagues who share a commitment to cooperative, cumulative efforts to
advance toward that goal. (Novick 1988, 1–2)
It is notable how objectivity implied a sharp separation of the knower and the known as
well as the externality of historical facts. Facts were as images let in through the aperture
of the camera obscura and  reflected  in  the  mind  as  a  mirror.  Holding  onto  this  idea  of
objectivity, American professional historians were convinced that they were following the
path of their hero – the German historian Leopold von Ranke (Iggers 1962; Novick 1988).
Ironically, however, as Novick (1988, 26–31) duly explains, they failed to comprehend
Ranke’s ideas and the ways in which these ideas fit into the German tradition of
historiography. The discipline of history in Germany developed within the idealist
tradition as part of the humanities. It was a gross misjudgment, therefore, to assume that,
when Ranke spoke about the reconstruction of the past “as it really happened,” he
intended to represent history as just another science operating on the basis of empiricism.
To this day, Leopold von Ranke is considered to have fathered the “scientific,”
professionalized  discipline  of  history  in  the  19th  century.  The  quest  for  the  truth  of  the
past by means of source criticism, archival research, and seminar training is attributed to
him as his most important legacy in the discipline of history. Yet, Ranke’s conception of
historical scholarship extends far beyond the well-known dictum to uncover the past “wie
es eigentlich gewesen.” What tends to be overlooked is Ranke’s ties to German idealistic
philosophy, which permeated his theoretical considerations of historical practice (Iggers
1962, 1988; Iggers & von Moltke 1973).
Ranke’s notion of objectivity cannot be appropriately grasped without placing it in the
context of his religious views and an emphasis on the individuality of existence (Iggers &
von Moltke 1973). For Ranke, every individual, every institution, or even a whole culture,
possessed a certain unique individuality, a meaningful unity, and this is precisely what
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constitutes, for him, the main object of historical investigation. The aim of the historical
investigation is to apprehend the general truth through the unique, the individual, and the
particular. He posits that “history recognizes something infinite in every existence: in
every condition, in every being, something eternal, coming from God; and this is its vital
principle. How could anything be without the divine basis of its existence?” (Ranke in
Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 38). The approach of a historian is, then, to grasp the eternal
dwelling in each individuality, to understand its uniqueness by a reconstruction of the past.
The whole endeavor to unravel what happened in the past is dedicated to this higher
purpose of recognizing the act of the human spirit in every existence: “By recognizing
something sublime in the event, the condition, or the person we want to know about, we
acquire a certain esteem for that which has transpired, passed or appeared.” (Ranke in
Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 39). This essence and inner core of existence is the ultimate
truth  the  historian  is  trying  to  attain.  For  Ranke,  the  focus  on  the  empirical  evidence,  as
important as it was, was only a means to cognize the atemporal, divine truth. Ranke
evokes the distinction between the eternal and the temporal, the Platonic knowledge of
pure, ideal forms and the knowledge of fleeting external manifestations of individuality.
Appreciation of the particular individuality also constitutes the leading idea of German
historicism (Historismus) which advocates that each epoch, culture or generation should
be viewed on their own terms, in their specific temporal and cultural context, as ends in
themselves.11 Since there is an inherent positive value in all products of history, the people
of the past and their actions should not be judged from a contemporary perspective. One
finds this point of view strongly expressed by Ranke:
We  judge  the  past  too  often  by  the  present  situation.  […]  This  may  be  the  way  of
proceeding in politics, but it is not truly historical. We, who search for truth, even in error,
who view every existence as permeated with original life, must above all avoid this error.
Where there is  any similar  struggle,  both parties  must  be viewed on their  own ground,  in
their own environment, so to speak, in their own particular inner state. We must understand
them before we judge them. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 41–42)
Furthermore, Ranke argues that when a historian encounters competing perspectives or
disputes, he must rise
to contemplate the essential character of opposing, conflicting elements, and see how
complex  and  entangled  they  are.  It  is  not  up  to  us  to  judge  error  and  truth  as  such.  We
merely observe one figure arising side by side with another figure; life, side by side with
life; effect, side by side with counter effect. Our task is to penetrate them to the bottom of
their existence and to portray them with complete objectivity. (Ranke in Iggers & von
Moltke 1973, 42)
11 In line with this ethical reasoning, Ranke, for example, insisted that historians should refrain from passing moral
judgment on Machiavelli and attempt to understand his writings from the point of view of Machiavelli’s specific
historical situation (Iggers 1988, 66–68). As Iggers (1988, 67) points out, Ranke conceded that there was something
“shocking” in Machiavelli’s “The Prince,” but he still insisted that his teachings should not be conceived as a general
instructive guide for political action, since they were intended specifically for the corrupt condition of Italy at that time.
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He affirms that “[i]t  is  not up to history even to pass judgment in theory on the struggle
which the past teaches it. History knows very well that the struggle will be decided
according to God’s will” (Ranke in Iggers and von Moltke 1973, 43). Objectivity is, thus,
conceived more as an abstention from judgment rather than disinterested neutrality. The
historian should give due attention to the unique existence, the meaningful unity of the
individuality under research. The historian is not in a position to pass judgment, since the
final judgment is, in all circumstances, the prerogative of God. The historian’s objective
approach to the past could at most disclose the existing order of things as intended by God
(Iggers 1997, 26).
Ranke also opposes the objection that the historian cannot separate himself from his
opinions and will judge the past according to his political or religious views. He admits
that the historian may obviously be too devoted to his opinions, but downplays the impact
of such bias on the objectivity of historical knowledge by asserting that
this is not all that matters. We can see the error, but where is there no error? This will not
lead us to deny the realities of the existence. Next to the good we recognize evil, but this is
an evil which is inherent in the situation. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 42)
The  good and  the  evil  are,  then,  qualities  of  the  historical  reality,  of  the  individuality  of
existence itself rather than sense-making produced by the historian. The historian is not
required to pass judgment. The historical reality readily possesses value quality, which can
be objectively recognized by historians, if they immerse themselves in the external
manifestations of the individuality. Even if historians happen to exhibit some present-
minded partiality in their attitude, their judgment will be restricted by the value inherent in
the subject matter.
However, this reveals ambivalence in Ranke’s concept of objectivity. On the one hand,
he firmly asserts that
every epoch is immediate to God, and its worth is not at all based on what derives from it
but rests in its own existence, in its own self. In this way the contemplation of history, that
is to say of individual life in history, acquires its own particular attraction, since now every
epoch must be seen as something valid in itself and appears highly worthy of
consideration. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke, 53)
Yet, he also ambiguously qualifies that
although every epoch has its justification and its worth in and by itself, one still must not
overlook what came forth from it. The historian must therefore, secondly, perceive the
difference between the individual epochs, in order to observe the inner necessity of the
sequence. (Ranke in Iggers and von Moltke 1973, 54)
For instance, Ranke observes that while the oldest epoch of “Asian culture” was the most
flourishing, the consecutive epochs show a pattern of regression, and the invasion of the
Mongols leads to the disappearance of culture in Asia altogether (Ranke in Iggers & von
Moltke 1973, 52). This reveals that Ranke, in fact, does not consistently apply his own
view that each epoch is equally worthy in its own self or is equally “immediate to God.”
54
The same inconsistency between Ranke’s philosophical considerations and historical
practice is observed by Iggers (1983, 82–84), who notes that Ranke distinguishes between
the healthy state and the sick state, wherein he, as the historian, is capable of determining
which characteristics express the healthy developments in congruence with the inherent
spiritual idea of the state, and which ought to be rejected or fought against as alien or
foreign elements. Hence, Ranke’s way of seeing the past was refracted through the lens of
his preference for states and orders, and their “natural” development over time, as opposed
to the revolutionary upheavals, which were deviations from the “natural evolution.”
Ranke’s way of approaching and viewing the past was, unsurprisingly, very much
informed by his own values and beliefs, his own forms of “entanglement” (Hodder 2012).
This rather long recourse to Ranke’s idea of objectivity serves to highlight the
misunderstandings surrounding the image of Ranke as a positivist. It shows that while
Ranke advocated “extinguishing one’s personality” and advised self-restraint from passing
judgment on the past, his idea of objectivity had more to do with a romantic conservative
reaction against the critical philosophy of the Enlightenment than the positivist view from
nowhere (Novick 1988, 26–27). He was primarily concerned to counter the scholars of the
Enlightenment who, in his view, judged the past without paying enough attention to the
unique individuality of the preceding epochs, which needed to be seen as worthy on their
own terms (Novick 1988, 27).
Despite the ambivalences and the conservative leanings in the practical application of
Rankean objectivity, the positivist objectivity is different from Ranke’s declared goal to
see the essence at the core of external manifestations of individuality, to grasp the inner
content of individuality on its own terms. Yet Rankean objectivity is still based on
Platonic disembodied metaphysics, which distinguishes between the eternal and the
changing, the essence and existence, the thing as it is and the thing as it appears.
According to Ranke, historians should immerse themselves in the external manifestations
of individuality, in the empirical evidence, in order to grasp the underlying essence by
intuitive apperception. It is through this intuitive contemplation that historians acquire
insight into the underlying forces or tendencies of spirit operating in history which is,
ultimately, what they seek after by investigating the past.
Notwithstanding all the above qualifications of objectivity, it was common for the 19th
century professional historians to conceive of their historical discourse as standing in
sharp contrast to the preceding “unscientific” literary tradition. Although, as Iggers (1997,
3) points out, the split was not as wide as the proponents of the “scientific” history would
have liked to assume. In fact, the older literary tradition of history shared certain
foundational assumptions with the 19th century “scientific” orientation, which
subsequently lasted well into the 20th century (Iggers 1997). The first of these
assumptions was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which history conveys
the truth of what happened as a mirrored reflection. Secondly, it was presumed that actions
of  people  represent  their  intentions  and  historians  are  in  a  position  to  comprehend these
intentions and build a narrative on their basis. Lastly, narrative, ordered in a chronological
sequence, was privileged as the most proper form of historical writing (Iggers 1997).
Ranke’s heritage – critical source analysis, archival research and the historical seminar
– was adopted by historians throughout Europe and the United States, who were
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convinced that the new methods of historical study would not only render historical
investigation more scientific, but also transform and perfect the character of aspiring
students, or their scientific self (Smith 2000). Smith (2000, 110) illuminates how this new
historian self, molded in the process of professionalization, was inseparable from the
gender- and class-bound self. The historical seminar enabled the performance of
masculine, middle-class values and allowed “the forthright (or “transparent”),
autonomous, and middle-class self to come into being”, as opposed to the 18th century
academies and social salons under the patronage of the aristocracy. The historical seminar
transformed mere gentlemen into professionals: The old hierarchies of status and estate
surrendered to the expertise in methods of inquiry, in turn, enabling the formation of
fraternal brotherhood of professional practitioners (Smith 2000, 111). The seminar
embodied “manly work”: It initiated trainees into a fraternal community of active, hard-
working “men” endowed with specific attributes of professional expertise (Smith 2000,
114–115). Consequently, professional historians adopted a language of scholarly history,
which took pride in its plain style and detailed factuality – as opposed to the amateur
history with its use of rhetorical embellishment and philosophical deduction. Smith taps
into an interesting parallel between the models of masculinity in the 19th century and the
nature of disembodied scholarly vision.12
The gendering of scientific history in the 19th century had much in common with the
approach of investigation in the natural and physical sciences. Science involved the active,
inquiring mind of men observing and manipulating passive matter and it offered a model
to emulate for historians, too. The operations of mind, importantly, were inseparable from
the eyesight, which had to be specifically trained. Smith (2000, 141) notes how in the
early  19th  century  the  eye  was  considered  by  scientists  to  be  distinct  from  all  the  other
parts of the body. It was an instrument, a lens outside the realm of the physical body,
outside the realm of the emotional body. The scientist,  likewise,  had to bypass the body,
dissociate  from  the  body,  as  “standing  outside  oneself”  was  the  only  way  to  reach  the
dispassionate truth (Smith 2000, 141). This logic of disembodied eyesight, a disembodied
way of seeing and of being, likewise served as an ideal for professional historians. The
scholarly mind was supposed to remain calm, lucid, disembodied, distant, in order to
capture the truth, in effect, recapitulating the general ideal of the 19th-century manhood
and repressing femininity in the name of truth (Smith 2000, 141–143).13
12 In  the  pursuit  of  rational  knowledge  of  the  past,  one  of  the  great  fears  of  historians  was  to  fall  into  obsession,  to
develop a fetishism for archival documents to such an extent that it might cloud their judgment in separating truth from
falsehood, i.e. undermine their objectivity (Smith 2000, 121–124). Archival repositories of documents were often
described by historians of the 19th century in sexual metaphors as princesses needing to be saved by chivalrous knights-
historians or as untouched virgins (Smith 2000, 119–125). The disciplinary methods of historical inquiry served the
function to prevent the dangers of delusion. They were the guarantors of truth and objectivity, making for a strange
connection between the language of desire and fetishistic love and the language of objectivity (Smith 2000, 126–127).
13 I do not specifically focus on the gender factor when discussing the school history textbooks in Chapters 6 and 7.
However, following Smith (2000), it is possible to argue that gendering of school historical knowledge is implicitly
present in textbooks to the extent that the disciplinary approach to doing history is introduced in textbooks in accordance
with the logic of disembodied eyesight.
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What Smith’s discussion suggests is that the ideal way of seeing for professional
historians was predicated on a conceptual split between mind and body and the rejection
of an embodied self. This is well illustrated by the French historian Fustel de Coulange,
who famously stated, “It is not I who speak, Gentlemen, but History who speaks through
me” (Monod 1897, 138). Or as Marc Bloch, one of the leaders of the Annales School14, put
it: “[T]o plumb the consciousness of another person, separated from us by the interval of
generations, we must virtually lay aside our own ego, whereas, to say what we think, we
need only remain ourselves” (Bloch 1984, 140–141). Or again, as the British historian
Geoffrey Elton felt the need to reinstate:
[i]t is knowledge of reality, of what did occur, not of something that the student or observer
has  put  together  for  study.  […]  But  that  men  cannot  ever  eliminate  themselves  from the
search for truth is nonsense, and pernicious nonsense at that, because it once again favors
the purely relativist concept of history, the opinion that it is all simply in the historian’s
mind and becomes whatever he likes to make of it. (Elton 2002 [1967], 48, 51)
The ideal historians in pursuit of objectivity had to, therefore, lay aside their self and
simply allow the images of that past reality to be reflected or mirrored in their writing. The
historian’s self was imagined as absent, detached, disembodied.
The disembodied way of seeing recognized the value only in the “real” and the
“factual,” which dictated a particular type of methodology. As Geoffrey Elton laid out in
his instructive The Practice of History:
If [the historian] asserts a sovereignty over his facts he is a traitor to his calling. To say it
once again: those things we discover, analyse, talk about, did actually once happen. The
historian is entitled to think about his discoveries and to find a significance in them which
may well have been invisible at the time. But his doing so does not affect the independent
reality of the event; the historian is not entitled to suppose that he alone, by choosing this
14 The Annales School accounts for some of the most significant historical writing of the 20th century. It takes its name
from the journal “Annales d'histoire économique et sociale,” later “Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations,” that
was founded in 1929 in France by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch. A group of historians that formed around the journal
began  its  work  with  the  aim  to  promote  a  new  kind  of  history.  While  they  started  off  being  on  the  margins  of  the
disciplinary community, after the World War II the Annales group with Lucien Febvre in charge was already firmly
established as the dominant school of academic historians in France (Burke 1990, 31). Initially, the Annales School
sought to replace the old traditional narrative of events with a problem-oriented analytical approach to writing history.
Political, diplomatic and military history were significantly undermined in the research agenda of the Annales historians
who instead were more interested in social history, economic history, and history of “mentalities.” The second
generation of the Annales School, led by Fernand Braudel, advocated the “total history” approach, which entailed focus
on underlying deeper structures and trends as opposed to superficiality of individual events and persons. In line with the
new approach of the Annales School, these historians actively encouraged and practiced research collaboration with
other disciplines, particularly with geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, linguistics,
demography, etc. They borrowed concepts and methodologies from other disciplines for the purposes of historical
research. More recently, the last generation of the Annales School has been influenced by the cultural and linguistic turn
and, as a result, turned its attention to the social history of cultural practices.
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fact and ignoring that, creates history. […] If the independent reality of history is ever to be
apprehended, the real meaning of the surviving material must be elicited from the surface
appearance. (Elton 2002 [1967], 52, 66)
On  the  basis  of  this  emphasis  on  the  externality  of  factual  truth,  special  methodological
procedures were devised to allow historians to extricate the truth of what really happened
from the surface apparitions. The importance of evidence stood above in the historian’s
mind: the historian
opens his mind to the evidence both passively (listening) and actively (asking). The mind
will indeed soon react with questions, but these are the questions suggested by the
evidence, and though different men may find different questions arising from the same
evidence the differences are only to a very limited extent dictated by themselves. (Elton
2002 [1967], 56–57)
According to Elton, the two main principles of method are: 1) a thorough knowledge of all
(available) sources, and 2) the competent criticism of them. If these two principles are
fulfilled,  historians  can  expect  to  be  able  to  extract  the  true  facts  of  the  past  from  the
surviving evidence, and their true meaning in relation to other facts. Meaning is pre-given
and only needs to be discovered as such by historians. In fact, Elton’s distinction between
surface appearance and the underlying real meaning of the past echoes Ranke’s dichotomy
between external manifestations of individuality and spiritual essences. Both Ranke and
Elton, despite the former being an idealist and the latter a realist, rely on Greek
metaphysics with the distinctions between “the thing as it is” and “the thing as it affects
me,” between essence and existence, knowledge of pure forms and fleeting sensations.
Their way of seeing is metaphorically structured by conceptual distinctions of Greek
thought. There is a persistent continuity of metaphorical conceptualization of reality and
knowledge.
In  the  name of  the  “real,”  the  language  of  history,  too,  had  to  be  rendered  free  from
metaphor and embellishment. Many historians were, however, troubled that language does
not seem to allow the mirroring of a past reality in the way they intended it to; more to the
point, they were troubled by the idea that a substantial contribution on the part of the
historian is necessary, in order to construct a narrative or an explanation. In response to
the  anxiety  about  the  intrusion  of  the  subjective  self  upon  the  “real,”  Elton’s  writing
advice to historians was the following: “Say exactly what you mean, no more and no less;
prefer the concrete to the abstract, the active to the passive mood, directness to
circumlocution; attend to the rules of grammar and syntax” (Elton 2002 [1967], 103).
Elton (2002 [1967], 101) also spoke against the usage of metaphors in history as “class
struggle,” “social mobility,” “demographic curve,” as well as the talk of “evolving
institutions”  or  “maturing  opinions.”  He  considered  these  terms  and  metaphors  to  be
borrowed from other disciplines and, since they did not refer to a real content of the past,
they introduced vagueness and obscurity into historical writing. They were faulty because
they attributed agency to the entities that were not real. The language of history was
supposed to mirror the past; it had to be free from metaphorical uncertainty. Metaphor, for
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Elton, is opposed to truth, hence, the irony of implicit metaphorical concepts that are
present in his own ontological and epistemological assumptions.15
On  the  other  hand,  there  were  also  those  historians  who  were  keenly  aware  that  the
historian is an integral part of the historical knowledge produced. In response to this
epistemological problem, the historians of the Annales School protested against the
hegemony of positivist history by rejecting the primacy the latter placed on pinning down
facts, political events, and the great men in history.16 One of the founders of the Annales
School Lucien Febvre, for example, was particularly outspoken on the matter of historical
facts. Febvre was severely critical of introductory handbooks that placed primary
emphasis on historical facts:
Establish the facts; apply the established facts,  but  what  are  we  to  understand  by facts?
How do such handbooks conceive of the historical fact? We soon see that for most of those
who  talk  in  this  way,  historical  facts  are  ‘given’  data.  Very  crude.  Such  people  refuse  to
consider that in reality it is they themselves who construct facts without even realizing it.
(Febvre 1973, 36)
Febvre (1973, 36) called grotesque an established image of the historian as a scientist who
observes the facts that present themselves to him transparently. Instead, he was convinced
that it was historians, who constructed facts, because the very nature of history demanded
it. It was history’s social function to organize the past in terms of the needs of the present:
For history does not present men with a collection of isolated facts. It organizes those facts.
It explains them and so, in order to explain them, it arranges them in series to which it does
not attach equal importance. For history has no choice in the matter, it systematically
gathers in, classifies and assembles past facts in accordance with its present needs. (Febvre
1973, 41).
Fernand Braudel, another leader of the Annales School, had a similar take on the relevance
of individual facts. Braudel argued that:
[T]he mass of diverse daily facts “does not make up all of reality, all the depth of history
on  which  scientific  thought  is  free  to  work.  […]  Thus  there  is  among  some  of  us,  as
historians, a lively distrust of traditional history, the history of events – a label which tends
to become confused, rather inexactly, with political history. Political history is not
necessarily bound to events, nor is it forced to be. […] The momentous discovery of the
document led historians to believe that documentary authenticity was the repository of the
whole truth. […] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this ideal of history “in the
raw”, led to a new style of chronicle, which in its desire for exactitude followed the history
15 Among other devises used in the written text in the name of truth, footnotes, appendixes and other similar paratextual
referential devices were used to aid in amplifying the sense of the “real” (Carrard 1995). The use of personal pronouns in
the text has been similarly adjusted to the realist effect: the self-disclosing personal pronoun “I” was to be avoided and
instead replaced by the more universalizing and neutral “we” (Carrard 1995).
16 This, however, represents the “positivist history” as understood by the Annales historians: the empiricist history
focused on individual events and people, usually political and military, and written in a narrative form.
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of events  step by step as  it  emerged from ambassadorial  letters  or  parliamentary debates.
(1980, 28–29)
Braudel distanced himself from traditional history, which put so much emphasis on the
individual events arranged in a chronological narrative form. Braudel (1980, 11) was
convinced that narrative history was incapable of giving access to the historical truth, for it
was merely a one-sided interpretation that did not give equal weight to the different
aspects of the complex reality of the past. It only focused on the short time span, the
history of events and individuals. Illumination of the historical past, however, required
that the historian also directed his attention to the longer cyclical changes, or conjunctures,
particularly in social and economic history, as well as to the structures that persist even
longer, such as geographical frameworks, biological realities, or mental frameworks. Only
by combining the fast-moving history of events with the slow-moving history of
socioeconomic cycles and even slower history of structures, can the historian expect to get
a glimpse of the past,  to attain an understanding of the complex past  reality.  The crucial
point, for Braudel, is the “unity of history which is also the unity of life” (Braudel 1980,
16). The historian’s task, in this regard, is to try to capture this complex, “intermeshed”
reality, in which different forces mingle, combine and conflict.
As to the self-image of the professional historian, Braudel criticized the requirement
for the historian to purge himself from the work of history. Writing in 1950, he considered
this kind of image of the historian’s work outdated:
Think  of  an  artist,  a  landscape  painter.  Before  him there  are  trees,  houses,  hills,  road,  an
entire peaceful landscape. Such for the historian is the reality of the past – a reality which
has been carefully verified, dusted off, and reconstructed. The landscape painter must leave
nothing out, not a shrub, not a puff of smoke. Nothing must be left out except, of course,
that the painter himself must be overlooked. For the ideal is to suppress the observer […],
as if history somehow existed outside our reconstructions, in a raw state of pure fact. The
observer  is  a  source  of  error,  and  criticism  must  be  on  its  guard  against  him.  (Braudel
1980, 8, emphasis mine)
The significance of visual metaphors for shaping ways of seeing and knowing is made
evident in this passage. Reality is metaphorically conceptualized as a landscape observed
and the historian as a viewer at a distance. The relationship between the landscape and the
spectator is not that of dynamic engagement, but of static detachment. Braudel captures
the central feature of the kind of realistic painting he describes: it excludes the knowing
self, the body of the observer. Like the monocular, static, fixed eye of the perspectival
construction or the withdrawn, decorporealized observer of the camera obscura, the
landscape painter must be suppressed because his presence in the picture is assumed to be
a source of error, of subjective interference into reality “as it is.”
However, this did not prevent Braudel from cautioning historians to restrain their
passions and emotions in scholarly investigation. If one were to open the pages of
Braudel’s “Identity of France,” one would see how Braudel claims that although he loves
his country, he pledges to keep his emotions and passions at bay in his investigation:
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But that passion will rarely intrude upon the pages of this book. I shall keep it carefully to
one  side.  […]  I  shall  keep  it  under  close  watch.  […]  For  I  am  determined  to  talk  about
France as if it were another country, another fatherland, another nation: ‘to observe
France’ […] ‘as if one were no part of it’.  The historian’s craft, as it has developed, is in
any case driving us towards ever greater restraint, towards the exclusion of feeling. Were
it otherwise, history, which is only too fond of contact with the social sciences, would not
have found itself becoming, like them, a very imperfect science perhaps, but a science all
the same. […] Our aim then should be to rid ourselves of our passions,  whether  they are
dictated by our nature, our social position, our personal experience, our fits of rage or
enthusiasm […]. […] I propose simply to carry out a reasonable investigation, exempt
from any a priori judgments, by climbing in turn to several familiar vantage points and
trying from there to understand how the long history of France has been constructed in its
depths, how it has followed its own currents and those of the rest of the world. I shall try to
keep my feelings out of it. (Braudel 1988, 15–16, 25, added emphasis)
Braudel is contradicting himself by claiming how he wants to “observe” France as a
detached, disembodied knowing self, as if he were no part it. As a model scientific self, he
intends to apply meticulous self-control and self-constraint, to rid himself of passions and
feelings, which would endanger the scientific status of the historical discipline. This
passage offers a better understanding of the type of objectivity that the Annales historians
pursued. The historian should be an integral part of historical knowledge only at the level
of questions, concepts, and methods used.
The rest of the historian’s subjectivity – feelings, emotions, experience and values –
should be restrained and eliminated from the process of investigation. Emotions and
experience are not part of cognition. What allows the historians to gain a measure of
impartiality towards their own cultural and temporal context is that, by observing the
distance that separates them from the past, they can become better aware of the
particularity of their own time. So, as Philippe Carrard (1995, 111) duly notes, the Annales
historians took objectivity to mean impartiality, restraint of judgment and emotions, but
with the exclusion of “independence from a cognitive subject.” They did not seem to
observe a contradiction in trying to take up a more analytical, problem-oriented approach
to history writing and simultaneously aiming to withhold their embodied authorial
presence in the text.
Yet, personal experience played a major role in the development of the Annales
approach to the past. Reflecting on his choice of historical language, Braudel revealed that
during his imprisonment in the special camp in Lübeck, he had the time to reflect on the
triviality of daily occurrences pouring upon him from the radio. He denied, sought to
distance himself from this fleeting daily news:
I had to believe that history, destiny, was written at a much more profound level. Choosing
a long time scale to observe from was choosing the position of God the Father himself as a
refuge. Far removed from our persons and our daily misery, history was being made,
shifting slowly, as slowly as the ancient life of the Mediterranean, whose perdurability and
majestic immobility had so often moved me. So it was that I consciously set forth in search
of a historical language – the most profound I could grasp or invent – in order to present
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unchanging (or at least very slowly changing) conditions which stubbornly assert
themselves over and over again. (Braudel 1999, 496–497)
Even as Braudel encourages the abridgement of one’s passions and emotions for the sake
of  a  more  objective  history,  in  his  introduction  to  “The  Identity  of  France,”  in  the  latter
passage he reveals that his personal experiences and emotions formed his model of reality
and subsequently enriched his intellectual endeavors. His personal model of history and
time, born out of life experiences, drove him to find a historical language suitable to
express what this way of seeing helped him to recognize in the world. Braudel used the
source domain of his experience of the perdurable, majestic, immobile Mediterranean in
order to metaphorically convey his understanding of what history is and how it is made in
the  target  domain.  This  metaphorical  transposition  allows  one  to  better  understand  the
roots of Braudel’s methodological approach. This illustrates well, I believe, the embodied
nature of knowledge making: how knowledge is born out of the experiential engagement
of the knowing self with the world.
The contradiction in Braudel’s reflections testifies to the pressure for historians to
comply, at least in a declarative manner, with the rules of disembodied, detached, static
objectivity. Even conceding that the historical investigation cannot proceed without the
historian making choices in concepts and methodology to be applied to the traces of the
past, it is still expected that emotions, feelings, and passions are kept securely at bay.
Thus, it is perhaps also not surprising that Lucien Febvre (1953, 40) underlined that
history should not recount the romances of Mary Queen of Scots or to “throw light on the
Chevalier d’Eon and her petticoats.” Emotions, feelings, passions, subsumed under the
sphere of the feminine, had to be left beyond the limits of objective, detached,
universalizing gaze of the historian. And, as emotions were not to interfere with the
process of historical investigation, the disembodied way of seeing and the
historian’sdisembodied self was maintained in scholarly practices.
A  contrasting  example  of  a  knowing  historian’s  self  is  Natalie  Zemon  Davis.  She  is
best known as an expert of 16th-century French history and as one of the most respected
historians in the field of women’s history and the social and cultural history of the early
modern period. Natalie Zemon Davis together with her colleague Jill Ker Conway were
the  first  historians  to  develop  a  course  on  the  history  of  women  at  the  university  of
Toronto in 1971, which later became a model for analogous courses in other Western
universities (Pallares-Burke 2002, 50). She has also been actively engaged in the civil
rights movement in the US in the 1950s.
Davis’s main goal in writing history, as she herself states, has been “to insert a series
of groups into history – workers, women, Jews, Native Americans and Africans – as
though she were “engaged in some rescue mission over and over again,” as if she sought
“to bring people to life again as a mother would want to bear children” (Pallares-Burke
2002, 50). This is a striking metaphor in the way it reveals the embodied cognizing self,
which  is  not  detached  and  static,  fixing  its  externalized  gaze  on  “the  thing  as  it  is.”  The
metaphor of the historian as a mother evokes a very fleshly, embodied, and interactive
way of engaging with one’s research topic. Her professional self is not only entangled
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with the rest of her selfhood and experience, but also with the people whose past she
wants to bring to life.
Her politics and her experience of motherhood – lived, embodied experience of active
engagement with the world – infused and guided her history writing. Davis stated that
“having children helped me as a historian. It humanized me; it taught me about
psychology and personal relations and gave flesh to abstract words like ‘material needs’
and ‘the body’;  it  revealed  the  power  of  the  family,  rarely  treated  by  historians  in  those
days” (Pallares-Burke 2002, 52–53, emphasis mine). This quote is evocative because it
shows the structuring influence of lived, embodied experience on how a historian
approaches and makes sense of the past. It illustrates how Davis’s personal experience of
living in the world enabled her to recognize important and neglected themes to pursue in
her research. Long-despised facets of the embodied self were brought into awareness of
the detached, universalizing gaze, forcing the displacement of the sharp boundary between
mind and body. This shows how universalizing, objective reason, with its ocularcentric
focus on the “thing as it is,” is predicated on the exclusion of bodily experience, the lived,
dynamic experience of active engagement with the world.
However, distance is not altogether eliminated in Davis’s thinking about the
knowledge of the past and her own role in creating that knowledge. In fact, the whole
discussion of her work with Pallares-Burke focuses on demonstrating how her political
engagement and her feelings do not upset the standards of a critical and objective study of
the past. Pallares-Burke comments that Davis has a gift for revealing her feelings and
emotions, but “without ever allowing this to compromise the highest academic standards
of her important work” (2002, 50). Davis herself posits that she certainly wants to be an
intellectual who is engagée, but then she continues to explain:
But  I  must  add  that  if  my  work  in  the  department  is  inspired  by  my  political  values,  my
work as a historian is not in the service of politics. In so far as my work has a critical edge
– which I  hope it  always does – that  seems to me to be a  commitment.  Because my first
task as a historian is to understand the past, to do research about it in order to get as much
evidence as I can, to check my evidence and do my best to interpret it in ways that do
justice  to  the  set  of  questions  asked  and  to  what  the  material  shows.  […] History serves
through the perspective it gives you, through the vantage points from which you can begin
to look at and understand the present, through the wisdom or the patience that it gives you
and through a comforting hope in the possibility of change. (Pallares-Burke 2002, 55,
emphasis mine)
The passage, to be sure, is the answer to the question posed by Pallares-Burke on whether
the  type  of  history  Davis  writes  is  at  the  service  of  her  political  commitments.  So  her
response is already framed by the doubt as to the objectivity of her history writing implicit
in the question. Even though she underlines that the contribution of history has mostly to
do with the alternative vantage points it offers, the standard of objectivity demands her to
emphasize the primacy of evidence, of the raw material of the past, which a historian is
supposed to interrogate in a self-restraining manner. There is a tension in Davis’ thinking
about her role as a historian which taps into the heart of a crucial problematic for
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historians: how to understand the lived experience of people in the past and yet maintain
some distance to it.
In an embodied vein, she posits how
The past can deepen our understanding of the present – our own personal present and our
public and political life – by its very differences and by its approximate similarities.
History offers us no well-defined or precise projects for improvement, but offers us many
possibilities – fascinating for the play of our intellect, offering us irony, delight,
indignation, but also helpful for our look at our own society. (Davis 2010, 172)
In this sense, history opens up new ways of looking at ourselves and our lives. Without
being didactic, it can enrich our own selves by offering knowledge about how others lived,
how they led their lives, in effect, enabling us to better understand our lives and our
selves. Not the truth of the “really real,” but in terms of the lived experience of other
people from other times and places is what becomes important in history reconceived this
way. The meaning which is made by the historian is then as much about the past as it is
about the present. The meaning is emergent in interaction between an embodied cognizing
self and the past.
To conclude, not many historians are willing to share, or even deem relevant how their
personal experiences and life trajectories might have influenced their scholarly work.
Reading historians’ reflections on objectivity, truth, and their own approach to knowing
the past, the first conclusion I draw is that the innovation that distinguishes the work of the
historians that I have discussed is born out of their lived, embodied, personal experience.
Their experiences allowed them to recognize something that others before them had not
been able to take note of, to gain a different way of seeing. It offered them metaphors
which structured their approach to making sense of the past in novel ways. Davis and
Braudel  seem  to  have  profited  most  from  relying  on  their  fully  embodied  selves,  rather
than from merely seeking to ascertain the facts. The knowledge they have created is hence
theresult of an interaction of their embodied selves, the methodological rules of the craft at
the time, and the past. Secondly, we could see the misconceptions to do with how Ranke’s
contribution to the professional discipline of history is regarded and the influence of an
empiricist, inductive gaze of the natural and physical sciences on historians and their ways
of seeing the past. The self-effacing, disembodied, detached historical gaze had long been
identified as the norm and as the structuring metaphorical model in the discipline. Even
though it has met serious challenges, especially in the second half of the 20th century, it
still retains its influence in structuring notions of historical truth and knowledge. In this
regard, the ocularcentric Greek metaphysics and its conceptual metaphors are still
influential  in  the  discipline  of  history.  Recognition  of  how  our  reasoning  is  partially
metaphorically structured does not mean that we should do away with logic and reason. It
only means that what we call reason is “embodied processes by which our experience is
explored, criticized, and transformed” and which are influenced by the metaphors we
adopt (Johnson 2007, 13). It also means that “a fundamental ontological divide between
mind and body—along with the accompanying dichotomies of cognition/emotion,
fact/value, knowledge/imagination, and thought/feeling” is flawed and needs to be
reconsidered (Johnson 2007, 7).
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In  what  follows,  I  discuss  the  critique  of  ocularcentric  Greek  metaphysics,  which
emerged in the 20th century. I problematize it by showing that this critique, while it aimed
to subvert ocularcentrism, continued to maintain an optical, mimetic, and disembodied
distinction between world and word, reality and language.
3.4 Endurance of the (disembodied) mind-world gap after the
linguistic turn
In this section, I discuss the critique of the hegemony of vision in Western philosophical
tradition in the wake of the linguistic turn. Decisive for the linguistic turn was the tradition
of structuralism of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure as well as the subsequent
movement of poststructuralism. The ideas, which emanate from structuralism and
poststructuralism, found their expression in the narrativist philosophy of history. This
section demonstrates the conceptual connections between the Saussurean arbitrariness of
the linguistic sign, Derridean poststructuralism, and narrativist philosophy of history.
Particularly, the endurance of the vision-based, disembodied mind-word gap after the
linguistic turn is problematized.
3.4.1 Derridean poststructuralism and the Saussurean arbitrariness of the
linguistic sign
One of the major figures, associated with poststructuralism and postmodern philosophy,
who criticized the prevalence of vision, was Jacques Derrida. Derrida aimed to propose a
new way of seeing that would displace the hegemony of vision. His deconstructive way of
seeing suggests a subversive vision, “a different visual Gestalt”: it implies a way of seeing
that “simultaneously contests the absolute sovereignty of the center, the absolute authority
of the frame, and the absolute grounding originality of the ground” (Levin 1999, 402). If
the hegemonic vision aims to master and dominate the object of its gaze, the Derridean
vision  does  not  attempt  to  impose  closure,  to  dictate  the  frame,  to  take  control  of  the
ground.
Derrida sought to displace the metaphysics of presence, or logocentrism, rooted in the
Western philosophical tradition and argued that “the embeddedness of the act of
perception in its situation, its context, its circumstantial field, will always deny perception
its metaphysical claims” (Levin 1999, 409). Important in this regard is that, for Derrida, an
act of perception is merely a conceptual construction (Derrida 1973, 103; Levin 1999,
409). Instead of the metaphysical eye of logocentrism, Derrida proposes a
postmetaphysical vision, which is insightfully characterized by Levin:
[T]he  gaze  that  Derrida’s  writing  seduces  us  into  pursuing  is  a  gaze  that  will  have  no
center, no permanence, no stability, no determinacy, no predictability. […] Derrida
demonstrates a postmetaphysical vision by inscribing and encrypting his glances and gazes
within the movement of écriture, subverting the metaphysical eye in the articulations of his
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texts. In effect, he articulates a “vision écriture”: in a style of writing that insists on being
strictly optical, he inscribes a vision, a gaze, that has no identity apart from the operations
and effects of the text. [..] Vision écriture, vision textualized in a Derridean style of
writing,  is  de-centered  and  de-essentialized  […];  and  it  loses  not  only  its  prized  self-
possession but also its power to possess what it perceives. (Levin 1999, 425, 427, 429)
“Vision écriture” is a strategy for decentering the metaphysical eye and its absolute gaze.
Derrida’s writing shifts attention to the margins, the invisible, the ambiguous and
indistinct. His vision, by having “no identity apart from the operations and effects of the
text” (Levin 1999, 427), embodies his philosophical theory. According to Derrida,
[t]he play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any
moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to
itself.  Whether  in  the  order  of  spoken  or  written  discourse,  no  element  can  function  as  a
sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This
interweaving results in each “element”—phoneme or grapheme—being constituted on the
basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. […] Nothing,
neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or
absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. (Derrida 1981, 26)
Difference is posited as the source of linguistic value: a sign derives its meaning from
other signs in an endless process of signification.
Derrida’s theoretical attitude to embodiment is problematic, because, even if, as
Reynolds (2004, Chapter 2) posits, Derrida’s position should not be reductionally
interpreted as a version of linguistic idealism, he nevertheless concedes that Derrida’s
comments on embodiment and the mind-body problem are extremely fragmentary.
Derrida rarely mentioned this particular hierarchical opposition between mind and body
and did not really engage with the issue of embodiment (Reynolds 2004).
Some commentators advanced an argument that, concerned to overcome the
metaphysics of presence, Derrida proposed to understand the text as matter, whose endless
movement of referral makes it more material than matter understood as presence or
substance (Cheah 2010, 75). Matter, in this reading, constitutes “the absolute exterior of
opposition” (Derrida 1981, 66), the relation to the other or alterity (Derrida 1981, 66;
Cheah 2010, 75). The inscription of materiality as the relation to the other, in effect,
desubstantializes matter (Cheah 2010, 76). Matter, as conceived by Derrida, does not
invoke embodied experience.
However, what draws me to argue that Derridean vision still contains an implicit
dualism of world and word is its dependence on the Saussurean principle of language: the
arbitrariness of the sign. If difference is posited as the source of linguistic value, then the
arbitrariness of the sign implicitly informs Derrida’s project. Crucially, Saussure’s sign
is defined as a disembodied and disengaged relationship between a “signifier” (acoustic or
visual form) and a “signified” (concept). In other words, the linguistic sign exists as a “two
sided-psychological entity” in the human mind, completely dissociated from and
unaffected by the external reality. Thus, material culture per se has no place in that system.
This  brings  us  to  the  second  point,  which  is  that  this  internal  bond  between  the  signifier
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and the signified is postulated as “arbitrary.” The linguistic sign […] is entirely a product
of human convention. (Malafouris 2013, 92)
In Saussure, meaning-making occurs on a completely separate linguistic plane, removed
from material reality. An arbitrary percept (sound-image, the signifier) and an arbitrary
concept (idea, the signified) are not connected in Saussurean linguistics to embodied
perception and interaction with the world. Sound-images are attached to concepts rather
than to anything in the world. There is no non-arbitrary relation between language and the
body, which moves and interacts with the world.
This argument is substantiated by Lisa Muszynski (2017), who demonstrates that
Saussure’s principle of the arbitrariness of the sign is informed by mind-body dualism. As
she  argues,  “[t]o  return  to  Saussure’s  systemic  value  with  enthusiasm  is  to  fully
(re)embrace Descartes’s mind-body dualism (Muszynski 2017, 174). Just like Saussure,
“Descartes took for granted the arbitrariness of the connection between words and their
meanings” (Joseph 2012, 81). Muszynski argues that
Saussure follows Aristotle, but Saussure’s purpose was to improve on and develop the
ancient language philosophy that he inherited from Aristotle – and to make it uniquely his
own, which is certainly what he did. What is new in Saussure’s arbitrariness is his specific
way of formulating it: the linguistic sign is binary, that is, both material and immaterial.
The sides are united in the (positive) linguistic sign by way of its arbitrary percept, or
sound-image (the signifier), which is bound to an arbitrary (psychological) concept, or idea
(the signified).  This  is  a  dualist  principle,  certainly,  insofar  as  it  separates  body  (the
physical percept) and mind (the psychological concept, meaning), but this was a traditional
philosophical argument that he accepted without a problem. (Muszynski 2017, 150)
The  union  of  the  arbitrary  traits  of  percept  and  concept  are  entirely  dependent  on  social
rules or human convention. Language was assumed to be conventional (“historical”) rather
than in any way dependent on the process of biological life, echoing the Aristotelian
theory of language, which maintained that language is not the same for all because it is
conventional,  and  different  communities  have  different  conventions  (Harris  &  Taylor
1997, 33).
In order to comprehend the disembodied nature of language in Saussure’s system of
linguistic value, it is crucial to take into consideration the metaphor of “coins as units of
value in a currency system,” which informs his binary principle (Muszynki 2017, Chapter
5). Saussure borrowed this master metaphor from the field of political economy, which
emerged in the 18th century. In fact, Saussure’s reliance on metaphors of political
economy itself reveals the embodied and metaphorical nature of theorizing dependent on
the process of lived experience: Saussure attended lectures on political economy at the
University of Geneva, which inspired his philosophy of language (Joseph 2016). Saussure
drew a similarity between the two “sciences” of economics and linguistics, arguing that,
in contrast to the other sciences, political economy and economic history constitute two
clearly separated disciplines [i.e., a “duality”] within a single science […]. Proceeding as
they have, economists are—without being well aware of it—obeying an inner necessity. A
similar necessity obliges us to divide linguistics into two parts, each with its own principle.
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Here as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of value; both sciences are
concerned with a system for equating things of different orders—labor and wages in one[,]
and a signified and signifier in the other. (Saussure 2011, 79, original emphasis)
Thus, the two binary orders of labor and wages are metaphorically transposed into the
field of language and equated with the similarly binary orders of the signified and the
signifier.
Like coins in a currency system, words have value, in Saussure’s linguistics, only
differentially, through their static relative position. When applied as a model to understand
language, this economic metaphor structures the concept of language as a structure of non-
living units of value, in which differences carry signification: “[E]verything is only
difference used as opposition, and opposition creates value” (Saussure in Joseph 2012,
545). The negative, differential system entails this principle of linguistic arbitrariness. In
other words,  it  is  not possible to selectively subscribe to the primacy of difference as the
principle of signification without likewise adopting the disembodied Saussurean
arbitrariness of the binary sign. If you adopt the idea that meaning is relative and
differential, you likewise adopt the assumption that the sign is arbitrary and bears no
necessary relation to the world or reality. The latter point substantializes my claim that
Derridean approach, which subscribes to the idea of difference as the source of linguistic
value, still implicitly upholds mind-body dualism, despite the claims against such
semiological reductionism.
The pattern of Saussurean linguistics embodies the assumptions one needs to make, in
order to arrive at this particular pattern. As Muszynski explains,
Saussure’s  system  of  the  arbitrariness  of  the  binary  sign  is  embodied  in  his  system  of
linguistic value through the constituting metaphor he chose. There is therefore no escape
from the ramifications and “veiled consequences” of this arbitrariness, even if you purport
to set it aside and move on without it. […] This constituting metaphor thereby enables
Saussure to embed the character of the arbitrary, binary sign (signified and signifier) in the
system  as  a  whole  in  terms  of  its  negative,  differential  value  –  the  very  features  that
poststructuralism continued using in shifting from Saussure’s focus on speech to Derrida’s
preferred focus on writing.(Muszynski 2017,157)
However, only when one artificially separates the pattern of organization from the process
of its development, does it become possible to think of the relation between language and
reality, word and world, mind and matter as arbitrary. More importantly, when one
separates pattern and process, it follows that one can only conceptualize change as a linear
sequence of static states, or perspectives, that are purely historically contingent and
arbitrary,  as  if  enclosed  onto  themselves.  Since,  in  this  case,  we  are  not  looking  at  the
process, which has led to a particular pattern emerging, we are not able to understand
change as a dynamic process of interrelations and entanglements, which involves
embodied experience. Change is reduced to a linear sequence of static states, patterns,
forms, and perspectives that are relative to each other. None of these patterns can be
claimed to do a better job of making sense of reality – their value is equal, fixed, and
specific to a particular language system, to a particular pattern. They are products of an
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arbitrary social convention. Therefore, the researcher need not preoccupy herself with
elucidating the process, which has led to this particular perspective or pattern emerging,
and, in consequence, with evaluating whether this perspective is equipped to comprehend
a particular aspect of reality.
What still needs to be clarified is how Saussure’s conceptualization of synchrony and
diachrony relates to the notions of pattern and process in enactive embodiment theory,
which will be introduced in more detail in the following section. For Saussure, what is
diachronic in language is “the successive states of the language considered in contrast with
one  another,”  whereas  what  is  synchronic  is  “the  linguistic  facts  as  given  when  one
confines oneself to a single state” (Saussure in Joseph 2012, 514).
Saussure’sconceptualization of diachrony is very different from how temporal
development is understood in the theory of enactive embodiment. Saussurean diachrony is
a linear sequence of static snapshots or fixed states, of isolated patterns. In contrast to
enactive embodiment, in which pattern and process are inseparable (i.e. pattern embodies
the process), Saussurean diachrony does not mean a dynamic process of movement, a
process of interactions and entanglements, which enact change and which are embodied in
the pattern of organization. The disembodied nature of Saussurean linguistics – the
separation between language and world and between pattern and process – entails that he
can only conceive of change in static terms. Thus, according to Saussure, a diachronic
study “should take the form of comparing two such states, two such ensembles [of sounds
in a language at a particular state – R.K.], rather than looking at how a given sound is
transformed across the centuries” (Joseph 2012, 320). Diachronic analysis entails the
comparison of one static, synchronic “slice” of development with another. Each sequential
state is new: “[W]hat determines its fundamental nature is not inherited” (Joseph 2012,
515). Thus, the process through which the state or the pattern emerges is irrelevant in
Saussurean linguistics. Saussure insisted that the synchronic analysis and the diachronic
analysis need to be kept strictly separate.
The  repeatability  of  the  sign  –  a  Derridean  version  of  Saussure’s  arbitrariness  of  the
linguistic sign (Melberg 1995, 172) – preserves the disembodied attributes of Saussurean
structuralism. The Derridean repeatability of the sign evokes an idea of language that is
disembodied – a language conceived of as a system of signs, in which difference produces
meaning, but which remains detached from the process of an embodied and world-
involving lived experience. Derridean language does not repeat or imitate, nor is it linked
to lived reality in any way. It separates between language and life and between pattern and
process in the same way that Saussure’s linguistics differentiates between the two. The
body, if it appears at all in postmodern conceptualization, is made entirely of words
(Hustvedt 2016, 349). In fact, the body disappears as a material, biological entity in the
discursive condition (Birke 1999, 137). The focus in Derridean poststructuralism falls on
the difference of meaning that is produced in iteration. Each time a textual iteration takes
place, the meaning changes to the extent that it does not correspond to the previous
meaning. In other words, each sequential state, each synchronic pattern is new: As for
Saussure, what is fundamental to meaning in each iteration is not inherited. In Derrida’s
own words, “iterability […] may be read as exploitation of the logic which links repetition
with alterity” (Derrida 1982, 315); “iterability” does not signify simply […] repeatability
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of  the  same,  but  rather  alterability  of  this  same idealized  in  the  singularity  of  the  event”
(Derrida 1988, 156). The repeatability of the sign introduces an element of fiction in
language (Melberg 1995, 170). Derrida links the “originally repetitive structure” of signs
to fiction: Reality derives from ever-changing fictional, mentalistic play of signification
(Melberg 1995, 170). The form of meaning in the mind is separate from the matter of
bodies and things. On such an understanding, the self is likewise a fiction spun out of
iterated  signs  that  bear  no  relation  to  the  body,  bodily  movement,  and  engagement  with
the world. The Derridean vision produces reality-as-fiction.
Thus, Derrida transforms classical “mimesis as sameness” into the deconstructionist
“mimesis as difference” (Heikkilä 2014). The idea that knowledge is truthful by being an
accurate representation of a fixed world is here replaced by an emphasis on the
constitutive process of meaning production that occurs in iteration. The world does not
structure the image contained in the mind (Figure 7): The play of signification produces
fictive images from which reality of the world is derived (Figure 8). However, and this is
more important, the dualist premise, which posits a distinction between knowledge and
reality, language and the world, form and content, concept and percept, mind and body is
preserved in mimesis as difference. What this means is that the metaphorical, image-
schematic distinction between an image and reality and between a mental concept and a
bodily percept, rooted in the Western intellectual tradition since Greek metaphysics, still
structures Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s rejection of correspondence and mimetic truth
as sameness does not bypass the problem of metaphysical dualism, it merely goes in the
opposite direction to posit a gap between reality and (disembodied) mind, life and
language, process and pattern (See Figures 7 and 8).
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Figure 7 Mimesis as Sameness (Optical Match)
Figure 8 Mimesis as Difference
71
By locking itself out from the bodily, experiential engagement with the environment, the
Derridean vision dissolves the one who cognizes. Meaning is slippery, evasive, and
infinitely susceptible to the play of signs in a chain of signification and difference.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the dissolution of the cognizing subject and the
slipperiness of meaning go hand in hand with the notion of the “Death of the Author,”
since the author is just a representative of further texts and ideological positions. Roland
Barthes announced the “Death of the Author” in 1968. The disappearance of the author, as
Biriotti (1993, 3) explains, “was part of a broader project in the 1960s: structuralism. […]
[S]tructuralism, following the work of Saussure in the early part of the century, insisted
that the linguistic sign was arbitrary and that therefore the link between language and the
“real world” was not straightforward.” The abandonment of the traditional concept of the
author was primarily a critique of the idea of the author as the single source of meaning
and it resulted in the critical focus on the reader and the text (Biriotti 1993). However, by
refuting the possibility of non-arbitrary links between language and the world, meaning
and reality, “vision écriture” has likewise lost the capacity to make sense of an embodied,
world-involving process of meaning making in an engagement between the cognizing self
and the world.
3.4.2 Disembodied dualism in postmodern philosophy of history
The characteristic disembodied distinction between language and world and between
pattern and process can be likewise observed in the work of postmodern philosophers of
history, who, in the wake of the linguistic turn, proposed to reverse the dominance of
content (the past/world/reality) over form (historical narrative/language/word). In other
words, these bearers of the Saussurean inheritance challenged the claim that reality or the
content of the past referentially determines the form history takes in a historical narrative.
A crucial argument in these accounts is that there cannot be an unmediated
correspondence between language and the world (e.g., Munslow 2006a). Nevertheless,
what is retained in this argument is the distinction itself between the content (past reality)
and the form (language of historical narratives), between world and word. Postmodernists
posit a sharp separation between content (past reality) and form (language), and claim that
“rather than the existence of a knowable past reality there is nothing but the-past-as-
history” (Munslow 2006b, 11). The past does not exist and we do not have access to it,
except for a few traces and the historian’s narrative.
Narrativist philosophers of history, because of their disembodied premises, make a
mistaken assumption: They are convinced that our only relation to the past is strictly
textual  and  that  “the  past  exists  for  us only as it is written up by historians” (Munslow
2006a, 36). History is only accessible by way of language: it is a “relationship to the past
mediated by a distinctive kind of written discourse” (White 1999, 1). The past is
accessible solely as a textual representation, through “the prison house of language”
(Munslow 2006a, 152). Thus, the deconstructive function of historians is to render one
text  (the  past)  into  another  text  of  the  historians’  own  invention  (written  history)
(Munslow 2006a, 153). Revealing the influence of Derrida’s concept of différance, the
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argument goes that “the historical text can be linked only to other historical texts and
derive its meaning from those other texts” (Munslow 2006a, 153).
It  is  only  possible,  however,  to  arrive  at  this  conclusion,  if  one  ignores  how the  past
process of lived experience is embodied in ourselves, in the way we engage with reality,
past and present, and in things from the past that endure into the present. Postmodern
philosophers of history likewise ignore the bodily sources of pre-linguistic meaning,
which is accessible to us via empathic, bodily resonance (see Section 3.6.1). To put it
differently, postmodern philosophers of history ignore that the patterns, in the present,
embody the past process of life. For postmodernists, however, history becomes the-past-
as-history: an empty signifier, which “is filled with the meanings and definitions we want”
(Munslow 2006b, 13). The effect of the arbitrariness of the sign on philosophy of history
manifests in claims that the meaning of the past is entirely constructed through narrative
impositionalism and social context in which the historian operates.
The pattern of a historical narrative is a perspectival, arbitrary state, enclosed onto
itself and conventional (“historical”). Its meaning does not relate to or inherit anything
from the past process of life. Whatever reality there is, it is always encountered as a
socially constructed text: the world is known only through language. Thus, “history is the
study not of change over time per se, but the study of the information produced by
historians as they go about this task” (Munslow 2006a, 3). The past and written history are
two completely different things. Historians, as they produce history as knowledge, create
and impose a particular form onto the past: They produce history as text. As Hayden
White insists,
We  may  […]  arrange  all  artifacts  known  to  us  along  a  time  line  in  such  a  way  as  to
constitute a series, but any pattern that we may think we perceive as inhering in the series
is actually a product of our own modalities of conceptualization, themselves given by rules
of linguistic combination that are peculiar to Western linguistic systems and the myths
which are formalizations of such combinatory strategies. (White 1974, 770)
The evidence of the past is itself meaningless and needs to be turned into “facts” through
narrative organization and interpretation by historians in order to gain meaning (Munslow
2006a). Or, in other words, “meaning is generated by socially encoded and constructed
discursive practices that mediate reality so much so that they effectively close off direct
access to it” (Munslow 2006a, 11). Meaning is wholly self-referential. Saussurean
influence is evident in how White, in the above quote, conceptualizes change in
Saussure’s diachronic terms – as a linear narrative sequence of static states. This is an
inheritance of a disembodied distinction of pattern and process as well as of language and
world. If you posit change as a linear sequence of static snapshots (and if you, likewise,
write history in such a way), this assumption prevents you from recognizing how the past
process of lived experience is embodied in a pattern of past organization. Therefore,
historiography, which ignores lived experience and which organizes the past as a sequence
of static states, is actually susceptible to a postmodern critique. If history is reduced to a
disembodied series of events, the meaning of the past will likely depend on the
arrangement of these events in a narrative.
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As characterized by Munslow, “deconstructionist” historians of the linguistic term
conceive of history as a “literary performance”:
[History]  is  first  and  foremost  a  deliberate  and  calculated  written  act  on  the  part  of  the
historian, rather than a neutral reflection or correspondence. […] History is an authored
impression of pastness. […] [T]he historian brings his/her narrative, conceptual and ethical
explanatory strategies to bear on the content of the past. (Munslow 2006b, 16, 17)
But the past itself bears no relation to the meanings that historians draw up. The
past/content/matter is removed from the narrative/form/mind. Meaning is strictly a product
of linguistic composition, social convention and the discursive structure of a given epoch.
It is the use of language, which endows facts with value and meaning, “a specific posture
before the world which is ethical, ideological, or more generally political” (White 1978,
129). By following the linguistic turn in epistemology, deconstructionist historians
emphasize “the figurative basis for the emplotments, arguments and ideological modes of
explanation upon which we are reliant for the meaning we ascribe to the past” (Munslow
2003, 146). Meaning is a conceptual, mentalistic and disembodied construction that is
imposed on the content of the past, passively waiting to be emplotted in historians’
narrativizations.  Historical  narratives,  as  literary  artifacts,  “derive  their  chains  of
meaning(s) or significations from the nature of narrative structure (or forms of
representation) as much as from other culturally provided ideological factors” (Munslow
2006a, 21). Thus, deconstructionists focus on how language constitutes the past.
Hayden White (1974), for example, argues that historians can interpret the culture of
any historical period by exploring its tropic prefiguration, its structuring linguistic codes.
For White, tropes are “a deep infrastructure of consciousness” that determines how
historians interpret the past and that constitute history-as-fiction (Munslow 2006a, 77).
Troping endows a chronicle of events with a kind of emplotment, which is provided by the
cultural tradition of the historian (White 1999).White (2014[1973]) utilizes the theory of
tropes to characterize “the deep structure of the historical imagination” (37). In other
words,  White  conceives  of  tropes  in  a  disembodied  Saussurean  sense  –  as  an  “internal”
mental system of understanding:
White proposes that as the tropes organize the deep structures of human thought in de
Saussure’s sense of constituting meaning through binary opposition – the idea of otherness,
or  difference in any historical  period – tropes lie  at  the core of  every society’s  and every
historian’s historical imagination. (Munslow 2006a, 78)
The  inheritance  of  Saussurean  structuralism  shapes  the  Whitean  conception  of  tropes  in
idealist, disembodied terms. Metaphors as well as other tropic devices are removed from
reality: They are an internal deep structure of the human mind, separated from an
externalized world or reality “out there,” and not shaped by it. World does not shape mind;
the interior forms of disembodied mind constitute aperception of the world that  bears an
arbitrary  relation  to  the  world.  This  dimension  of  White’s  thought  reveals  a  Kantian
idealist influence, which White himself acknowledges (Doran 2013, 108). Whitean tropes
are dependent on an implicit image-schema that explains cognition in terms of a
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disembodied mind producing images of the world/past, except that, in this case, images do
not reproduce the world, but rather constitute it.
Thus, there are no “intrinsically tragic events”: There are only stories told or written
depending on the perspective from which the events are viewed (White 1992, 1999, 9).
White constructs the meaning of events in terms of subjective-objective dualism. The
event is either objectively tragic (which is untenable) or it is subjectively and arbitrarily
emplotted as a tragedy. Crucially, it is not lived as a tragic event: only literary figuration
renders it tragic (White 1999, 9). White’s “perspective” is not a lived, experiential,
embodied relationship to the past. The pattern of figuration is understood as an enclosed
culturally-determined “perspective,” ignoring an embodied process of lived experience,
out of which this pattern emerges. Only when one ignores the body and embodied
experience and interaction with the world, out of which meaning emerges, can one
conceive  of  knowledge  as  such  a  mentalistic  image  of  the  world.  In  contrast  to,  for
example, the embodied metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), which link the tropic
figuration  of  abstract  concepts  in  the  target  domain  with  the  embodied  and  world-
involving lived experience in the source domain, Whitean tropes are still implicitly
dependent on dualist Greek metaphysics.
Lastly, postmodern thinkers suggest viewing all historical narratives as forms of
artwork, of literary work whose truthfulness or falsity cannot be determined once we reject
the representationalist justifications of truth claims at the narrative level. What is crucial to
note is that the latter claim still implies the dependence of the postmodernist argument on
the separation between world and language. Thus, it relies on an assumption that
narratives cannot be true or false because they do not mirror the world “out there.” What
this means is that truth is still implicitly articulated in terms of an optical match between
an externalized world and word, which implies disembodied metaphysics and dependence
of  the  postmodern  claims  on  the  notion  of  correspondence.  The  argument  is  that,  if  the
truth differs for Marxists, liberals, feminists and poststructuralists, then it is impossible to
get at the truth (Munslow 2006a, 158). This formulation reveals that truth continues to be
indirectly treated in the postmodern conceptualization in dualist, metaphysical terms.
Postmodernists cannot conceive of a kind of truth that bypasses the optical dualism of (a
disembodied) mind and world.
If all historical narratives are forms that bear no link to past life, but rather constitute it,
the plurality of possible narrative figurations of the past is not in any way constrained or
affected by the past itself. There is no way to adjudicate between these different
narratives/forms, other than in terms of ethical consideration. In line with Saussure’s
system of negative, differential linguistic value, historians’ narratives
occupy absolutely relative positions, vis-à-vis other narratives in the synchronic system of
historical narratives, in terms of their relative interpretations of the events they discuss
(where these narratives now function metaphorically on the model of (a) coins as units of
value in a currency system, or the model of (b) different inertial systems of reference and
their unique measurements). In such a synchronic system of exchange values, there are no
referential anchors outside the system of signs that constitute their formal relationship,
analyzed on the model of la langue. (Muszynski 2017, 176, original emphasis)
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Thus, Hayden White, for example, can assert that
the Holocaust is a synthetic concept or a figure of an event, the occurrence of which could
hardly be doubted but the meaning or the significance of which, for European, American,
Jewish, and Near Eastern history is an open question, begging to be treated under as many
different modes of meaning-production as possible. (White 2005b, 337)
The discursive fact and the material event, or language and life, are radically separated.
The event happens, whereas facts are constituted through language – they are not to be
confused (White 1999). The meaning does not in any way depend on the actual event,
because the meaning (pattern) is separated from the process through which this meaning
emerged. In other words, it does not matter who and by what process of experience has
come up with a particular meaning or a narrative. As a result, Munslow can argue that “we
don’t look to the past, much less history, as a source for engaging with and understanding
‘the other’” (2006a, 171). The disembodied theoretical premises of postmodernists
predispose them to exclusively focus on the pattern, while ignoring the lived process, and
assume that the past process of life has nothing to offer for understanding “the other”
(since the past is inaccessible other than through language). But if you do not look at the
process through which a pattern has emerged, you cannot really understand the pattern,
and in what ways it relates to the world (assuming that the relation is not one of simple
correspondence between a static pattern and past reality). What remains for a
deconstructionist historian, in the face of a plurality of narratives, is to compare one
history against another history.
Seeking to overthrow the representationalist convictions of empiricist historians, who
believe that content of the past dictates the form and meaning of the past, postmodern and
narrativist thinkers reduce meaning to an arbitrary, mentalistic ascription grafted onto the
passive content of the past. Either way, the dualisms of form and content, word and world,
language and life, pattern and process remain firmly rooted in the theoretical premises of
both modernist and postmodernist historians. The principal difference is that modernists
claim to be able to bridge the gap and acquire truth, whereas, for postmodernists, the gap
is unbridgeable, because the past and history are two ontologically different entities.
This disembodied, dualist premise of their theoretical position has, as a result,
particular methodological implications, focusing their gaze exclusively on textual
rendition of reality, culturally determined discursive practices, conceptual, ethical and
ideological strategies and emplotments. Even though postmodernists manage convincingly
to  show  that  history  is  not  merely  a  mimetic  reproduction  of  past  reality,  they  uphold  a
metaphysical differentiation between word and world, language and reality, mind and
world, and, in this regard, deconstructionist history is not properly postmetaphysical.
Having proved that the relation between world and word is not straightforward,
deconstructionist thinkers do not concern themselves with the question of what the
relation between world and word, reality and mind, mind and embodied experience is, if it
is not explained by representationalism and referentialism.
I will elaborate on an alternative notion of an embodied cognizing subject and how it is
crucially coupled and engaged in a dynamic interaction with the environment in the next
two  sections.  I  will  argue  that  the  meaning  is  neither  strictly  “in”  the  world,  in  need  of
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being discovered, nor is it solely determined and ascribed onto passive reality by the
discursively produced self. Rather, it is emergent in engaged, dynamic interaction between
the embodied self, conceived of as a process, and a changing environment.
3.5 Reconceiving the cognizing self in embodied terms
In this section, I explore the findings of research on embodied cognition and assess their
implications for an alternative notion of a cognizing self. Replacing the default concept of
the  cognizing  self  as  a  disembodied  entity  with  a  notion  of  an  embodied  self,  which  is
coupled to and interacts with the world, simultaneously transforms our conceptions of the
past, knowledge, truth, and reality. This paves the way for a new understanding of making
sense  of  the  past,  that  is  shared,  but  remembered  differently,  in  the  field  of  history  and
history education.
The disembodied model of vision is still prevalent today in the understanding of
knowledge, truth, and reality, even though it has received extensive criticism from
philosophers and social theorists. As Rebekah Modrak (2011, 18) notes, “[w]hat was a
radical proposition in the 15th century has been so absorbed and internalized that linear
perspective is now a given – easily legible and assumed to represent natural vision. This is
one example of how individual systems can quickly become absorbed as common
knowledge.”17 Yet, it is not how embodied, living human beings see. The eyes of human
beings are not fixed, static. In fact, they are in constant motion as they scan the
environment.  Our  entire  body  rotates  and  moves  to  assist  the  eyes  in  seeing  the
environment (Modrak 2011, 20). Our experience of seeing is mediated by the movement
of our bodies. The philosopher of mind Alva Noë renders this point succinctly in a video
interview:
Seeing is a temporally extended interaction with the environment. […] The skillful ability
to  move  is  at  the  very  core  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  conscious  perceiving  agent.  […]  The
capacity to move and the capacity to see are interwoven. […] It is not just the capacity to
move. It is understanding and movement, understanding the sensory effects of movement.
[…] [U]sing that kind of sensorimotor understanding is what brings the world into focus
for consciousness. […] The world comes into focus as a kind of dynamic of trying to make
sense of it. […] Consciousness is dance: dance is an enactment or modelling of this
fundamental fact about our relationship with the world around us. […] The seeing, the
perceiving is not something detached from that coupling, it is the dance. (2012, 2:20–3:41,
4:31–5:35)
17 Erwin Panofsky (1991, 34) writes about the pervasive endurance of linear perspectival construction by giving an
example of the 17th century German astronomer Johannes Kepler who “had been led by the rules of painterly
perspective to believe that straight is always seen as straight, without stopping to consider that the eye in fact projects
not onto a planatabella [a flat surface] but onto the inner surface of a sphere [R.K. – the concave surface of eye’s retina].
And, if even today only a very few of us have perceived these curvatures, that too is in part due to our habituation –
further reinforced by looking at photographs – to linear perspectival construction.”
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In the enactive, interactionist understanding, perception is an active, embodied,
experiential engagement with the world. Dance, as a metaphor, captures how cognition is
embodied, emotive, and interactive (Maiese 2011, 164). Understanding results from this
active and creative engagement. However, as philosopher and physicist Ernst Mach
observed more than a century ago, “in ordinary visual experience, one is seldom conscious
of the ways in which the body is continually present but effectively deleted out of one’s
visual perceptions” (Crary 1999, 220). Figure 9, Mach’s self-portrait as seen from his left
eye,  evokes this curious experience of how vision distances the body and hides dynamic
content in perception. This echoes Hans Jonas’s observation, stated in Section 3.1, how
the primacy of sight led to the domination of abstract concepts which overlooked the
embodied and dynamic nature of perception. Hence, we are faced with a paradox that our
body-based experience reinforces the belief in disembodied thought: “We are aware of
what we see,  but not of our seeing. The bodily processes hide,  in order to make possible
our fluid, automatic experiencing of the world” (Johnson 2007, 5).
Figure 9 Ernst Mach, "The Inner Perspective." Image in the Public Domain.
What I want to propose is that we need to rethink what it entails to see and to know, to be
a cognizing subject, in the light of abounding evidence for the embodiment of mind. The
habitual ideas we hold about history, the past, knowledge, truth, reality are still firmly
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embedded in disembodied Greek (Platonic) metaphysics and its dismissal of the bodily
involvement in the process of thought, which we take for granted, so much so that our
reliance on it is invisible to ourselves. This is why ontological18 and epistemological
questions need to be preceded by the question: What is cognition? If we adopt a different
understanding  of  what  it  entails  to  be  a  knowing self  and  how this  self  cognizes,  then  it
also  radically  alters  our  ways  of  thinking  about  history,  the  past  and  how  we  can  know
them, or make sense of them.
The standard empiricist view in neuroscience on consciousness, as characterized by
Noë (2009), is suggestive of a camera obscura model, according to which consciousness
is something that happens inside our skulls. The brain, while being of the body, is at the
same time detached from the rest of body. Alva Noë argues:
According to the now standard view, our conscious lives – the fact that we think and feel
and that a world shows up for us – is achieved in us by the action of our brain. The brain
produces images of the environment and manipulates those images in a process known as
thought. The brain calculates and infers and eventually produces neural commands so that
we  act.  We  really  are  our  brains,  and  our  bodies  are  at  most  robotic  tools  at  our  brains’
disposal. The brain is sole author of what is in fact a grand illusion: that we inhabit a richly
detailed and meaningful world, that we are the sorts of beings we think we are. (2009, 4)
This  view  posits  that  brain  is  sufficient  for  cognition,  and  that  if  we  understand  what  is
happening in the brain, we will be able to understand what mind or consciousness is. The
“I” is reduced to the brain, which is separate from the rest of the body and is located in the
skull. It thinks and feels, and inhabits the body. This understanding of subjectivity blends
empiricism with the Cartesian model of an interiorized thinking subject.19 It implies the
conception of the cognizing self as isolated, autonomous, enclosed within the confines of
the head, withdrawn from the world. It is passive in that the world acts as a trigger on the
nervous system and is then processed by the brain, rather than consciousness being born in
a dynamic, interactive engagement of brain, body, and world, in which the embodied
subject is making sense of her experience. This brain is envisioned as the disembodied
“eye” that stands aside from the world, receives pictures or representations of the world,
imprints of the external world, and then processes them as a computational machine. Noë
argues that the representationalist internalism of neuroscience is the persisting vestige of
Cartesian ideas about the mind:
The abiding idea here, then, is that our lived experience, our daily world, our everyday
actions and reactions and feelings and concerns are events in the nervous system. The
world itself is a domain of we know not what that acts on the nervous system and is
18 In fact, the very notion of “ontology,” being at the core of Greek metaphysics, is rendered problematic by the idea of
an embodied self because ontology implies static, fixed, eternal presence, or Being.
19 In this regard, the neuroscientific view of subjectivity shares a lot in common with the religious doctrine, in that both
of these models conceive of a conscious self as something that happens or is inside of us (Noë 2009, 5-6). For Descartes,
it was the decorporealized thinking and thus conscious subject; in religion, it is an immaterial, spiritual essence, the soul,
the inner core.
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screened off by its own effects. We find ourselves on this side of the wall of effects
separating world and mind. We know things not as they are in themselves; we know only
our brain’s internal fabrications of them. […] We just assume that the membrane dividing
brain and environment is somehow the causally critical division between self and world.
(Noë 2015, 123, 125)
However, the representationalist internalism may not be so much the invention of
Descartes as a legacy of Greek ocularcentrism, its mind-body dualism and a distinction
between the world and its images, which shapes the conception of lived experience as
merely a “fabrication” of the world, a subjective representation removed from the truth out
there.
Recently, however, there has been a shift in cognitive science to conceive of
consciousness not as something that happens in our brains, but as something we do or
achieve by active bodily engagement with the world (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993
[1991]; Thompson 2007, 2015; Noë 2009; Di Paolo et al. 2010). Francisco Varela, Evan
Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1993 [1991]) in their groundbreaking book “The
Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience” advanced a theory of
cognition called “the enactive approach” (De Jesus 2016). Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (2002
[1945]) phenomenology of embodiment constitutes the philosophical basis for these
explorations of the body and embodiment in cognitive processes. Varela, Thompson, and
Rosch (1993[1991]) explicitly acknowledged the influence, which Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy has exerted on their research program in the context of contemporary cognitive
science. It likewise needs to be added that the embodied approach to cognition likewise
has its antecedents in the work that appeared in the 1970s by the Chilean neurobiologists
Humberto Maturana and Francisco J. Varela (1980).
The field of enactivism has become more fragmented over the past decade as different
theoretical accounts have emerged (De Jesus 2016).20 Nevertheless,  all  these  different
accounts endorse the original enactivist rejection of internal mental representations and
propose that cognition entails “living organisms as active embodied subjects dynamically
coupled to, and interacting with, their respective environments” (De Jesus 2016, 267).
Since the latter shared principle of enactivism is the main point that concerns my further
argument,  I  will  not  examine  the  differences  and  similarities  between  these  different
varieties of enactive accounts (on such distinctions, see, e.g., Muszynski 2017, 63–68).
My further use of the notion of “enactive embodiment” is meant to indicate the broader
paradigmatic shift in the field of the cognitive sciences, rather than any single and more
specific account of the enactive approach.
Enactive embodiment challenges the assumption that cognition is an internal
representation of the external, pre-given world. Varela, Thompson and Rosch proposed
instead to regard cognition as embodied action – “an enactment of a world and a mind on
the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (1993
[1991], 9). The process or history of (inter)action shapes the cognizing self and is reflected
20 De Jesus (2016) identifies three of the most prominent accounts: the canonical autopoietic enactivism (AE),
alternative accounts of sensorimotor enactivism (SE) of O’Reagan and Noë (2001) and the radical enactivism (REC) of
Hutto and Myin (2013).
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in  how the  self  makes  sense  of  the  world.  Enactive  embodiment  emphasizes  that  we  are
conscious through and in our living bodies and that perception and action are inseparable
in lived cognition. Perception is not a passive internalization of information, but an active
process – it implies a dynamic process of doing and acting.
Embodied cognition depends on the experiences that arise from having a body with
various sensorimotor capacities, which are themselves embedded in a broader biological,
psychological, and cultural context (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991], 173). They
criticize the input-output representationalist model of cognition, where input as sensory
stimuli or information is separated from output as behavior. Rather, by interacting and
engaging with the environment, a cognizing subject is constantly transformed by its own
process of cognition and interaction. Cognition is a self-modifying process implying
embeddedness in an environment rather than a passive representation of a fixed,
externalized world. In other words, Through this process of self-modifying cognition, or
sense-making, the cognizing subject is enacting or bringing forth a world and itself.
Cognition and life are processes that are bound up with one another. Living organisms are,
therefore, undergoing a continuous process of change by way of cognition, movement, and
interaction.
The interaction enables what is described as structural coupling between the cognizing
self and its environment: Cognizing selves/systems influence the environment; the
changes in the environment trigger changes in the selves/systems and if there are recurrent
patterns of interaction between the cognizing self and environment/other selves, this
recurrent interaction results in structural coupling (Maturana & Varela 1998 [1987]). The
changes  in  the  cognizing  self  are  therefore  partially  produced  by  its  own  actions  in  and
with the environment. The cognizing self never encounters the environment a-historically:
“All acting and perceiving is done in a flow of activity that is continuous for living
beings” and that is permeated and shaped by a dynamic cultural context (McGann 2014,
9).
The process of cognition or interaction with the world manifests in the pattern of self-
organization and structural coupling with the environment. Over time, the cognizing self
form its own way of structural coupling, which is “a record of previous structural changes
and thus of previous interactions. In other words, all living beings have a history. Living
structure is always a record of prior development.” (Capra 2003, 31).
Enactive embodiment overcomes the split between a subject and an object, the
cognizing self and the world: The two are seen as interdependent and as emerging
together. Proponents of this theory do not exclusively focus on the individual’s actions or
the individual’s structural dynamics, but rather on the individual-in-her/his-environment.
Their concern is with how the knower and the known co-evolve and are co-implicated
(Davis, Sumara & Kieren 1996, 156). Context is introduced not merely as a place which
contains the individual; rather, it is emphasized how the individual is part of the context
and co-evolves with it (Davis, Sumara & Kieren 1996). That is, enactive embodiment does
not support the notion of independent, bounded individuals plus contexts/rules or pre-
given, independent organisms plus environments. The environment is not so much a pre-
given container, but a part of one’s entangled process of co-emerging.
Alva Noë’s interactionist conception of consciousness likewise stresses the latter idea:
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The locus of consciousness is the dynamic life of the whole, environmentally plugged-in
person or animal. […] To understand consciousness in humans and animals, we must look
not  inward,  into the recesses of  our  insides;  rather,  we need to look to the ways in which
each of us, as a whole animal, carries on the processes of living in and with and in response
to the world around us. […] Consciousness isn’t something that happens inside us: it is
something we do, actively, in our dynamic interaction with the world around us. […] I urge
that it is a body- and world-involving conception of ourselves that the best new science as
well as philosophy should lead us to endorse. (Noë 2009, xiii, 7, 24)
Consciousness conceived as a dynamic process of interaction between a living being and
its  environment  extends  the  idea  of  the  cognizing  self.  The  knowing  self  is  not  isolated
from the world, but actively participates, engages in knowing, in grasping. World comes
into  focus  for  consciousness  as  it  actively  seeks  to  understand,  to  know,  to  make  sense.
Consciousness is done or achieved in this process of engagement proximate to how
dancing is done or enacted (Noë 2012). It is not an independent thing-like entity, whether
conceived as a material brain or an immaterial spirit.
When  the  subject  is  understood  this  way,  we  may  realize  how  making  sense  of  the
world cannot be separated from lived experience and interaction with the world, and what
crucial role embodiment plays in this process. Knowledge and truth can no longer be
conceived as internalized, mimetic essences or images that mirror the world inasmuch as
these notions of knowledge are dependent on dualistic metaphysical views that mind is
separate from body and that mind operates on “internal representations” that represent the
external world (Johnson 2007). In the interactionist view of cognition, reality is not
something  completely  external  to  us,  but  something  we  actively  engage  with.  When  we
make sense of the world, or the past, our language communicates not by finding the
“correct” words or statements (essence- or image-like) that correspond to the reality as it is
or was, but by conveying the lived experience of interaction with others and environment
with the help of embodied metaphor (Modell 2003). Cognition, in this sense, is not about
“taking up a perspective on things” because “we do not perceive our surrounding from a
series of fixed points” (Ingold 2015, 135); it is about moving along a non-linear path of
cognition, engaging with and being attentive to one’s environment which is not pre-given,
but in continual emergence.
The conscious “I,” rather like dancing, is a process:
Our ordinary or everyday concept of the self is the concept of a subject of experience and
an agent of action, not of an inner and substantial essence of the person. Furthermore,
when we look carefully at what we apply our ordinary concept of self to in the world of our
individual and collective experience, we don’t find any inherently existent thing or
independent entity; what we find is a collection of interrelated processes, some bodily or
physical, some mental or psychological. These processes are all “dependently co-arisen”,
that is, each one comes to be and ceases to be according to a multitude of interdependent
causes and conditions. The proper conclusion to draw from this is not the nihilist one that
there is no self whatsoever but rather that the self–the everyday subject of experience and
agent of action–is a dependently arisen series of events. More simply stated, the self isn’t a
thing or an entity; it’s a process. (Thompson 2015, 323)
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Yet, as the philosopher of mind Thompson (2015, 324) notes, the habitual way to conceive
of the self is to take it as a unified thing or entity, independently real with its inner
essence. This conception is oblivious to how the self is “brought forth or enacted in the
process of living” and how it is shaped by lived, embodied experience.
The essentialized view of the self as a fixed entity and the conception of the
world/environment as pre-given and perceiver-independent reveal our everyday
metaphysics. Metaphysics, whether in philosophy or in daily life, defines what is real, but,
as Lakoff and Johnson argue (1999, 14), such a conception of the real depends upon
unconscious metaphors. They propose that “our bodies, brains, and interactions with
environment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that is,
our sense of what is real” (1999, 17). They argue that the Western tradition of philosophy
requires reconsideration in light of the three ground-breaking findings of cognitive
science: that the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, and abstract
concepts are largely metaphorical. Lakoff and Johnson propose that reason and abstract
thought use the sensorimotor system and that “reason is not disembodied, as the tradition
has largely held, but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience”
(1999, 4). Categories and concepts that we form are, for the most part, based on how we
are embodied and on the kind of experience we can have due to the bodies we have. The
properties  of  the  human  body  shape  the  peculiarities  of  our  conceptual  systems  (Lakoff
and Johnson 1999, 18). A key point in their argument is that our conceptual system – the
ways in which we think and act – is metaphorical in nature (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
Embodied lived experience is an important source of metaphors for cognition. Meaning-
making is accomplished through metaphorical and metonymical mapping between a
concrete source domain onto an abstract target domain, which is shaped by bodily
experience, sensorimotor activities and interactions. In Lakoff and Johnson’s experiential
approach to meaning-making and cognition, the metaphorical projection extends from
concrete bodily, sensorimotor and interactional experience to more abstract conceptual
structures.
The embodied cognitive science of Lakoff and Johnson (1999) stands in opposition to
the first-generation cognitive science of the 1950s and 1960s, which assumed that mind
was disembodied and functioned as a computer program that could be run on any
appropriate hardware. From this disembodied perspective, meanings were defined either in
terms of the internal relationships between symbols or as inner representations of an
external reality (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 76). Accordingly, a mental representation was
either a concept, whose meaning was defined only in terms of its relationship to other
concepts in a formal system, or a symbolic representation of something outside the formal
system (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 76). In the former case, a representation bears no link to
the world outside the formal system of symbols; in the latter, a representation is assumed
to  be  a  mentalistic  mirror  image  of  the  external  reality.  In  both  cases,  however,  the
conceptualization of meaning is metaphorically structured by the spectatorial imagistic
model of cognition (the camera obscura represents this imagistic schema well), which
determines the dualism between reality and representation, matter and mind, language and
reality, subject and object.
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The shared dualistic assumption leads to two concurrent epistemological solutions: to
bridge the gap by means of optical mirroring or, if optical truth is not possible, to distance
the world and define meaning within the boundaries of one’s mental construction. Both
options share the metaphorical, image-schematic structuring premise of the mind-world
gap, which shapes reasoning about meaning in disembodied terms. Meaning is conceived
as mentalistic, contained in the head, detached from the world. The latter inferences are
drawn from the imagistic conceptual structure of the source domain – spatial containment
of mind, which is “inside,” as opposed to the body and the world which are “outside.” The
ocularcentric  division  between  mind  and  world  can  be  said  to  structure  an  entire
metaphorical conceptual system. Once the mind is assumed to be disembodied, the mind-
world gap becomes unbridgeable (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 95).
It is important to understand that representational theories of mind stem from mind-
body dualism, according to which mind and body are not only separate, but ontologically
different in kind. “Inner” mental space contains mental “representations” (ideas, concepts,
images,  propositions)  that  relate  to  the  “external”  material  things  in  the  world  (Johnson
2007). Embodiment theory, as opposed to representationalist theories, treats concepts,
percepts, propositions, and thoughts not as inner mental quasi-objects, but as patterns of
experiential interaction, as “aspects or dimensions or structures of the patterns of
organism-environment coupling (or integrated interaction) that constitute experience”
(Johnson 2007, 117). Thoughts are not just about the world, but they are in and of the
world as processes of experience (Johnson 2007, 117). They are patterns of experience
and reality, not inner, abstract representations of reality.
Moreover, as an organism interacts with, relates to and couples with its environment,
its continued functioning, growth and flourishing require emotions and value judgements,
which is one of the ways in which organisms assess their situation and make adjustments
to maintain a homeostasis within different kinds of environments. Emotions are necessary
for our survival and harmonious interaction with our environments; “they provide a
natural means for the brain and mind to evaluate the environment within and around the
organism, and respond accordingly and adaptively (Damasio 2003, 54).21 An organism’s
21 As Hogan (2016) notes, emotion has become a focus of concern in literary studies, philosophy, psychology, and other
fields. He differentiates between two broad strands in such studies: affective science and affect theory. Whereas affect
theory has drawn on the tradition of psychoanalysis and postructuralism, affective science derives from the field of
cognitive science. Although both of these two broad orientations in affect studies comprise a diverse arrary of
approaches, there are some traits that are shared among the specific approaches of each of these strands of work,
respectively. Affect theory, according to Hogan (2016), is very much influenced by the psychoanalytic thought of
Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze, defining affect in relation to a conception of fundamental drives. Even though Gilles
Deleuze or Félix Guattari discuss affect by way of critique of the earlier psychoanalytic tradition, their discourse is
“continuous with psychoanalysis in a way that affective science is not” (Hogan 2016). Importantly, affect theory also
combines psychoanalytic thought with a critique of institutions and language, social and political structures, influenced
by the poststructuralist ideas of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. It underlines how emotions are elicited and
imagined in ideologically-motivated ways. Affective science, on the other hand, articulates an account of affect that is
based on empirical study and analysis of cognitive and affective processes. I draw on this latter tradition and insights of
affective science.
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interaction and cognition of the world is therefore not neutral, but value-laden, as it seeks
to sustain its identity and preferences, which means that emotions and feelings22 play an
important role in cognition (Johnson 2007; Maiese 2011). Emotions, as complex neural,
chemical, behavioral responses to the environment, typically have a positive or negative
value as they elicit changes in the body in response to perceived harm or benefit (Johnson
2007). Facts of cognition are thus not separate from emotions and values of cognition;
they are intertwined. Most of these emotional processes, however, take place beneath the
level  of  conscious  awareness.  Before  we  become  consciously  aware  of  our  feelings,  we
have frequently already understood our situation in a certain value-laden way (Johnson
2007, 66). Even though emotion and feelings are at the heart of our capacity to experience
meaning, most of the analytic philosophy of mind and language pays no attention to
emotions and feelings because it considers them to be non-cognitive (Johnson 2007).
Values, in the analytic philosophy of mind and language, are separate from propositional,
factual content of meaning.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) oppose both disembodied objective scientific realism and
postmodern relativism. Instead, they defend embodied realism, which accepts that there is
a world independent of our understanding of it, but denies that our “concepts and forms of
reason are characterized not by our bodies and brains, but by the external world in itself”
(Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 90). Embodied realism rejects a strict subject-object dichotomy,
which posits an unbridgeable gap between the objective reality “out there” and the
subjective representation “in here” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 93). If this dualism is
accepted, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 93) explain, then there are only two conceptions
of objectivity possible: either objectivity is given by the external reality itself (the object)
or by the intersubjective, universal, transcendental structures of consciousness shared by
all people (the subjects). Thus, objectivity is either derived from accurate mirroring of the
external world or from universal, transcendental and disembodied reason. On the other
hand, embodied realism, in accordance with enactive embodiment, posits that we are
coupled to the world through our embodied interactions with our environment. Lakoff and
Johnson (1999, 93) emphasize that disembodied realism mistakenly “takes two
intertwined and inseparable dimensions of all experience—the awareness of the
experiencing organism and the stable entities and structures it encounters—and erects
them as separate and distinct entities called subjects and objects.” This explains why
disembodied realism puts so much weight on theories of reference and truth because it
needs to fill the gap between representation and the world.
Lakoff and Johnson’s approach corroborates my argument that metaphorical models of
cognition are closely linked to models of the self:
What  we  now  know  about  the  mind  is  radically  at  odds  with  the  major  classical
philosophical views of what a person is. For example, there is no Cartesian dualistic
person, with a mind separate from and independent of the body, sharing exactly the same
disembodied transcendent reason with everyone else, and capable of knowing everything
about his or her mind simply by self-reflection. Rather, the mind is embodied, reason is
22 Emotional responses can operate without us being aware of them, whereas feelings are consciously experienced
emotional states.
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shaped by the body, and since most thought is unconscious, the mind cannot be known
simply by self-reflection. Empirical study is necessary. There exists no Kantian radically
autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly
dictates what is and isn’t moral. […] There is no a priori, purely philosophical basis for a
universal concept of morality and no transcendent, universal pure reason that could give
rise  to  universal  moral  laws.  What  we  can  think  is  limited  by  the  body.  […]  The
phenomenological person, who through phenomenological introspection alone can
discover everything there is to know about the mind and the nature of experience, is a
fiction. […] There is no poststructuralist person – no completely decentered subject for
whom all meaning is arbitrary, relative, and purely historically contingent. (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999, 5–6)
This passage captures how ways of knowing are interdependent with ways of being, how
the ways in which we engage with the world link to our conceptions of the self or the
cognizing subject. Crucially, if we examine these different models of the cognizing self
and their respective ontology and epistemology, each is informed by a peculiar
metaphorical model, which illustrates how the cognizing self relates to itself, others, and
the world. The adopted model then shapes the kind of knowledge that is produced.
Movement, rather than making inner representations of a static, pre-given world, is
then  the  principal  way  “by  which  we  learn  the  meaning  of  things  and  acquire  our  ever-
growing sense of what our world is like” (Johnson 2007, 21). Movement occurs within an
environment and requires connection and interaction with aspects of this environment
(Johnson 2007, 20). It is, as a result, not accurate to speak of subject and objects, because
they are “abstractions from the interactive process of our experience of a meaningful self-
in-a-world” (Johnson 2007, 20). Importantly, it is not just the structure and patterns of
movements that matter in shaping meaning, but also the qualities of movement in
corporeal encounter with our environment. These perceived qualities of movement and
interaction are not subjective, inner, mental fabrications, located inside our skull, but they
are “the qualities in the world as much as they are in us. They are the qualities of different
experiences that involve both the structure of the organism and the structure of its
environments inextricably woven together” (Johnson 2007, 25). Meaning has experiential,
embodied rootedness.
It still needs to be underlined how the “concept empiricism” of Lakoff and Johnson, as
it  is  sometimes  referred  to,  differs  from  a  standard  empiricist  view.  For  Lakoff  and
Johnson, bodies participate in the very concept formation and not just shape perception
through the senses. Body, brain, and our active interaction with the world is what enables
reason and abstract thought, rather than just informs it through sense perception that
captures images of the external world. Reason is dependent not only on perception, but
also movement,  emotion, and other bodily capacities.  Knowledge and truth are mediated
by embodied understanding and imagination. In other words, Lakoff and Johnson’s theory
rejects mind-body dualism. In an empiricist argument, on the other hand, the role of the
body is reduced to sense perception, leaving the dualism in place. Movement is never
taken into account in regular empiricist arguments, which perhaps accounts for their static,
fixed, passive visual metaphorical models, which inform empiricist epistemology. For
empiricists, sense perception precedes concept formation and the body is only involved in
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forming percepts. What Lakoff and Johnson argue is that percept and concept converge,
that the body is actively part of concept formation.
The argument on the convergence of concept and percept is taken further by Iain
McGilchrist, who argues that we do not need words and language for abstract thought and
concept formation. Concept formation precedes language: categorical perception is
something human beings share with other animals (McGilchrist 2009). Therefore, it is
wrong to assume that meaning depends on language: in fact, meaning antedates language.
He provides examples of how different animals are able to categorize their environment as
they come to engage with it.23 Making sense of the world by abstract conceptual thought
and categorization is something we share with other animals. McGilchrist argues:
Language is necessary neither for categorization, nor for reasoning, nor for concept
formation, nor perception: it does not itself bring the landscape of the world in which we
live into being. What it does, rather, is shape that landscape by fixing the “counties” into
which we divide it, defining which categories  or  types of  entities  we see there – how we
carve it up. […] Language helps some things stand forward, but by the same token makes
other recede. […] What language contributes is to firm up certain particular ways of seeing
the world and give fixity to them. (McGilchrist 2009, 110)
We could extrapolate from this that the ways of seeing are a result of both the already
established categorizations and our lived experiential engagement with the world by way
of metaphor. McGilchrist makes a pertinent point:
The model we choose to use to understand something determines what we find. If it is the
case that our understanding is an effect of the metaphors we choose, it is also true that it is
a cause: our understanding itself guides the choice of metaphor by which we understand it.
The chosen metaphor is both cause and effect of the relationship. Thus how we think about
ourselves and our relationship to the world is already revealed in the metaphors we
unconsciously choose to talk about it. That choice further entrenches our partial view of
the subject. (McGilchrist 2009, 97)
Metaphorical models or visual metaphors, which guide thinkers in the Western intellectual
tradition, shape their ways of engaging with the world, knowing the world and their own
selves. The metaphors they unconsciously choose in trying to make sense reveals how
they relate to themselves, their ways of being and engaging with the world. Therefore, it is
crucial to pay attention to the kind of metaphorical models we apply in our thinking about
ourselves as beings-in-the-world, because we shape ourselves and the world based on
these metaphorical models.
The thought-shaping role of embodied metaphor is illustrated by the above-discussed
example of Machiavelli, who looked at Leonardo da Vinci’s landscape sketches and made
conclusions about objectivity using spatial schemas provided by the visual imagery (as
discussed in Section 3.2). Perspective and distance are therefore conceptual metaphors that
23 For example, pigeons not only can categorize different types of leaves, fish, or people, but also distinguish between
different paintings by Monet and Picasso and generalize unfamiliar paintings from different styles (Hernstein, Loveland
& Cable 1976; Cerella 1980; Watanabe, Sakamoto & Wakita 1995).
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are based on the peculiar schematization of the knowing self and its interaction with the
world. The same applies to the metaphor of the camera obscura (also discussed in Section
3.2), which entails an inside, outside, and a boundary, with the cognizing subject placed in
the dark confined interior and reality being externalized. If you adopt this metaphor as
your model of cognition, it has implications for how you reason, about how cognition
proceeds, and what knowledge is. It means that cognition is the internalization of an
external, pre-given, static reality and knowledge is an image, a mental representation of it.
To  say  that  we  internalize  images  of  the  external  world  is  to  employ  a  metaphor.  The
problem with these metaphors, when they are made the exclusive basis of our
epistemology, is that they disregard the body, its movement, its dynamic interaction with
the world. Static visual metaphors are prioritized and associated with truth and knowledge
because of the persisting prevalence of Greek ocularcentrism in the Western philosophical
tradition (see Section 3.3). In other words, the intellectual tradition, which we inherit
through implicit metaphors, shapes our ways of relating to ourselves and the world, our
habitual ways of knowing, and is hence responsible for establishing certain neural
structures that maintain these habits. Simultaneously, experience acquired from
engagement  with  the  world  may alter  these  neural  structures,  allowing  us  to  modify  our
ways of knowing and being.24 Tradition  shapes  the  body  and  the  body  shapes  tradition:
there is a constant interplay between them enacted in the process of life.
If we explore the conceptual metaphors of the ocularcentric tradition and the Platonic
distinction between the pure, ideal forms and fleeting apparitions, they are based on two
key conceptual metaphors, as characterized by Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 366–367):
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and  KNOWING IS SEEING. Knowing is seeing an object, and one’s
knowledge is dependent on how substantial an object is. Only what is, what exists (Being)
can be known as solid knowledge, and can be clearly seen. What can be seen best by the
mind are ideas, pure forms or essences. Plato upholds a theory of essences, which claims
that there is a single essence shared by the multiplicity of instances of the same thing or
phenomenon; it is the real thing, as opposed to multiple appearances. Only what is real can
be seen, so ideas are objects that exist externally in the world. Subjective apparitions, on
the other hand, belong to the realm of Becoming: they neither are nor are not, so they
cannot be seen/known, and are therefore not real. Plato’s philosophy being at the root of
the Western intellectual tradition results in how we are habituated to think of knowledge,
truth, and reality.
In relation to the different ways of knowing, McGilchrist (2009) proposes a
compelling argument about why philosophers have tended to prioritize certain metaphors
in their thinking. He points out that while the left and right hemispheres of the brain
cannot be divided in terms of “what” they do or what functions they perform, they can,
24 My own process of thinking about notions of truth, knowledge, reality has been affected by my experience of
dance/movement. It showed that there was an altogether different way to think about what it means to know something
and convey that knowledge by using the experience of bodily engagement through movement. I learned that movement,
sense of connection, posture, tension of my own body and other people’s bodies was loaded with meaning.
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however, differ in “how” they do it, in their manner of knowing, of seeing the world.25 The
right hemisphere holds a way of knowing in the sense of experience or an encounter with
something or someone. It is how we approach other living human beings and, crucially,
art. We encounter art experientially in the same way we encounter a person. The meaning
that we derive from this encounter is conveyed metaphorically: it is transmitted and
received by our unconscious minds; it does not need to be translated into words, concepts,
abstract ideas in order to be understood. This way of knowing has to do with living beings;
it does not provide fixed certainties; it is focused on the whole rather than the parts and it
depends on an encounter (McGilchrist 2009, 95).
The  left  hemisphere,  by  contrast,  holds  a  way  of  knowing  which  has  to  do  with
approaching non-living, inert entities; discrete “pieces” of information, impersonal,
general, fixed, certain, distanced knowledge. This knowledge does not vary from person to
person or at one point in time from another; context is irrelevant to it (McGilchrist 2009,
95-96). The left hemispheric way of knowing is about “grasping,” “putting finger on it,”
“getting a hold of it,” which allows seizing a thing in order to control or manipulate it for
our purposes.
The right hemispheric way of knowing, on the other hand, is about exploring without
necessarily seeking to grasp or get a hold of something. McGilchrist (2009) argues that
these  two  different  ways  of  knowing,  of  understanding  offered  by  the  two  hemispheres,
are synthesized in our experience of the world. However, the ways in which these two
versions of knowledge are synthesized is not symmetrical, accounting for which kind of
knowledge tends to dominate in our attempts to understand the world and ourselves.
According to McGilchrist (2009), the left hemispheric way of knowing has gained
dominance in the course of evolution. He hypothesizes that it was the drive to manipulate,
to grasp the environment, which had propelled the expansion of the left hemisphere in our
early ancestors before even language evolved for doing that more effectively. Language is
then regarded by him as the extension of this capacity to grasp and manipulate:
Language enables the left hemisphere to represent the world “off-line,” a conceptual
version, distinct from the world of experience, and shielded from the immediate
environment, with its insistent impressions, feelings and demands, abstracted from the
body, no longer dealing with what is concrete, specific, individual, unrepeatable, and
constantly changing, but with a disembodied representation of the world, abstracted,
central, not particularized in time and place, generally applicable, clear and fixed. Isolating
things artificially from their context brings the advantage of enabling us to focus intently
on a particular aspect of reality and how it can be modeled, so that it can be grasped and
controlled. But the losses are in the picture as a whole. Whatever lies in the realm of the
implicit, or depends on flexibility, whatever can’t be brought into focus and fixed, ceases
to exist as far as the speaking hemisphere is concerned. (McGilchrist 2009, 115)
Language, however,
25 McGilchrist’s theory should be differentiated from the “folk” psychology of left- and right-brain behaviors popular in
the 1970s. He carefully distances himself from these theories.
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begins in the world of experience” by way of metaphor, “which is a function of the right
hemisphere, and is rooted in the body. […] Only the right hemisphere has the capacity to
understand metaphor. […] Metaphoric thinking is fundamental to our understanding of the
world, because it is the only way in which understanding can reach outside the system of
signs to life itself. It is what links language to life. (McGilchrist 2009, 115)
It is relevant to keep in mind, in this regard, that when people come to encounter or
experience something new, it engages their right hemisphere first. Only when the new
thing or situation becomes routine, is its processing transferred to primarily the left
hemisphere (McGilchrist  2009).  The right hemisphere engages with the world by way of
metaphor, which makes sense of what it encounters by way of connotations with the
earlier experience of something else, something that relates to our previous embodied
experience.
For  instance,  such  an  abstract  word  as  “immaterial”  is  a  Latin-origin  term  which
relates to the feel of a piece of wood, or materia (McGilchrist 2009, 116). Denotative
language (left hemisphere) is preceded by connotative language of metaphor (right
hemisphere). Thinking, reasoning begins with metaphorizing when we experience or
encounter something new and are making sense of it by relating it to something else we
already have an experience of. The trajectory of previous experience is therefore crucial
for the breadth and variety of our capacity to make sense of the world we come into
contact with. The metaphors that guide our metaphysics reflect our previous experience:
we can compare and relate the new only in terms ofwhat we are already familiar with.
Metaphors acquired from embodied, lived experience is what enables abstract thought.
For  the  left  hemisphere,  metaphor  is  suspicious.  It  is  regarded  as  a  lie  or  an
unnecessary adornment, which intervenes with certainty and fixity of meaning: we need
only to remember Elton’s advice to historians (Section 3.3) to avoid metaphor by all
means, because it obscures the meaning and, according to him, does not refer to anything
real in the world. Elton’s aforementioned cautioning to guard historical language against
all sources of imprecision and vagueness is a good example of the left hemisphere’s
dominant way of knowing, which ignores how language springs from metaphorical sense-
making and which builds knowledge from observation of pieces of information or data
isolated from their context.
McGilchrist’s (2009) argument suggests that the prevalence of ocularcentrism in
Western  philosophy  could  be  a  sign  of  the  dominance  of  the  left  hemispheric  model  of
knowing, which is taken as the standard of knowledge, according to which all knowledge
is measured. Furthermore, McGilchrist’s (2009) argument is compelling in that it explains
how visual metaphors – the linear perspective, a vantage point, the camera obscura, the
monocular eye of the mind/soul, the mind as a mirror of nature and others – both reflect
philosophers’ lived experience and guide their ways of knowing, being and engaging with
the world. Just as in the case of historians, we have seen how Fernand Braudel’s approach
to studying the past was profoundly shaped by his experience of imprisonment in Lübeck
and how Davis’s experience of motherhood affected her way of writing history (Section
3.3). Their methodology, as their language and style, reflect their lived experience in
engagement with others and the environment.
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As a final point, my argument, supported by the research of Lakoff, Johnson, and
McGilchrist, is that bodily experience and movement allow for abstract thought when we
are making sense of ourselves, others, and the world. In the very way we use metaphorical
models to structure our language and thought, it already illustrates the embodied nature of
thought, of how percept and concept converge in cognition. Realizing how the body
participates in the formation of concepts and abstract ideas bridges the gap between
language and world, mind and world. The body can no longer be overlooked in
discussions of knowledge-making and truth. In the following section, I will discuss what
embodiment entails for historiography and history education.
3.6 Towards embodied ways of making sense of the past
Having posited the notion of history as the process of life and lived experience, the
concept of experience needs to be explained in more detail. A peculiar feature of
embodied experience is that it elides efforts to pin down its defining qualities: “Despite its
continual relevance, even despite its sometimes grinding presence, embodied experience
remains too slippery, fluid, mobile, and variable to be contained comfortably and
completely within any symbolic form” (Brown et al. 2011, 496). Experience, as an
ongoing, transient process, requires different methodological approaches.
LaCapra (2004, 4) asserts that “experience” is a frequently invoked but undertheorized
concept  both  in  history  and  in  related  disciplines.”  He  observes  that  in  the  past  few
decades there has been “an experiential turn,” which led some historians to turn to the
issue of experience, particularly with regard to experience of different marginalized,
subordinated groups (LaCapra 2004, 3). The experiential turn has similarly been visible in
the approaches of microhistory and oral history as well as in the reevaluation of the status
of testimony, which bears witness to lived experience, especially in the cases of traumatic
experience (LaCapra 2004, 3). LaCapra’s particular interest in traumatic experience leads
him to differentiate between the traumatic event and traumatic experience. According to
him, the traumatic event is  firmly situated in the past.  The event is  datable and punctual,
but traumatic experience
is not punctual and has an elusive aspect insofar as it relates to a past that has not passed
away – a past that intrusively invades the present and may block or obviate possibilities in
the future. So-called traumatic memory carries the experience into the present and future in
that the events are compulsively relived or re-experienced as if there were no distance or
difference between past and present. In traumatic memory the past is not simply history as
over and done with. It lives on experientially and haunts or possesses the self or the
community and must be worked through in order for it to be remembered with some
degree of conscious control and critical perspective that enables survival and, in the best of
circumstances, ethical and political agency in the present. (LaCapra 2004, 55)
LaCaprian experience can be conceived of as “the past in the present,” the past, which
persists  in  the  present  in  embodied  memory.  LaCapra  has  an  expansive  definition  of
experience:
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[U]ndergoing something characterizes a person having the experience as well as those
(perhaps unconsciously) identifying with (even being haunted or possessed by) him or her
or, in distinguishable ways, those empathizing with him or her while recognizing and
respecting alterity and even resisting identification. (LaCapra 2004, 43)
LaCapra’s work aims at revealing how the past of lived experience is not something
inaccessible and remote, but something that carries on and can be found in the present
because of conscious or unconscious identification and/or empathizing with people who
underwent the experience. His view is at odds with that of Peter Novick (1999) and Walter
Benn Michaels (1999), for whom remembered lived experience is limited to those who
personally and directly lived through the past experience in question. LaCapra (2004, 43)
questions the latter view by arguing that Novick and Michaels are not able to explain the
intergenerational transmission of trauma, where it is possible to observe posttraumatic
symptoms of experiences in people who have not directly lived through these experiences.
Modell (2003, 40) addresses the persistence of the traumatic experience in the present
by suggesting that traumatic experience remains intact, obliterating the distinction
between the past and the present, when this experience has not been re-contextualized or
transformed as a result of later experience. For a successful transformation, understood as
re-categorization or re-contextualization of traumatic experience, to happen, a metaphoric
process needs to be activated (Modell 1990, 2003). When the metaphoric process is
successful, a metaphor not only transfers meaning, but “can transform meaning and
generate new perceptions” (2003, 27), which means that imagination by way of metaphor
is not a fantasy or fiction, but a re-combinatory metaphoric process, which is very much
tied to lived experience. However, if the traumatic memory is unconscious, it exists as a
latent potential awaiting reconstruction and is triggered later in life by similar
circumstances, where it evokes a transfer of “meaning from the past to the present without
transformation” (Modell 2003, 38). The metaphoric process is foreclosed. In effect, “the
past becomes a template for the present, creating a loss of ambiguity in the experience of
the here and now […] In experiential terms, this means that the present is conflated with
the past” (Modell 2003, 38–39). The past persists in the present in the ways of relating to
others, environment, and the self. Modell argues that “inasmuch as category formation is
an aspect of memory, metaphor provides the link between emotional memory and current
perceptions. […] Unconscious emotional memories exist as potential categories, which, in
the process of retrieval, are associatively linked to events in the here and now by means of
metaphor and metonymy” (Modell 2003, 42–43). For Modell, metaphors are multimodal
and can engage visual, auditory, and kinesthetic inputs (2003, 32). The metaphor is
embodied and does not necessitate language: it can be conveyed in gestures, movements,
visual images, bodily sensations and feelings (Modell 2003, 27). Similar to the argument
of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Modell (2003) asserts that metaphors are not just figures of
speech, but they are “a primary form of cognition and thought that becomes secondarily
incorporated into language” (26–27). Metaphors, for Modell, are selective interpreters of
embodied experience, of both conscious and unconscious memory (2003, xii, 26, 69).
Modell (2003, 171) points out that, since Descartes, some philosophers have been
convinced  that  it  is  not  possible  to  imaginatively  know  other  minds  and  that  only  one’s
own mind can be known with some certainty. Giambattista Vico, in contrast, asserted that
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“our knowledge of other minds is privileged, in the sense that we can imaginatively enter
into other minds and understand the works of human creation in a way that is not possible
with regard to inanimate or other natural objects” (Modell 2003, 172). The difference
between  these  two  different  ways  of  thinking  about  knowledge  of  other  people’s
experience is that Descartes and his followers do not permit for the “as if-ness” of
metaphoric thought: a type of empathy which “involves a sense of similarity while
maintaining a sense of difference. To experience the simultaneity of similarity and
difference requires the acceptance of paradox, which in turn rests on the cognitive capacity
for metaphor” (Modell 2003, 175). For Descartes, there seems to be only two options:
total identification or total alterity, total correspondence or total difference. For Vico,
empathic identification is only partial and does not deny alterity of the other: it only makes
one feel “as if” they resemble the other person. So Modell goes on to argue that “our
cognitive capacity to empathetically know other minds relies on an unimpaired faculty for
metaphoric thought,” where a metaphoric process allows for the play of similarity and
difference enabling a transitory, partial identification (Modell 2003, 175). Individuals,
who have had traumatic experience, have their capacity for metaphoric thought degraded
or impaired:
What  I  have  observed  as  a  clinician  is  that  identification  in  such  cases  is  not  partial  or
transitory  but  absolute  and  total.  There  is  no  sense  of  the  “as  if.”  In  such  cases,  to  feel
identified with the other is viewed as hazardous, as one may fear the possibility of
becoming swallowed up in the other and losing one’s sense of self. […] Identifying with
the other rests on a paradox—that one is similar to the other and yet one remains oneself.
One  must  be  able  to  accept  the  paradox  of  something  that  both  is  and  is  not.  […]  When
metaphors  become  foreclosed  as  a  response  to  trauma,  such  impairments  can  be
circumscribed and limited to metonymic associations to the original trauma. […] Those
who survived the Holocaust, […] live in a world that is beyond metaphor. This loss of the
metaphoric capacity may extend to children of survivors through a form of cultural
transmission. This loss of the sense of safety appears to have been communicated from the
inner world of the parent to the inner world of the child. How this process occurs is not at
all clear. What characteristically develops can be described as a primary identification with
the parent’s experience. Again, there is an inability to accept the paradox of similarity and
difference. The parent’s memories and the parent’s guilt of surviving becomes the child’s
own guilt and memories. Instead of the play of sameness and difference that is part of the
empathic imagination, the child experiences a total identification with his parent. (Modell
2003, 175–177)
Modell’s characterization of how impaired metaphoric thought allows for traumatic
experience to be passed on to the next generation fits well with LaCapra’s definition of
lived experience, as transcending the individual who has personally undergone this
experience, as something that carries on through conscious or unconscious identification
in embodiment. In effect, Modell demonstrates how the past can manifest in the present,
how the past can be engaged with and known in the present. He also shows direction for
finding  ways  to  tackle  the  presence  of  the  past,  especially  the  traumatic  presence  of  the
past, with the help of metaphoric thought. Art, for example, is considered by him as a tool
enhancing metaphoric thought and therefore enabling people to re-contextualize or
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transform the sense of their lived past experiences, asserting both similarity and difference
between the present and the past.
Another important way in which Modell’s approach helps elaborate LaCapra’s insights
is that Modell draws attention to the discovery of “mirror” neurons by two Italian
neuroscientists, Vittorio Gallese and Giacomo Rizzolatti (Gallese, Fadiga, et al. 1996;
Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Gallese 2000). Modell points out that the discovery of mirror
neurons, firstly in monkeys and then in the human brain, shows how the brain is
intrinsically  relational.  Mirror  neurons  fire  when a  person  perceives  an  action  performed
by another individual: the same neural response is evoked as if the one who observes the
action initiated and performed the action. Gallese (2001) believes that there may be more
similar matching mechanisms in the brain, which permit this relational intersubjectivity.
The discovery of mirror neurons, importantly, clashes with a representationalist theory of
mind, which posits a distinction between the external world and its representations in the
mind, which are truthful if they match the reality “out there.” In the case of mirror
neurons, there is a neural link between self and other, which is immediate and which does
not require an intervening symbolic code or a mental language (Modell 2003, 185).
Modell argues that research on mirror neurons and other potential relational matching
mechanisms “suggests that we use our bodies as a template that enables us to feel our way
into the other’s experience. This supports the contention that the roots of empathy are in
the body” (187).
3.6.1 Disembodied and embodied senses of (historical) empathy
So what does it mean to know another mind? And, crucially, which way of knowing – a
first-person, second-person, or third-person approach – is most conducive to making sense
of the experience of another person? If we recall the argument made by Levesque (2016)
and Seixas (2016) in Chapter 2, the disciplinary way of knowing the past is a third-person,
distanced approach aimed at a pursuit of scientific/scholarly knowledge about the past. It
implies that a practicing historian seeks evidence about the behavior of people in the past
and, on the basis of the evidence, makes inferences about what happened. Minds cannot be
known,  but  behavior  or  activities  of  the  people  in  the  past  can.  The  third-person  way of
seeing is tied in this approach to the neo-Cartesian dualism between mind and bodily
behavior. Memory/experience, on the other hand, is characterized by Levesque (2016) and
Seixas (2016) as a first-person, subjective relation to the past, implying that one can
reliably know only one’s own mind, whereas the minds and experiences of others remain
opaque. Both the third-person and the first-person conceptualization of empathy is bound
to be disembodied, because it implicitly relies on dualistic Greek metaphysics and its
separation between mental and bodily dimension of human experience. De Certeau (1998,
39, 46–47, 99–102) argues that this irreversible break between the historian writing in the
present and the experience of the people in the past underpins modern Western
historiography. The historian struggles to access the experience and minds of the people in
the past, but the past is the dead and absent Other. In this understanding, history is
incapable of bridging the experiential abyss between the past and the present.
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As Reddy (2008) is able to clarify, there are two starting positions for the assumption
that a gap exists between one mind and another. The first of these positions states that “I
can know my own mind, but I cannot know your mind.” The second position asserts that
“I can see your body and observe your behavior, but I cannot know whether you have a
mind inside.” In both cases, the mind of another person is assumed to be opaque to
perception. The first position illustrates Cartesian understanding. As Reddy (2008, 9),
explains,
for Descartes, the mind was an isolated, unworldly, and disembodied thing, with no direct
access to anything other than itself. As a consequence, individual minds (or people) were
not only reaching across a profound gap for knowing or relating to other minds, but were
also reaching across a gap in relation to knowing or relating to the world around them.
Their relations were necessarily limited to their own—possibly hallucinatory—ideas about
the world or other minds.” However, even if Descartes’ idea of a mind-body separation has
been rejected in psychology and in cognitive sciences, a mind-behavior dualism is still
alive and well. (Reddy 2008)
The mind-behavior dualism is one of the primary principles taught to students of
psychology: It asserts that description of behavior must be clearly separated from
interpretation of its meaning, because the behavior of the body is transparent to the
observer, while the “mental” meaning is opaque and only accessible by interpretation and
inference (Reddy 2008, 10). Behavior and the body, in other words, should by no means
be confounded with meaning. The meaning is assumed to be disembodied, mentalistic,
hidden in the mind, and impervious to perception. Behavior can be read, but not the minds
and experienced meaning: “If we cannot know anything other than our experience, and if
we cannot directly experience minds other than our own […], then it follows with an
inevitable logic that we have absolutely no way of knowing the experience of others”
(Reddy 2008, 12). Another sense in which mind has been understood as disembodied is by
portraying it as a “mental representational” entity that exists in “representations” and can
be known only by inference (Reddy 2008, 15).
The idea that other minds are opaque, unknowable, “hidden from view” is based on a
faulty Cartesian assumption of an internalized cognizing self. If you assume that the mind
is an isolated, disembodied entity, hidden in the confines of one’s head, then, you can at
most be certain about your own mind, whereas the minds of others remain a mystery.  In
such case, all you can do is to observe the behavior of others and make inferences about
their minds on the basis of the behavioral evidence. Yet, the Cartesian assumption rests on
a misguided ocular-optic metaphor of a disembodied eye of the mind and the internal
cognizing subject (for example, as in the camera obscura metaphor). If you adopt this
assumption, knowing other minds would entail, quite impossibly, being the other person,
implying total identification and discarding alterity of people in the past.
So how can other minds be known? One route to bridge the gap between minds, Reddy
(2008, 19-21) posits, has been the first-person route, when the experience of another
person  is  understood  on  the  basis  of  one’s  own  experience.  The  modern  version  of  this
argument from analogy adopts the view that
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[p]erceiving the similarity of behavior between bodies, the individual has only to access
her own mental experience usually accompanying that behavior and use this experience as
an internal model for the other’s mind. Recognizing situations that the other is in, the
individual can run “simulations” of the experiences she would have if she were in that
situation, and through these “simulations” she can feel or think what the other feels or
thinks. (Reddy 2008, 20)
The first-person route is, however, problematical in tying knowledge of other’s mind
completely to one’s own experience (Reddy 2008, 19). The idea that, in order to
understand another’s experience, one needs to extrapolate from one’s own personal
experience is a neo-Cartesian notion, because it explains intersubjectivity as an ascription
of one’s own subjectivity to others (because you can only know your own mind reliably)
rather than seeing intersubjectivity as an engagement between subjectivities (Reddy 2008,
23). It implies that an empathic understanding of another’s experience is based on
sameness between my experience and someone else’s experience.
Reddy (2008), on the other hand, proposes a second-person approach to knowing other
minds.  She  argues  that  the  first-person  approach  lacks  a  recognition  of  difference  of  the
other and the ability to respond in the situation of embodied interaction. The second-
person approach implies an alternation of engagement and disengagement, as opposed to
the third-person detachment or the first-person ascription of one’s own introspected state
(Reddy 2008, 35–36). Engagement implies encountering another as a separate person
while simultaneously blurring the line between self and other. Others are experienced as
others, but in direct emotional engagement (Reddy 2008, 26). Yet, engagement between
subjectivities does not preclude disengagement, which is not the same as detachment.
Disengagement happens within the frame of engagement, not outside of it; it is “a
temporary stepping outside the frame to explore the frame better” (Reddy 2008, 36). One
could say that disengagement, as characterized by Reddy (2008), is reminiscent of Alva
Noë’s (2015) discussion of how art and philosophy both require some extent of
disengagement in order to notice and to make manifest how we are organized by certain
ideas. Knowing other minds and their experienced meaning, for Reddy (2008), happens in
engagement with the other person and it does not necessarily require a mediating
language, a symbolic code, or evidence-based inferences. Empathic knowledge of other
minds means sharing in the experienced, embodied meaning of other persons.
Furthermore, the second-person approach illustrates the paradox of a metaphoric
empathic relationship, where one can imaginatively experience an embodied felt sense of
what it is like to be someone else, while at the same time maintaining a differentiation
between  self  and  other.  This  implies  a  combination  of  the  so-called  “cognitive”  and
“affective” aspects of empathy, when we are able to recognize both that other people have
different  experiences  and  beliefs  than  our  own and,  at  the  same time,  we  are  capable  of
sharing another’s experience and emotions. In practice, these two elements of empathy are
typically intertwined.
The possibility of such empathic knowledge is corroborated by studies on mirror
neuron systemswhich show strong links between the mirror neuron systems and empathy,
as, for example, in the case of observing facial emotional expressions (Carr et al. 2003;
Leslie et al. 2004; Pfeifer et al. 2008) or grasping actions (Kaplan & Iacoboni 2006). In
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fact, Gallese’s (2001) initial prediction that there may be multiple neural matching
mechanisms in the brain has been proven correct, as different mirror neuron systems for
emotion, action, touch, and pain have been discovered (Spaulding 2013, 234). In the case
of facial expressions, for example, this means that the same neural circuits of the mirror
neuron system for emotion are recruited when we observe facial expressions of other
people and when we ourselves adopt these expressions. Neuroimaging studies of the
neural mechanisms involved in the perception of pain, too, reveal that the affective states
of others can be shared intersubjectively and intercorporeally (Morrison et al. 2004;
Botvinick et al. 2005; Jackson et al. 2005). Other studies also demonstrate that the areas of
the brain activated during a particular action are also activated not just by observation of
this  action  being  performed  by  another  person,  but  likewise  by  imagination  of  the  same
action (Decety & Chaminade 2003; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). The main insight
coming  from  the  growing  literature  on  mirror  neuron  systems  is  that  we  have  direct
experiential knowledge of others, which is gained not purely cognitively, through
linguistic representations, but by “simulating”26 the embodied minds of others (Gallese et
al. 1996; Gallese et al. 2004; Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011; Gallese 2014). This
corporeal imagination of what it is like to be the other person proceeds through preverbal,
gestural, and tactile relations with others (Hustvedt 2016, 410). As Wojciechowski and
Gallese elaborate,
[e]mbodied simulation is a mandatory, pre-rational, non-introspective process – that is, a
physical, and not simply ‘mental’ experience of the mind, emotions, lived experiences and
motor intentions of other people. Embodied simulation challenges the notion that
interpersonal understanding consists solely of our explicitly attributing to others
propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, which we map as symbolic representations
within our own minds. (Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011, para. 39)
In a related vein of research, illuminating how mirror neuron matching mechanisms
work in the absence of an actual bodily contact with another person, reading has been
shown to be an embodied experiential activity, where reading about actions and bodily
movements  evokes  a  neural  firing  in  the  premotor  and  motor  cortex  as  well  as  a  motor
potential in the limbs (Aziz-Zadeh et al 2006; Fischer & Zwaan 2008; Speer et al. 2005).
Reading about affective states similarly leads to those feelings and emotions being felt in
the body, resulting in the readers’ feeling of the affective states of characters (Oatley
26 The usage of the term “simulation” to describe intersubjective attunement has been contested by phenomenologist
Shaun Gallagher (2007). His critique of simulation suggests that it is more appropriate to comprehend embodied
attunement between persons as a direct intersubjective “perception” rather as a “simulation”. On the other hand, both
Gallagher (2007) and the supporters of the implicit simulation theory (Gallese et. al 1996, Gallese et al. 2004;
Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011; Gallese 2014) contest the disembodied explanation of interpersonal understanding,
according to which understanding between persons proceeds by inferential attribution of mental states to others. In my
own discussion of mirror neuron systems, I will keep using the term “simulation”. However, as I specify below, I do not
take it to mean that we first make an offline model of the other person’s movements, actions or emotions and then
internalize it. Rather, embodied “simulation” here implies a direct, bodily experience of the other person’s emotions,
actions or movements.
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2002; Clay & Iacoboni 2011; Miall 2011; Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011). Reading about
people’s emotions, actions, and experiences stimulates the mirror neuron systems of
readers in grasping what the characters are undergoing (Chersi et al. 2010). The same
activation of mirror neurons seems to play out with “simulation” of embodied emotions,
corporeal sensations, and actions when engaging with visual artwork (Freedberg &
Gallese 2007). Spectators of artwork may undergo feelings of empathetic engagement
with the depicted content or they may also, especially in the case of abstract art,
experience empathetic engagement with bodily movements whose traces are implied in,
for example, brush marks or paint drippings (Freedberg & Gallese 2007).27
What this suggests is  that  emotions,  actions,  movements are not first  copied and then
internalized, but directly experienced; the reader/viewer does not firstly form an image of
another’s emotions, actions, gestures and then “internalize” or introject them; she
undergoes them in an embodied, engaged way by reading or looking at a painting, a
sculpture, a video. It is not an image imitation, but an embodied intersubjective experience
(Kuzmi?ová 2012b; 2014). An ocularcentric, mentalistic imitation, or mimesis, implies a
gap between an image and the world, a representation and reality, self and other, the
internal  and  the  external.  The  embodied  empathetic  engagement  is  at  odds  with  this
ocular-mimetic theory of knowledge. Some scholars, for lack of a better term, propose to
regard the embodied, empathetic, engaged way of knowing as “perceptual mimesis”28
(Scarry 1999; Kuzmi?ová 2012a) or, also, as a process of sensorimotor
simulation/resonance (Kuzmi?ová 2012b). Gallese (Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Gallese
2014) uses the term “embodied simulation” to convey the idea of intersubjectivity as a
second-person intercorporeal attunement between self and other.
Embodied resonance allows for the reader’s/viewer’s sense of presence in a story or an
artwork, which is experiential and characterized by bodily interaction with environment.
In fact, Kuzmi?ová’s (2012a) research shows that detailed visual descriptions (as opposed
to simple remarks and other narrative instances of fiction) fail to elicit experiential
imagination. Detailed visual descriptions, while they can be thought of as more faithful
representations of reality (in terms of an ocular theory of truth), lack the experiential
quality because “visual description construed as stasis and as subsequent temporary
detachment from the object described has no purely experiential correlate in the actual
world. For in visual description, interaction has come to a temporary halt” (Kuzmi?ová
2012a, 283). Lengthy visual descriptions, especially of inanimate objects, tend to evoke a
sense of being informed of visual facts with no sense of direct perceptual, interactive
experience, which goes hand in hand with their low memorability (Kuzmi?ová 2012a,
286).  By  contrast,  what  enhances  the  vivid  sense  of  embodied  resonance,  or  empathic
capacity, is comments on bodily movement and motor interaction with the environment
(Kuzmi?ová 2012b; Fischer and Zwaan 2008). So in the case of embodied resonance,
reading or looking at art is not a passive, detached, externalized third-person activity, but
27 See, for example, Julie Mehretu’s “Invisible Sun (algorithm 6, third letter form),” Jackson Pollock’s “Number 32” and
Lucio Fontana’s “Concetto Spaziale ‘Atteza.’”
28 I choose to avoid the term “perceptual mimesis” in my work because of the connections of the notion of “mimesis” to
Greek metaphysics.
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more of an engaged, dynamic process by which meaning is achieved. This meaning,
furthermore, is neither strictly “in” the words nor “in” the painting (whose meaning you
decode and internalize), nor “in” the reader/viewer: the meaning is brought forth or
achieved in the experience of engagement between the reader/viewer and the text/artwork;
the meaning is emergent in engagement.
As Hustvedt (2016, 372) insightfully states, “the imagination itself, the ‘as if’ realm of
human life, is not generated by purely mental activity, by conscious thinking processes,
but originates in our fundamental intercorporeality.” Thus, imagination and empathy are
interconnected. The connection that is activated and that offers insights into what the other
person or even a character in a narrative is undergoing does not depend exclusively on a
conscious mental process, but to a large extent derives from a bodily connection, likely
mediated by mirror neuron systems and other bodily connection mechanisms, which
neuroscientists are only beginning to understand. The kind of in-between space, between
self and other, that is generated does not entail “a delusion of my actually being the other,”
but serves rather as a “means of connecting with the other” (Hustvedt 2016, 380).
Understanding of meaning that proceeds in this connection does not rely on inference or
on identifying differential relationships of signs.
3.6.1.1 Empathy in history
Historians, who spend hours engaging with traces of past lives in sources, undoubtedly
have a capacity to forge such an empathic connection with people in the past and partake
in their lived meaning. Even if the histories they produce are not a mirror copy of the past
and equally evoke the historians’ own lived experience, history writing does have a
capacity to offer some non-arbitrary meaning of the past that does not depend on
historians’ narrative organization of material and emplotment strategies. It is, rather, the
bodily-rooted capacity for imagination and empathy that conveys the meaning of
experience: “The imagination must be understood as a corporeal reality, one that can move
from one person to another” (Hustvedt 2016, 407).
Although the topic of empathy is not new to the discipline of history, historical
empathy remains a problematic and vague term, even for researchers who study empathy
(e.g., Davis 2001). There also seems to be a lack of understanding and agreement on what
empathy is and how it can be taught (Shemilt 1984). For example, Barton (1996, 4)
proposes  that  historical  empathy  is  the  skill  of  recognizing  how  historical  actors viewed
their circumstances. Downey (1995) expresses his preference for the term “perspective
taking” to historical empathy, because it implies an ability to understand the frames of
reference of the people in the past without trying to identify with their feelings. The
overall tendency is to define historical empathy as a disembodied mental act, aiming to
know the thoughts of the people in the past. Empathy is reduced to cognitive empathy,
excluding the affective and bodily aspect of empathic connection.
This is problematic for two main reasons. First of all, taking only a cognitive step to
another person’s perspective, without an affective empathic identification, is how
sociopaths empathize: This means that history education,which only teaches pupils to take
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the perspective of another, without the affective component, is diminishing their capacity
for empathy. Secondly, the mentalistic conception of historical empathy, as the above
definitions demonstrate, is inseparable from ocularcentric, vision-oriented metaphors for
making sense of what empathy is. Researchers speak of empathy as the ability to identify
how historical actors viewed their circumstances and as perspective taking.
Perspective is, however, a fixed and static viewpoint. If our empathic goal is to
understand where somebody “is coming from” rather than merely “where they stand,” the
metaphor of “perspective taking” is insufficient to convey the meaning of empathic
relation. The metaphor of perspective eludes the process of lived experience, which shapes
perception. If, by contrast, we seek to know how the temporally extended process of lived
experience shapes the worldviews of another person, we are trying to understand their
non-linear process of life, their “path of life” and not just an isolated present context.
Implicit in “perspective taking” is also an assumption that worldviews and values are fixed
and rigid; “perspective taking” prevents us from recognizing change of experience over
time. “Perspective taking” should not be taken as an exclusive metaphor for empathy
because it obscures the process of lived experience.
Philosopher of history R. G. Collingwood, who has elaborated on the topic of
historical empathy, conceived of it as historical imagination. He famously proposed that
[a]ll history is history of thought. But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he
is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by rethinking them in
his own mind. […] The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of
past thought in the historian’s own mind. (Collingwood 1946, 215)
According to him, historians should therefore inquire into the thinking of historical actors
by re-thinking the thoughts of the past actors. It is an active endeavor on the part of the
historian, who “not only reenacts past thought, he reenacts it in the context of his own
knowledge and therefore, in reenacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its
value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it” (Collingwood 1946, 215).
Importantly, Collingwood (1946) consistently upholds a dichotomy between nature
and history, where nature is associated with a process of events, whereas history – with a
process of thought: “so far as man’s conduct is determined by what may be called his
animal nature, […], it is non-historical” (216). Thought, on the other hand, is above nature
and bodily life, and is a proper subject of interest for historians:
Thus a biography […] is constructed on principles that are not only non-historical but anti-
historical. Its limits are biological events, the birth and death of a human organism: its
framework is thus a framework not of thought but of natural process. […] The record of
immediate experience with its flow of sensations and feelings, faithfully preserved in a
diary or recalled in a memoir, is not history. (Collingwood 1946, 304)
Thought itself is characterized by Collingwood as the “inside” of a historical event and
contrasted to the “outside” of an event, which is an event in terms of bodies and their
movement (213). Mind and thought are located in the interior, evoking the ocularcentric
metaphorical models of cognition. Therefore, although he criticizes the application of the
scientific method to the discipline of history, he is embracing the Cartesian mind-body
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dualism in his philosophy of history. The animal nature in man in no way affects the
historical process of thought:
[S]ensation as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from conceptions, appetite as
distinct from will. Their importance to us consists in the fact that they form the proximate
environment in which our reason lives […]. They are the basis of our rational life, though
no part of it”. (Collingwood 1946, 231, emphasis added)
This dualistic assertion stands in sharp contrast to the findings of cognitive linguist George
Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1999), which show the embodied and, to a large
extent, unconscious nature of thought.
In order to know other minds, to reenact another’s, Collingwood (1946, 291) believes,
the historian should go beyond immediate bodily experience or feeling, and be aware of
one’s act of thought cognitively, which renders the knowledge of another’s mind
objective. Collingwood’s argument seems to be permeated by this recurrent contradiction.
He elevates thought above the body, but simultaneously does not find it contradictory to
criticize the “philological way” of doing history, which only focuses on names, dates,
ready-made descriptive phrases and which is only “dry bones,” as opposed to the re-
enactment of past thought, which clothes these “dry bones” “with the flesh and blood of a
thought” (1946, 305). His argument seems to oscillate between these two different ways of
thinking about the “living past” and how it can be known. The conclusion seems to be
that, for Collingwood, thoughts of people in the past can be reenacted in one’s
disembodied mind because they are simply re-thinkable propositional contents, separate
from  bodily  processes.  Thoughts  are  disembodied:  They  are  above  the  physiology,  the
corporeal, and the natural.29
Collingwood describes imagination as a mental operation, an activity which bridges
the gaps between different sources of evidence and allows making inferences about what
has happened. It has a structural function in the historian’s thinking process: without it,
“we could never perceive the world around us […]: it is this which, operating not
capriciously  as  fancy  but  in  its a priori form,  does  the  entire  work  of  historical
construction” (Collingwood 1946, 241). Collingwood sought to distance himself from the
understanding of historical imagination as a flight of fantasy, and he did that by insisting
that historical imagination needed to be tied to inferential judgments based on evidence.
Inferential reasoning, however, is not a relational, second-person approach to knowing
other minds – it is an objectifying, third-person approach of an external, detached
spectator. Accordingly, Collingwood delineated between the task of the historian and that
of the novelist:
29 One of the few instances, where I found Collingwood’s elaboration on knowing minds of people in the past to come
somewhat closer to an embodied, relational understanding, was, when he argued that, “to the historian, the activities
whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they
are objective, or known to him, only because they are also subjective, or activities of his own” (Collingwood 1946, 218).
In this case, he makes a clear distinction between a detached, spectatorial way of knowing and a relational, experiential
way of knowing, aligning the latter with the historian’s method. Yet, this does not translate into any kind of coherent
thinking about historical empathy on Collingwood’s part.
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As works of imagination, the historian’s work and the novelist’s do not differ. Where they
do differ is that the historian’s picture is meant to be true. The novelist has a single task
only: to construct a coherent picture, one that makes sense. The historian has a double task:
he has both to do this, and to construct a picture of things as they really were and of events
as they really happened. This further necessity imposes upon him obedience to three rules
of method, from which the novelist or artist in general is free. First, his picture must be
localized in space and time […]. Secondly, all history must be consistent with itself. […]
Thirdly, and most important, the historian’s picture stands  in  a  peculiar  relation  to
something called evidence. (Collingwood 1946, 246, emphasis added)
Imagination, construed this way, is not much more than an inferential judgment: “The
hero of a detective novel is thinking exactly like an historian when, from indications of the
most varied kinds, he constructs an imaginary picture of how a crime was committed, and
by whom” (Collingwood 1946, 243, emphasis added). This kind of historical imagination
remains tied exclusively to “perspective taking” or cognitive imagination of a static
picture of where a person “stands” without an effort to comprehend where they are
“coming from.”
Levesque (2009), reflecting on historical empathy in educational contexts, suggests
that historical empathy could be regarded as entailing three interrelated aspects: historical
imagination, historical contextualization, and judgment of the past. Imagination here
implies mental re-creation of what it was like to be in the context of the time. In the
educational context, this means that students would be offered to engage with a wide
range of multimodal sources and objects to facilitate the imagination of the past.
Experiential learning activities could be used to induce imagination, such as dramatic re-
enactment, role-play, field trips or virtual history. Contextualization, on the other hand, is
conceived by him as a mental act primarily based on mental thinking processes (Levesque
2009, 150, 155). When contextualizing the past, three interrelated contexts need to be
taken into account: the personal (inner), the sociocultural (outer), and contemporary
(present-day) (Levesque 2009, 150).
Levesque explains that “the personal context refers to the inner beliefs, perspectives,
and environment of the author of the source”; the sociocultural context implies the social,
cultural, and economic context of the time and an author’s relation or participation in that
context; lastly, the contemporary context denotes the historian’s own context which
shapes the way he or she imagines and contextualizes the past (2009, 150–151). Finally,
empathizing with the past is unavoidably linked to judging the past. Levesque (2009, 167)
encourages teachers to help their students clarify their own sets of moralities and keep
awareness of these when considering values and beliefs of historical actors.
I suggest thatan exclusively mentalistic, cognitive, ocular notion of historical empathy
should be combined with an embodied and relational understanding of empathy: empathy
as metaphoric imagination where one aims not for a total (ocular) identification
(knowledge as sameness), but for a metaphoric, partial, “as if” identification, where one
can hold a paradox of both being and not being like the other person. Ultimately, this
implies both respecting the alterity of the other person and imaginatively identifying with
the  person  in  the  past,  his  or  her  embodied  lived  experience  –  it  implies  the  practice  of
metaphoric thought (Modell 2003). It does not entail a first-person projective
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identification of the sort one can sometimes find in history textbooks: for example,
“Imagine you are a soldier in WWI. Write a letter home” (Kitson and Husbands 2011, 68–
69). A relational, embodied, second-person empathetic engagement requires a lot of
information and a variety of sources about the people in the past in order to enable an
understanding of their experience. The kind of knowledge that it leads to is not merely
spectatorial, detached, disembodied.
Moreover, when one adopts the understanding of empathy not as total identification,
but as a transitory, partial, metaphoric identification, the problem of how to combine
empathy and judgment/evaluation of the past can be transmuted. Indeed, one can both
empathize with a person in the past and, recognizing them as a different human being,
judge or evaluate their actions (such as, for example, actions of slave-traders, imperial
colonizers, or the Nazis). This is particularly relevant in the case of violent, brutal,
dehumanizing actions of people in the past, if there is an attempt to make sense of the
lived experience of the perpetrators and not just of victims.
Empathizing does not mean you have to accept and agree (sympathize) with the
actions of the perpetrators of violence: it can only mean that if the metaphoric thought is
replaced by the (literal) total identification with the perpetrator. This is an important point
to stress with regard to Megill’s (2007, Chapter 2) view that a focus on memory of lived
experience undermines history’s critical function, that is, renders history incapable of
delivering a sustained critical account. Megill (2007) seems to be convinced that the focus
on memory can only be affirmative,  while I  would point out that  this view stems from a
misunderstanding of what empathic, second-person engagement with people in the past
entails.
Crucially, this invites rethinking the historicist principle not to judge the past and
regard it on its own terms. An embodied, relational understanding of empathic
imagination allows regarding both the experience of people in the past on their own terms
and acknowledging how the actions of these people may be unacceptable to the
investigator, in the light of his or her experience and contemporary social and cultural
environment. The two are not mutually exclusive. Some critics might also say that this
implies that there are no absolute moral standards, and if there are no absolute moral
standards, one does not have any foundation for non-arbitrary evaluation of the past. This
assertion  only  holds  if  one  assumes  that,  there  being  no  absolute  moral  standards,  his  or
her embodied, lived experience is rendered non-valid, not true. This logic only applies
when one separates the notion of truth from embodied, lived experience.
The neuroscientific research on how empathy is enabled by mirror neuron systems in
relation to other people as well as artwork and literature provides clues as to how empathy
works and how it could be elicited. In an embodied approach, historical empathy is an
experiential, dynamic, bodily engagement and not just “viewing the past through the eyes
of the people in the past.” Embodied connection between self and other allows for
understanding of meaning that is not dependent on inference, interpretation and analysis of
relationships between signs. In the next section, I will elaborate further on how embodied
ways of making sense of the past could be put into practice.
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3.6.2 Putting embodied ways of making sense of the past into practice
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) conceptual metaphor theory has significant
implications  for  the  discipline  of  history.  If  we  take  seriously  the  claim that  the  way we
think, reason and conceptualize is shaped by metaphor and image-schemas, rooted in
bodily, sensorimotor experience, this holds several implications. It suggests that
historians’ assumptions concerning what the past, events, causation, time, and the mind is;
what relation between the past and the historian is; how historians can know the past and
make sense of it; and historians’ theories of truth and reference, depend on their, mostly
unconscious, choice of metaphors. However, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999; Johnson
2007) metaphors are not conceived of as idealist, deep mental structures, as an “internal”
mental system of understanding that is removed from the world “out there.” Their notion
of metaphors is embodied: It links abstract conceptualization with a process of embodied,
lived experience and interaction of the cognizing self and the world, to the extent that the
boundary between the two is blurry, although not completely absent.
I agree with Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999; Johnson 2007) that metaphor use is
inevitable and necessary in cognition and thought. Without metaphor and image-schemas
our capacity to reason, understand and make sense of the world would be greatly
impoverished. Yet metaphors, which structure philosophical concepts, often tend to be
taken as literal and the only possible ways to make sense of reality and our relation to it.
Metaphors highlight certain aspects of reality for us and hide others. Just as philosophers,
historians, too, need to reconsider the taken-for-granted, implicit metaphors, which inform
ontological and epistemological assumptions in the discipline of history and assess their
aptness for purposes of understanding.30
In the light of the latest findings of cognitive neuroscience and embodied cognition, a
disembodied idea of mind is no longer tenable. Mind and body are not separate, nor are
they ontologically different in kind. Cognition does not entail detachment or separation
from the world, but quite the opposite – engagement and interaction between the organism
and its environment. This means that the dualist image-schema of representationalism and
internalism no longer serves as an appropriate metaphor to explain our interaction with
and cognition of the world. This is the beauty and the paradox of the insight of enactive
embodiment:  Elevation  of  an  embodied  experience  of  sight,  to  which  Hans  Jonas  (1982
[1966]) insightfully drew attention, allowed for a disembodied theory of mind and
cognition to emerge in Greek philosophy.
For  the  discipline  of  history,  it  means  that  sources  are  traces  of  an  embodied  life  as
lived and not merely subjective “perspectives.” Sources reveal something about how a
shared world is lived in terms of individual histories. Sources are traces of past life, which
can offer valuable insights, depending on historians’ questions and interests. Embodied
engagement with sources implies that historians do not just infer and interpret meaning,
but they can have a bodily and empathic connection with the lived past by way of sources.
30 The representational theory of mind, which informs the correspondence theory of truth and empiricist epistemology,
as seen in Section 3.5, is shaped by mind-body dualism and an imagistic schema of the mind-world gap, where mind is
located in the interior, detached from the externalized world.
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Empathic engagement with the sources may offer historians an understanding of the
meaning of lived experience that is based on bodily attunement rather than solely inferred
(as discussed in Section 3.6.1).
Moreover, just as historians’ attempts to know and understand are metaphorically
structured and shaped by unconscious emotional responses and previous experience, so
too did people in the past make sense of their environment and circumstances in terms of
embodied, lived experience. These people may not have had all the relevant information
for making sense of their environment, but irrespective of such informational tools, their
understanding of their environment was based on their embodied, lived experience of
interaction with the world.
As such, lived experience cannot be reduced to a subjective, mental, disembodied
image, which bears no link to reality, because it constitutes past reality. This is one of the
implications of rejecting a sharp and disembodied subject-object dualism, where what is
subjective is solely an internal arbitrary mentalistic construct, opposed to objective reality.
Importantly, the way people experienced their situation shaped their actions and ways of
being, irrespective of how accurate their judgment was, or what they invented to explain
their sometimes inexplicable experience. It is worthwhile to remember that emotion is
real, even when it is not based on an accurate assessment of a situation. Historians’ work
then consists in combining critical analysis and comparison of various sources with an
empathic engagement with lived experience and ways of being of the people in the past.
Since the metaphorical structuring of mind as an interior space “containing” quasi-
objects or mental entities, such as propositions, ideas, concepts, and thoughts, is flawed, a
methodology for knowing the lived past entails an embodied approach. This approach
requires a reconsideration of how mind and thought relate to the world. For one, the
thought of people in the past (as in the present) was not solely linguistic. As Lakoff and
Johnson (1980, 1999) demonstrate, thought does not necessarily require language.
Thought is metaphorical, imagistic, and embodied. This position is opposed to a
“spectatorial view of interpretation” of others’ minds (Hutto 2004, 549), which assumes
that mental states of others (thoughts, feelings, intentions) are hidden inside people’s
heads and, in order to perceive them, we need special cognitive processes (Maiese 2011).
To perceive others’ mental states, according to this view, we need to adopt a third-person,
distanced way of seeing, observe behavioral output and then make inferences based on
gathered evidence. It is the work of a detached (fully objective) spectator.
What is overlooked in such accounts is that most of what amounts to understanding
others’ (embodied) minds happens in emotive and embodied engagement and interaction.
For example, Dominick LaCapra suggests that besides such experiential sources as diaries
and autobiographies (LaCapra 2004), oral and video testimonies are also valuable to
historians because of
their distinctive relation to experience or the way events are lived; their role in the
reconstruction of events, especially in the absence or paucity of other sources; the manner
in which they enable one to hear the grain of the embodied voice in relation to facial
expressions and bodily gestures, making “voice” more than a metaphor; and the way they
bring up the issue of  the “tricks” memory plays,  at  times related to post-traumatic  effects
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and the interplay of conscious and unconscious forces involved in the movements and
vagaries of memory. (LaCapra 2016, 382)
Oral and video testimonies enable one to understand embodied and emotive meanings of
the lived past. It is not the case that we first form an image of others’ minds and then
internalize it. Understanding happens through embodied and empathic resonance between
bodies, as discussed in Section 3.6.1. If, however, sources, which could afford such
embodied, emotive meaning, are lacking, then inference-making, theorizing and prediction
become necessary. But this also means that understanding of others’ lived experience most
likely remains quite opaque.
If thought is not exclusively linguistic and if it is not just a disembodied “text” to be
“read,” it means that when we make sense of the lived past, a linguistic model of meaning
is not suitable: “Meaning cannot be reduced to a sign which exists on a separate level
outside the immediate sphere of the body’s acts” (Connerton 1989, 95). In a linguistic
model of meaning, the prevailing conceptual metaphors are MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS,
WORDS ARE CONTAINERS and COMMUNICATION IS SENDING (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).
Meaning, according to this metaphorical understanding, is contained in the words
themselves. To make sense of meanings, people only need to passively receive the carrier
words, decode them, and then turn them into inner mental representations. Alternatively,
meaning can likewise be conceived of in terms of a relationship of concepts in a formal
system. Even if, in this understanding, meaning does not inhere in words as a thing-like
entity, meaning remains “outside the sphere of the body’s acts.”
As Connerton (1989, 100–101) points out, textual sources have formed the privileged
story in the history of hermeneutics, while the embodied practices have been neglected or
ignored. This also explains why embodied practices continue to be approached by
interpreters as “texts” that can be read and as metaphorical “carriers” or “containers” of
meanings that can be “unpacked.” It reflects the history of humanist interpreters who
sought after the original meaning of the text and who, therefore, developed a method and a
theory  of  historical  criticism,  in  order  to  assess  the  authenticity  of  documents,  to
discriminate between original and secondary sources, or to assess a bias of a source
(Connerton 1989, 100).
This preoccupation with the original textual meaning and its faithful reproduction
could be traced, in fact, to the tradition of accurate ritual repetition whose main purpose
was to preserve the unchanging substance of the group identity (Assmann 2011). Enacting
a disembodied subject-object dualism, textual sources can then be ranked according to
how accurately they represent the objective past reality, ignoring how a given source, be it
a diary or an autobiography, gives insight into how the past was lived and meaningful in
its embodiment. Historical criticism alone, as such, is therefore inept in its efforts to make
sense of the past in embodied terms: Its tools have been shaped by different goals and
understandings of meaning-making processes. The dominance of the philological
approach obscures the bodily sources of meaning and underscores strict subject-object and
mind-body dualisms.
But embodied meaning cannot be examined independently of its being lived. If
historians completely overlooked how the past was lived, experienced by, and was
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meaningful to people, then history would only be a chronicle containing generalized
propositions about states of the world. The depiction of the past in a chronicle could still
be evaluated by historians in terms of their own conceptualizations, emotional responses
and values, but it would lose touch with the lived past. When history is, however, written
without attention to the lived, experiential past, I believe that it also loses the capacity to
engage readers, to enable readers to find themselves moved by the past (cf. Runia 2014).
The  issue  of  how  mind  and  thought  relates  to  the  world  has  also  recently  become  a
topic of debate in archaeology. Archaeology is a disciplinary approach, which may be a
rich source of theoretical and methodological insights into how we could reconceive the
relation between knowledge and reality and pay attention to the ways of being and
embodied practices implicit in things that endure in the present.31 As  a  field  of  study  in
which a focus on representations has been replaced by a “return to things,” materiality and
the experiential (Hodder 2012), archaeology gives clues as to how the past process of life
is embodied in the traces of the past that gives us access to a lived past. As Hodder
explains, before a “return to things,” the application of structuralist and poststructuralist
theories centered archaeologists’ gaze on symbols and signs, whose arbitrary nature was
taken for granted: “Since the relationship between signifier and signified was seen as
conventional and arbitrary, constructivist perspectives were foregrounded, and subject and
object, mind and matter were thoroughly disconnected” (Hodder 2012, 16). In other
words, mind was metaphorically structured as an interior container of arbitrary mental
constructs disconnected from the world. What, however, soon became apparent is that
there is some link between signifier, signified, and lived context, shifting the focus of
archaeologists to interconnectedness of things and human experience (Hodder 2012, 16).
Archaeologists began to problematize the treatment of material culture as a site of
subjective “inscription” that always represents something else:
A subtext in most contemporary approaches is an implicit conception of culture as
somehow “prior” to or detached from matter, with an assumption that cultures, “already
different,” approach the material world in unique ways, causing a variety of material
expressions and meanings. Thus, despite much talk about somatic experiencing and bodily
practices, things and landscapes seem to have little to offer to this experience beyond being
plastic, open ended, and receptive. (Olsen 2010, 3)
Thus, instead of reducing materiality to little more than discursive objects, the
“phenomena” of subjective experience, to passive entities, which wait to be endowed with
socially constituted meanings, archaeologists are increasingly paying attention to how
things, materials, and landscapes shape and affect our perception and interaction with
31 See, for example, A Desolate Place for a Defiant People: The Archaeology of Maroons, Indigenous Americans, and
Enslaved Laborers in the Great Dismal Swamp, by Daniel O. Sayers (2014). The book tells the history of a community
of fugitive slaves, maroons, living on an island in the middle of The Great Dismal Swamp. It is a history of slavery as it
was lived rather than merely a history of the institution of slavery. It would remain untold had the archaeologist not
ventured into the thick of the swamp, found the island on which the fugitive slave community was established and
performed excavations on it.
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them by way of their own unique qualities (Olsen 2010).32 This point can be illustrated by
an earlier example from Section 3.3: Braudel’s understanding of what history is and by
means of what methodology it should be studied was shaped by his experiences of the
Mediterranean as well as the imprisonment in Lübeck. I believe these insights from the
field of archaeology are similarly applicable in the discipline of history and social
sciences, more generally. Similarly, Ewa Domanska has asserted that “the future of the
ways of thinking about the past […] depends on and belongs to achaeologists” as well as
other  scholars  interested  in  the  past,  who  are  reformulating  their  relation  to  the  material
remnants of the past (Domanska 2005, 393, 2006). The focus on materiality, relations, and
interactions can potentially transform the subject matter of historians to encompass non-
humans, such as things, plants, and nonhuman animals (Domanska 2010).33
If we replace the linguistic model of meaning with an embodied and enactive model of
meaning, this holds implications for the interpretation of sources, which need to be viewed
as part of an embodied process of life. Sources can provide clues about a life history of an
embodied and embedded cognizing self. The aim becomes not merely to judge the
distortions or biases of a source, but to make sense of what the source can reveal about the
way their authors experienced and engaged with their environment. Through people’s
practices, actions, and habits in a lived context, we get to make sense of their lived
experience, because action in and of itself is not only just an externally observable
behavior  but,  rather,  a  constitutive  part  of  cognition.  Because  of  the  prevalence  of  the
representational theory of mind and the need to bridge the mind-world gap as its
entailment,  all  too  often  the  emphasis  falls  on  the  question:  Does  a  representation  in  the
source match past reality?
This question may still be relevant, but only at the level of general facts about states of
the world (for example, when we seek to ascertain the amount of taxes collected, the
outcome of a battle, the number of people attending an event, the number of victims). This
does not preclude the fact that alterations and intentional distortions in the sources are
possible and likely and that source criticism and comparative analysis could help identify
forgeries and subsequent modifications. Source criticism and comparative source analysis
are still relevant in this regard, but they are not sufficient. They need to be integrated into
a model of cognition, which pays attention to the past as a complex process of lived,
embodied interaction between people and their environment.
The  past  is  then  not  a  metaphorical  static,  fixed  image  that  we  should  seek  to  mirror
and reproduce as distanced spectators, but rather a past process of life, which can be
approached at different levels of complexity. For historians, combining the empathic and
32 This shift of focus to materiality in archaeology can be seen as a manifestation of the broader theoretical movement of
the new materialisms (e.g., Frost & Coole 2010). New materialists adopt a new ontology of matter. They conceive of
matter not as inert and passive, but as lively, indeterminate, constantly forming, and possessive of agential traits (Frost &
Coole 2010).
33 Since my focus in this project is tied to the (human) relations and interactions between Poles and Lithuanians, I have
not elaborated further on possible ways to include non-humans into an embodied history. However, the latter task, even
though it would be an important contribution to the development of the humanities, would potentially require scholars to
develop a different way of knowing, adjusted to non-human ways of being in the world.
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analytical ways of knowing can enable them to understand the past as lived experiences
that entangle and interweave to produce an overarching process of life, the junctions and
patterns of which can be seen as something that is more complex than the individual lived
experience, but still very much connected to it. I am convinced that history as a discipline
needs to combine these two ways of knowing: the empathic, metaphorical second-person
way of knowing (aimed at understanding the process of lived experience) and a critical,
systematizing third-person way of seeing (aimed at comparing, identifying patterns and
inconsistencies, making inferences). Knowledge of larger-scale processes of the physical
and social environment require the contribution of experiential, relational, empathic
knowledge of lived experience. The past as lived experience then needs to be
complemented and juxtaposed with knowledge of larger-scale processes and structures.
The advantages as well as challenges inherent to combining the micro-level lived
experiences and the macro-level processes in historical understanding are, for example,
illustrated in Henri Vogt’s (2005) study of political transformations in Eastern Europe in
the post-communist era. Vogt (2005) examines the revolutions that took place in Estonia,
East Germany and Czechoslovakia by carefully weaving together experiences and
perceptions of ordinary people and contextualizing them in relation to broader social and
political processes.
Past reality is therefore not an externalized static space “out there,” but, rather, a past
process of life, the materiality of which is weaved into the present. This is what is meant
by the notion that the present embodies the process of past life. If we are able to overcome
the objectivity-subjectivity divide between “how it is that humans are able at one and the
same time to have a world in common and to live it as a function of their own particular
histories” (Toren 1999, 16), then we can also transcend the sharp distinctions between the
real and the symbolic, the past and language, nature and culture, structure and process,
stasis  and  change.  If  I  were  to  use  a  particular  metaphor,  the  process  of  life  can  be
metaphorically understood as a woven fabric, which constitutes a material embodiment, an
emergent product of the process of becoming or weaving. Threads (lived experience),
through their particular entanglements, bring forth patterns, textures and shapes, which
make up the materiality of the overall weave (past process of life) and which, in turn,
shape the threads. You can both recognize the complex knots, textures and patterns in the
weave, as if from outside, and follow the entanglements of individual threads (lived
experience) that produce the patterns, but it is necessary to understand that they shape
each  other.  Both  the  patterns  and  individual  threads  are  part  of  the  same  weave  and  are
interconnected. The past reality is, therefore, not a linear sequence of static states, but a
process of interrelations, junctions, and entanglements that shape the patterns the weave
takes. Larger-scale structures, in this understanding, come to be viewed as patterns that
come into shape over time by human activity, although they are not reduced to that
activity. Similarly to how Hodder (2012) speaks of cultural practices as “entanglements,”
these structures can be conceived as systems of linkages between human experience,
things and ideas rather than as rigid, static “wholes.” They are both created and
transformed by human activity and interaction.
The  cognizing  self  (historian),  who  makes  sense  of  the  weave,  its  patterns,
entanglements and threads, engages with its shapes and textures and makes meaning that
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is as much dependent on the weave as on the experience, categories, concepts, and
metaphors of the cognizing self. The meaning emerges in the process of engagement
between the weave and the embodied cognizing self. The meaning of the past is neither an
arbitrary, subjective attribution, nor is it an objective representation of the pre-given,
context-independent meaning of the weave. Historians bring their own embodied lived
experience into the process of making sense of the past. Knowledge of the past requires an
embodied engagement with that past on the part of the historian, for whom knowledge
constitutes the activity of making sense of the sources. Historians’ practice, thus, requires
self-reflective effort seeking to comprehend how their own process of embodied, situated,
lived experience has shaped their ways of reasoning, thinking, making sense of and
engaging with the past.
Making sense of the past is not just a matter of nailing down the externally,
“objectively” seen generalized facts about states of the world. For example, if a historian
faces several sources, which convey a very different account of what happened, the aim
becomes not just one of identifying inaccuracies. Indeed, the aim also becomes one of
understanding how the authors of these sources had come to experience the events in this
particular way, through which kind of experiences of interaction with the world.
Lived, emotive, and embodied experience matters because it shapes meaning-making
and interacting with the world; it shapes how people co-create the reality in which they are
embedded, to which they are coupled. Emotional engagement with our environment plays
a crucial role in cognition and sense-making, shaping the process of life. As enactive
embodiment theory demonstrates, the way a living organism relates to, adapts to, and
couples with its environment has implications for its continued existence, thus rendering
the world into a place “that always means something to the organism” as it moves about
(Maiese 2011, 160). A living organism’s value judgments are rooted in its bodily feelings
of affective framing through which it makes sense of the world (Maiese 2011, 160). As a
result, sharp differentiation between facts and values, cognition and emotion is deeply
problematic. Emotional responses are part of cognition and dependent on embodied
interaction with the environment. What we can do at most is to reflect on and seek to
identify our unconscious emotional responses and conscious feelings in relation to the
past. That is, we can assess to what extent these responses are justified or appropriate in
particular, given circumstances. Finally, as meaning and value are not pre-given or static,
the meaning of the past is continuously reconsidered, modified, and adjusted to new
experiences of interaction with the environment in an ongoing process of life. This
explains why each generation has the need to rewrite history; this is because experience,
by changing the cognizing self, has likewise changed that experiential relation to the past.
The way the past was experienced by people in the past is irreversible and stable, but our
engagement with that lived past is constantly changing.
For example, one of my interviewees from a Polish minority in Lithuania34 explained
to me that although the military takeover of the city of Vilnius by Poland in 1920 is
regarded as an occupation in the official Lithuanian historical narrative, her grandfather,
she emphasized, did not experience this  as  an  occupation.  Different  historical
34 This was an interviewee from an earlier Master’s Thesis project.
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interpretations of this highly contested past raise a question: What is the truth? If I attempt
to deal with the ensuing plurality of historical narratives about the take-over of Vilnius in
1920 by adopting a dualistic, disembodied representational theory of mind, I will look for
the  truth  of  the  past,  conceived  of  in  terms  of  mimesis  as  sameness.  The  truth  of  a
historical narrative will be defined in terms of a match between word and world, language
of the narrative and past reality, form and substance, mind and matter. It will be a truth
modeled upon the objective perspective of the camera obscura, which hides the embodied
self of the viewer. This approach, however, will only permit me to determine certain very
general factual truths about static states of the world. Like a distanced spectator, I will be
able to determine: the Polish troops entered the city of Vilnius and took control of it.
If, rather, I adopt a deconstructionist approach to doing history of the interwar Polish-
Lithuanian conflict, the truth of the past will not be a concern for me, since I would
assume that I do not really have access to the past other than through textual
representation and the narrative design we impose on it. I would preoccupy myself with
discursive articulation of the past, the form, the pattern, the language of history without
paying much attention to how it relates to the past process life. I would approach the
plurality of contested narratives by exploring how ideologies, emplotments, rhetorical
devices and explanatory strategies impose meaning onto past reality and shape social and
cultural practices. I would approach different narratives a-historically, as culturally-
determined “perspectives” of the situation. I may want to show how each group constructs
their own definition that excludes and negates the perspective of the other group. The
metaphor of “perspective,” in this case, will imply the relativist subjectivity of sight. On
the  basis  of  an  implicit  Saussurean  legacy,  I  may  focus  on  how  each  identity,  each
perspective is defined by what it negates. I would then study the articulations of
perspectives, identities, and narratives in terms of the Saussurean understanding of
meaning production as a chain of signification in the differential, negative system of
values. I would focus specifically on the pattern, the form, the formal, discursive
arrangement of signs. At the same time, I would regard these different perspectives as
literary performances, as history-as-fiction, whose truth-status cannot be ascertained. My
approach would likely enable me to successfully show how different groups use symbols
from the past that take on meanings that have little to do with past life itself, especially in
the case of analysis of national myths.
As a deconstructionist, however, I would preoccupy myself with the form, the pattern,
but not the process that led to this pattern emerging. In other words, I would exclude the
process from sight. As a result, I would not concern myself with the long-term, centuries-
spanning political, cultural, social processes of the region’s very complex history, which
led to this pattern arising in the first place. In other words, as a deconstructionist, I would
not be interested in the past process of life. Neither would I be interested in the actual
lived experience and past life that function as symbols in contemporary myths. Insofar as I
would be dealing with the historical development in any way, I would be approaching
history as a linear sequence of static states, each enclosed onto itself, in which meanings
are not related to life/reality/world, but are rather defined by convention and social context
(understood as a figural rhetorical form that is not based on physical nature and bodily
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experience). Given that pattern would be my focus of analysis, as a deconstructionist, the
primary question for me would be: “How are signs arranged in relation to each other?”
If I, on the other hand, adopt an embodied approach to making sense of the past, I will
be interested in how a particular pattern relates to a process, which has led to this pattern
emerging.  I  will  be  interested  both  in  “how signs  are  arranged  in  relation  to  each  other”
and “how this pattern has come about.” The process, for me, will not merely be a
disembodied  sequence  of  static  states  that  bears  no  link  to  lived  reality,  because  the
patterns will not be determined solely by social conventions of a given historical epoch. I
will take into account how the world and embodied experience shape mind, and not just
how  mind  shapes  an  understanding  of  the  world.  I  will  be  eager  to  understand  how
emergence of specific patterns of social organization or values or material culture depends
on a history of interaction of embodied and embedded cognizing selves and the world.
History, for me, will mean a process of interrelations, entanglements, junctions, which
have shaped the pattern. I will want to know what process is embodied in a specific
pattern,  what  experiences  led  to  this  kind  of  construal  of  the  situation  by  Poles  and
Lithuanians. I will focus on the lived realities of different indivudals or social groups. For
example, to understand the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, I will need, among other things, to
comprehend the relation between the experience of serfdom by the Lithuanians and their
negative attitudes towards the Poles. In order to understand the Polish hostility or
contempt for the Lithuanian national movement, I will need to understand the lived
experience of the Polish landlords, their felt sense of superiority towards their subjects and
their identification with the old tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian state. To understand the
pattern, I will need to study the process of lived experience. In order to do that, I will not
be able to treat emotions, feelings, experiences of the people in the past as just a subjective
misconstrual of an external, objective reality. The experience of the people in the past will
be significant to me, because it is lived and dependent on an embodied understanding of
the situation. The experience may not be based on a fully informed position, but in order
to understand the roots of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, empathetic, second-person
engagement with lived experience of people will be necessary. I will need to understand
the entire complicated past process of life. By looking at the process and not just the
pattern, I will be able see where a particular perspective is coming from, even if I do not
agree with it.
Thus, embodiment encompasses both the embodied and disembodied ways of
knowing. I can explain, in an embodied way, why Saussure focuses on the formal
arrangement of signs in a pattern and ignores process by looking at the experience/process
that led Saussure to develop his theory (for example, his fascination with political
economy and metaphors that he borrowed from this field, see, e.g., Joseph 2016;
Muszynski 2017). I can also explain a disembodied, detached, objectifying way of
observing  and  analyzing  reality  as  one  of  the  modes  of  knowing,  because  it  has  roots  in
embodied experience. As discussed in Section 3.1, the experience of sight neutralizes the
dynamic content in cognition and, as shown by Jonas (1982 [1966]), enabled Greeks to
come up with a distinction between mind and matter, essence and existence, being and
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becoming).35 In other words, while “everything” has roots in embodiment, even the
distancing effect of perspective, the metaphor of perspective may not suit the phenomenon
one  is  trying  to  explain  if  the  structural  properties  of  the  source  domain,  which  are
transferred to the target domain of the phenomenon, hide or misconstrue important aspects
of this phenomenon. Embodiment itself affords disembodied thinking. Whether one
adopts a focus only on the pattern, or on both a pattern and a process, whether one adopts
a first, second or third-person way of knowing, they are different modes of engagement
with the world, but not of equal, relative value. Our task, as cognizing selves, is to make
sure we are applying the right mode of knowing to make sense of the aspect of reality that
we are interested in. Likewise, we need to be aware of how changing the mode of knowing
will affect what we know.
Polish  forces  took  over  and  adjoined  the  region  of  Vilnius  to  Poland  in  the  interwar
period: This is something that can be ascertained without engaging with concrete lived
experience, as if from outside. Once we engage with the lived experience of this event, we
will discover that it was experienced differently by different groups of people. Looking at
the process of experience of these people, we may come to comprehend how their distinct
perspectives depend on divergent trajectories of life that permeate their understanding of
the situation with very divergent meanings and values. To understand why Polish forces
took over Vilnius requires an empathetic engagement with lived, embodied experience.
The fact of the take-over is permeated by an embodied and value-laden understanding of
the situation by people who implemented it. To understand the experience and judgment
of these people does not require justifying what they did.  The task for the historian is to
both ascertain the particular details of the territorial take-over by examining and
comparing sources, but, more importantly, to understand what process of experience led to
different individuals and groups of people adopting a particular interpretation of events.
The truth of the past is, in other words, incomplete if we only focus on the factual
details or try to determine the optical truth of the past, ignoring the value-laden meaning-
making in lived experience. Because it deals with the human past, history cannot be
detached from people, from living human beings who engage with the world and who are
shaped throughout their life course by their particular experience. The terms “objective”
and “subjective” become problematic in that they impose spectatorial, disembodied Greek
metaphysics on our notions of truth. They presume the possibility of knowing pure
essences or pure sensations detached from existence, which are considered objective, as
opposed to impure, tainted, subjective “appearances.”
Differences in the interpretation of the past, in an embodied approach, result from
differences in lived experience of interaction with others and the world. We regard the
past in very different ways and cannot seem to comprehend how others can interpret it so
differently, because we have not been able to relate to their experience. Others’ experience
can seem alien, incomprehensible, and unrelatable. This “loss in translation” of embodied
experience between individual people and groups is at the root of historical disagreements.
35 Humans, for example, can likewise experience what an extreme third-person mode “feels” like in a traumatic
situation, which triggers dissociation and depersonalization, when all affectivity “switches off” and only “disembodied
mind” remains – logical, rational, calculating.
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Yet, unfortunately, this is completely overlooked in the “truth wars,” where each party
seeks to prove their truth and where truth is conceived in disembodied Greek metaphysical
terms, as the correspondence between a statement/image and the world.
This kind of essentialist, disembodied concept of truth ignores differences in lived
experience and traditions of knowing. It completely misses the point of the embodied
nature of knowledge making. Importantly, it is this kind of concept of truth that tends to
be  appropriated  in  the  political  use  of  history,  when  states,  governments,  or  nations  are
ready to impose their “objectively valid truth” on others, when lived experiences are
completely ignored or selectively chosen. “Truth wars” reveal a reductionist
understanding of truth, knowledge, and reality. The same issue also applies to
governments imposing a narrow, political history-oriented historical narrative on their
populations, which is also built upon the disembodied Greek metaphysics and its
reductionist concept of truth. This is eloquently illustrated in school-history education
when it is tightly focused on the institutional narrative of the nation-state, where
knowledge of history first and foremost means the knowledge of political history
embedded in detailed and supposedly value-neutral factuality. This, however, imposes an
injustice on people exposed to this kind of history education, because they lose the
capacity to understand the complicated process of life, to engage with the plurality of lived
experiences and to nurture the capacity to empathically relate to people different from
themselves.
Understanding the metaphorical, embodied nature of language and thought also affects
the  long-standing  debate  on  whether  history  is  a  science  or  an  art.  The  form  of
presentation and language of history textbooks should be chosen not according to the
imperatives of the disembodied notions of objectivity and factuality, but according to how
well they can translate, convey the past process of life. The dichotomy between art and
science that has animated so much of historiographical discussion over centuries loses its
potency. Art,  being the domain of embodied, metaphorical  expression of experience,  can
teach historians a lot about truth-as-lived-experience, about how it can be understood and
conveyed.
The unique quality of art to move us, to touch us derives from art’s access to
embodied, metaphorical modes of expression. This is why sometimes a novel, a painting,
a dance, a piece of music seems to access “truth,” explain, help us understand the past
much better than an academic history book can. Art holds experiential knowledge which is
primarily communicated by imagistic, linguistic, gestural metaphor and which is achieved
by active engagement with the world. Art can give access to the past as embodied, lived
experience in its “how-ness,” by displaying, revealing, making manifest the ways of being
and relating to others, self, objects, and environment. In other words, the process of lived
experience can be embodied in a work of art. The meaning is not something “in” the
artwork as a pre-given thing which we only need to decode or extract; rather, artwork
affords the emergence of a meaning in an encounter with it that is shaped both by the
artwork and ourselves.
Put differently, the meaning is not in the artifact from the past as an object; rather, the
meaning is achieved in a dynamic exchange between an intentional self and the artifact, it
is  in  the  experience  of  the  artifact  (Noë  2015).  To  extend  the  analogy,  objects  from  the
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past are not the past itself; rather, they invite you to engage in your imagination with the
“how-ness” of the past, the ways in which these objects were used or experienced in the
past by living human beings. The truth of the past is not in the authenticity of objects from
the past; it is not in their “thing-ness” or “what-ness”; it is in the ways these objects were
experienced by people in the past and shaped that experience.36 They afford access to the
past as lived, embodied experience. In short, the embodied nature of art is what allows us
to relate to it, and this is probably what distinguishes great art: it is able to move, to touch
a lot of people, to relate to their experience. In this regard, an embodied approach
embraces art-driven forms of engaging with the past: interactive, multi-modal museums
and exhibits, novels, films and the experiential knowledge that they may give access to (as
opposed to solely looking for factual mistakes or biases in art in terms of how it represents
the past).37
In  the  end,  engagement  with  the  past  as  a  process  of  life  of  a  being-in-the-world  has
significant implications for our relation to and expectations towards the past. The
emphasis shifts away from trying to pin down the fixed, invariant, essentialized
knowledge of the past, which, as a snapshot, refers to a pre-given reality. Similarly, the
preoccupation with immobile, invariant, rigid foundations and original meanings
diminishes,  because  identity  is  seen  as  a  movement  and  a  process,  a  way  of  being  over
time rather than a static thing-like substance, which requires continuous, repetitive,
identical repetition. It is not a matter of replacing one way of thinking with another, but
rather re-adjusting the weights on an imbalanced scale of Western tradition where the
third-person, analytical, systematizing way of seeing has been considered weightier than
the second-person, relational and empathetic attention to shifting lived experience.
36 For  how  this  idea  could  be  conveyed  in  artwork,  see,  for  example,  “Life  Garage  Sale”  (2009)  by  Simon  Evans.
Exhibited at the Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, these everyday objects made from paper pulp, in white and black
colours, remind one of old colorless photographs. They are not the past themselves. Their authenticity, their being the
original and not a copy, is irrelevant. These paper pulp copies of objects from the past are not the past itself, but they
invite you to re-experience in your imagination the “how-ness” of the past; they capture the ways in which these objects
were used in the past by living human beings. The truth of the past is not in the authenticity of objects from the past; it is
not in their “thing-ness”; it is in the ways these objects were used and experienced by people in the past.
37 Comics, or sequential art, might be a medium well-suited for combining the two ways of seeing the past – analytical
and empathetic. Comics or graphic novels are both read sequentially and viewed, taken in, all at once (Sousanis 2015).
Their constituent parts may be arranged in a linear, sequential manner, but each individual part is simultaneously a
fragment of a larger cohesive whole, so that both the individual and the general, the sequential and the simultaneous, the
hierarchical and the web-like have to be taken into consideration jointly when reading comics and graphic novels.
Sousanis (2015, 63) argues that comics interweave two modes of knowing, of perceiving that are enacted by the two
sides of the brain: the left side of the brain, which breaks down information and analyzes it in segmented, isolated parts,
and  the  right  side  of  the  brain,  which  engages  the  whole  in  its  context  (McGilchrist  2009).  In  fact,  such  a
historiographical approach has already been taken in some graphic novels dealing with historical topics (Heuvel et al.
2007; Spiegelman 2003).
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The empirical part of the dissertation that follows is a terrain in which I apply and
explore my theoretical insights. In particular, I seek to identify the embodied and
disembodied aspects of the textbook presentation of shared past. Such analysis illuminates
the role of meta-theoretical assumptions in disagreements about the past. The inquiry into
the textbooks and interviews with their authors allows to discern which points of
postmodern critique of history can be considered justified. However, the analysis likewise
reveals the cases in which an embodied approach to making sense of the past can be more
useful in disentangling controversies over the past. By bringing into attention the role of
embodied, lived reality in making meaning, the embodied approach in certain ways
extends and is able to encompass the postmodern critique of history. Thus, the empirical
analysis that I take up in Chapters 6 and 7, in particular, offers a rich, example-driven
assessment of theoretical points advanced in Chapter 3.
116
Chapter 4. Materials and Methods
4.1 Materials
The materials, used to examine how shared Polish-Lithuanian past is presented in school-
history education in Poland and Lithuania, consist of school-history textbooks and
interviews  with  their  authors.  I  chose  to  combine  the  analysis  of  textbooks  with  the
interviews, since the latter provided unique insights into why the past was presented in a
particular way, what the reasoning of the author was, and whether it changed over time.
Conducting interviews with the textbook authors enabled me to contextualize specific
choices made by the authors in the presentation of the past. In Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, I
describe the scope of my materials and how they were collected.
4.1.1 Interviews
Qualitative semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the authors of school-
history textbooks in Poland and Lithuania in the summer of 2012 and later in 2013 and
2014. In selecting the interviewees, the priority was usually given to those authors whose
textbooks I included in the analysis. Thirteen interviews have been collected in total with
the Lithuanian textbook authors during the course of my research. Three of these were
conducted in the summer of 2012, which I chose, however, not to include into my final
analysis because the questionnaire I used in them differed from the later interviews. They
served me mainly as exploratory interviews, providing me with information of a more
general kind that later enabled me to select a more specific direction for my research. The
other remaining ten interviews I conducted December 2013 – January 2014. Out of these
ten interviews, I included five in the final analysis. The reasons for the elimination of the
remaining interviews from the analysis are different in each case. For instance, one
interviewee, who was supposed to co-author a textbook included in my analysis, later
resigned from this task. Another interviewee was not essential for the analysis, because the
main author of the textbook series in question was already included in the analysis. The
textbook of another of the interviewees has not yet been published at the time of finishing
this dissertation. Nevertheless, all of the interviews provided valuable insights and enabled
me to have a broader understanding of the context of textbook authorship.
Seven interviews have been collected from Polish authors. Five of these interviews
were conducted in person in the summer of 2014 and two interviews were conducted using
Skype in the autumn of 2014. Out of these seven interviews, I included four into the
analysis. I made a choice not to include one of the interview into the analysis, because the
author in question did not write the parts of the textbook, which interested me specifically.
In  the  case  of  the  other  two,  I  had  to  exclude  them  in  order  to  limit  the  length  of  the
chapter.
An important point regarding the collection of these interviews is that, at the time, my
methodological approach was not yet informed by the enactive embodiment theory and the
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conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999). Therefore, I did not
specifically  focus  on  metaphorical  models  of  cognition,  nor  did  I  focus  on  how  my
interviewees metaphorized the past, history, time, or events of shared Polish-Lithuanian
past. Irrespective of this, however, the people I interviewed utilized metaphors in
explaining their ideas. My questionnaire consisted of six related themes, which remained
important to me to the very end of my research process: objectivity and truth;
multiperspectivity in representation of the past; the relation between facts and values; the
presentation of the discipline of history in school textbooks; the purpose of history
education, and the presentation of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past in textbooks. I did not
follow the questionnaire strictly and sought to pay attention to and follow up the points,
which the authors themselves wanted to stress, but simultaneously I tried to stay close to
and bring discussion back to my own interests and questions. The general outline of the
interview questionnaire can be consulted in Appendix 1. The questionnaire was typically
modified with additional context- and author-specific questions in each interview.
The interviews were first transcribed and analyzed in the language in which they were
conducted. I analyzed the transcriptions using Atlas.ti software in order to elucidate the
authors’ ontological and epistemological orientations and to explore metaphors, which
inform their thinking about and depicting of the past. In particular, I focused on how the
authors articulated metaphors in their response to my questions, even though this was not
planned at the time of collecting the interviews.
4.1.2 Textbooks
I apply my theoretical approach by analyzing a sample of the Lithuanian and Polish
history textbooks, published after 1990. I have combined the analysis of textbooks with
the analysis of interviews.
Before selecting which textbooks to include in my analysis, I read and executed a
preliminary analysis of 37 Lithuanian and 26 Polish school-history textbooks for grades 5
to 12. I chose the majority of these textbooks during a research stay in the Georg Eckert
Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig,  Germany, where I  stayed
March–April 2013. The library of Georg Eckert Institute has a wide-ranging collection of
Lithuanian and Polish school-history textbooks, which was at my disposal during the
fellowship. In this preliminary analysis, my aim was to note down in what ways textbooks
introduce the discipline of history and its epistemology, the relation between the past and
historical knowledge as well as how the shared Polish-Lithuanian past is presented,
explained, and evaluated. In 2013 and 2014, when I began to analyze the textbooks, I was
not yet focusing on the metaphor use and implicit models of cognition in the textbooks in
a systematic way, even though in some cases I was paying attention to how textbooks
employed metaphors to explain abstract concepts or past events.
I had several principles that underpinned which textbooks I chose to be included in the
analysis. Firstly, I wanted to have a selection of textbooks, which would represent a
diverse range in terms of publication date, so that the analysis would encompass textbooks
published in the 1990s immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as more
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recent publications published in the 2000s–2010s. Secondly, I sought to include the most
widely used textbooks series from the major publishing houses, which I expected had the
biggest influence in shaping pupils’ historical consciousness. Lastly, I sought out the
textbooks series, which would represent a diversity of interpretations of the shared Polish-
Lithuanian past.
4.2 Method
The conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) serves as an
inspiration in my project to examine metaphors that shape understanding of cognition and
the past at a meta-theoretical level. These metaphorical models of cognition have concrete
implications for how we deal with controversial past, or the past, which is shared, but
understood and remembered very differently. In what follows, I describe the
methodological approach of metaphor analysis and how I applied this method in the
analysis of textbooks and interviews.
4.2.1 Metaphor analysis
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) were the first to propose that metaphor is at the core of
thought processes and that conceptual metaphors shape our human ways of thinking about
the world. The work of Lakoff and Johnson has inspired successive generations of
researchers working in the field of metaphor analysis in applied linguistics and social
sciences. One of the central tenets of their theory states that metaphor is not limited to
language, but permeates thought and action. On such an interpretation, metaphor is more
than an isolated linguistic expression and a rhetoric device. Metaphorical expressions are
tied to certain metaphorical concepts which shape thought and actions and which are
emergent in concrete embodied, lived experience of interaction with the world. As such,
metaphor use is dynamic. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) assert that our conceptual
system, in terms of which we perceive, think, reason, and act, is metaphorical in nature.
As an illustration of how a conceptual metaphor can structure thought, Lakoff and
Johnson (1980, 1981) provide a conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. In terms of this
metaphor,  we  can  win  or  lose  arguments.  We see  the  person  we are  arguing  with  as  our
enemy or opponent. We can attack the position of our opponent or defend our own. We
can  gain  and  lose  ground,  strategize,  adopt  a  new  line  of  attack.  What  is  crucial  to
emphasize is that conventional ways of talking about an argument presuppose a metaphor,
which is not just in the words, but which is in the very concept of an argument (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980, 1981). If, by contrast, we structured our understanding of an argument in
terms  of  the  concept  of  dance,  it  would  result  in  a  very  different  experience  of  what
argument is and what it does. Our understanding and experience of an argument is
therefore metaphorically structured. Conceptual metaphors and image-schemas shape how
people, for example, reason about economics (Boers &Littlemore 2000), controversial
debates (Read, Cesa, Jones & Collins 1990), philosophical concepts (Lakoff & Johnson
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1999), natural science concepts (Brown 2003), mathematics (Lakoff & Núñez 2002),
psychology (Gibbs 1994; Fernandez-Duque and Johnson 1999, 2002), medicine (Wright
2007), music (Brower 2000; Johnson &Larson 2003).
Primary metaphors, like MORE  IS  UP or AFFECTION IS WARMTH,  result  from  a
metaphorical correlation between the sensorimotor domain and the domain of subjective
experience or judgment (Grady 1999). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), primary
metaphors are embodied in three interrelated ways. First, metaphorical connections arise
out of embodied functioning in and interaction with our environment, where we may
regularly encounter correlation between two domains. Secondly, the source domain of the
metaphor comes from the body’s sensorimotor operation. Lastly, this metaphorical
correlation is instantiated in the body through neural connections. These primary
metaphors, when they are put together in use and combined with certain cultural models or
widely accepted beliefs, form more complex conceptual metaphors. For example, the
conceptual metaphor A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY arises  out  of  two  primary
metaphors (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS), which are combined
with a prevailing belief that people are supposed to have a purpose in life (Lakoff &
Johnson 1999, 60–63). Primary metaphors provide the experiential grounding for the more
complex conceptual metaphor. Primary metaphors supply the logic, imagistic schemas,
and the qualitative feel of sensorimotor experience to abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson
1999). Primary metaphors constrain inferences that can be drawn within a certain
philosophical theory. They constrain how one can reason within a certain conceptual
system of a philosophical framework.
The metaphorical mapping of aspects of a source domain onto a target domain is
partial, which means that the source domain does not completely structure abstract
concepts (Lakoff & Johnson 1981). Not all the features of the source domain map onto the
target domain, which is why, for example, even if we understand theories in terms of
buildings, it does not follow that theories have stairwells or elevators (Gibbs 2011). In
light of a dynamic view of metaphor, a specific verbal metaphor may also arise from
multiple “metaphorical contingencies” rather than a single conceptual metaphor (Gibbs
2011, 554). Moreover, even though two languages share a conceptual metaphor, specific
cultural-ideological background has an effect on how this metaphor manifests in a
concrete culture, resulting in subtle differences (Kovecses 2002; Yu 2003). Differences in
the manner in which cultures speak of certain abstract topics reflect differences in how
they think about these areas of experience (Gibbs 2011, 540). Metaphor use is, therefore,
not caused by some innate single mental mechanism in the mind of people. It is highly
dependent on the circumstances and history of an embodied, environmentally embedded
individual in interaction with his or her changing environment. It is an emergent property
of brains, bodies, and world (Gibbs 2013, 51). As a result, metaphor use is individual-
specific, context-specific, language-specific, and task-specific (Gibbs 2013, 50), yet
despite this people can communicate and understand each other’s use of metaphors,
because people share certain embodied, sensorimotor experiences, can empathetically
engage with another person’s experience, and because they may be embedded in a similar
environment.
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As Cameron (2010b) notes, metaphor is embodied, cognitive, affective, socio-cultural,
and dynamic. Metaphors are embodied, which means that they are motivated by embodied
experience, or by recurrent patterns of bodily activity and experience (Gibbs 2006, 2011;
cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999). For example, the source domain of the classic
conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is an emergent pattern of bodily activities where
people start from a point, move along a path and reach a destination (Gibbs 2013, 48).
This recurrent bodily activity produces the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema that
informs the metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). The cognitive dimension of metaphor
highlights how metaphors, by linking two domains in the conceptual system, structure the
way people think and reason (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999).
Metaphors are also affective, which is revealed in the way they tend to express values,
beliefs, and emotions. According to Cameron (2010b, 5–6), when people engage
metaphors to explain something in terms of something else, they usually choose these
metaphors which enable them to better express how they feel towards that phenomenon or
thing. Moreover, metaphors are socio-cultural and inseparable from the social interaction,
which enables the emergence of certain conventionalized metaphors over long periods of
time or of certain more specific ways of metaphorizing bound with particular groups of
people in a more specific place and time. Thus, analysis of metaphor use can reveal how
people are tied to certain socio-cultural conventions or, alternatively, how they seek to
reject certain conventionalized ways of thinking. Finally, metaphor is dynamic: it is
constantly evolving and is transformed by social interaction and lived experience.
Cameron, who has done extensive research on metaphor use, characterizes metaphor as
built into the very ordinary ways in which we use words to share our thinking with others.
[…] [M]etaphor does more than just saying; it connects into our thinking through the
words used. By collecting the metaphors that people use, we can understand something of
their thinking. We can catch glimpses of how their thinking has been shaped by the culture
they grew up in, and by the people they live around; how thinking is shaped by
participating in talk and by processing the ideas that others offer them in conversation.
(Cameron 2011, 4)
Cameron (2011, 20) conceives of conversation in terms of complexity and dynamic
systems theory, which means she treats a conversation as a process of activity of complex
dynamic systems in interaction, shaped by their starting points as well as by the history of
the interaction. In such a conversation, empathy, or the ability to understand the other’s
experience, emerges “from the flow of talk, a complex dynamic system in its own right”
(Cameron 2011, 20). Cameron proposes that:
A complex dynamic system is an evolving collection of heterogeneous elements or agents
(people, language resources, ideas etc). These elements of the system are dynamic (always
changing), and change also occurs in the connections, or relations, among components. As
a result of these dynamics, the system develops as a whole that is more than, and cannot be
reduced to, the combination of its component elements. A conversation is more than the
sum of the words spoken. When two people come together to try to understand each other
through talk, a complexity perspective sees a process of multiple interacting complex
dynamic systems, where the component elements (which may themselves be systems) are
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the individuals and their linguistic and cognitive resources. Each moment in the talk
changes the participants’ understanding of the other and affects what is said next. […]
[T]wo brains or minds engage in dynamically constructing understandings of the Other;
two patterns of thinking and speaking built up over lifetimes are brought into use; two sets
of memories and histories are called upon. (Cameron 2011, 20–21)
Even though metaphorical language is subject to the dynamics of self-organization and
emergence just as any other language use, metaphor use is special in its role to supply
emergent  ways  of  talking  and  thinking  (Cameron  2010a,  88).  The  emergent  ways  of
talking and thinking may be more or less conventionalized and permanent or transient and
temporary. Some enduring metaphorical conventions may become characteristic or even
defining of groups, marking the identity of groups and revealing who belongs to a group,
or is allowed to become part of it (Cooper 1986).
One of the main methodological issues to be cautious about in metaphor analysis is the
danger of over-interpretation (Steen 2007). It is important not to overgeneralize on the
basis of limited linguistic evidence when trying to identify a conceptual metaphor. As a
possible solution to this problem, Steen (2007) highlights the need to choose
representative texts and to have a reliable procedure for identifying metaphors. The
researcher should also preferably carry out the procedure on large amounts of text and
develop a reliable procedure for deciding which source and target domains metaphorical
expressions realize.
4.2.2 Application of metaphor analysis to my materials
I investigated the use of metaphors in school-history textbooks and interview materials
aiming to identify metaphorical models, which shape ways of thinking about and
engagement with the past. I expected to find that metaphorical models, which inform the
ontological and epistemological orientations, would have an impact on the ability to make
sense  of  divergent  or  conflicting  accounts  of  what  happened.  For  example,  if  people
metaphorically conceptualize truth in vision-based terms, as a static correspondence
between language and past reality, it becomes difficult to integrate different narratives of
experience into such a concept of truth. The entailment of the latter metaphorical model
would be to think about divergences in terms of subjective bias, which needs to be
eliminated, in order to arrive at truth. Alternatively, truth could be reduced to
representation of general states of the world, which can be shown to accurately mirror the
past. In both cases, however, the concept of truth underlies an image-schema, which
derives from the experience of sight, disregards the role of embodiment in cognition and,
therefore, cannot integrate embodied narratives of experience into knowledge of past
reality.
I hypothesized that the metaphorical models, which invoke the ocularcentric,
mentalistic, static, third-person, detached, self-effacing epistemological approach, prevent
or  are  less  successful  at  enabling  one  to  view  the  past  in  terms  of  an  embodied  lived
experience and empathically understand a different lived past. In the ocularcentric
representational theory of mind and language, the truth of the past is regarded as an inner
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mental construct, an entity that is detached from an embodied process of life. The
entailment of the disembodied metaphor of mind is that the person who uses this metaphor
has the need to advance a theory of truth, which can bridge the gap between “inner
representations” and reality by means of empiricist correspondence that is devoid of
values, emotions, context, and history of interaction with the world.
A relevant factor in metaphor analysis was that my materials emerged from two
different contexts. Interviews, although guided by my questions and thematic interests,
reveal a more spontaneous conversation, in which metaphors arose more contingently and
depended on the interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer. Textbooks, on
the other hand, were crafted much more carefully either by a single author or by a team of
several authors and were arranged according to a deliberately designed structure. The
differences in contexts out of which the analyzed materials emerged are reflected in
metaphor use. As it will be revealed in the analysis, although the carefully crafted
presentation of the textbooks disclosed fewer explicit metaphorical expressions than the
partially spontaneous interview conversation, textbooks nevertheless contained implicit
metaphorical ways of thinking that could be identified due to the interview analysis.
Throughout the analysis process, I was likewise interested in correlations or lack
thereof between metaphorical ways of thinking in the interviews and the textbooks. The
aim  was  to  detect  whether  and  in  what  ways  the  presentation  of  the  past,  pedagogic
approaches, ontological and epistemological assumptions in the textbooks related to the
views and ideas espoused by textbook authors in the interviews. The interviews proved to
be a valuable source of information on how textbook authors reasoned about what they
wrote and why they wrote it in a particular way. I was likewise focused on identifying any
correspondences between the ontological and epistemological ideas and specific portrayals
of  the  shared  Polish-Lithuanian  past.  In  other  words,  my  interest  was  in  whether  it  was
possible to argue that certain ontological and epistemological ideas, shaped by implicit
metaphors, affected how the past was depicted and how the authors made sense of
controversial events or phenomena in the past. This proved to be a fruitful approach,
revealing certain important patterns between ontological and epistemological assumptions
and how a particular individual deemed it appropriate to handle disagreements about what
happened in the past. The key point, in this context, is that meta-theoretical assumptions
on what the past is, what history is, how we can know the past, what truth of the past and
objectivity are, what the relation between facts and values is, were shaped to a great extent
by implicit metaphors, which none of the respondents seemed to be aware of.
An important question was whether these implicit metaphors were appropriate and
helpful  in  attempts  to  make  sense  of  the  past  and  whether  they  hid  rather  than  revealed
certain important aspects of cognition. In other cases, it was also made apparent in the
analysis that a particular model of reasoning and justification in the textbook, while
described without using any explicit metaphorical expressions, had an underlying
structuring metaphor, which was revealed in an interview conversation. While the
depiction in the textbook could appear as a regular historical explanation, based solely on
logical arguments and free from metaphorical associations, the analysis revealed, in some
instances, that the argument and justification depended heavily on metaphors as an
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important part of the process of perception and understanding. Hence, my approach
combining the analysis of textbooks and interviews proved to be useful.
The very first step in the analysis of interviews consisted of a general thematic coding
of the transcripts using Atlas.ti software. This enabled me to identify certain topics, which
overlapped to a great extent with the main themes of my interview questionnaire:
objectivity and truth; multiperspectivity in representation of the past; relation between
facts and values; presentation of the discipline of history in school textbooks; purpose of
history education, and representation of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past in the author’s
textbook(s). Throughout the coding process, I was alert to the metaphorical and idiomatic
expressions, seeking to identify certain patterns emerging between thematic and
metaphorical use.
The total of 749 codes were organized into 11 code families: Authorship,
Epistemological Orientations, Multiperspectivity and Plural Interpretations, Optical-
ocularcentric Metaphors, Perceptions of Lithuania and its History, Perceptions of Poland
and its History, Perceptions of Polish-Lithuanian History, Perceptions of the Discipline of
History and the Past, Purpose of and Approach to History Education, Relations between
Facts and Values, Textbooks. There was a degree of overlap between some code families,
such as, for example, between Epistemological Orientations and Relations between Facts
and Values. However, keeping the code families distinct in this manner allowed for
refining different analytical foci.
At this stage, I made a choice to organize the presentation of analysis by keeping the
focus on particular authors and their textbooks, rather than on the themes of code families.
The unique relation between an author’s reasoning and textbook contents as well as the
richness of an author’s ideas, experiences, motivations would have been lost, had I
arranged  the  presentation  of  analysis  in  Chapters  6  and  7  in  terms  of  the  thematic  code
families. In order to compensate for the lack of generalizability of my analysis in Chapters
6 and 7 due to the depth of engagement with each individual author, I present a more
general thematic comparison of textbook authors and their textbooks in the final
discussion in Chapter 8.
The second step in the interview analysis was to underline the metaphorical
expressions in passages that were thematically relevant to me and then to interpret their
meaning entailments with a view to the context of the interview, the topic discussed and
other metaphors used in it. In some cases, the use of metaphors was consistent throughout
the interview; in other cases, important tensions or discrepancies in ways of thinking
appeared as revealed by metaphors. I have sought to indicate such tensions in the
presentation of analysis.
By identifying metaphorical expressions, I mean identifying words or phrases that can
be seen as somehow incongruent or mismatching in a given context in a literal sense, but
which support a transfer of meaning, typically from the concrete to the abstract domain.
Moreover, metaphorical words and expressions are best identified, when the researcher is
familiar with the context in which they were produced (Cameron & Maslen 2010). Thus, it
was useful to first familiarize myself with the interview transcripts by making a general
thematic analysis and only then proceed to identifying and underlining concrete
metaphorical expressions. While I sought to identify and underline all metaphorically used
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words and phrases, not all were relevant to my research interests. Even though I included
them in the identification stage, I was not always making use of them in further analysis.
In terms of translation from Lithuanian and Polish into English, the general rule I
followed was to identify the metaphorical usage in the original language and then translate
the passages that I chose to quote, seeking to convey the meaning as closely as possible to
how the metaphor functioned in the original language. In many cases, due to the proximity
of conceptual metaphors across Lithuanian, Polish and English (for example, when
metaphorical usage concerned the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING), translation was not
particularly problematic. Concrete linguistic expressions could vary across languages, but
the conceptual metaphor underlying these linguistic expressions was shared. However,
there were also a number of instances, where a direct translation of the metaphorical
concept  or  an  idiom into  English  did  not  make  sense.  In  these  instances,  I  combined  the
translated metaphorical expression with a contextualized explanation of its meaning and
entailments in the original language.
After analyzing each individual interview transcript, I turned to close-reading of the
presentation in the textbooks. I had already done the preliminary analysis of the textbooks
during 2013–2014, where I marked and made a list of significant passages with a short
commentary of why they seemed important to me. In the later stage of textbook analysis, I
re-read the relevant sections of the analyzed textbooks, marking the metaphors in them as
well as taking note of evaluations, arguments, justifications, and explanations presented in
them in depicting the past. The interview context, on this second reading, illuminated the
meanings and ways of thinking implicit in the narrative of textbooks.
I  chose  to  juxtapose  the  interview  analysis  with  the  textbook  analysis  of  a  particular
author(s), in order to reveal how the metaphorical models and reasoning of the author
corresponded to or differed from the textbook narrative. The aim was not so much to show
the  variety  of  representations  of  the  same  historical  event  or  epistemological  concept
(which in any case becomes visible in the analysis), but rather to show the links between
textbook contents and an authors’ reasoning.
In my analysis, I sought to identify not just the implicit metaphorical models of
cognition, but paid equal attention to conventional metaphors and novel metaphors, the
meaning of which depended a lot of on the context of the conversation. There were also
metaphors,  which appeared not as a linguistic expression, but,  for example,  as a form of
presentation of material that carries implicit ontological assumptions. For example, a
visual presentation of time and change on the textbook page as a uni-directional, left-to-
right axis, which is divided into discrete segments and along which there are specific
events, revealed the influence of the disembodied model of cognition. This model of
cognition is supported by optics and the camera as metaphors of cognition, because optics
spatializes time, rendering it to a succession of discrete, fixed snapshots, intervals, and
states. Optics and camera, as an optical instrument, support the disembodied conception of
cognition and change in history. Another visual presentation of time featured a box in
which all time was contained, implying that time is a static, fixed, contained, structured
substance. Neither of these metaphorical models of time, however, give any explicit
acknowledgment to embodied human presence in time. They are both surprisingly de-
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humanized metaphorical models of time, in which time is viewed as if from outside, by a
spectator who is cut off from time.
I have adopted the convention for marking the metaphors in the empirical chapters 6
and  7  that  consists  of  two  basic  principles.  All  the  metaphors  are  underlined  when  they
appear in quotations. However, when I discuss these metaphors in the main text, they are
distinguished in small caps.
Thus, the main steps in metaphor analysis of my materials were to identify metaphors,
consider why they were used in terms of context and topic discussed, reflect on the
entailments of the used metaphors, seek out patterns of metaphor use in and between
textbooks and interviews, and find connectionsbetween metaphor use and inclination to
empathically understand a different experience.
4.3 My role as an interviewer
My presence in the interview setting shaped the flow of conversation not only because I
arrived prepared with a set of questions and topics that I wanted my interviewees to talk
about. Being there and engaging in a conversation also meant that I was participating in
bringing forth the knowledge of the authors’ ways of thinking. My presence and
participation in the interview are, in my understanding, not a source of bias, but rather a
condition and a procedure of discovery (Ingold 2011). As I tried to understand how my
interviewees think, I needed to engage them and reveal some of my own thinking and
ideas to them. Together, the interviewee and I, were pro-ducing (bringing forth) (Ingold
2011) the knowledge and understanding of how each of us made sense of certain
questions. The opinions and ideas that came out of this mutual encounter marked a point
in an ongoing process of cognition.
My own thinking has developed significantly since 2014, when I conducted most of
the  interviews  with  the  Lithuanian  and  Polish  textbook  authors.  What  manifested  as  a
struggle with questions about truth and knowability of the past in 2014 led me eventually
through various encounters, readings, and experiences to the theory of enactive
embodiment. However, at the time of the interviews, I had positioned myself with the
postmodern theory of history, as advanced by Hayden White (1978, 1992, 1999, 2005a,
2014 [1973]) and Alun Munslow (2003, 2006a, 2012). This is noticeable in some of the
questions I pose in the interviews. However, my fascination with postmodern historical
theory gradually faded. I found myself agreeing with only some of the points argued by
White and Munslow, whereas certain other aspects of the postmodern theory of
historiography did not seem convincing or sufficient to offer answers to the questions I
was grappling with. Specifically, I agreed with the critique of objectivity and scientificity
in history advanced by Munslow and White, but was not as convinced that historiography
is merely a fiction constructed out of historians’ figurative choices. I felt unease about this
statement because it did not conform to my own experience of engaging with the past.
Still,  the  postmodern  critique  of  objectivity  and  scientificity  exerted  an  important
influence in the development of my thinking and the questions I posed to the textbook
authors. I was interested in understanding: how they made sense of historical truth and
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objectivity; what it meant for them to know the past; how they defined what the past and
history were; and how textbooks should instruct pupils to respond to and adjudicate
among competing accounts of what happened. In the end, I can only be grateful to the
tension induced in me by the ideas of postmodern thinkers, because it kept me interested,
vigilant, and reflective on the subject of the knowability of the past – to the extent that I
have lived my questions and sought to apply them in different fields of my life. In a way,
my process of research is itself an enactive process, as I found myself learning new things
and developing new ideas, influenced by a changing context, which was partially of my
own creation.
As to my interviewees, some of them were much more cautious in their responses and
reactions than others, partly because they were reasonably fearful of revealing too much
about their personal views and guarded their privacy and partly because they held
assumptions about who I am and what opinions I held about a given subject. Many authors
wanted to redirect the same questions that I posed back at me, which gave me an
opportunity to learn about engaging the interviewee in a conversation. Observer
independence, or taking up a role of a neutral interrogator, who only poses questions and
actively excludes herself from the conversation, was not an option, inasmuch as the
interviewees and I were co-creating knowledge. If they were willing to reveal their
opinions to me, it was only fair to satisfy their curiosity and disclose at least some of my
own thinking,  too.  I  also  noticed  that  if  the  authors  expected  me to  be  critical  of  certain
values  and  ideas  they  likely  subscribed  to,  they  were  carefully  choosing  words  so  as  to
maintain a more neutral image of themselves, which did not always coincide with the
textbook  contents.  As  a  result,  I  sometimes  needed  to  challenge  them  and  point  out  the
discrepancy between their response and the textbook contents.
However, when I sat down to transcribe and later immersed myself in analyzing the
interview  materials,  a  remarkable  outcome  was  that  I  felt  much  less  critical  towards  the
authors than I had been initially. Seeing their ideas as emerging from their particular lived,
embodied, longitudinal and ongoing experience enabled me to empathize with them, even
when I questioned or disagreed with their ideas. Engagement with a person in a face-to-
face conversation and, later, with their metaphorical ways of thinking about the past,
history, and history education made me develop empathy and a deeper understanding of
the experiential contexts out of which this person emerged and why they were holding
onto these particular ideas.
I  believe  this  would  not  have  been  possible  had  I  merely  analyzed  the  textbooks
without talking to their authors. It was the interviews, rather than the textbook analysis,
that enabled me to understand their ways of thinking through the metaphors they selected.
The theoretical framework of enactive embodiment played an important role by focusing
my attention on how ideas and meanings are not imposed on the thing-like, factual
substance  of  the  past,  but  how,  rather,  ideas  and  meanings  arise  and  are  emergent  in  the
process of life and interaction with one’s environment. The former understanding – that
meanings are ascribed and imposed onto the factuality of the past – is a legacy of
ocularcentric epistemology, according to which we look at the past as if from “outside,”
considering other people, things and events as a final, evolved, fixed form. The form is
separate from matter; the deed is separate from the doer; the thought is separate from the
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thinker (Ingold 2015). By contrast, considering other people and the meanings they
express not as a final, static, idealized form, but as part of an ongoing, generative process
of formation, of coming into being allows me as a researcher to approach my interviewees
and  their  ideas  as  continuously  in  the  making.  Engaging  with  a  person  as  a  verb  was  a
different experience from looking at a person as a noun or a pronoun: it enabled me to see
a person more generously and to recognize how their past as lived experience shapes how
they make sense of the world. As a researcher, it made me more attentive and open to an
encounter with the interviewees.
Finally, my nationality (Lithuanian) and linguistic skills have also likely played a role
in shaping the interview conversations. My national background has inevitably rendered
me more sensitive to and perceptive of the ways in which the Lithuanian lived experiences
might have been overlooked in the Polish accounts of the past. However, I strove to attend
carefully  to  the  Polish  lived  experiences  and  to  be  mindful  of  the  diversity  of  these
experiences.38 The proficiency of my linguistic skills in Polish might also have exerted an
influence  on  the  interview  dynamic,  as  I  am  not  bilingual  in  the  two  languages.  I  have
started learning Polish during my master’s studies and acquired a level of linguistic
proficiency  sufficient  enough  for  me  to  read  and  conduct  interviews  in  Polish.  Even
though it did not constitute a major impediment to the conversation flow, I was not able to
express myself as fully in Polish during the interviews as in my native tongue.
38 When  I  refer  to  the  Polish  or  Lithuanian  lived  experiences,  I  do  not  assume  these  to  be  in  any  way  uniform  or
invariant.
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Chapter 5. Context of Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the analysis that is carried out in Chapters 6
and  7.  Firstly,  I  will  acquaint  the  reader  with  the  events  of  the  shared  Polish-Lithuanian
past that have received different evaluations in Polish and Lithuanian historiography.
Secondly, I will introduce the school-history curricula that have shaped history education
in Poland and Lithuanian since 1990.
5.1 Lithuanian and Polish narratives of shared past
In  this  section,  I  will  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  shared  Polish-Lithuanian  past,
focusing on the main events that have raised controversy in Polish and Lithuanian
historiography.
5.1.1 The Union of Krewo
The contention over the shared past begins with the very first step in rapprochement of
Poland and Lithuania in the 14th century, when the Union of Krewo was concluded
between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1385. Under the
terms of the union treaty, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila (Polish: Jagie??o) was to be
crowned the King of Poland and Christianize Lithuania. The treaty also stipulated that
Jogaila was to help Poland regain lost territories, release Polish captives, and “attach” (the
Latin term applicare) Lithuania to Poland. The proper translation and meaning of the
Latin term applicare became an issue of debate among Polish and Lithuanian historians.
Did the term suggest that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was annexed to the Kingdom of
Poland? Did it imply incorporation of Lithuania into Poland or a union of the two states?
Historiographical narratives, which emerged in the first few decades of the 20th
century in Lithuania and Poland, drew on very different meanings with regard to the
Union of Krewo. Polish historians saw the Union as one of the most significant merits of
Jagie??o, which permitted Polish culture and influence to spread in Lithuania (Jurkiewicz
1994). Polish historians also did not oppose Jagie??o to his cousin, the Lithuanian Grand
Duke Vytautas, regarding the latter as Jagie??o’s closest ally (Nikžentaitis 2002).
Nevertheless,  Polish  historians  perceived  Jagie??o  as  if  separately  from  Lithuania  and
Lithuanian culture (Nikžentaitis 2002). He was fully integrated into a modern Polish
national historical narrative and perceived as a representative of the Polish nation.
In the Lithuanian historiography of the interwar years, the narrative focused on the
Lithuanian struggle for the preservation of statehood, labelling Jogaila as a traitor of
national interests, as opposed to Vytautas, who was held in high esteem as a national hero.
Lithuanian historian Alvydas Nikžentaitis (2002) argues that heroization of Vytautas in
Lithuania had begun already in his own lifetime. According to him, the resistance of
Vytautas to Jogaila’s rule was portrayed as a Lithuanian uprising against Polish attempts
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to take control of Lithuania already in the end of the 14th century. Nikžentaitis (2002)
refers to multiple sources, which show that, also during the 15th-16th centuries,
commentators  from  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  praised  the  political  merits,  style  of
leadership, and personal characteristics of Vytautas, while downplaying or disregarding
those  of  Jogaila.  However,  a  concrete  image  of  Jogaila  as  a  traitor  emerged  only  in  the
beginning  of  the  20th  century  in  the  context  of  the  Lithuanian  national  revival.  The
emerging modern national Lithuanian identity required clear-cut differentiation between
Poles and Lithuanians. Simultaneously, any traces of Vytautas’ anti-Polish, pro-
Lithuanian policies and attitudes were given a renewed emphasis as his most celebrated
merits in the emerging, national, historical narrative. Vytautas became a symbol of
Lithuanian resistance against Poland.
Historiographical assessments exerted a considerable influence on political visions and
policies. Lithuanian and Polish politicians, debating on future state models in the early
20th  century,  drew analogies  and  examples  from the  history  of  the  Union  of  Krewo and
relations of Jogaila and Vytautas (Nikžentaitis 2002). Hence, for Lithuanian politicians the
Union of Krewo was a historical mistake, which they were determined not to repeat ever
again,  whereas  Polish  politicians  perceived  the  union  or  federation  of  Poland  and
Lithuania as a consistent and even necessary outcome of a long-standing historical
tradition.  The  Chief  of  State  of  Poland  Józef  Pi?sudski  imagined  a  federal  Polish  state,
which  comprised  the  territory  of  the  former  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania,  whereas
Lithuanian politicians were unequivocally opposed to any binding ties between Poland
and Lithuania.
In the Soviet period, despite the influence of Marxist ideology on the discipline of
history, the historiographical depiction of the Union of Krewo as well as Jogaila and
Vytautas did not change dramatically in terms of evaluative framework. In Poland, the
history of Polish-Lithuanian relations became less topical (Nikžentaitis 2002). Finally,
after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Union of Krewo and the personalities of Jogaila and
Vytautas have received a historiographical re-evaluation. As Nikžentaitis (2002) notes,
Lithuanian and Polish historians agree today that the Union of Krewo did not signify the
loss of statehood of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, nor was it a historic mistake. However,
certain evaluative connotations and attitudes persist in the popular historical
consciousness. Jogaila, for example, continues to be perceived in an unfavorable light in
popular Lithuanian historical consciousness.
5.1.2 The Battle of Grunwald
Another  event  from  the  shared  Polish-Lithuanian  past,  which  has  received  controversial
interpretations, is the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. Already in the 16th century, Poles and
Lithuanians held divisive opinions about the course of the battle (Nikžentaitis 2002). Until
the mid-16th century, there existed a separate Lithuanian historical narrative, developed in
the Bychowiec Chronicle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which credited Vytautas and
the Lithuanians with victory and downplayed the contribution of the Poles (Nikžentaitis
2002; Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012). However, starting from the second half of
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the 16th century, as a political and cultural rapprochement of two nations began to
intensify, Lithuanian authors adopted a modified version of the Polish narrative, according
to  which  the  victory  was  credited  to  Polish  troops  (Nikžentaitis  2002).  The  basis  of  the
Polish  narrative  was  the  “Annals  or  Chronicles  of  the  famous  Kingdom  of  Poland,”
authored by the 15th century Polish priest and chronicler Jan D?ugosz, whose narrative
became the main source of historical knowledge about the battle until the 20th century
(Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012, 26). D?ugosz advanced an account of the battle,
according  to  which  the  Lithuanian  army  escaped  from  the  battlefield,  portraying  the
victory against the Teutonic knights as a Polish victory. The Lithuanian narrative of the
battle after the 1569 Union of Lublin with Poland was greatly shaped by the Stryjkowski
Chronicle, written in 1582, which countered the claims that Lithuanian troops escaped
from the battlefield and presented the victory as a shared Polish-Lithuanian achievement
(Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012). In the 17th and 18th centuries, the significance
of the Battle of Grunwald faded in the memory cultures of both Poland and Lithuania
(Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012).
However, the event returned to its prominence in Poland at the end of the 19th century
because of intensifying Polish-German tensions. The novel of Polish writer Henryk
Sienkiewicz “The Teutonic Knights,” serialized by the magazine “Tygodnik Ilustrowany”
between 1897 and 1899, depicted Germans as enemies of Poland, which were finally
defeated in the Battle of Grunwald (Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012). The main
winners, according to the novel’s narrative, were Poles and the King Jogaila, whereas the
contribution  of  Lithuanians  and  the  Grand  Duke  Vytautas  was  downplayed  as  of
secondary importance. The Battle of Grunwald became one of the key Polish lieux de
mémoire starting from 1910, when Poland celebrated the 500th anniversary of the battle
(Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012, 44). Polish publications, dedicated to the
celebration, emphasized the image of Germans as an eternal enemy of Poland and sought
to unite the nation against the threat of Germanization (Sala 2010). Jogaila and Vytautas
emerged in these representations as personifications of Polish and Lithuanian nations
whose shared efforts to defeat the Teutonic Order were seen as the foundation for a shared
life in the Polish-Lithuanian union. Poles presented themselves as “elder brothers” who,
by gaining the victory in the battle, proved to the Lithuanians how useful it was to accept a
closer union with Poland (Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012, 49).
In the 19th century, the memory of the Battle of Grunwald played only a marginal role
in the Lithuanian national revival movement. As Nikžentaitis (2002) explains, modern
Lithuanian nationalism sought to differentiate Lithuanian identity from Polishness,
whereas the history of the Battle of Grunwald represented a joint struggle of Poland and
Lithuania as allies. Nevertheless, the importance of the battle began to steadily increase at
the beginning of the 20th century. Most Lithuanian literary accounts of the battle from the
early 20th century accentuated the role of Vytautas and the Lithuanian army in defeating
the Teutonic knights, and portrayed Jogaila as a coward who spent more time praying than
leading the army (Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012, 58–61). However, contrary to
Polish renditions, Lithuanian authors perceived rapprochement between Poland and
Lithuania in the aftermath of the battle as the beginning of the decline of Lithuanian
statehood and  the  nation.  As  a  result,  the  Battle  of  Grunwald  was  not  such  a  significant
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historical  event  in  the  Lithuanian  commemoration  culture  as  it  was  in  Poland  at  the
beginning of the 20th century.
In the 1920s, Lithuanian historians renewed their interest in the debate about the
tactical  retreat  of  the  Lithuanian  army  during  the  course  of  the  Battle.  Instead  of  a
narrative about a joint Polish-Lithuanian victory against the Teutonic Order, the new
interpretation foregrounded the disagreement between Poles and Lithuanians on the
battlefield. Contradictions in the portrayal of the battle centered on the question of whether
the true leader of the battle was Vytautas or Jogaila, and whether the Lithuanian retreat
was a tactical maneuver, which determined the triumph of the Polish-Lithuanian forces, or
a shameful escape (Nikžentaitis 2002). In Lithuania, however, the image of the battle was
rather a background for the cult of the Grand Duke Vytautas and served as a constitutive
part of mobilizing anti-Polish rhetoric in the interwar conflict with Poland (Ma?iulis,
Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012). In Poland, on the other hand, the image of the battle was
actualized in relation to the propaganda struggle against the German revanchism.
During the postwar period, the history of the Battle of Grunwald was ideologically re-
interpreted  as  the  fight  of  brotherly  socialist  nations  against  the  Western  powers  and
“German  imperialism.”  Soviet  ideologues  sought  to  present  the  image  of  the  battle  as  a
shared lieu de mémoire of the Soviet bloc (Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012). This
ideological shift in interpretation was, however, unsuccessful in Lithuania due to the hold
of memory of the interwar conflict with Poland (Nikžentaitis 2002). A latent strife for the
legacy of the battle continued even under Soviet ideological constraints, where both
Lithuanians and Poles sought to emphasize the achievements of their nation on the
battleground. In Poland in particular, political elites systematically used nationalist ideas
in relation to the battle in order to consolidate their power, whereas in Lithuania the Soviet
commemoration was more modest and emphasized the battle as a symbol of “eternal
friendship” of Lithuanian and Slavic nations and resistance to German militarism
(Ma?iulis, Petrauskas & Stali?nas 2012).
5.1.3 The Union of Lublin
The closer alliance of Poland and Lithuania eventually culminated in the establishment of
a joint Polish-Lithuanian state in 1569. Contemporary commentators referred to the Union
of Lublin by the metaphor of the “sacred marriage” (Bumblauskas 2009). It created
conditions for major linguistic and identity transformations in the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania,  especially  with  regard  to  the  Lithuanian  gentry,  who,  over  the  course  of  the
existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, increasingly adopted Polish language
and culture.
Lithuanian historiography and periodicals of the 19th and 20th century generally could
be said to hold predominantly negative attitudes towards the Union of Lublin. In these
accounts, the Union of Lublin denoted the end of the grandeur and authentic traditions of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Buchowski 2012). The Lithuanian gentry was said to resist
the union, but finally had to succumb to pressure because of Polish blackmail and
betrayal. For example, the 19th century Lithuanian historian Simonas Daukantas assessed
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the Union of Lublin as a great misfortune, which opened the gate for the spread of the
Polish language and ill customs in Lithuania. Only peasants, according to him, remained
“unspoiled” by Polish influence. The Commonwealth was taken to signify the loss of
independence, moral decline, weakening statehood and an increasing Polonization of
political elites. In effect, these historiographical accounts tended to diminish the
significance of the entire historical period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
perceived as the period of gradual decline, which eventually led to the disintegration of the
state in the 18th century.
However, in the end of the 20th century, alternative interpretations of the Union of
Lublin and the Commonwealth emerged in Lithuanian historiography. Historian Edvardas
Gudavi?ius introduced a new narrative by considering the gradual cultural Polonization of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after its unification with Poland as the consequence of
Lithuania’s Europeanization process and, thus, as an inevitable development, which
brought Lithuania closer to the field of Western civilization. Gudavi?ius (2002, 203)
claimed that Poland in the 14th century was to Lithuania what Germany was to Poland in
the 10th century – the source of Western civilization. Rather than seeing the influence of
Polish culture and language as solely a regrettable process of cultural colonization causing
the loss of Lithuanian sovereignty and identity, he highlighted the role of Polish language
as a medium through which the advancement of Western culture reached Lithuania,
located far from the centers of Western culture. Nevertheless, he reaffirmed that the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania and its society retained a sense of separate identity, distinct interests
and traditions. In other words, the spread of Polish language and culture did not eradicate
a separate political consciousness in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuanian historian
Alfredas Bumblauskas (2009) also highlighted that the Lithuanian nobility retained a
sense of separate political identity, based on the traditions of the Grand Duchy, despite the
gradual and overwhelming cultural Polonization.
However, despite these recent changes in historiographical accounts of the Union of
Lublin, the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is not popular in Lithuanian
society. A survey, conducted 2005–2006 on Lithuanian social memory, showed that, for
Lithuanians, the least important historical period significant for their national identity is
the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Šutinien? 2008). Only 4% of the
respondents considered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth meaningful to their national
identity. Meanwhile, the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania before unionization with
Poland was a much stronger and relevant element of national identity. A total of 25.6% of
respondents considered the history of the Grand Duchy before the rule of the Grand Duke
Vytautas (a period until 1392) to be important to their national identity, and 14%
identified the rule of the Grand Duke Vytautas and the subsequent period until the Union
of Lublin (1392–1569) to be the most important (Šutinien? 2008, 109). This shows that
the Union of Lublin and the ensuing history of a shared Polish-Lithuanian statehood is still
regarded by many Lithuanians as “not their” history, but rather a regrettable “dark age” of
Lithuanian history, overshadowed by Polish cultural domination.
Bumblauskas (2009) explains such generally negative attitudes by noting two key
factors. First, the common Polish-Lithuanian history is traditionally judged through the
prism of the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict. Secondly, unification with Poland is
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perceived to be the causative factor for Polonization of Lithuanian culture. Bumblauskas
(2009)  also  emphasizes  that  such  negative  assessments  of  the  past  partly  stem  from  the
fact that Polish historical tradition tended to portray Lithuania prior to the Union of Lublin
as merely the “Poland of Jagiellons” and label the Commonwealth as “the Republic of
Poland,” ignoring the dual character of the state. According to him, Polish historiography
for a long time ignored the existence of a separate Lithuanian political consciousness in
the Commonwealth (Bumblauskas 2009).
In Poland, a similar differentiation can be observed in historiographic accounts on the
Union of Lublin. In the 19th century, Polish historians tended to ignore the dual character
of the Commonwealth. For example, Józef Jaroszewicz (1844–1845) and Józef Szujski
(1862–1866) overlooked the articles of the Union treaty, which implied that the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania continued to exist as a separate political entity. As a result, the equal
standing  of  Lithuania  in  the  common  state  was  largely  ignored.  A  similar  historical
narrative was maintained by Oswald Balzer (1919) in the beginning of the 20th century,
who argued that after the Union the Polish-Lithuanian state became one legally
undifferentiated entity. In the 19th-century Polish literature, the Union was depicted as an
amalgamation of a powerful and culturally advanced nation with a neighboring nation,
which was brutal, pagan, and uneducated (Buchowski 2012, 49). The Union of Lublin was
therefore  a  benevolent  action  on  the  part  of  Poland  and  a  salvation  to  Lithuania,  which
could adopt Christianity, Western civilization, and a high culture from Poland. The Union
of Lublin, rendered this way, was a symbol of success, power, and the brotherhood of two
nations.  The  belief  in  the  stability  and  eternal  endurance  of  the  Union  was  so  strong  in
Poland that the modern Lithuanian national movement infuriated Polish society
(Buchowski 2012, 50–51).
A new perspective on the nature of the Polish-Lithuanian state was introduced by the
post-war generation of Polish historians. For example, Henryk Wisner (Visneris 1991, 7)
acknowledged that the Union of Lublin did not mean the end of Lithuanian sovereignty
and asserted that the newly formed Republic was comprised of a single nation of the lower
gentry,  but  of  two separate  states,  distrustful  of  each  other.  This  distrust  was  maintained
primarily by the families of the Lithuanian magnatry, who were against the union with
Poland, seeing it as a danger to the sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Wisner
stressed that the establishment of the Commonwealth depended more on a lack of
alternative options for the Lithuanian gentry than on mutual voluntary acceptance of the
negotiated terms. Furthermore, he highlighted the fact that the gradual cultural
Polonization  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  did  not  entail  the  takeover  of  the  Polish
identity and loss of a separate political consciousness (Visneris 1991, 24, 69).  Despite the
fact that Polish became the official state language and the language of communication and
literature in the Republic, there remained two distinct states – the Polish Kingdom and the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania – each of them in possession of their own political identity and
“native” citizenry, as opposed to the “foreigners” of the other confederate state.
Henryk Samsonowicz is yet another Polish historian who attempted to show the
duality of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the equal standing of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania in its union with Poland. He argued that despite the gradual
Polonization of the Lithuanian gentry and its acceptance of Polish customs and offices
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after 1569, it still retained a continuing consciousness of a separate identity (Samsonowicz
1982, 56). Samsonowicz highlighted cultural and linguistic differences as well as a long-
standing tradition of mutual hostility, which hampered the realization of the Polish-
Lithuanian union (Samsonowicz 1982, 55).
5.1.4 The interwar conflict and the Question of Vilnius/Wilno
After the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and
Austria in the end of the 18th century, the memory of a joint Polish-Lithuanian state and
union persisted in Polish society throughout the 19th century (Buchowski 2012). The
heritage of the multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was, however,
increasingly understood in Polish society as simply Polish heritage (Buchowski 2012). It
needs to be pointed out here that, in the Commonwealth, being a Pole did not signify
identity based on ethnic origin, but rather political identification with the multicultural
Commonwealth, which is why, for example, a nobleman could perceive himself as a
Lithuanian and a Pole simultaneously. Similarly, the label “Lithuanian” denoted political
and administrative belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, irrespective of ethnic or
linguistic identification. However, in the 19th century, identity definitions were
undergoing significant transformation. A split occurred in the understanding of what it
meant to be a Lithuanian, where the gentry of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania began
to increasingly identify themselves as Polish, as opposed to the “new” Lithuanian nation,
originating from the peasantry.
Despite emerging national movements and changing identities, certain attitudes from
the time of the Commonwealth tended to endure. Lithuanians peasants were patronizingly
regarded by the Polish gentry and intelligentsia as “younger brothers,” who served the
interests of the Polish nation and who needed to be educated and guided in the right
direction, since they were not able to make their own national decisions (Buchowski 2012,
33–34). Lithuania was perceived as a territory integral to Poland’s “eastern borderlands.”
Countryside life and culture were depicted as primitive and exotic, in seeking to
emphasize the positive impact of Polish culture on peasants and idyllic, harmonious
relations between the gentry and peasantry. A mythology of pagan Lithuanian history and
folk customs emerged in Romantic Polish literature of the 19th century, which painted the
image of Lithuania as a mysterious land, which was simultaneously very close to the
Polish heart (Buchowski 2012, 39–53).
Familiar with this Romantic image of Lithuania, Polish society could not comprehend
the aims and rhetoric of a rising modern Lithuanian national movement. Lithuanians,
according to Polish imagination, were merely Poles, who spoke a different language; they
were part of the same nation (Buchowski 2012). Lithuanians had to be grateful to Poland
for Christianity and Western civilization. Hence, the only option for Poles and Lithuanians
was to renew the union and establish a joint state when the circumstances would allow for
that. Negative reactions of Lithuanians to such future visions of a shared statehood were
surprising to Polish society. As antagonism was becoming fiercer, initial Polish
indifference towards the Lithuanian national movement, mockingly labeled “Litwomania,”
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was soon replaced by feelings of contempt and hostility. Lithuanian emancipatory aims
were perceived to be an artificial initiative and a Russian intrigue, which did not match the
spirit of history and the real interests of Poland and Lithuania (Buchowski 2012, 98–99).
The Lithuanian republic, established in 1918, was similarly held to be a Russian or
German sabotage directed against Poland (Buchowski 2012, 115).
“Litwomania” was metaphorically understood as a disease, which had to be controlled
and treated in order to prevent its further spread (Buchowski 2012). Conservative
landlords viewed claims of the Lithuanian intelligentsia contemptuously as a plebeian
pathology. Supporters of Lithuanian national aspirations were also metaphorically
portrayed in Polish periodicals as capricious children who play with dangerous toys and
need supervision of an older sibling (Buchowski 2012, 106). Although older brother did
his best to be patient with his inexperienced, ungrateful sibling, the child needed to
understand that patience had limits and one day he might be punished for misbehavior.
The image of Poles among Lithuanian peasants in the 19th century was shaped by their
experience of the local gentry, who were mocked for their vanity, laziness, gambling, and
alcoholism. Serfdom and bondage to the lord of the manor, far from idyllic representations
produced by the gentry, were experienced as painful injustice by peasants (Buchowski
2012, 37). Memories of abuse and violence under serfdom were later often used in anti-
Polish articles in Lithuanian periodicals. The emerging Lithuanian intelligentsia of the
19th century used and adapted these anti-Polish attitudes and beliefs, in order to shape
modern Lithuanian national identity. Literary and historiographical works, which
portrayed Polish-Lithuanian antagonism in history and critically depicted Polish
aspirations to annex Lithuania, were very successful.
Despite this, Polish language and culture were identified by Lithuanian peasants with a
higher social status, which induced faster processes of Polonization among Lithuanian
peasants in the 19th century. Certain leaders of the Lithuanian national movement, such
as, for example, Vincas Kudirka, felt ashamed in their youth of their peasant origins,
preferred to be seen as Poles, avoided speaking Lithuanian, and only later experienced a
transformation of national identity. Polonization of the peasantry was metaphorically
perceived by supporters of the Lithuanian national movement as a disease, which spread
from the sin of the Polonized Lithuanian gentry and originated from the Polish-Lithuanian
Union (Buchowski 2012). Poles and the Polish language were regarded as the biggest
enemies of Lithuanian nation and culture, which was said to have implemented a
systematic, intentional program of eradication of the Lithuanian nation since the 14th
century. Fighting “Polonomania” meant bringing back the members of the Lithuanian
nation to good health, lost under Polish influence during the course of history.
These ingrained mutual attitudes of Poles and Lithuanians played a major role in the
interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict. On 16 February 1918, when the Council of Lithuania
signed the Act of Independence of Lithuania in Vilnius39,  the reaction of the local Polish
population was unambiguously negative. Lithuanian Poles felt offended and excluded
from the newly established Lithuanian state and perceived it merely as a German-backed
intrigue of Lithuanian nationalists (Buchowski 2012). They questioned the legitimacy and
39 I will use the present-day Lithuanian version of the city name in what follows.
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popular support enjoyed by the Council of Lithuania and argued that ethnic Lithuanians
had  no  right  to  claim  the  city  as  the  capital  of  the  newly  established  Lithuanian  state
(Weeks 2012, 63). In 1918, Lithuanian-born Polish Chief of State Józef Pi?sudski foresaw
only two possibilities in this situation: either Lithuanians agreed to renew the union with
Poland or they had to limit their territorial claims to only those regions which were ethno-
linguistically Lithuanian, thus, excluding the city and region of Vilnius, whose population
was predominantly Jewish and Polish (Buchowski 2012, 144). The Lithuanian authorities,
on  the  other  hand,  argued  that  the  local  Polish-speaking  population  was  not  made  up  of
Poles, but rather of Polonized Lithuanians who had lost their mothertongue over the
centuries and needed to return to their ethnic Lithuanian roots.
In 1919, when, in the aftermath of World War I, the German troops retreated, the
Bolsheviks attacked Lithuania and Poland from the east. On April 19, 1919, the Polish
army captured the city of Vilnius, which soon led to clashes between Polish and
Lithuanian soldiers. Immediately after the takeover of the city, Pi?sudski issued a bilingual
proclamation to the “inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania,” in which he
pledged to create an opportunity for settling nationality problems and religious affairs in a
manner that inhabitants of the city would determine, without any kind of force or pressure
from Poland. Pi?sudski expected that the Lithuanian authorities would settle for a
compromise in order to regain Vilnius and would accept the idea of a Polish-Lithuanian
federation (Buchowski 2012).
However, neither Polish, nor Lithuanian nationalists supported Pi?sudski’s vision. The
disagreement was further negotiated in the Paris Peace Conference. Poland did not want to
make any territorial concessions, basing its claims on the right of self-determination of the
local Poles. The Lithuanians claimed Vilnius as their historical capital and refused any
federation ties with Poland, desiring an independent Lithuanian state and perceiving
Polish presence in the city as an occupation. The situation was further complicated by an
attempted Polish coup organized in the city of Kaunas where the Lithuanian government
resided at the time. The local Polish Military Organization was planning to take down the
Lithuanian government and replace it with a pro-Polish cabinet, which would accept the
idea of the Polish-Lithuanian Union (Buchowski 2012). Lithuanian intelligence
discovered the secret plan and the coup failed. After this incident, the image of Poles as
enemies of the Lithuanian nation and independence became even stronger.
Tensions between Lithuanian and Polish armies grew worse in 1920. In July 1920,
westward advancing Bolshevik troops took control of Vilnius. Soviet Russia and
Lithuania signed a peace treaty on July 12, according to which Russia recognized
Lithuanian independence and an eastern border with the city of Vilnius on the Lithuanian
side. The hostility felt towards Poland was so powerful that Lithuanian political elite was
eager to sign an anti-Polish accord with Soviet Russia and did not consider the Bolsheviks
as a serious threat to Lithuanian sovereignty (Kasperavi?ius 2001, 147–156; Laurinavi?ius
1997, 235). Although Lithuania declared neutrality in the Polish-Soviet war, the
Lithuanian-Soviet peace treaty was interpreted by Poland as a violation of neutrality.
When  the  Polish  army  crushed  Soviet  troops  in  the  Battle  of  Warsaw  in  August,  Polish
troops started again to advance towards Lithuania. Only when the Polish army defeated
the Bolsheviks at the Battle of Warsaw and started approaching the southern borders of
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Lithuania, did the Soviet Army transfer Vilnius to the Lithuanian authorities. In
September, fierce clashes began between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of
Suwa?ki at the southwestern Lithuanian border. Polish and Lithuanian delegations opened
negotiations over a demarcation line, but the most contentious point regarding Vilnius and
to whom it belonged remained unresolved.
On  October  7,  both  sides  signed  an  agreement  in  Suwa?ki,  according  to  which  a
demarcation line was drawn leaving the city of Vilnius on the Lithuanian side. In the
Lithuanian narrative of the conflict, the Suwa?ki agreement has been traditionally given a
lot of significance as a legal document proving Lithuania’s right to the city (Buchowski
2012). Polish accounts, on the other hand, downplay the importance of the agreement.
Finally, in October 8, before the Suwa?ki agreement came into force, Pi?sudski ordered
General Lucjan ?eligowski to stage a mutiny with his 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian Division
and capture the city of Vilnius. For Lithuanians, it meant that Poland broke the Suwa?ki
agreement and became a symbol of Polish treachery. After taking control of Vilnius,
?eligowski’s troops continued marching further into Lithuanian territory, at which point
their  advancement  was  halted  by  the  resistance  of  the  Lithuanian  army.  On  October  12,
?eligowski proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Central Lithuania, with
Vilnius  as  its  capital.  The  Polish-Lithuanian  War  continued  until  the  intervention  of  the
League of Nations, which demanded both parties to sign a ceasefire. Further negotiations,
mediated by the League of Nations, were unsuccessful and did not change the status quo.
The Republic of Central Lithuania was eventually incorporated into Poland as the Wilno
Voivodeship in 1922. Lithuania broke off all diplomatic relations with Poland and refused
any actions that would recognize Poland’s control of Vilnius. In 1939, however, the city
and its surrounding areas were transferred to Lithuania according to the Soviet–Lithuanian
Mutual Assistance Treaty. In exchange, Lithuania agreed to allow Soviet military bases to
be established in strategic parts of the country. In 1940, the first Soviet occupation of
Lithuania began.
The dramatic events of the interwar further consolidated hostile mutual attitudes. Poles
were perceived in Lithuanian society as an eternal treacherous enemy, which sought to
coerce Lithuania to submit to the imposed vision of the union. Lithuanian propaganda also
widely employed the social antagonism by presenting Poles as rich landlords eager to
oppress peasants and bring back serfdom (Buchowski 2012, 156–157). Pi?sudski and
?eligowski were portrayed as greedy aggressors and criminals in periodicals and school-
history textbooks throughout the interwar period (Buchowski 2012, 178–179). The Polish
takeover and annexation of the Vilnius region was widely portrayed as an unjust
occupation.
The negative image of Poland which reached its peak in the interwar Lithuanian
republic persisted throughout the postwar period and can still be detected in Lithuanian
society today, even if not in such acute terms. In Soviet Lithuania, the narrative of Polish-
Lithuanian relations did not undergo drastic changes despite the pervading Marxist
ideology. Polish landlords, according to the Soviet narrative, sought to oppress the peasant
folk people throughout history and, in 1920, “Poland of bourgeois landlords” once again
sought to take over Vilnius, which Soviet Russia had earlier rightfully given to Lithuania
(Buchowski 2012, 501).
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In communist Poland, the narrative about a shared Polish-Lithuanian past also did not
undergo major changes, despite the fact that old antagonisms were downplayed. Until the
end of the 1980s, Polish school-history textbooks depicted the glory and advantages of the
Polish-Lithuanian union, described the Commonwealth as simply “Poland” and portrayed
the interwar conflict as a minor border skirmish, among many other similar disagreements
that sprang up after World War I (Buchowski 2012, 503). In bookshops, cinema and TV,
the old romanticized vision of a historical Lithuania continued to prevail, based on the
19th century literary novels (Buchowski 2012, 504).
In the 1990s, tensions over the status of Vilnius reemerged once again. Poland strongly
supported Lithuania’s independence in the turbulent years of the late 1980s-early 1990s.
However, the common task to agree on the contents of a bilateral treaty in the early 1990s
turned out to be a challenging endeavor, requiring extensive negotiations and
compromises on both sides. What provoked most of the controversy during the
negotiations on the bilateral Polish-Lithuanian treaty was, unsurprisingly, the question of
the historical past and how it should be addressed in the text of the treaty. Prior to the
signature of the 1994 Treaty, eleven deputies of the Lithuanian parliament urged the
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas Saudargas not to sign the declaration of
January 1992, demanding that Poland condemn the act of aggression, led by General
?eligowski in 1920, and claiming that if this provision was not included in the bilateral
treaty, the results of aggression would be legalized (Snyder 1995, 326). The Lithuanian
side sought that Poland would officially acknowledge the fact of occupation and confirm
that the annexation of Vilnius and its surrounding area was an illegal act, in breach of
international law. The president of Poland Lech Wa??sa stated that Poland had no claims
on Lithuanian territory (Snyder 1995, 327). However, the Lithuanians still insisted that the
treaty  could  not  be  signed  without  an  additional  declaration  on  history,  while  Poland
repeatedly responded that historical debates should proceed after the treaty had been
signed. Ultimately, Lithuania agreed to exclude the historical issues from the treaty and
the accompanying declaration. The treaty was signed on 22 February 1994. Lithuanians,
initially determined to achieve Poland’s condemnation of the takeover of Vilnius in 1920,
compromised and accepted a statement on the “possibility of different interpretations of a
shared history.”
5.2 Lithuanian and Polish school-history curricula
In this section, I provide an overview of Lithuanian and Polish school-history curricula
that were adopted after 1990.
5.2.1 Lithuanian school-history history curricula
During 1990–1999, the Ministry of Education and Science (Ministry of Culture and
Education until 1993) issued seven history curricula for general education. Fiveof these
curricula (1990, 1991, 1993, 1997, 1999) described the aims and contents of education for
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the 5th to 12th grades. The 1996 curriculum provided guidelines for history education in
the 10th-12th grades and the 1998 curriculum outlined history education for the 5th to
10th grades.40
Starting from the 1992–1993 school year, the concentric curricular approach was
introduced, according to which the teaching of history was divided into several
consecutive phases that present the material at an increasingly advanced level (Bitautas
2015). In 1997, a new structure of history education in elementary (years 5 to 10) and
secondary schools (years 11 to 12) was introduced (Bitautas 2015). In the 5th grade,
pupils learned an episodic course of Lithuanian history. An episodic course of world
history followed in the 6th grade. In the 7th to 10th grades, pupils learned an integrated
Lithuanian and world history course, which encompassed the entire chronological expanse
from pre-history to the end of the 20th century. In the 11–12th grades, pupils again
repeated the entire Lithuanian and world history from pre-history to the end of the 20th
century, at a basic or advanced level. In practice, this meant that pupils covered the same
material three times during school education at an increasingly advanced level. This three-
tier concentric approach to history education still endures in Lithuania today.
The 1999 history curriculum for the 5th to 12thgrades specified that history lessons
should help pupils form an image of the chronological sequence of the historical process;
distinguish between facts and opinions; detect mistakes and biases; develop critical
thinking; understand that a historical narrative is only a hypothetical approximation of the
past, which depends on sources and research methodology (ŠMM 1999). It stated that the
main aim of history education is to develop an understanding that “today’s world is a
result of a long-term and historically contingent development of humanity” (ŠMM 1999).
The curriculum placed much emphasis on the development of historical thinking, critical
evaluation, and understanding of the main methods of professional historical analysis. In
terms of thematic focus, much of the curriculum, in particular starting from the 9th grade,
focused onthe political history of Lithuania and the world.
On the other hand, the curriculum likewise postulated that the ability to “feel into” a
given historical epoch is no less important than the methods of historical reconstruction
(ŠMM 1999). Moreover, the curriculum stated that pupils should learn that the same facts
can be interpreted differently and should be able to compare and evaluate divergent
interpretations (ŠMM 1999). Many of these postulates were retained, almost word for
word, in later curricular documents. It is questionable, however, to what extent these
didactic aims could be fulfilled in history lessons, because the curriculum encompassed an
immense amount of factual information, which, undoubtedly, encouraged pupils to adopt
rote memorization as a method of learning.
In 2002 and 2003, the Ministry of Education and Science released the new curricula
for elementary and secondary education, which subsumed the subject of history under
“Social education,” along with geography, philosophy, civic education, psychology, and
religion studies.The new curriculum paid more attention to the development of pupils’
values, skills, knowledge, and understanding (ŠMM 2002, 2003). The curriculum for
40 Children start compulsory education at the calendar year when they turn 7 years of age. Education is compulsory until
16 years of age at which the learner has usually finished the basic education course.
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elementary school education underlined that “school should not seek to convey as much
knowledge as possible”; rather, knowledge acquired in school should be meaningful and
should relate to pupils’ experience, interests and needs (ŠMM 2003, 10–11). It likewise
postulated that pupils should learn to actively engage with and interpret knowledge rather
than solely memorize and reproduce it (ŠMM 2003, 11).
According to the curriculum for elementary school education, pupils should acquire
historical consciousness, or, in other words,an understanding that “today’s world, its order
and values are historically contingent and changing” (ŠMM 2003, 365). It is emphasized
that facts of past life unavoidably have an emotional, aesthetic, and ethical character; that
“our relation to history is not only analytical, but likewise value-laden, dialogical” (ŠMM
2003, 366). As a result, history education should help pupils understand the concrete
everyday life of people in the past, their ways of thinking, feeling, believing, acting, their
values, and ideas (ŠMM 2003, 366). The curriculum emphasized the lived experience of
people in the past and claimed that if “we do not get acquainted with everyday life of
people, […] we cannot know the historical process thoroughly, because humanity is not
divisible into those, who simply live, and those, who create history” (ŠMM 2003, 366).
The curriculum for elementary school education posited that pupils should learn to
work with historical sources; analyze them; understand different interpretations of the
same factual information and their causes; raise questions; explain historical phenomena
and processes from different perspectives (social, political, cultural, economic, everyday
life); reconstruct the past; “feel into” and even seek to experience a certain historical
period (ŠMM 2003, 368). Thus, critical analysis was meant to be combined with historical
empathy and perspective-taking.
After an episodic course of Lithuanian and world history in the 5th and 6th grades,
pupils became acquainted with an integrated course of Lithuanian and world history from
grades 7 to 10. The topics covered during these years were as follows:
A human in history; the human of pre-history; ancient Eastern civilizations; civilizations of
antiquity; the civilization of the Middle Ages; Early modern history; the World and
Lithuania from the second half of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century;
World Wars and the interwar period; the World and Lithuania from the second half of the
20th century to the beginning of the 21st century. (ŠMM 2003, 371–375)
Although  the  sub-topics  of  the  curriculum  are  chronologically  ordered  in  terms  of  the
history of states and nations, the primary focus on political history is compensated by sub-
topics dealing with social, economic, cultural history, and the history of daily life. Rather
loosely defined descriptions of the contents of education likewise permitted textbook
authors more interpretative freedom when writing textbooks (Bitautas 2015, 109).
In the 11th and 12th grades, pupils could then choose to follow one of four tracks:
humanistic, “realistic” (exact and natural sciences), technological and art-oriented tracks
(ŠMM 2002). Similar to the curriculum for elementary school education (ŠMM 2003), the
curriculum for secondary education prescribed teaching methodology, based on
interpretative analysis instead of merely reproducing factual information (ŠMM 2002, 16).
It likewise underlined the need to relate acquired knowledge and skills to pupils’
experience, social and cultural context, and needs (ŠMM 2002, 16).
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The description of the aims and methods of history education in secondary schools was
more concise than in the curriculum for elementary school education. The curriculum
reiterated some of the same ideas, adopted in elementary education, regarding the
development of historical consciousness, analysis of sources and the interpretation of the
past. The capacity to understand that the same facts can be interpreted differently and the
capacity to compare and evaluate justifications for different interpretations were
acknowledged as relevant only at an advanced level of history education (ŠMM 2002,
252).
However, the curriculum for secondary education failed, for example, to acknowledge
the significance of daily life and lived experience of people in the past; the emotive and
value-laden aspects of facts as well as the empathetic and dialogical engagement with the
past. Rather, the emphasis fell strictly on the development of historical thinking,
understood as critical evaluation of facts, opinions, events and processes; the ability to
distinguish between facts and opinions; the ability to find and select information from
sources and to assess their authenticity and veracity; the ability to explain historical events
and processes, to raise and solve problems (ŠMM 2002, 248). This resulted in a strange
incongruity between history education at the elementary and secondary levels. On the one
hand, in elementary school education, pupils were learning to combine critical thinking
with  empathetic  and  dialogical  engagement  with  past  life;  they  were  encouraged  to
understand  that  the  relation  to  the  past  is  not  only  analytical,  but  also  value-laden;  they
sought to understand ways of thinking and feeling of people in the past. On the other hand,
at the secondary level, pupils were suddenly required to adopt a distinctly critical-
analytical approach, which echoed certain 19th-century disciplinary ideas of history (such
as a sharp distinction between facts and values, facts and opinions; an exclusive emphasis
on veracity and authenticity of sources). Principles of balanced historical understanding,
given so much emphasis in the curriculum for elementary school education, were suddenly
unimportant, or were then abandoned.
Moreover, the scope of the curriculum for secondary education remained vast and
encompassed “all” history from pre-historical times to the present. Since all this material
of both Lithuanian and world history had to be covered in two years, political and military
history became the most prominent part of the curriculum.
In 2008 and 2011, the most recent history curricula for elementary and secondary
education, respectively, were issued, which retained the focus on pupils’ skills and
understanding of historical processes. History education remained part of social-studies
education, which, apart from history, encompassed geography, civic education, economics
and entrepreneurship, and psychology. The curriculum for elementary education
prescribed the maintenance of close relations between these subjects in order to ensure
that pupils build an integrated knowledge of the social world (ŠMM 2008).
The main aim of history education remained the same: pupils should acquire “an
understanding that today’s world, its order and values are historically contingent and
changing” (ŠMM 2008, 937). The curriculum for elementary education postulated that
history enabled pupils to orient themselves in life and predict the development of social,
economic, political and cultural processes (ŠMM 2008, 937). Likewise, the curriculum
reiterated that pupils should get acquainted with concrete lifestyle of people in the past,
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their ways of thinking, feeling, believing and acting, their values and ideas (ŠMM 2008,
937). Pupils should be able to connect facts into a meaningful whole; recognize different
interpretations of the past and explain their causes; select, analyze and assess critically
information from various sources; express and justify their understanding of the past
(ŠMM 2008, 937).
The curriculum identified four main spheres of education: understanding of historical
process; orientation in historical time and space; historical analysis and interpretation; and
expression  of  one’s  understanding  of  history  (ŠMM 2008).  It  is  notable  that,  in  terms  of
historical analysis and interpretation, the curriculum placed emphasis on critical relation to
the past. Accordingly, pupils were expected to learn to evaluate authorship and reliability
of sources, critically assess historical facts, opinions and interpretations (ŠMM 2008).
After an episodic course of Lithuanian history in the 5th grade, pupils continued to
learn the history of Europe in the 6th grade. Thus, the scope of the 6th-grade curriculum
was reduced to encompass only the history of Europe (in the previous curriculum, 6th-
graders learned world history). In the 7th to 10th grades, the focus on political history is
counterbalanced by topics dealing with social, cultural, and economic history and the
history of daily life. In particular, social, economic, and cultural history prevails in the
parts of the curriculum dealing with prehistory and ancient history. Political history,
however, dominates the presentation of modern history. However, the chronological scope
of the curriculum for elementary education remained vast and encompassed the period
from prehistory to the 21st century of both Lithuanian and world history. The description
of thematic contents in the curriculum is quite general, permitting considerable freedom
for textbook authors in interpreting and evaluating the past.
The 2011 curriculum for secondary education (11–12th grades) adopted a focus on the
“history  of  society.”  The  choice  of  society  as  the  primary  emphasis  was  justified  in  the
curriculum by noting that everybody is a member of society and that the history of society
integrates politics, culture, and economics more than any other area of history (ŠMM
2011, 2). In practice, political history prevailed in the curriculum, primarily organized as
the history of states and nations, accompanied by sub-topics devoted to social, cultural,
and economic aspects of development. Chronologically, the curriculum still encompassed
“all” world and Lithuanian history from antiquity to the 21st century. The history of
Lithuanian society was given more attention in the curriculum. At both the basic and
advanced levels of education, the curriculum encompassed the following main themes:
Europe and the formation of society of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), until the end
of the 15th century; the change of European and GDL society, 16th to mid-17th century;
Enlightenment in Europe and changes in the life of the GDL society; Lithuanian society in
the environment of European and global changes from the 19th to the beginning of the
20th centuries; society fromthe beginning of the interwar through theWWII period (1919–
1945); society in the period of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Europe; life of
contemporary society and the change of Lithuanian society in an independent state. (ŠMM
2011, 5)
The curriculum underlined that “the 19th-century aim ‘to show how it really was’ has
already become obsolete. For a 21st century person, important, memorable and valuable
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information explains ‘what our relation is to what happened in the past’” (ŠMM 2011, 5).
Pupils should learn to read and understand historical sources, critically assess historical
information, reflect on solutions of currently significant problems in the past (ŠMM 2011,
6). The curriculum stated that education should include activities that would be related to
pupils’ experience and context of daily life, because they enable pupils to learn better than
standard tasks of source analysis (ŠMM 2011, 6).
A glance through concrete descriptions of knowledge and skills pupils should acquire
from each subtopic reveals, however, that memorization and reproduction of information
still plays a prominent part in history lessons. For example, the skill defined as the ability
“to compare the features of governance of Lithuania in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and
in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” requires the following knowledge:
To explain the causes and essence of the Union of Lublin;
To describe the functions of the most important officials of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
in the Commonwealth;
To explain the main characteristics of the governance of the Commonwealth in the 16–
17th centuries. (ŠMM 2011, 9, 21)
Thus, pupils need to memorize detailed information about systems of government and
functions of officials in Lithuania before and after the union with Poland.
Oddly, such descriptions of pupils’ knowledge and skills, based on factual information,
belong exclusively to the competency of “understanding of the historical process.” On the
other hand, the competency of “historical analysis and interpretation” is operationalized
separately from the concrete factual information. The curriculum abstractly defines that
pupils, for example, should identify factors, which generate different interpretations of the
same event, phenomenon, or process (ŠMM 2011, 16, 29), but this requirement is not tied
to any concrete historical topic. In other words, the curriculum does not suggest which
historical topics should be depicted in textbooks by presenting different interpretations of
the past and their causes.
To sum up, despite reforms of school-history education in Lithuania, the curriculum
continues to encompass a very vast chronological stretch of the past, filled with factual
information. It is, therefore, questionable to what extent history educators can manage to
find time for more nuanced tasks and projects, aimed at the development of historical
thinking, analysis, and interpretation. Although the most recent curricula place emphasis
on interpretative, skill- and problem-oriented methodologies of teaching, memorization
and reproduction of factual information occupies a significant part in history education.
The latter point is revealed by the way aims of education are operationalized in the
curriculum into concrete skills and knowledge of pupils. Moreover, political history
retains its prevalence in the curriculum, even though it is combined with topics of social,
economic, and cultural history.However, as the descriptions of contents of education are
rather general, textbook authors exercise a considerable measure of freedom in choosing
how to depict and frame the narrative of the past. Lastly, a discrepancy between the aims
of elementary and secondary level history education can be observed. Whereas in
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elementary school education the curriculum underlines the significance of historical
knowledge about daily life, people’s ways of thinking and feeling in the past, the
curriculum for secondary education ignores these issues and focuses exclusively on
political, social, and economic issues, failing to integrate the former into the latter issues.
As a result, such curricular choices disrupt the continuity and coherence between
elementary and secondary levels of history education.
5.2.2 Polish school-history curricula
The emergence of the Solidarity trade union in Poland ushered in an alternative
educational discourse already in the 1980s that challenged the governmental monopoly
over education. In the aftermath of the fall of the communist regime, Polish history
educators and historians expected that loosened government control of school history
would result in new textbooks, more representative of contemporary historical scholarship
and democratic pedagogical principles (Parker 2003, 151). However, the end of the
communist period in Poland in 1989 did not bring immediate changes to school-history
education. As Maternicki (1998) observed, history educators were still complaining in
1998 about many of the same problems textbooks had in the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s,
history textbooks were dominated by chronologically ordered narrative focused on
political and military history (Parker 2003).
Even though older publishing houses, such as, for example, WSiP (School and
Pedagogical Publishers), retained a majority control of the textbook market and
transitioned successfully into a free-market economy, they did not develop new textbooks
(Parker 2003, 163). Established publishers continued to produce the same old textbooks
with only minor changes (Parker 2003, 163). Paradoxically, as discussed by Christine S.
Parker (2003), the free-market economy impeded development of new, innovative
teaching materials, because Polish publishers, seeking to reduce financial costs and
increase profit, avoided investing in expensive changes in textbooks. Older textbooks were
still selling and were cheaper to produce.
The Ministry of National Education (MEN) issued the new Basic Curriculum in 1999,
which was introduced into the fourth grade of elementary school and the first grade (year
7) of middle school (gymnasium) in the 1999–2000 school year for all state-run public
schools.  The  old  system,  consisting  of  an  8-year  primary  school  and  either  a  2-year
vocational, or a 4-year secondary school, was replaced by a 6-year elementary school, a 3-
year middle school (gymnasium) and a 3-year vocational or upper secondary school
(lyceum).41
41 In Poland, children are admitted to primary schools at the age of 6 or 7 (they must reach the age of 6 or 7 during the
calendar year in which they start compulsory education). Before 2014, admission of 6-year-olds to grade 1 of primary
school was left to the parents’ discretion. In 2014, education in primary schools became compulsory for 6-year-old
children born in the first half of 2008, i.e. children born before the end of June 2008. Starting from the academic year
2015/2016, all 6-year-olds had to commence compulsory schooling. However, starting from the academic year
2016/2017, the obligatory age to start school returned to seven years old, leaving the discretion to parents to decide if
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According to the 1999 Basic Curriculum, the subject of history was integrated with
civic  education  in  grades  4  to  6  of  elementary  school.  The  contents  of  historical
knowledge, which pupils were expected to acquire, continued to focus exclusively on the
traditional narrative of political and military history, history of kings, battles, and wars:
The Christianization of Poland; the Congress of Gniezno and the coronation of the Polish
Duke Boles?aw I Chrobry; W?adys?aw Lokietek and Casimir the Great; the Battle of
Grunwald; the Polish-Lithuanian Union; the Queen Jadwiga and Jagie??o; Stefan Batory;
the Swedish Deluge; Jan Sobieski; the Constitution of May 3; partitions of the
Commonwealth; forms of conflictfor the independence of Poland; WWI; retrieval of
independence; the Polish-Soviet war; Józef Pi?sudski and Roman Dmowski; WWII;
occupation and the struggle for independence. (MEN 1999)
In the gymnasium (years 7 to 9), the curriculum integrated Polish history with the history
of Europe and the world. Among important educational aims, the curriculum, for example,
listed the development of historical thinking and criticism as well as a deepening of the
patriotic mindset. The curriculum indicated that pupils should learn about the basics of
source analysis as well as become aware of possible different interpretations of the past:
Transmission of knowledge about the most important periods of the history of Poland,
Europe and the world;
Teaching of skills of analysis and synthesis of historical material; teaching of principles of
reading and interpreting a historical source;
Disclosing the possibility of varied interpretations of sources, events and historical figures;
teaching of honesty in research;
Improvement of various forms of oral and written communication; development of skills of
searching, organization, utilization and maintenance of different kinds of information.
(MEN 1999)
The curriculum for gymnasium provided detailed content for the teaching of Polish
history,  with  an  enduring  focus  on  political  and  military  history.  Some  themes  of  social
and cultural history were introduced, but they remained subjected to the overall politically
oriented  narrative.  Below,  I  list  topics  of  the  curriculum  dealing  with  Polish  history,
excluding European and world history. The definitions of topics are quite general,
allowing for a wide-ranging interpretation by school textbook authors.
6. Poland and the first Piasts, the stature of Boles?aw Krzywousty and the period of
fragmentation of Poland, the unification of the Polish state, the reign of Casimir the Great.
they prefer their children to begin school at six years old. Compulsory full-time education, currently, ends in grade 9,
until the pupil is 16 years old (the age of the completion of gymnasium). Part-time compulsory education, however, lasts
until 18 years of age.
146
7. The first members of the Jagiellonian dynasty on the throne of Poland, economy and
culture of Poland in the Middle Ages – phenomena and processes, specifics of the culture
of the Polish Middle Ages.
9. The Nobles’ Republic of the 16th and 17th centuries – a nation of many cultures and
religions.
10. The Enlightenment era in Europe and in Poland – structural, economic and cultural
transformations, Poland in decline in the 18th century (cultural rebirth, attempts to save the
Republic, partitions, the Kosciuszko uprising).
12. The fate and attitudes of Poles during the period of the lack of sovereignty, national
uprisings, the conception of organicwork, the fate of Poles in emigration.
15. The rebirth of the Polish state, the building of the state, battles over borders, structural
evolution, the major economic and social problems, international politics and the place of
Poland in interwar Europe.
17. Poland 1939–1945, dual occupation, Katyn, forms and locations of battlesfor
independence, the Polish underground movement, the Warsaw uprising, the fate of Poles in
the country and abroad.
19. Poland after 1945, strugglefor the shape of the state, Polish Stalinism, socio-economic
transformations in the People’s Poland, political crises of 1956, 1968, 1970, the election of
a Pole as pope, 1980 and the rise of Solidarity, martial law and the 1980s, the events of
1989, the process of building the Third Republic. (MEN 1999)
In 2001, the Ministry of National Education adopted consequent regulations for history
teaching in upper secondary schools. The curriculum postulated that pupils repeated the
entire chronological material from ancient history to the 20th century during the 3-year
upper secondary education. In practice, this meant that pupils, for example, learned about
the Polish-Lithuanian union in three consecutive rounds: in primary school, gymnasium,
and lyceum. The curriculum defined the topics to be covered in upper secondary education
more loosely, but retained a focus on chronologically ordered political history (MEN
2001). Pupils, according to the curriculum, had to become acquainted with the scientific
methodology of cognition and description of the past, learn to interpret and verify different
types of sources and be able to use historical knowledge for building their own picture of
the past (MEN 2001).
In 2009, the Ministry of National Education introduced a new core curriculum for
general education in Poland. The curricular reform began in 2007 with consultations and
further shifted the emphasis from knowledge acquisition to critical and analytical thinking.
The main educational aims, common for primary, middle and upper secondary education,
were focused on knowledge of historical chronology, historical analysis and interpretation
and creation of a historical narrative (MEN 2008).
In primary education (grades 4 to 6), history remained integrated with civic education.
The overall number of topics devoted to history increased and encompassed not only
themes  of  Polish  history,  but  also  more  general  historical  subjects,  such  as,  for  instance,
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“monks,” “knights,” “peasants,” and the “industrial city” (MEN 2008). The usual
chronological  overview of  the  history  of  Poland  remained  in  place  and  was  expanded to
encompass  the  period  from  the  rule  of  the  first  Piast  dynasty  in  the  10th  century  to  the
establishment of the Third Polish Republic in 1989. The curriculum described in detail the
knowledge pupils needed to acquire from each topic. For example, in the case of the
curricular topic “Jadwiga and Jagiello,” pupils had to identify the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania on the map, explain the causes of the Polish-Lithuanian union, characterize the
person of Jadwiga and enumerate her merits to Polish culture, describe the causes and
consequences of the Battle of Grunwald (MEN 2008). Since the amount of information
pupils were expected to assimilate increased after the curricular reform, it is, therefore,
highly questionable to what extent the new curriculum enabled teachers to focus more on
development of analytical skills and critical thinking.
The curriculum for gymnasium (years 7 to 9) was also defined in more detail,
specifying concrete knowledge and skills,which pupils had to acquire or practice in each
thematic unit. Chronologically, the curriculum encompassed the period from prehistory to
World War I. From a total of 39 thematic units, 13 units (a third of the curriculum) were
specifically devoted to the history of Poland. The themes of Polish history included in the
curriculum focused on a chronologically ordered political and military history.
The 2009 curriculum introduced more novelty in the upper secondary level of
education. Pupils could choose between a 3-year history curriculum at an advanced level,
or  a  1-year  history  curriculum  at  a  basic  level,  combined  with  a  2-year  curriculum  of  a
supplementary subject “History and Society.” The changes in curriculum at an upper
secondary level were introduced in schools during 2012. According to the new
requirements, middle school (gymnasium) students and first-year high school (lyceum)
students would follow a unified World and Polish history curriculum, after which they
would choose their track. The science-track students would then be able to build upon the
history knowledge they acquired in earlier grades and deepen their understanding of
history in the “History and Society” subject.
At an advanced level, the curriculum demanded that pupils, among other things, would
learn to notice the multiplicity of scientific perspectives and historical interpretations as
well as their reasons (MEN 2008). Pupils were likewise required to learn: to identify a
problem and build argumentation, taking into consideration different aspects of the
historical process; to analyze historical events, phenomena, and processes in the epochal
context;to evaluate the usefulness of a source for explaining a historical problem; to create
a historical narration in a problem-oriented or cross-sectional approach (MEN 2008).
Chronologically, the curriculum encompassed the period from the history of ancient
civilizations to the end of the 20th century, with an enduring focus on political history, the
history of the state and nation. Although the curriculum incorporated topics of social,
cultural, and economic history, these functioned rather as themes supplementary to the
main politically-oriented narrative.
When,  on  the  other  hand,  pupils  chose  the  science  track,  the  curriculum consisted  of
one year of “History” and two years of the “History and Society” subject. Pupils spent the
first year learning the history of the 20th century (after World War I). In this course, 7 out
of 12 thematic units were dedicated to Polish history, focused primarily on political
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history. Similar to the advanced level, there was an emphasis on analytical skills. Pupils,
among other things, needed to learn to notice the multiplicity of scientific perspectives,
diverse historical interpretations and their reasons, analyze historical events, phenomena
and processes in an epochal context, build an argument, taking into consideration different
aspects of the historical process (MEN 2008).
The new “History and Society” course encompassed overarching topics that the
teacher would be able to develop together with students. The recommended topics
provided by the Ministry of National Education are the following: “Europe and the
world,” “Language, communication and the media,” “Science,” “Familiarity and
strangeness,” “Economy,” “The rulers and the ruled,”“War and military affairs,” “Woman
and man, family,” and “The pantheon of the Fatherland and Fatherland’s disputes.” Each
of these nine topics was, moreover, divided into five historical periods: ancient history, the
Middle Ages, Modern history (15th–18th c.), the 19th century, and the 20th century. The
teacher could then choose to deal with either four thematic units in their chronological
entirety or two thematic and two epochal units.
The reform of history education, particularly in the science track, resulted in
considerable protest in Polish society. Critics pointed out that pupils would not be exposed
to enough history and might not learn about Polish history at all, which could hinder the
formation of a Polish identity (Bakalarz 2012). The opponents also feared that there was
no control over teachers’ choices of thematic units, permitting them to de-emphasize
Polish history in the “History and Society” classes (Bakalarz 2012). Public protests against
the reform initially started with hunger strikes initiated by groups of parents in eight
Polish cities in February and March 2012 (Bakalarz 2012). The protests were eventually
embraced and ignited by the right-wing “Law and Justice” and “United Poland” parties,
which demanded “to bring history lessons back” to high school (Bakalarz 2012). As a
response to the demands of protesters, the Ministry of National Education eventually
announced that the topic “The pantheon of the Fatherland and Fatherland’s disputes”
would be a mandatory thematic unit for all pupils studying the “History and Society”
subject.
However,  the  reforms of  the  Polish  core  curriculum do  not  end  here.  In  2017,  a  new
core  curriculum  reform  for  primary  schools  was  introduced  by  the  ruling  “Law  and
Justice” party. The reform changed the structure of the system of education, replacing the
previous  6-year  elementary  school  with  an  8-year  elementary  school.  The  new
curriculumpresents a significant conceptual shift, defining history as “the storehouse of
collective memory” and as a fundamental instrument of patriotic national education (MEN
2017). It states that “the history of the fatherland is permeated by heroism and the daily
toil  of  ancestors,  is  full  of  heroism  and  praise,  but  also  of  tragedy,  doubt  and  even
villainy” (MEN 2017). One of the key aims of history education is to learn about “values,”
such  as  of  the  fatherland,  nation,  state,  national  and  state  symbols,  patriotism,  historical
memory, truth, justice, goodness, beauty, freedom, solidarity, responsibility, courage,
criticism, tolerance, identity, and culture (MEN 2017). In history lessons, pupils are
supposed “to feel love for the fatherland,” respect for and adherence to tradition and
history of the nation, its culture, and native language (MEN 2017). Pupils need “to learn
important moments from the history of the Polish nation, particularly through the acts of
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great historical figures; to become familiar with national state and religious symbols; to be
able to explain their meaning, and to develop respect for them” (MEN 2017).
In  the  4th  grade,  pupils  are  familiarized  with  the  main  elements  of  Polish  cultural
heritage, historical figures and events of great meaning for shaping Polish cultural identity
(MEN 2017). The government provided a complete list of such historical figures and
events, which need to be presented in history classes. In grades 5 to 8, pupils cover the
entire chronologically ordered swath of history from the ancient civilizations to the
accession of Poland to the EU in 2004, with a continuous focus on political history of
states and nations. It is noted that “in every phase of elementary school education, the
shaping and development of a patriotic attitude, while simultaneously respecting the
achievements of other nations, should be brought into the foreground” (MEN 2017).
However, the curriculum, for example, barely even mentions other national or religious
groups and their contribution in the history of Poland. The amount of information that
pupils need to cover in history classes remains extremely large, inducing rote
memorization and hindering the development of analytical and critical thinking skills.
The  historians  of  the  University  of  Warsaw  issued  a  statement  about  the  new
curriculum, in which they declared that:
With  regret  we  state  that  the  new  programmatic  principles  have  abandoned  concern  for
such vital attitudes for contemporary society as civic engagement, social sensitivity,
tolerance for differences in opinion, behavior, customs and convictions, opposition to
manifestations of discrimination, maintenance of bonds not only in local and national
communities, but also European and global communities. […] History is neither a
collection of patriotic episodes nor a gallery of heroes. Passing over controversial figures
and negative interpretations distorts our image of the past. (Rada Naukowa Instytutu
Historycznego UW 2017)
However, the criticisms of the new curriculum by academics and teachers were largely
ignored by the government. The new curriculum will come into effect in primary schools
in September 2017.
To sum up, despite gradual shifts in the Polish history curriculum, one of the main
issues has been and remains that the curriculum encompasses an extremely vast amount of
information. It leaves little time for development of analytical and critical-thinking skills,
in-depth analysis of different types of sources, consideration of different historiographical
approaches and interpretations because teachers are forced to rushthrough, in seeking to
cover all the curricular topics. Although themes of social, cultural, and economic history
have been increasingly inserted into the curriculum, political and military history retains
the primary emphasis in the chronological narrative. History is, first and foremost,
presented as the history of the state and nation. The curriculum largely represents a 19th
century understanding of history as a discipline, ignoring the thematic and methodological
shifts that transformed the discipline in the 20th century. However, it needs to be added
that the curriculum, at least until the 2017 reform, left considerable freedom for textbook
authors on how to depict and evaluate the past in the textbooks.
An  innovation  in  the  history  curriculum  was  the  “History  and  Society”  subject  for
science-track pupils at the upper secondary level, which permitted customizing history
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education toward a thematic rather than chronological orientation. However, in light of
impending education reforms introduced by the ruling “Law and Justice” party, the fate of
this subject in the future is not clear. The most recent curriculum for elementary schools
reveals that the current Polish government seeks to turn history education into an
instrument for inculcation of nationalist values.
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Chapter 6. Metaphor analysis of the Lithuanian school-
history textbooks and interview transcripts with the
authors
In this chapter, I will analyze the Lithuanian school-history textbooks and the interviews I
have made with their authors. I engage with five textbooks authors and their textbooks:
Juozas Brazauskas, J?rat? Litvinait?, Ignas Kapleris, Mindaugas Tamošaitis, and
Deimantas Karvelis. This selection of textbook authors does not exhaust the list of school-
history textbook authors in Lithuania. However, it covers the main publishing houses,
some of the most popular textbook series on the market, and textbooks published in
different time periods. Each section merges an analysis of an interview and textbooks
written by the author discussed.
In the sections on Juozas Brazauskas and J?rat? Litvinait?, I introduce two authors,
who have worked with the publishing house “Šviesa.” “Šviesa” is the largest national
publisher of textbooks and educational literature in Lithuania. It was founded in 1945 as a
publishing house of educational literature and has not changed its purpose since. In 1995,
“Šviesa” was privatized. Brazauskas’s textbooks from the 1990s together with Litvinait?’s
textbooks from the 2000s reveal an evolution of pedagogical approaches and narratives in
the textbooks of the publishing house “Šviesa.”
Ignas Kapleris represents the publishing house “Briedis,” where he works currently as
a project manager. He is the main author of the textbook series “Laikas.” Initially, the
publishing house “Briedis” was founded in 1989 as a publisher of cartographic materials.
In 1994, “Briedis” began to publish educational materials and, eventually, textbooks. The
history textbook series “Laikas” has been particularly successful on the Lithuanian
textbook market.
Finally, Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis represent the publishing house
“Baltos lankos”. Established in 1992 as an editorial office of a magazine “Baltos lankos”,
the publishing house was later changed—increasing staff and the number of publications.
“Baltos lankos” publishes fiction by Lithuanian and foreign authors, academic books on
humanities, textbooks for secondary schools, illustrated children books, etc. The history
textbook series “Raktas” is among the most popular history textbook series currently
available on the Lithuanian market.
6.1 Juozas Brazauskas
Juozas Brazauskas is a well-known history teacher and history textbook author in
Lithuania. He is a graduate of Vilnius University with a degree in history. He is the author
of the first school-history textbooks published in Lithuania after the fall of the Soviet
Union. These first textbooks were intended for the 6–7th and 7–8th grades, focused
entirely on Lithuanian history and were published by the publishing house “Šviesa.” I will
be focusing on these two textbooks in the subsequent analysis. In 2014, when I
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interviewed Juozas Brazauskas, he was about to retire (in 2015) from the Catholic
Kazimieras Baltarokas gymnasium in the city of Panev?žys.
Analyzed textbooks by Juozas Brazauskas:
 Textbook I. Juozas Brazauskas, “Lietuvos istorija nuo seniausi??? laik? iki Liublino
unijos,” Vadov?lis 6–7 klasei, [The history of Lithuania from prehistory to the Union
of Lublin, Textbook for the 6–7th grades]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 1994.
 Textbook II. Juozas Brazauskas “Lietuvos istorija nuo Liublino unijos iki 1918 met?,”
8–9 klas?s vadov?lis. [The history of Lithuania from the Union of Lublin to 1918,
Textbook for the 8–9th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 1995.
6.1.1 Juozas Brazauskas: LOOKING AT the past from the WINDOW of Lithuanian
history
Textbooks authored and co-authored by Juozas Brazauskas stand out in their national-
patriotic orientation. As he explains, the main conceptual idea behind the very first
textbooks  he  wrote  was  to  offer  a  narrative  that  reflected  the  political  changes  that  were
taking place in the late 1980s–early 1990s in Lithuania. It was inspired by the
historiography of the interwar Lithuanian historian Adolfas Šapoka. Šapoka was a
prominent Lithuanian historian of the interwar period, who was the editor of an extremely
popular “History of Lithuania,” published in 1936. Throughout the Soviet occupation
period in Lithuania (1940–1990), Šapoka‘s “History of Lithuania” was forbidden and held
in the so-called spetsfonds.42 For many Lithuanians, the book represented the “true history
of Lithuania” (Senn 2002, 44), as opposed to the forfeited history written by the Soviet
historians. This is probably why many Lithuanian families found it necessary to own a
copy of the book, when it was published for the second time after the reestablishment of
Lithuanian independence in 1990. Despite its historical research being outdated, Šapoka’s
work became “the embodiment of popular discontent” with the official Soviet
historiography (Senn 2002, 43). Thus, by its perceived opposition to the corrupted
Lithuanian history of the Soviet era, Šapoka’s book, presenting strong anti-Polish
sentiments and an explicitly Lithuanocentric narrative, became the “idolized true history
of Lithuania,” which portrayed Poles as treacherous enemies of Lithuanian statehood. In
the interview he accounts:
The main intention was to present the Lithuanian history in a new way. It is the history,
which was concealed, which was cherished by the older generation, the history written by
Šapoka, read and cherished. When I was working in Panev?žys, I dictated a lot from this
book to children. (P 3: 3:14)
Brazauskas’s main concern with history education, as he reiterates multiple times
throughout the interview, is to lay a strong FOUNDATION for the Lithuanian identity, based
on respect for one’s culture and tradition. This orientation appears to be informed by
several interrelated metaphors about history and the past. Brazauskas primarily likens the
42 Special collections of the USSR libraries.
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global  history  to  a WIDE OCEAN, in which the Lithuanian history may MELT AWAY and
dissolve like MILK DILUTED IN WATER. The same metaphor is used in two different
passages. It evokes a sense of danger of losing oneself and disappearing into something
much larger; being unable to specify a boundary anymore and losing one’s identity in the
process  of  mixing  with  what  you  are  not.  The  Lithuanian  history,  on  the  other  hand,  is
metaphorized repeatedly as a FOUNDATION, something necessary, solid, and tangible to
HAVE and to LEAN ON in order to be able to create the future.
In the excerpt 3:41 below, Brazauskas attributes the source of his ideas to Vincas
Kudirka, a 19th century Lithuanian poet, who is the author of the Lithuanian national
anthem  and  one  of  the  most  active  participants  of  the  national  revival  movement.  The
emphasis on the past as the FOUNDATION for national consciousness and national pride
stem from Kudirka’s POINT OF VIEW.43 By identifying with Kudirka and his ideas,
Brazauskas becomes a living link between a 19th century Romantic conception of
nationhood and the 21st century school context. Kudirka’s ideas live on through the
person of Brazauskas, who passes them on to his pupils.
Either the Lithuanian school has Lithuanian history as the foundation, or this cosmopolitan
history, so the Lithuanian history is melting and melts away into this wide ocean of history,
and I don‘t know what will happen to it in the future. (P 3: 3:13)
But just this wide ocean and the Lithuanian history in it...As I say, pour some milk into
water and it will dilute. I wanted to have a stronger foundation. That’s why children do not
cherish, appreciate it or radical nationalism is appearing, which turns into certain
phenomena, which I also do not want to understand and agree with. (P 3: 3:45)
We  have  the  past  and,  by  looking  at  the  past/taking  the  past  into  consideration,  we  are
creating  the  future.  This  is  the  emphasis,  from  the  point  of  view  of  Kudirka.  We  lean
against the past, and it is, was the foundation to be proud of, to recover one’s self-esteem,
to feel worthy, and then the freedom appeared, and this shared understanding of nation and
of our community, what we can be proud of. (P 3: 3:41)
A related metaphor, which further specifies how Brazauskas conceives of “seeing history”
evokes a perspectival metaphor of looking at history from a WINDOW. The perspectival,
optical nature of this metaphor may not be obvious at first, but perspectival construction in
painting since the Renaissance was typically likened to viewing something through a
window. Elkins (1994, 49), for example, explains how the Renaissance painters were
using tools, called “perspective windows” or “perspective frames,” to help them produce
perspective views. In the extract, Brazauskas identifies two “perspective windows” from
which one could look at the Lithuanian history: the WINDOW of the national, Lithuanian,
history and the WINDOW of  the  world  or  what  he  also  sometimes  refers  to  as  the
cosmopolitan history. The two WINDOWS seem to be mutually exclusive: either you look
43 The lyrics of the national anthem, for example, urge “the sons of Lithuania” to draw inspiration and spiritual strength
from the past. Lithuanians are called to work for their homeland’s good and for the good of humanity. The Romantic
obligation of Kudirka to devote himself fully to fostering the Lithuanian language, culture, and national consciousness is
embodied in Brazauskas’s thinking.
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from one or the other. It illustrates well how the optical metaphors lead to “ways of
seeing” that isolate different perspectives from each other and suggest that they are
incompatible. The relation between the two perspectives is negative and differential. To
focus on Lithuanian history is to exclude European history, and vice versa.
That  is  to  look  at  the  Lithuanian  history  from  the  window  of  Lithuanian  history.  If  we
looked at it from the window of world history, so perhaps we would only have the Battle of
Grunwald,  maybe  also  the  Union  of  Lublin.  So  this  is  the  principle:  how  to  look  at  this
history? At the moment this history is being looked at not from the window of Lithuanian
history. (P 3: 3:16)
Brazauskas underlines that the principle and choice of “how to LOOK AT history” is crucial
for one’s sense of the past  and for what one can find and notice in it.  LOOKING from the
WINDOW of world history implies that one almost loses Lithuanian history from sight,
because there are so few events in Lithuanian history that can be merited as important on
the global scale. In this sense, the WINDOW metaphor reflects the same way of thinking as
the OCEAN metaphor,  for  in  both  cases  what  is  implied  is  the  threat  of  being  lost,  of
disappearing into the big picture, the big frame. It reflects uncertainty and anxiety about
the future of Lithuanian national identity, which should “lean against” the Lithuanian
history as its FOUNDATION, and point of stability, but that FOUNDATION is in danger of
being dissolved, of MELTING AWAY, of DILUTING.
Brazauskas perceives his textbooks as vehicles of RESISTANCE to the SPIRIT of
cosmopolitanism, which, in his opinion, is MARCHING FAST into Lithuania, to his great
regret. Several times throughout the interview, he articulates his disappointment that his
views and principles are not appreciated anymore and that he feels excluded by those who
have a different vision for history education today. He feels THROWN OUT, left behind.
Thus, his metaphors bear a relation to a contemporary Lithuanian context – rapid changes
of Lithuanian society which have been taking place since the accession of Lithuania to the
European Union in 2004. Brazauskas perceives the influence of pro-European, pro-
Western values and ideas as threatening the stability of the traditional Romantic vision of
the nation, which he seeks to preserve in his pupils. The act of teaching history acquires a
new meaning: It is an instrument of rebellion against the perceived onslaught of European-
cosmopolitan values and attitudes.
The sense of threat  re-emerges again in relation to the change of times and prevalent
political views, as he conceptualizes the relation between his national-patriotism and the
cosmopolitan ideas in combat metaphors of RESISTANCE and MARCHING FAST. The
metaphors imply his beliefs and value judgments: RESISTANCE suggests the righteous,
honorable defense of one’s land against the enemy MARCHING in. The enemy is
threatening to invade the national territory and undermine the foundations.
So I say: the kind of order there was at the time, the kind of conception that was given, so
accordingly the kind of textbooks there are. I am somewhat happy that they have not been
burned yet and they are as if a certain resistance to the spirit of cosmopolitanism, which is
fast marching into Lithuania. (P 3: 3:43)
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These first textbooks are very nationalistic. They clash with the contemporary times,
because they are cosmopolitan, and when Lithuania turned to this cosmopolitan spirit, I
was practically thrown out from the vortex of textbook writing. (P 3: 3:4)
RESISTANCE is strongly linked to setting and maintaining strong foundations for the
national identity, which stands out as the main purpose of history education. However, in
the extract below, the metaphor RESISTANCE is a different Lithuanian word, which relates
more to bodily health and immunity. He makes sense of the metaphor of FOUNDATION by
associating it with the organic metaphor of the TREE, which can only be RESISTANT to
outside influences if it has a FIRM, solid trunk. If the TRUNK or FOUNDATION is strong, then
the BRANCHES can twist and turn in any direction without the danger of being uprooted. It
implies that what is healthy and strong is firmly rooted in the soil. RESISTANCE as combat
against the enemy marching in and as protective immune RESISTANCE to disease coincide
in Brazauskas’s metaphorical usage. The overarching belief is that the basis for a strong
national identity can act as a protective measure against the intrusive, uprooting, and
disorienting influence of cosmopolitanism.
Resistance, if it is, if this foundation is firm, you can then, like the branches of the tree, you
can rotate them. (P 3: 3:117)
There is a curious contradiction, however, that when he talks about the Lithuanian
accomplishments throughout history, in which they should take pride and which should
form the FOUNDATION for the national identity, he consistently discusses and evaluates
these achievements in the wider European context. Simultaneously, however, Europe is
characterized by the metaphor of WASHED OUT FOUNDATION.
I  would  think  that  when  we  are  raising  historical  consciousness,  we  really  need  this
national foundation, the civic pride in, let’s say, the nation and to emphasize what
Lithuania  has  given  to  Europe,  that  Lithuania  is  not  a  secluded  corner.  Of  course,  it  was
lagging behind in the process of historical development, but we certainly have unique
achievements, which are indisputable in European history. For example, Lithuania
achieved the first European Constitution in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The
French declared later. Our civic consciousness, in 1918, is another example; Lithuanian
women  were  among  the  first,  10  years  earlier  than  the  English  and  French  women,  to
receive their civic rights. We can behave with our history in a very civic way and properly,
and to raise pride, to eliminate the sense of worthlessness, the complaint that we are
worthless, that we don’t have anything, except for basketball. It seems as if we do not have
scientists...Then Simonavicius stands in his right place, the rocket engineer, and Freitag
appears  from  the  17th  century,  and  other  scientists,  who  in  Europe  were  creating  a
European-level science. Now Europe is disputing: nation, state – are they of value? If this
unitary Europe is what will be, then these things will certainly be washed out. (P 3: 3:34)
The above passage makes for incongruity between thinking of global/European history
and political unification of Europe as threats to the FOUNDATION of the Lithuanian identity
and identification of the Lithuanian achievements that are worthy of pride using “Europe”
or the “European level” as the measuring stick. Temporal and spatial metaphors are
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combined when he acknowledges the temporal disadvantage of Lithuania in historical
development (LAGGING BEHIND),  but at  the same time, he contests the spatial  positioning
of it as a SECLUDED CORNER, where there is not much movement or activity. It also needs
to be mentioned how he talks about the period of shared Polish-Lithuanian statehood and
personalities from that period by including them in “Lithuanian history.” The famous
scientists from the period of shared statehood with Poland all have their RIGHT PLACE TO
STAND IN among the merited national heroes. This renders his understanding of the
national identity and national values somewhat more nuanced, in that the label
“Lithuanian” is not limited to just strictly ethnic Lithuanian statehood and identity.
The following three subsections illustrate how the metaphors used by Brazauskas in
the interview manifest in the textbook contents.
6.1.1.1 Textbook I: The story of defense and resistance
Textbook I: Juozas Brazauskas, “Lietuvos istorija nuo seniausi??? laik? iki Liublino
unijos,” Vadov?lis 6–7 klasei, [The history of Lithuania from prehistory to the Union of
Lublin, Textbook for the 6–7th grades]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 1994
In the textbook from the 1990s, the overarching frame used for telling history is the
“nation.” History is told primarily as the story of the Lithuanian nation. The main
elements  on  the  basis  of  which  the  story  is  structured  are  periods  of  rule  by  different
political and military leaders, battles, political treaties, and unions. The textbook
encompasses the period from prehistory to the 1569 Union of Lublin between Poland and
Lithuania.
The relations with the Poles are introduced in an ambiguous manner. On the one hand,
it is underlined that the Poles and the Lithuanians grew closer in the 14th century due to
the common enemy – the Teutonic Order. On the other hand, the two sides were involved
in a continuous military conflict over what the textbook calls “the Ukrainian territories.”
The textbook mentions that the Poles, seeing that they are unable to take over the disputed
territories by military actions, hoped to acquire them via a dynastic union with the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania (106). The decision of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila44 to adopt
Christianity from the Kingdom of Poland rather than from the Teutonic Order or the
Duchy  of  Moscow  is  explained  as  an  outcome  of  Jogaila’s  desire  for  the  Polish  crown,
which  had  been  offered  to  him  in  exchange  for  baptism.  Moreover,  adoption  of  Eastern
Orthodox Christianity would not have prevented the attacks by the Teutonic Order.
44 Jogaila, known in Poland as W?adys?aw II Jagie??o, was the Grand Duke of Lithuania and the King of Poland. Born a
pagan, he made a union with the Kingdom of Poland in 1385, converted to Christianity and became the King of Poland
in 1386. The union was a decisive moment in the histories of Poland and Lithuania: it marked a beginning of the four
centuries of shared history between the two nations. Jogaila has been assessed negatively in the nationally-oriented
Lithuanian historiography. He was the founder of the Jagiellonian dynasty in Poland.
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The textbook gives the following reasons for the Polish-Lithuanian Krewo Union in
1385: pagan Lithuania needed to adopt Catholic Christianity in order to remove the pretext
for the Teutonic Order’s attacks on Lithuania; unification could aid in resisting the attacks
of both the Teutonic Order and the Tatars; Poland sought to gain influence in the territory
of  the  Grand Duchy of  Lithuania  (GDL);  and  the  merchants  of  both  states  sought  union
(109-110). The enduring separateness and independence of the GDL after the Krewo
Union are strongly underlined: “the Lithuanian nobility understood the Krewo agreement
as a union of two equal states, based on shared military goals. Under no circumstances did
they agree to abolish their state and be ruled by strangers” (110). However, the downsides
of the union, according to the textbook, are that Lithuania became a vassal country to
Poland and, secondly, the fact that the union did not guarantee the survival of “the
Lithuanian nation,” even if Jogaila’s decision prevented the “physical annihilation” of the
Lithuanians by the Order (114). The “Lithuanian nation” emerges as a continuous, stable
entity, in possession of a fixed, clearly delineated identity throughout history. The
textbook narrative presents a history of stable continuity and of the will to survive rather
than, for example, a history of changes, entanglements, and influences.
The textbook considers how to evaluate the person of the Grand Duke Jogaila and his
role in Lithuanian history. The value judgments are exclusively framed in terms of
national interests, which, however, reflect a modern notion of nationhood and national
identity of the 19th century rather than the lived context of the grand duke. As a result,
Brazauskas is able to reproach Jogaila for “selfishly wanting to keep Lithuania to himself
and his dynasty,” although the Grand Duchy of Lithuania constituted his patrimonial
inheritance. Thus, it is possible to argue that, rather than engaging with past life, textbook
projects the contemporary values and beliefs onto the past.
 “What good or bad had he done to Lithuania?
-With the help of Poland, Lithuania had defended itself against the Teutonic Order
(without the Union of Krewo the victory in the Battle of Grunwald would have been
impossible);
-After having adopted Christianity, our land took a decisive step in the direction of
Western culture, without undergoing any territorial losses;
-Jogaila loved Lithuania, but selfishly. He desperately wanted to keep it to himself and his
dynasty. Without Lithuania, Jogaila would not have been the king of Poland for one day.
(114)
And yet later in the textbook, the meaning of the Union of Krewo is evaluated as
essentially negative, because it subjected Lithuania to Poland’s dominance.
Remember that the Krewo Union (1385) was essentially unfavourable to Lithuania – even
though the Lithuanian state remained, it was bound to Poland through the vassal relations.
(203)
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Although positive effects of Christianization are acknowledged (the spread of Western
civilization and culture; increased contacts with Western countries; the Order lost the
reason to attack Lithuania), the main negative outcome of adopting the Catholic faith from
Poland  is  identified  as  the  start  of  the  Polonization  process  in  Lithuania,  carried  out
initially by the Polish priests, who looked down on the Lithuanian language as a remnant
of the pagan culture and, hence, forced the Lithuanians to use Polish (113).
The aspirations of the Grand Duke Vytautas (Jogaila’s cousin) to increase the
autonomy of the GDL in relation to Poland are strongly emphasized. Jogaila, we are told,
was  mainly  occupied  with  his  duties  as  the  king  of  Poland,  which  created  favorable
conditions for Vytautas to centralize his power and influence in the GDL. The efforts of
Vytautas to increase his power and become the sole sovereign of the GDL, weakening the
union  ties  with  Poland,  are  presented  in  a  section,  titled  “The  fight  of  Vytautas  and  the
Lithuanian gentry over the independence of the Lithuanian state.” The Poles are described
as trying to prevent the strengthening of the Lithuanian statehood and autonomy. On the
other hand, it is acknowledged that Vytautas himself eagerly invited the Polish knights to
the Duchy, which stands in contradiction with the aim to present Vytautas as the defender
of Lithuanian independence. In spite of this, Vytautas is justified by claiming that he
invited the Polish knights only to ensure a better defense of the Duchy as the Polish
military garrisons had better military equipment (121).
The role of the Polish gentry is introduced in negative terms: still unable to annex the
Duchy to Poland, “they decided to destroy the Lithuanian state in another way – by
making uniform the interior life in both countries” (134). The tension between the
Duchy’s aim to increase its independence and sovereignty, and Poland’s intention to
subordinate  the  GDL  constitutes  the  overall  background  frame  for  the  outline  of  the
Polish-Lithuanian relations. The GDL, throughout the narrative, is on the defense, under
siege, being attacked by adverse forces.
The textbook describes how the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas, after the coronation
and, along with it, sought the further loosening of the union ties with Poland. The Polish
gentry are depicted as seeking to create different obstacles attempting to block Vytautas’
goal. The increased sovereignty of the Duchy was not in their interests and, thus, the
textbook outlines how the Poles prevented the coronation of Vytautas by attacking the
envoys and taking away the crowns, which were being transported to the coronation
ceremony in  Vilnius.  The  textbook presents  the  actions  and  aims  of  the  Polish  gentry  as
insidious and adverse, hostile to the idea of “independent Lithuania.” Vytautas dies soon
after the failed coronation and his death marks the “end of the most glorious period of
Lithuanian history”45 (138). The Duchy’s unification with Poland is gradually intensifying
and Polish political and cultural influences in the GDL become increasingly prominent.46
45 Importantly, that the latter interpretation strongly echoes in the popular historical memory has been revealed by a
survey, conducted during 2005–2006, which showed that, for the Lithuanians, the least important historical period to
their national identity is the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Šutinien? 2008, 109). Only 4% of the
respondents considered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth meaningful to their national identity.
46 When different treaties between Poland and GDL are discussed in the textbook, the emphasis is usually placed on the
relation of sovereignty and subordination between the countries. For instance, a lot of attention is typically paid to the
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The construction of the narrative by emphasizing that the death of Vytautas equals the end
of  the  glory  of  the  Lithuanian  history  further  reveals  the  connections  of  this  narrative  to
the interwar Lithuanian historiography, in which Vytautas was traditionally idealized and
presented as a symbol of the struggle and resistance to Polish influence.
The negative image of the Kingdom of Poland is rendered even stronger when the
reasons for the Union of Lublin are discussed. Essentially, the textbook portrays how the
GDL was pressured into the union by Poland, which made use of Lithuania’s destabilized
situation  during  the  War  of  Livonia  with  the  Duchy of  Moscow.  It  is  stressed  that,  until
the power balance between the GDL and Moscow was stable, Poland raised no further
demands on the GDL. But when the GDL became increasingly unable to effectively
defend the territory of Livonia from Russian attacks, Poland started demanding the
annexation  of  the  GDL  to  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  as  an  integral  part  of  its  territory.
During the negotiation process for the union, when the Lithuanian delegation refused to
accept the Polish terms, the King Sigmund August annexed the southern territories of the
GDL to Poland. This further weakened the situation of the GDL in the negotiations as well
as its position in the war with Moscow. Taking this point into consideration, the approval
of the treaty by the Lithuanian delegation is characterized as being forced onto the
Lithuanians by the Poles. This textbook, thus, participates in the maintenance of the
traditional 19th century Lithuanian narrative about the Union of Lublin.
The textbook shows in what ways the GDL remained autonomous, even after agreeing
to the union with Poland (208–209). It is strongly emphasized how the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania was not annexed to Poland, despite the immense pressure that Poland exerted.
Rather,  the  GDL  is  said  to  maintain  its  autonomy  and  statehood  in  the  common  Polish-
Lithuanian state. The two members of the union still had an internal border and separate
territories, armies, legal and court systems, and treasuries.
The textbook narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian relations is representative of the
metaphors of RESISTANCE and  strong FOUNDATIONS that prevent one from disappearing,
MELTING AWAY. A lot of emphasis is laid on the Lithuanian plight to preserve a separate
identity and state sovereignty in opposition to the Polish influences and pressures of
unification. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is portrayed as a subject that continuously
fights for its survival, whereas Poland emerges as an actor, which seeks to subordinate the
Lithuanian state. Thus, the relation between the two countries is depicted in terms of
defense and attack.
6.1.1.2 Textbook II: The story of struggle and resurrection
Textbook II: Juozas Brazauskas “Lietuvos istorija nuo Liublino unijos iki 1918 met?,” 8–
9 klas?s vadov?lis. [The history of Lithuania from the Union of Lublin to 1918, Textbook
for the 8–9th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 1995.
question of the inheritance of the GDL throne. Poland sought to acquire the throne of the GDL so that the Polish king
would simultaneously be the grand duke of Lithuania. The Duchy, on the other hand, aimed to break free from this
subordination and sought after the right to elect its own independent grand duke.
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In the following textbook, Brazaukas engages with the period of Lithuanian history, which
begins after the 1569 Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin and is primarily characterized by
struggle and misfortune. One of the forms of this misfortune is the intensifying
Polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The textbook explains that the main centers
of Polonization were the Catholic Church, the courts of the grand duke and of the nobility,
and public institutions of the shared state. The gentry is criticized for losing its Lithuanian
roots and joining the “Polish nation,” whereas the aristocracy is appraised for seeking to
defend  the  autonomy of  the  GDL and fighting  for  equal  rights  in  the  union  with  Poland
(58).
The overall negative assessment is particularly discernible in the section of the
textbook that offers an overview of Lithuanian history from 1569 (the Polish-Lithuanian
union) to 1795 (the last partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the
neighboring powers). Brazauskas concludes the assessment of the period with the
following points.
The previously independent and powerful Grand Duchy of Lithuania became a part of the
Polish-Lithuanian state in the 16th century.
The political sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was continually diminishing in
the joint state.
The Polish-Lithuanian state was partitioned by the neighboring monarchies in 1795, and
Lithuania […] fell to the Russian Empire.
The weakening of statehood and its loss was harming the national interests. […]
The majority of the denationalized gentry became distant to the Lithuanian nation. This
encumbered the Lithuanian national emancipation movement but did not halt it. (155)
Starting from the Union of Lublin, the Lithuanian political and economic sovereignty
gradually diminished until, exhausted by the wars, internal strife with the Polish ally, it
weakened completely and became a victim of Russian imperial aggression. (158)
The main conclusion appears to be that the union with Poland was destructive to the GDL
in the long run and caused the loss of sovereignty and previously held power. The Grand
Duchy of Lithuania is described as an ailing state, whose RESISTANCE had been
compromised by the negative consequences of unification with Poland. Existence in a
shared state compromised the ability to resist, to withstand the encroaching ailment. It
evokes a sense of disease taking over a weak body (or a TREE?) after its immune system
has been severely damaged.
The 19th century marks the rebirth of the nation, yet even then the Polish culture still
posed a severe threat to the health of the nation, according to the textbook.
The beginning of the 19th century was a very important and fatal period in the Lithuanian
national history, marked by its resurrection. Weighed down by double Slavic – Polish and
Russian – oppression, the Lithuanian nation was on the verge of extinction. It seemed like
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there was no power capable of resurrecting it. Polonization was far more dangerous to the
Lithuanian nationhood than Russification. Why? In the first half of the 19th century
Polonization already had had several centuries of tradition. Since Polonomania (sic!)
spread through churches, schools, manors, government institutions, its effects on the
Lithuanian language and culture were catastrophic. (182)
Samogitia was resisting Polonization more firmly. The Lithuanian national revival in the
beginning of the 19th century is associated with exactly this part of Lithuania. Patriotically
minded Samogitian gentry understood that that the source of all the misfortunes of the
nation was the Russian occupation and the spread of Slavic culture. […] Many Samogitian
manors became hotbeds of the Lithuanian culture. Their reserved character helped
Samogitians not  to  lose the spirit  of  their  forefathers,  which at  all  times have resisted the
influence of foreigners. (183)
The metaphor of RESISTANCE strongly reverberates throughout these excerpts in relation to
the Polish language and culture that SPREADS like  a  virus  or  disease.  Gentry  from  the
region of Samogitia are praised for their withdrawn character, which acted as a defensive
mechanism against losing one’s identity. Resisting the foreign influence becomes a
character trait to be emulated in order to prevent the nation from MELTING AWAY. The
withdrawn character became part of the fixed canon or cultural memory of the Lithuanian
identity. The textbook allocates the blame decisively to the outsider, neighboring nations,
which WEIGHED DOWN the Lithuanian nation and interrupted its healthy development. The
narrative of the Lithuanian history, as  Brazauskas presents it, follows the pattern in which
the strong and powerful Grand Duchy of Lithuania is WEAKENED in the union with Poland,
to the point of being threatened by EXTINCTION, followed by oppression and, finally,
RESURRECTION.47
In the context of the 19th century national revival, the textbook describes how the issue
of “purity” of the nation emerged: the BRIGHTER Lithuanian people started “to look for a
“PURE” Lithuanian, “PURE” Lithuanian language, the “PURE” truth about the past of
Lithuania, because history had MUDDLED everything UP too much” (197). These BRIGHTER
people “decided to DEFEAT their weakness, feelings of inferiority, start interacting with
foreigners on equal terms, not to YIELD to their influence” (197). Initially, the terms “pure”
and “purity” are used in quotation marks, suggesting some critical distance to the term on
the part of the author. However, the metaphorical term “pure” is used without the
quotation marks when referring to PURE history in the same section. The author regretfully
mentions that until the 19th century the Lithuanian history was written only by the clergy,
which were, moreover, foreigners (198). Brazauskas claims that only a Lithuanian, secular
historian could tell the PURE truth about the past of Lithuania (198). As history messes up
the sharp boundaries of the Lithuanian identity, brings in foreign influences, MUDDLES
everything UP, diminishes RESISTANCE to the threat of disease, BRIGHT people are expected
to cleanse it of impurities, to DIG UP the ROOTS, to tell the PURE truth  of  the  past.
Brazauskas suggests that only the Lithuanian people themselves can distinguish what the
47 This kind of narrative is likewise suggestive of a secularized version of the Christian narrative, which begins with
pristine origins, through struggle, to an ultimate salvation (Megill 2007, 31).
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PURE truth  is.  Within  the  same  context  of PURE culture, the people and the gentry are
juxtaposed. The people are uneducated peasants, who have almost no rights, speak
Lithuanian, sing Lithuanian songs, and live in wooden huts. The gentry, on the other hand,
are “rich landlords, educated, reside in palaces, in possession of all the rights and all the
opportunities  to  make  use  of  the  world’s  cultural  wealth,  speak  and  write  in  Polish,
German” (198).
In textbook II, Brazauskas outlines a coherent continuation of the narrative of struggle
for survival. RESISTANCE to harmful outside influence is compromised in the aftermath of
the Union of Lublin, but eventually the RESURRECTION of vitality returns once again in the
19th century as BRIGHT Lithuanians begin looking for and uncovering the PURE history of
the nation.
6.1.1.3 Textbook II: LEANING ON the FOUNDATION of the past
Textbook II: Juozas Brazauskas “Lietuvos istorija nuo Liublino unijos iki 1918 met?,” 8–
9 klas?s vadov?lis. [The history of Lithuania from the Union of Lublin to 1918, Textbook
for the 8–9th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 1995.
This part of the Textbook II conceptualizes history and the past. The author addresses the
pupils in a short preface as “daughters and sons of the Fatherland” (3).
“The history of Lithuania,” which you have been studying in the 6th and 7th grades, gave
you a response to the question, where we came from. Knowing this, you will walk forward
– you will  try to  comprehend who we are and where we should go,  what  we should seek
after. This will be the learning aim in the 8th and 9th grade course of “The history of
Lithuania.” As sons and daughters of your Fatherland, seek to know the past of the nation
and learn from it. (3)
The preface reveals a linear understanding of temporality, history, and the past. Time is
conceived of as a line along which you can WALK. If you know history, you know where
you COME FROM and where to go FORWARD,  which  direction  to  follow.  If  you  know
history, you know your way, you are not lost. Temporal development is a spatial linear
trajectory, where the past constitutes the source and the future is a goal. Knowing history
implies not digressing from the path which is predetermined by the past. Knowing history
means staying on the path and not wandering about. The relation between the past, the
present, and the future is further elaborated in the passage below.
So the past, the present, and the future are time segments which supplement each other.
The present leans on the past and rushes into the future. Memory and dream flow
together/join  in  the  present,  reality  and  the  ideal  fuse.  All  of  it  together  blossoms  and
ripens the fruit.
In the first  half  of  the 19th century,  the road taken was reflected on and assessed for  the
first time; the roots of the Lithuanian national culture were dug up; ways and possibilities
163
to  further  create  and  foster  it  were  found.  The  tree  of  the  Lithuanian  culture,  which  was
about to wither, was restored, began to grow, to branch out:
Centuries ago my roots grew into this land
And the black storm of centuries will not uproot them. (An excerpt from a poem by
Bernardas Brazdžionis48). (202)
In the above passage, the author employs multiple metaphors to make sense of the
temporal dimension. The past, the present and the future are defined as separate SEGMENTS
that can be distinguished on the shared temporal line or path to WALK along. The past  is
behind you as the ROAD TAKEN. The metaphor of FOUNDATION re-emerges  when  the
author describes the present as LEANING ON the past. The present is more dynamic than the
fixed, solid, stable FOUNDATION of the past. Memory and dream, reality and the ideal
FLOW TOGETHER, FUSE in the present. There is movement and a margin of unpredictability
in the present, as the past (what has been) meets the future (what could be). The three time
segments taken together combine into a recurrent organic metaphor of the TREE.
Brazauskas used this metaphor in the interview to suggest that the TREE needs a solid
FOUNDATION if it is to RESIST foreign influences and uprooting. Only if it has a firm trunk
and strong ROOTS, can its branches rotate in any direction without the threat of them
breaking or being uprooted. The TREE of the Lithuanian national identity and culture had
almost WITHERED, DRIED UP before the 19th century, according to the textbook, when
historians reflected on the ROAD TAKEN for  the  first  time.  What  helped  to  restore  the
vitality and growth of the TREE was reflection on the past, DIGGING UP the ROOTS, writing
the  history  of  the  nation.  So,  history  writing  is  associated  with  rebirth,  growth,
revitalization  of  the  nation  after  centuries  of  struggle  and  suffering,  or  a  centuries-long
BLACK STORM. Writing history is DIGGING UP THE ROOTS.
6.1.2 Juozas Brazauskas: Perceptions of the Polish-Lithuanian past
In the interview, I inquired more into his understanding and evaluation of the shared
Polish-Lithuanian state. In the extract below, he speaks about the impact of the 1791
Constitution of 3 May, which abolished the dual monarchical union of Poland and
Lithuania into one unitary state of Poland.
Unified state. One state – Poland. So if we look at this, there is one disadvantage in that the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania does not exist. But if one looks at the development of civic
consciousness...There was a shared state, then it was fused into one Poland, but the nation
remained. The Lithuanians remained. Another question: what language did they speak?
They spoke Polish. What was the culture? So wait then: what about Mickevi?ius? How to
assess him? Are we going to continue tearing him asunder: whether he is ours, or Poles’, or
Belarusians’, or is he a citizen of the Grand Duchy? Therefore I sometimes say: what is the
48 A Lithuanian poet (1907–2002), known for patriotic poetry as well as poetry for children.
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difference, what language does he speak – what is important is that you feel yourself as a
citizen. (P 3: 3:39)
He attempts to see two sides – positive and negative outcomes – of the 1791 Constitution
and is willing to regard the Polish-speaking nobility from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as
Lithuanian. In this context, he exhibits a civic, political understanding of the Lithuanian
identity rather than one strictly based on ethnic Lithuanian language and culture. Since this
positive  treatment  of  a  shared  past  with  Poland  was  so  much  at  odds  with  the  textbook
contents, I pointed out the contrast. However, Brazauskas defensively renounced his
authorial responsibility and deflected responsibility to the political demands made by the
government.
When writing a textbook there is the so-called conception, the program, according to
which you need to write. You cannot clash, because you will not pass through the
commission of  reviewers.  They reject  the manuscript.  You have to,  as  they say:  Sing the
song of the man whose cart you sit on. It is a state order. You cannot do anything here. If
there were an alternative… (P 3: 3:95)
R.K: You speak quite sharply about the Poles in your textbooks, especially in the 8–9th
grade textbook. I had at least this impression.
Maybe,  maybe  this  was  the  order… Maybe  this  was  the  program.  Maybe  it  was  such  an
order. (P 3: 3:101)
I say: this is an order, the programs, perhaps the confirmed conceptions. Perhaps it was the
reviewers.  If  they  let  it  through,  they  let  it  through.  Perhaps  it  had  to  be  that  way.  Of
course, you live and learn. I think that from the conversation it is visible that something has
changed, hasn’t it? (P 3: 3:119)
He sought to convey how his ideas about the shared Polish-Lithuanian history have
evolved since the early 1990s, when he first engaged in writing textbooks. Despite this, his
pupils seem to have a straightforwardly negative idea of the role of Poland in the
Lithuanian history.
Yes, my kids [pupils – R.K.], when we speak: who is the most vicious enemy of our
nation? A Pole! […] Then I tell them: why are you thinking like this? Where is this hatred
from? For the Vilnius region? For the Union of Lublin? But if there had been no Union of
Lublin, there would be no Lithuania. It would be Russia. So what was one to choose? From
two evils one had to choose the smaller evil. (P 3: 3:53-54)
The  passage  above  is  a  telling  example  of  the  prevalent  stereotypes  associated  with  the
Poles in Lithuania, which have a strong basis in the perception of the shared Polish-
Lithuanian history. This perception likely results not just from school-history education,
but is also influenced by the media and discussion of the past with family members.
When I asked whether Pi?sudski, who iniated the take-over/occupation of the Vilnius
region by Poland in 1920, was, according to him, a Pole or a Lithuanian, he responded by
identifying him as a Lithuanian, but as someone who went to SERVE another country
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(3:57). This taps into a more general trend in thinking about the relations between Poland
and Lithuania in the past (e.g., Snyder 2003, 32–35, 68–70; Buchowski 2012). The
metaphors of BLOOD FLOWING DOWN and small Lithuania FEEDING big  Poland  with  the
supply of state leaders conjure the idea of the uneven balance of power and, at  the same
time, of a dependent bond where one side is weakened and loses vitality – BLOOD –
because of the bond. This metaphorical image supplies the reasoning about Polish-
Lithuanian relations in the past with a negative evaluation, implying that Lithuania was
depleted and weakened by its relation to Poland.
Our blood flowed down to Poland. And they say: Jogaila, Jagie??o is ours, but he is ours.
Our dukes had become the kings of Poland, and not vice versa. Our small state, small
territory was feeding big Poland. (P 3: 3:58)
6.1.3 Juozas Brazauskas: Multiperspectivity and truth
In the case of different interpretations of the past, Brazauskas does not have faith that
pupils  can  make  right  choices  and  adjudicate  among  them.  His  thinking  seems  to  be
guided by the idea that pupils need to evaluate and choose a certain interpretation, and he
is not convinced that they will be able to select the one which merits this choice. He thinks
that pupils are not yet cognitively and intellectually able to accomplish this and, hence, the
teacher should play an active role in guiding the students as to how they should judge the
divergent interpretations. The underlying idea, possibly prompted by my own formulation
of the question, is that there is only one preferred interpretation that pupils need to adopt,
to the exclusion of the rest. The aim of history education is to convey the “correct”
narrative rather than to teach pupils how to engage, make sense of and adjudicate among
different narratives.
R.K. So how should one pick what goes into the textbook, which version of the events?
I  don’t  believe  that  kids  will  pick.  It  is  often  told:  there  needs  to  be  different  opinions
offered. We tried to offer some questions, but I don’t believe that the kids will pick. Their
age is still such that… (P 3: 3:76)
Pupils’ own requests need to be taken into consideration as well. Brazauskas reveals that
students sometimes ask the teacher to give them information in a short and clear manner,
that is, without different interpretations being discussed. In this particular context, he uses
a gestural metaphor to express how exam questions require from pupils very concrete,
factual, brief answers. He knocks several times on the table, evoking the Lithuanian idiom
“to hammer information,” which means to learn information, especially factual details, by
heart, without reflection, interpretation, or critical engagement.
Yes,  because  during  the  exam,  it  comes,  straight  to  the  point  –  is  there  the  date  of  the
Union  of  Lublin  or  not?  –  tasks.  We  can  talk  a  lot  and  explain  that  there  should  be  the
development of personality, critical thinking. The exam task comes – (knocks several times
on the table: a gestural metaphor) everything is set, put straight. (P 3: - 3:81)
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Multiperspectivity  is  not  demanded,  in  his  opinion,  in  the  exams,  which  shapes  how
students approach the information studying the past. The goal becomes to cram the
student’s head full of detailed information, which might be required in the state exam.
Several times during the interview Brazauskas expresses his critique of the currently
existing system of examination and the way in which textbooks are written, calling it
superficial and even primitive. However, this claim is not without contradiction, for in
another segment of the interview he also proudly mentions that he has received feedback
from some students, who say they still use his textbooks when preparing for exams, since
they provide information in a clear, abridged, summarized manner.
The theme of multiperspectivity in the history classroom brought up an uneasy
juxtaposition between truth and personal memory of the past, which is made most acute in
the context of exams. If you subscribe to the optical notion of truth as a mimetic
representation, an image that mirrors the past reality “out there,” there is little room left
for divergent, lived experiences and memory. Experience and memory may be treated as
personal, subjective interpretations of the externally existing objective reality that only
take place “inside one’s head” and, hence, are irrelevant. They are like subjective internal
fabrications of the externally incoming sensory stimuli, according to the optical-
ocularcentric epistemology.
But I say, I feel as if, as if this generation is imbalanced. Imbalanced and it is not easy to
understand. While it is good to have different points of view, when the hour of exam
comes and he needs to tell one truth – which one is the truth? Is it the one which
grandmother told him, the way you said it? Or is it the one which is written in Brazauskas’
or Bumblauskas’ book? (P 3: 3:114)
The discordance between the memories of lived experience and factual truth becomes
particularly severe in the context of exams, where pupils may find it problematic to decide
what  the  truth  is,  if  truth  is  a  singular  copy  of  past  reality.  The  ocularcentric  binary
opposition between subjective memory and objective history does not accommodate the
idea that truth cannot be separated from an embodied process of life or experience.
I also have mournful experience – personal. From my family, from my mother’s side,
when my R.I.P. mother-in-law was telling what the Poles were doing along the
demarcation line, how girls and men were defiled, and these “feats” of the Home
Army…So  it  was  implanted  a  little,  since  (a  pause),  but,  but…  But  now  already  it  is
different, these things appear differently. But the memory of people is alive. And it bears
witness. You cannot write everything in the textbook. (P 3: 3:102)
In the passage above, he reflects on how his own lived experience and memories of his
family  might  have  affected  his  way  of  conceiving  the  past  and  writing  textbooks.  He
speaks of the negative connotations of the Polish role in Lithuanian history, which he has
acquired from the memory of his family as something that was IMPLANTED in him, almost
as if against his will, as something done to him without his consent. This process of
personal experience has very likely affected the form, in which he presents the Polish-
Lithuanian past. This influence means for him what he elsewhere described as
“subjectivism.” Lived experience and memory are therefore something one should get rid
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of in order to be more objective because personal, embodied “vision” departs from the
optical truth and its mimetic representation. It is a deviation from the “Essential Copy,” to
use Bryson’s terms (1988), which should exclude all residue of the body and the lived
experience of the painter/scholar. To be objective, one’s relation to the past should be
strictly optical. A painter/historian should only transmit the image passively, as if she is
not there.
It also constitutes a good example of the intergenerational transmission of traumatic
memory, where painful events experienced by a distant relative can be remembered as
ALIVE and  almost  one’s  own.  At  the  same time,  the  memories  can  be  passed  on  without
awareness of the one who inherits them. They are ALIVE and can be re-experienced,
bearing witness to that lived experience. Perhaps, in such cases of traumatic experience,
the memory of it, when not resolved or re-contextualized for long periods of time,
becomes static, formalized and preserved as if in an “archive” of memory. It becomes part
of a cultural memory (Assmann 2010; see Chapter 2) of the group. However, Brazauskas
mentions that his way of thinking about the Polish-Lithuanian conflict has changed over
time.
The intergenerational transmission of traumatic memory is important to understand
also because school-history teaching includes meetings with people from the older
generation, who had lived through important events and want to share their experiences.
Although there are events: the exile to Siberia, and Vorkuta, the Christian Democrat youth
that returned from Vorkuta, there was an event at school about the exile locations, the
preservation of memory, how they were tidying the graves, they were speaking, with
music,  with  songs.  There  are  very  sensitive  things.  […]  So  from  time  to  time  we  are
organizing such meetings, where kids listen to people who have suffered. (P 3: 3:107)
This  demonstrates  how  textbooks,  even  if  they  are  a  significant  factor  shaping  one’s
sense of the past, are not the only or exclusive source of information about the past.
Meetings  with  people,  who  personally  experienced  important  events  in  the  past,  or  who
strive  to  preserve  the  memory  of  the  past,  incorporate  embodied  forms  of  shared
knowledge. The lived past is passed on through storytelling and songs.
In the case of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, the negative evaluation by pupils
prevails, which may point to the buildup and gradual reinforcement of such beliefs by
different sources and environments over time. The prevailing negative assessments of the
Polish role in Lithuanian history seems to be the result of a drawn out process, where
negative experience and memory, instead of being gradually resolved and re-
contextualized, are used and reinforced by the state for identity building purposes.
Communicative memory is preserved and institutionalized as cultural memory, suitable
for maintaining clear group boundaries and a sense of identity based on the memories of
injustice.
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6.1.3.1 Textbook II: Truth and lived experience
Textbook II: Juozas Brazauskas “Lietuvos istorija nuo Liublino unijos iki 1918 met?,” 8–
9 klas?s vadov?lis. [The history of Lithuania from the Union of Lublin to 1918, Textbook
for the 8–9th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 1995.
Polonization as a subject emerges when the textbook outlines the situation of the
Lithuanians who lived in Užnemun? (beyond the river Nemunas), a part of Lithuania that
was incorporated to the Duchy of Warsaw after the 1815 Congress of Vienna. The author
notes that the process of Polonization was particularly fast in this region, schools being the
main instruments of spreading Polonization. The textbook offers an excerpt from Vincas
Kudirka’s memoirs, who was the author of the Lithuanian national anthem and who went
to one of these Polish-language schools in Užnemun?. Kudirka’s case is special because
he was transformed from a person who identified with the Polish culture in his youth to
one of the leading figures of the Lithuanian national movement. As a young man, he was
ashamed of his Lithuanian peasant family background and considered himself a Pole.
Later in life, upon reading the first Lithuanian national newspaper “Aušra” [orig.
“Auszra”], he experienced a transformation of identity.
V. Kudirka wrote in his memoirs: “Pupils were forbidden to speak in Lithuanian not only
in the progymnasium, but also at home, not only with other pupils, but even with parents
when they would bring the son home after the holidays or when they would come to visit
in the boarding school. Speaking in Lithuanian was punishable by hanging a trinket around
the neck of the one who spoke […] – a sign of humiliation and contempt. (246)
Since lived experience of Vincas Kudirka constitutes the foundation of modern Lithuanian
nationalism and finds expression in the 19th century Lithuanian historiography, it is not
surprising that Brazauskas is eager to include it in the textbook. It conforms with
Brazauskas’ reasoning about the past and gives a basis for his metaphors. The process of
the 19th century Lithuanian experience shapes and is embodied in the nation-centered
textbook narrative. On the other hand, this kind of narrative ignores the experiences,
voices, and testimonies of the Polish-speaking Lithuanians, the Lithuanians who were
willingly adopting the Polish language and culture, those Lithuanians who supported the
idea of a Polish-Lithuanian statehood and of members of ethnic minority groups. Only the
lived experience that agrees with the author’s own experiential meaning framework gets to
be included in the textbook narrative.
In  the  end,  it  leads  to  the  question  of  whose  experience  pupils  learn  about  from  this
textbook, which eventually affects the present by shaping their ways of thinking about the
Poles and Poland. It could explain why so many pupils, although having no personal
contact with the Polish people and having never visited Poland, hold negative views on
this country and its people. Is the textbook capable of conveying the lived experience of
people in the past? Or does it convey the lived experience of only certain limited groups of
people and individuals taking it for the history of an entire nation? To take it even further,
does it express the traumatic lived experience of certain historians who were among the
first ones to produce the narration, such as the interwar historian Adolfas Šapoka, whose
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influence Brazauskas admits? While this traumatic experience should be acknowledged,
the question is whether it should be passed on as the exclusive truth of what happened,
where the textbook acts as an instrument of transmission of traumatic experience across
generations of people. This emphasizes the role of historians, who make sense of past
lived experiences and build narratives on such a basis. History writing allows them to
convey an experiential meaning framework that consists of an amalgamation of the ways
of being in the past and the historian’s own lived experiential environment. Historians’
own lived experience, engagement with their environment throughout their lifetime, the
ways  in  which  they  learn  to  make  sense,  to  understand,  affects  how they  respond to  the
traces of people in the past.
The recurrent metaphors of RESISTANCE to foreign influence, strong FOUNDATIONS and
ROOTS, danger of MELTING AWAY, threat of EXTINCTION and RESURRECTION after years of
misfortune and oppression shapes into a narrative that may have less to do with the actual
experience of people who, for example, lived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, than with
the efforts to make sense of the past by the generation who lived in the late 19th – early
20th centuries and the interwar period. This is the period of fierce antagonism between the
Polonized Lithuanian gentry and the Lithuanian intelligentsia of peasant origin. This is
also the period in which the 19th century nationalist historiography first emerged and was
later continued by the Adolfas Šapoka School, emphasizing the continuity of the
Lithuanian nation throughout history. Therefore, the two textbooks, written by
Brazauskas, reflect an understanding of the past that stems from this period of the
Lithuanian national rebirth. The process of experience of the generation involved in the
national revival movement and the establishment of the Lithuanian state became embodied
in the historiography of this period.
When Brazauskas was writing the textbooks in the 1990s, the old interwar
historiography was his primary source, since new narratives, presenting an alternative
vision to the Marxist interpretation of history, were not yet available at the time. This
situation of a “narrative vacuum” in the early 1990s was conducive to the return of the
Romantic, idealized narrative of the Lithuanian nation as a stable, fixed entity, which
persisted throughout history, despite struggle and adversity. Brazauskas’s textbooks are,
therefore, a good example of the embodied nature of history writing. His (unconscious)
choice of metaphors reveals an influence of lived experience of the 19th–20th century
historians and activists of Lithuanian national revival. On the other hand, the narrative,
being focused strictly on political and military history, not only fails to pay attention to
non-political aspects of past life, but likewise projects contemporary values and ideas onto
the life of political elites in the past. In this regard, the textbooks fail to engage with past
lived experience.
6.1.5 Conclusion
There are several main points to draw from the textbook analysis, when we assess it
jointly with the interview commentary. First, the narrative of textbooks strongly
accentuates the themes of threat, resistance, and defense of sovereignty/independence.
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These themes match the thinking captured by the interview metaphors of RESISTANCE to
invasion and defense of one’s territory and culture against the external influences
MARCHING IN. In the textbook, the central question that is raised to assess the role of
Poland in the Lithuanian history is whether it strengthened or diminished the FOUNDATION
of the Lithuanian state and separate identity. The onset of Polonization after the adoption
of Christianity is evaluated in negative terms, evoking once again the threat of MELTING
AWAY, disappearing, losing oneself in something larger and being unable to specify a clear
boundary. This explains the strong emphasis on the endurance of the boundary between
the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the shared state, which
constitutes perhaps the key thematic aspect of the textbook narrative. If there is no clear
boundary, the FOUNDATION may be WASHED OUT and the identity can become DILUTED. In
effect, dissolving and losing the boundary could be interpreted as implying death, the non-
being, which renders the historical narrative so important and so laden with emotional
value, even if the count of explicit metaphors is low throughout the textbook.
This leads me to the second point: The textbook I bears many fewer metaphors than
the spoken interaction during the interview. On the one hand, this may not seem surprising
as spoken language is, in general, more interspersed with metaphors, whereas the textbook
language adopts a fact-driven narrative with mostly straightforward layout of significant
information, offering explanations, causes and consequences of events and actions of its
historical agents. And yet, what the analysis reveals is that even though the textbook
language does not employ many metaphors, the historical narrative presented therein is
congruent with the metaphorical ways of thinking disclosed in the interview, thereby
demonstrating how metaphors shape thought and historical thinking, even if they are not
present in the text itself. I find this significant in that it shows that historical reasoning in
the textbook and in the historiography, on which it is based, is influenced by metaphorical
concepts  which  play  a  significant  role  in  shaping  thought,  but  which  are  rarely,  if  ever,
explicitly revealed. Furthermore, because metaphors are affective (Cameron 2010b) –
people use metaphors to convey how they feel towards something – the values are already
inbuilt in the forms of reasoning and justification presented in the textbook, even though
the language used in the textbook is itself almost free of metaphor.
The metaphors that inform the thought of people can vary greatly from person to
person, particularly if the metaphors are taken from one’s individual experience, but they
are also and predominantly shared by groups of people (cultural and social). Meaning is
shared when it is enacted together in a shared context. Metaphorical meanings are
acquired in social engagement, part of which is constituted by institutionalized exchange
of information. Historiography and textbooks are one such source of institutionalized
metaphorical models, thereby shaping not only how one is to understand the past, but also
how one is to approach and make sense of new information and experience in the present.
Hence, the negative attitudes towards the Poles persist among the Lithuanians. The
particular choice of metaphors by Brazauskas, as the interview reveals, was influenced by
the preserved/inherited memory of his extended family, swift political changes in the
aftermath of the reestablishment of Lithuanian independence, as well as the Lithuanian
historiography of the interwar period. The process, which has led Brazauskas to this kind
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of understanding of the past, demonstrates that modern sensitivities and values deeply
affect the way he makes sense of past life.
6.2 Jūratė Litvinaitė
??rat? Litvinait? is a well-known history teacher and history textbook author in Lithuania.
She is a graduate of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. She is an author
and a co-author of the history textbook series “Šok” for the 5–8th grades. She has also co-
authored one textbook for the 8th grade from the series “Lithuania in the World.” Her
latest project is a textbook for the 5th grade published in 2015. She works with the
publishing house “Šviesa.” I interviewed Litvinait? in January 2014 at Vilnius Vytautas
Magnus Gymnasium, where she works as a history teacher.
Analyzed textbooks by J?rat? Litvinait? (authored and co-authored):
 Textbook I. Salom?ja Bitlieri???, J?rat? Litvinait?. Lietuva Pasaulyje. Istorijos
vadov?lis 8 klasei [Lithuania in the World. History textbook for the 8th grade].
Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 2004.
 Textbook II. J?rat? Litvinait?. Palikimas. Istorijos vadov?lis, Pirmoji knyga, 5 klas?
[Heritage. History textbook. The first book, 5th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 2007.
 Textbook III. Darius Petreikis, J?rat? Litvinait?, Faustas Meškuotis, R?ta Ramoškait?-
Stongvilien?, Algis Bitautas, Simona Stankut?, Istorija, Serija „Atrask” [History,
Series: “Discover,” 5th grade textbook]. 2015. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa.
6.2.1 Jūratė Litvinaitė: History is no longer a reliable FOUNDATION to lean on
In the beginning of 2014, when I interviewed Litvinait?, she was engaged in writing a new
history textbook for the 5th grade. Our conversation reflected her preoccupations and
conceptions of history teaching at the time. As a history teacher, she was cognizant of the
fact that pupils could no longer identify why learning about the past would be relevant or
how the knowledge of history could be applicable in their everyday life. The textbook
project was therefore informed by the motivation to convey to pupils why and how history
could be useful and what could be learned from it that would aid in facing modern-day
challenges. One of the great concerns for Litvinait? is the widening gap between different
generations, which results from the acceleration of change in the present. The world is
changing so fast that the experience of the older generation bears little relevance for young
people. History and the past, during such accelerating change, lose their importance as
sources of knowledge and experience. They can no longer be deemed reliable
FOUNDATIONS for a young person to LEAN ON. History, especially if it is taught as stories
about the deeds of brave heroes, does not equip pupils to live in the present.
Assmann’s (2010, 2011; see Chapter 2) insights into cultural memory are relevant in
this context, because the stories about brave heroes are a part of the static, state-sanctioned
historical canon, which loses its pertinence if it is not re-interpreted in the face of
changing, ongoing experience in the present. The past as an abstracted substance
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consisting of role models, foundational events and values is locked into a pattern of
invariant reproduction, expecting it would strengthen the group identity, but it appears that
an emphasis on fixity and rigid repetition only widens the gap between the present and the
past,  endangering  the  group  identity,  as  a  result.  More  importantly,  the  new  state  of
experience in a high-paced world disrupts the linear conception of time, where a person
could LEAN ON the past and LOOK TO the future. Incommensurability of experience
between generations unsettles the sense of continuity across a broad span of time. Pupils
cannot relate to the past, because they cannot relate to it as it is depicted in history lessons.
Litvinait? is  convinced  that  her  pupils  have  a  different  sense  of  time,  where  they  mostly
LOOK TO the future and ignore the past. However, I would argue that this phenomenon of
being unable to relate, to empathize, to partially identify with the past can be explained to
a great extent by the static, detached, invariant – canonical and ritualistic – nature of
historical knowledge, as it is presented to pupils. Hence, the paradox occurs that efforts to
preserve the group identity lead to reverse effects of disengagement, where past
experience is diminished as irrelevant to one’s sense of self and of group identity.
Kids live today in a very fast-changing world […] and history becomes irrelevant to them.
[…] The fairy tales, narratives about the brave Vytautas or the victory in Grunwald are
lovely, interesting, but not practical. A child cannot comprehend why he needs it, what the
use of it is. He is unable to place history in the system of his values, way of thinking and
experience. (P 4: 4:2)
From Herodotus until, let’s say, 1990, perhaps it was possible to expect that your
experience, your knowledge will come from the past. You look to the past and by
modelling it you carefully go to the future. Not anymore. I very often think that our kids,
this generation, they don’t look to the past, they only look to the future. […] And this is a
general, total social shift, if we hold onto this linear [model – R.K.], agreeable with
Western  historiography.  So  if  we  stood  in  time  and  leaned  on  the  past  as  our  most
important baggage, so this generation is certainly “presentist,” because the past is a half
year and after the half year he must change his phone, because a new one arrived. And
when he goes to his grandmother, you know, twenty years ago I could tell: “Go to the
grandmother, ask her and come to recount.” And he comes with glittering eyes and
recounts. Nowadays they do not believe that the grandmother and even the parents can
help them with anything. (P 4: 4:16)
Two crucial observations differentiate Litvinait? from the position of Brazauskas on
history teaching and the importance of the past. Firstly, Litvinait? approaches the past not
so much as a foundation for one’s present identity and orientation needs, but rather as a
practical tool, an instrument that can offer a tangible skill or practical application. Since
pupils cannot relate to the past, she seeks to resurrect it by rendering history practical.
History teaching is instrumentalized, placing more emphasis on disciplinary literacy and
analytical skills. Secondly, Litvinait? indicates that the intergenerational transmission of
memory and lived experience is losing its impact, that pupils are no longer interested in
speaking to their elders and hear their stories. She perceives a more general departure from
the past as a source of valuable and much needed knowledge, which requires that history
teaching and our engagement with the past be reconceived.
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6.2.2 Jūratė Litvinaitė: Historians as FISHERMEN
The passage below contains several key metaphors, which aid Litvinait? in accomplishing
the reconceptualization of school history education. The latter arose from Litvinait?’s
classroom experience as well as from her extensive reading on the subject.
Is it still worth teaching history in schools? Does history, as a discipline, have a prospect?
After  I  had  raised  this  question,  I  read  a  lot  of  specific  literature,  which  examines  the
philosophy of history, the purpose of history teaching [...]. I really sought to understand
what the meaning is, and from this the new conception of textbooks emerged, and after all
it responds to the current needs, not to teach history in a history lesson, but to teach
“taking” history, when you need it, the way you need it and for the purpose you need it.
Because I really like this metaphor that history is a boundless ocean and the historian is a
fisherman, who catches the fact he needs. And then the question: the historian catches the
fact  which  he  needs  for  his  experience,  in  order  to  model  his  future,  in  general,  he  is
catching, he knows where he is going to put it, how he is going to eat it and use it. And the
kid does not need that because the kid is different, with different experience, with different
needs, and then I think that perhaps we should also teach the kid to fish.  (P 4: 4:5)
Her metaphors reveal how she comprehends the nature of historian’s work. As
FISHERMEN, historians are motivated by their concrete needs and previous experience.
They are FISHING for  facts  with  a  clear  intention,  and  therefore  not  for  its  own sake.  As
professional historians, they are equipped with a skill of “TAKING” from the OCEAN what
they need, of identifying the relevant FISH within this BOUNDLESS myriad of floating facts
and CATCHING them for dinner. They know how to prepare and EAT the FISH, what method
to  apply  to  make  the  most  of  it.  And  it  is  precisely  this  mastery  of FISHING skills  that
Litvinait? wants to impart to pupils in school-history education. She is aware that pupils’
experience is different from that of professional historians, and she wants to accommodate
history teaching to pupils’ experiences and needs.
The metaphors might also suggest the idea that facts, as FISH,  are  whole  and  ready-
made, waiting to be pulled out of the OCEAN by the FISHERMAN. They come into being in
the vast space of the OCEAN without the efforts of the fisherman; historians only require
the expertise in retrieving the facts with their rod and then using the FISH for their needs.
Litvinait? concedes though that a pupil cannot become an accomplished historian, but the
skills of a professional historian – the mastery of fishery – is held as a model of practical
applicability of the knowledge of the past. Learning how to work as a historian responds
to demands in rendering history more useful and relevant to modern-day life.
Firstly, the very first step is to show, what history is and what one can catch in this ocean.
To become acquainted with a few facts, which prove that the past was successfully used in
the present, that problems were solved on the basis of past experience, that certain
political, economic or social constructs were assembled on the basis of these past
happenings. So that a kid, after having seen that there really are some examples, that
history has been usefully applied and that these people who understood history, which had
a grasp of  it,  acted very successfully and won.  Then the child naturally believes:  If  I  too
understand history,  I  will  also be able  to  apply it.  But  in  this  place the kid has to have a
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real, strong, steadfast certitude that historical information, which is in a textbook, or that,
which  is  in  a  film,  or  that,  which  is  in  a  novel  or  even  a  game  is  not  necessarily
indispensable for me. Perhaps history textbooks do not even depict that, which is important
for me, as a child, as a person, as a Lithuanian, as a... citizen. Therefore, I have to go to the
history ocean, sit down myself, fish, pull out, fry and use.  (P 4: 4:6)
The author supports the idea that students themselves should not be satisfied with the
information offered in a textbook and dare to raise their own questions, which reflect their
own experience and interests. The textbook may not be up to date or relevant for pupils’
needs, which is why they need to learn how to become FISHERMEN themselves. The
encouragement to examine the past on your own could possibly present a way to counter
the invariance of cultural memory. The goal of history teaching shifts to providing pupils
with the most important skills and techniques of historical literacy, so that they would be
able to find their way in the OCEAN of history independently. The past in this regard
emerges as something that can offer a BASIS or  a FOUNDATION of useful knowledge, but
not in the sense of giving a solid ground for an identity, of finding oneself firmly rooted in
the past, but as practical knowledge which could inform and guide people‘s actions. She
lays out a step-by-step approach of how such skills could be conveyed and taught.
The first step is to convince a child by examples, stories, situations, that history is really
practical  and useful,  that  one can accomplish a  lot  with it.  That  is  why,  when writing the
textbook, we have put advice in the first lessons, which is useful not just in history, but
also in learning other subjects, for example: how to write down a fact, how to collect
information, how to construct a narrative. Elementary things which, of course, will help
first of all in history, but they are easily applied in daily life, too. Then the child knows that
history lessons give a practical use. Then the second step goes: he is taught how to
investigate the past and know it. Professional historians are given as an example, of course;
it is briefly described what they do, and the child is allowed to do it himself in one small
step at a time.  (P 4: 4:7)
When professional historians and their ways of thinking, knowing, seeing are provided as
a model, as a disciplinary standard, it is quite evident that the teaching approach and the
textbook aspire to emulate the disciplinary thinking, as it is understood by the textbook
author.  The  basic  level  of  the  scholarly  investigation,  as  it  is  introduced,  consists  of
learning how to write down a factual statement, to collect information and construct a
narrative. Pupils are taught to conceive of historical knowledge as language, which refers
to the past and which needs to be carefully selected, verified, and organized. In this
process, pupils become apprentices in learning how to work as professional historians.
What this amounts to in the context of the 5th grade is basic historical literacy rather than
any kind of more advanced methodological approach to the study of the past.
On the other hand, the pedagogical approach becomes more nuanced in upper
secondary education when pupils are already more capable of engaging in critical thinking
and analysis. The 12th-graders whom she teaches frequently become frustrated, as she
describes in the excerpt below, by not being able to pin down what actually happened in
the past.
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Let’s say, we discuss about this a lot with the 12th graders. Each of our lessons ends with
their despair that they do not know how it is. Perpetual discussions.
R.K. Why do they want to know how it is? Where does this strong need come from?
Because the main load comes from intrigues, which I constantly pour on them. For
example, I say: you imagine, write in a controversial way, for example, that Vilnius
belongs to the Belarusians or Poles. One option for and one option against. All sorts of
facts. As you say, to draw out varied opinions and show that there can be different and
varied assessments. And when they come to some kind of conclusion, to give one more,
which would deny their conclusion. So they say: Where is the end? These are my happiest
moments when children do not ask anymore: “So what do these historians do? Everything
has  been  written  already.  All  the  past  has  been  written  about.  What  are  they  still  doing
there?” (P 4: 4:22)
If you have described, written down, written a book, what else can you do? And when they
say that history is really a boundless [ocean – R.K.], and the further, the worse it gets. The
12th graders often ask me: So what should we do, how can we know? I tell them: You
need to read. And they really start to read more. It’s interesting to them and they dispute,
but it is only a 12th-grader when he already senses that, when reading, he no longer needs
to believe the author, but can question the author. (P 4: 4:23)
It is a telling illustration, which reveals the epistemological understanding of upper
secondary school pupils. Before their teacher’s intervention, they are convinced that a
historical  monograph  lays  out  an  exhaustive  depiction  that  mirrors  past  reality.  Once  the
image of the past has been captured in an optical truth, there is no need for further
research. Pupils are prone to believe that the knowledge of the past in historians’
monographs is an accurate representation of the past reality in an optical sense of
truthfulness.  These pupils hold an optical  theory of truth,  which permits them to take for
granted an externalized past reality and its faithful mimetic representation as historical
knowledge. The teacher then adopts a pedagogical approach seeking to intentionally
disrupt the certainty and bring in doubts about whether such truth of the past can be
attained.
On the other hand, Litvinait? does not really provide clear advice to pupils on how to
deal with multiperspectivity. She proposes to them that they read more, but this does not
amount to any clear suggestions on how to make sense of a plurality of different
narratives. In the excerpt, she associates the epistemological anxiety that stems from this
plurality with the BOUNDLESSNESS of  the OCEAN, which further explains how she
conceives of the historian’s method. Historians’ mastery of method, their skill at casting
nets  and  cooking  a  meal  out  of  a  catch  is  what  ensures  they  can  face  the  vast OCEAN of
history. It is a tool which prevents historians from getting lost in or being overwhelmed by
the OCEAN.
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6.2.2.1 Textbook II: Finding one’s way in the BOUNDLESS KINGDOM of time
Textbook II: J?rat? Litvinait?. Palikimas. Istorijos vadov?lis, Pirmoji knyga, 5 klas?
[Heritage. History textbook. The first book, 5th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 2007.
Pupils begin a history course as a separate school subject in the 5th grade. As a result, the
author dedicated the introduction of the textbook to elucidation of history as a discipline:
what it is; how historians do research on history; how it relates to the present. She cautions
the students that since
We have already decided to set out into the world of the past, hence we should agree about
certain things in order not to get lost in the boundless kingdom of time. (12)
The past is characterized in spatial terms: as a separate WORLD and  a BOUNDLESS
KINGDOM. SETTING OUT into the past evokes a sense of mystery and adventure. The past is
vast and BOUNDLESS, suggesting a connection to the metaphor of the past as a BOUNDLESS
OCEAN, which Litvinait? had used in the interview. The spatial metaphors to express the
notion of the past should be the focus of our attention, because they put forward a static
configuration of time, which contrasts, with an understanding of time as a temporal
process of change. The temporal change is obscured by the ontological idea of time as a
spatially  laid  out  geographical  terrain.  In  this  sense,  the  past  is  already,  from  the  very
beginning, introduced as located outside of and independent of a human life, with its
particular boundaries and needs49: it is a pre-given, pre-existing WORLD, external to the
knowing self. Pupils are, as a result, left with a narrative, which can either be read naïvely,
as an objective account of the past, or in a postmodernist fashion, as an imposed form on
the content of the past. The spatial ontology of the past suits the ocular-optic epistemology
well.  However,  this  produces  an  inherent  tension  between  the  aim  of  history  to
simultaneously convey dynamic, embodied change, on the one hand, and the static,
disembodied, mimetic ontology and epistemology, on the other. The “kingdom of time”
stands outside of or distant to the time of one’s life, or time that is embodied in this life
through lived experience(s).
In order to find one’s way around the vast terrain of spatially constructed time, pupils
need to acquire specific skills and knowledge, which historians apply in their research on
the past. History is described as “a science about people’s activities in the past” (12).
Historians, the textbook explains, are interested in people’s activities in the past, because
“history is the TEACHER of life. If people in the past did something wrong, don’t do it. That
which they did not know – you learn. That at which they succeeded and which was useful
– you adopt.” (12) Two contradictory senses of history are combined together, when, on
the one hand, the textbook underlines Cicero’s formula “historia magistra vitae” and
simultaneously conjoins it with the idea of history as a scientific discipline. The classical
notion of history as a source of authoritative ethical-practical examples from the past for
the present suggests that historians inquire into the actions of people in the past not for its
own sake, but in order to learn from and evaluate people’s behavior in the past. This
49 I am grateful to Lisa Muszynski for helping me elaborate this point.
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conforms to the way Litvinait? emphasized the practical purpose of history and its useful
applicability. Simultaneously, however, the historian who draws lessons from the past
should be circumspect and balanced, avoid judgment and strive for empirical veracity. The
following extracts illustrate the methodology and dispositions towards the past, which,
according to the textbook, distinguish the historian’s work.
The most important thing is that the conclusions of the historian’s investigation would be
proved by evidence – by the sources of historical cognition. […] A real historian is very
distrustful.  [...]  He verifies  several  or  even more sources,  finds out  who their  authors  are,
under what circumstances they appeared, compares them and only then makes conclusions
– writes an article or a book about the past. (14)
As in every scientific work, only these data are presented in the historian’s article or book
which can be verified. A historian avoids words, such as long ago, much, small, beautiful,
good, expensive. He refers to dates, amounts, sizes in digits, to qualities in clearly visible
chracteristics; he mentions the nationality, name, surname of the described human being.
(14–15)
These excerpts reveal that the historical discipline is introduced as an exclusively
ocularcentric and positivist undertaking, emphasizing its scientificity and referential
verifiability. “Real historians” should avoid any value judgments and seek precision in
their utterances about the past. Historical knowledge is conceived as propositional, factual
statements that are truthful by virtue of optical correspondence to past reality. Historians
should sift through multiple sources and seek to disentangle the mimetic, factual
knowledge from subjective opinion and evaluation. The striving to separate between facts
and opinion and to eliminate any traces of subjectivism – anything that cannot be verified
– is a distinguishing mark of 19th-century positivist history.
Once again, we can see that historical truth is presented as an accurate reproduction of
the past reality, which primarily aims at descriptive verity rather than value-laden
meaning-making. If past reality is metaphorically understood in spatial terms, as a fixed
terrain, then historical knowledge can be grasped as a snapshot of this spatially imagined
past, which is a faithful reproduction to the extent that it is captured by a cognitive
apparatus located outside the embodied viewing self. So it becomes important to show
how the description of the past is purged from subjective bias and personal, experiential
attributes. In this case, we again have to do with optics and the camera as the metaphorical
models structuring metatheoretical assumptions about what knowledge is and how it
relates to reality (see Section 3.2).
Historians’ methodology is portrayed as focused on the separation of mimetically
accurate, factual knowledge from subjective opinion and evaluation. The truth is presented
as an accurate reproduction of past reality, where the latter is metaphorically structured in
spatial terms, as a geographical terrain. Historical knowledge is a faithful, accurate de-
piction,  a  snapshot  of  this  spatially  organized  past,  captured  by  a  disembodied  eye.  The
optical apparatus of the camera thus serves as an overarching metaphorical model for
textbook’s meta-theoretical assumptions. This shows again how metaphors inform and
shape historical thought and its forms of reasoning about the past. The underlying
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metaphorical models may not be explicitly spelled out, but they do seem to influence how
historians, textbook authors, and eventually pupils come to explain and view the events in
the past and approach the task of historical understanding, despite the absence of any
explicit metaphors in the outlined justification.
6.2.2.2 Textbook III: Knowledge about ESSENCES and OBSERVED reality
Textbook III: Darius Petreikis, J?rat? Litvinait?, Faustas Meškuotis, R?ta Ramoškait?-
Stongvilien?, Algis Bitautas, Simona Stankut?, Istorija, Serija „Atrask” [History, Series:
“Discover,” 5th grade textbook]. 2015. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa.
In Textbook III, the main contribution of J?rat? Litvinait? is the introductory, first chapter,
which explains what history is, why history is important, and how history can be
researched. In fact, the overall conception of the history textbook series “Discover” is that
pupils should learn about the past by carrying out their own investigations of the past.
Each of the eight chapters begins with an outline of a historical investigation, which pupils
need to implement throughout their engagement with a given chapter. An investigation is
defined as “an activity which is planned and implemented during a predetermined period
and which is carried out seeking to gain new knowledge about the essence of phenomena
and/or observed reality” (6). The two key ideas, which emerge from the above statement,
is that history has access to the ESSENCES of phenomena and an investigator OBSERVES the
past reality. The meta-theoretical assumption that the phenomena have an underlying
essence disclose an ocularcentric, Platonic distinction between essence and existence,
between the underlying pure, ideal forms that are real because they are unchanging and the
fleeting impressions, which are not real because they are transient, changing.
Ocularcentrism at the root of this conception of historical investigation is also discernible
in the idea that a historian OBSERVES the past. In other words, the historian is understood
as  a  detached  spectator  who  is  not  part  of  the  reality  or  world  that  he  or  she  observes.
Historians are not coupled or engaged with the past reality, nor do they co-create the
understanding of the past: they are positioned outside the past reality, conceived of as
externalized and pre-given. What historians do is to accurately represent the externalized
past, to produce faithful depictions of the past, thereby evoking the metaphor of the
camera obscura as the model of cognition.
The purpose of history, according to the textbook, is to investigate the past of
humanity and to explain the present on the basis of the past (12). “History,” the readers are
told, “can advise, help find solutions. The examples of the past can inspire, teach. We
learn from the mistakes of the past” (12). There is a perceptible continuity between
Litvinait?’s textbook “Heritage” for the 5th grade (Textbook II) and this textbook in how
both place a lot of emphasis on Cicero’s dictum “historia magistra vitae,” or the idea of
history as the teacher of life. History is an authoritative source of ethical-practical
examples, which implies that history is entangled with value judgments and normative
principles. History, understood in Cicero’s terms, is not just a source of neutral
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information about what happened, but it necessarily invites assessing the deeds of people
in the past and learning from their success or failure.
This value-laden aspect of historical investigation, however, is grafted onto an
understanding of history as a scientific pursuit, in which facts and values are defined as
pertaining to different and sequentially distinguished procedures of a historical
investigation. A scientific history work is said to be written following specific
requirements, which are listed in four sequential steps. Firstly, the historian writes an
introduction in which he describes the topic of research, which can be a certain region, a
sphere of human activity, or a historical period. Secondly, the historian identifies and
writes down the most important factual data, which are clear, precise and have been
verified. The following procedure is perhaps the most telling in terms of how a historical
investigation is introduced to pupils. The textbook explains that
3. After the historian has written down the most important data of the event or
phenomenon, he begins to analyze them: a) he specifies the causes of the event or
phenomenon, explains why it happened; b) he reveals the course of the event or
phenomenon, explains how it began, continued and ended; c) he specifies the
consequences of the event or phenomenon, explains its impact on the subsequent history.
4. After the historian has analyzed the topic specified in the introduction, he summarizes,
provides conclusions and his opinion, identifies the sources on the basis of which he
prepared the work. (14)
A historical investigation is presented as a clearly sequentially distributed set of
procedures. The textbook suggests that the historian, first, writes down the facts, only then
analyzes them and, lastly, can reach an opinion on or evaluation of the findings.
Identification of facts is separate from their analysis. Analysis is separate from evaluative
and meaning-making aspect of the historian’s work.
This  explanation  of  how  an  investigative  work  proceeds  is  completely  at  odds  with
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) cognitive metaphor theory, according to which percept and
concept converge in cognition. In other words, metaphors (concept) shape the process of
knowing and reasoning about the past (percept), and because metaphors are affective
(Cameron 2010b, 5–6), that is, people engage metaphors to explain how they feel towards
something, metaphors import values, beliefs and attitudes into the very fabric of reasoning
about the past. Facts and values cannot be separated so neatly in the process of knowing,
as the textbook suggests. If cognition (meaning-making process), on an embodied-
enactivist account, is dependent on the history of lived experience and interaction with the
world, then metaphor is the link between the previous experience and cognition in the
present.
6.2.3 Jūratė Litvinaitė: Multiperspectivity and truth
The use of multiperspectivity in school-history teaching is not without obstacles or risks,
according to Litvinait?. In the interview, I mention an example from an 8th-grade
textbook, co-authored by Litvinait?, where pupils are asked to assess the “accuracy of
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information” based on two sources. The sources in question present two radically different
evaluations of the 1569 Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin. The first source, an excerpt
from the speech by the leader of the Lithuanian delegation in Lublin, Jan Chodkiewicz, a
fierce opponent of the union with Poland, expresses the view that the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania was forced into unification with Poland against its free will. The second source,
an  excerpt  from  a  1613  map  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  by  the  Polish-Lithuanian
cartographer Tomasz Makowski, offers a very different opinion arguing that the
unification was equally desired by both parties, eager to join forces against shared
enemies. The pupils are expected to compare the two sources and discuss the accuracy and
reliability of the information. Litvinait? admits that since pupils are not equipped or able
to make a competent, nuanced judgment solely on the basis of these two sources, they will
be steered to view one of the sources as biased and inaccurate. This reveals the
responsibility, which falls on the textbooks authors and teachers in shaping students’
beliefs about the past.
R.K. I remember there was this one task about the Union of Lublin. I think it was authored
by your colleague Salom?ja. One source was the famous speech by Chodkiewicz, the
lamentation about the defense of the Fatherland, and the other source was a commentary
by Makowski that the Union of Lublin was made and very much desired by both parties
and that those, who claim there was a resistance from either side, speak untruth. A pupil is
then asked to compare these evaluations…
…and which one of them is correct? (laughter)
R.K. “…and to make conclusions about the accuracy of information.” My question would
be: What is really expected here from the pupil? What conclusions does he need to make?
You see what happens, what gigantic risk, when you decide to teach children by giving
them sources, isn’t it? You see, then, when you give children two alternative things – good
and bad – and some sources for proofs, you take a gigantic responsibility, because you, as
a teacher, direct them to the truth you prefer. And you know what the postmodernists say:
There is no objectively existing truth. What is truth? Truth is what you believe. But really,
I increasingly start to think that this saying is inspiring, that the truth is what you believe. If
you believe it, you can convince another, too. (P 4: 4:18)
Litvinait? is tempted to adopt the postmodernist rejection of an objectively existing truth
when faced with multiperspectivity towards the past. The truth, according to her
understanding of the postmodernist argument, is that which you believe about the past.
Truth can be whatever you shape it to be and are able to persuasively present to others.
The relation to the past life of a historical narrative becomes secondary in this
understanding, because the emphasis falls on history-as-fiction, the form, subjective
meaning that we ascribe to the past. Not only the relation between the past and language
of historical narratives is not straightforward; the relation is likely unattainable at all.
However, since the truth of the past cannot be known, she suggests that the relativity
of truth of the past exposes an urgent need for firmly grounding certain value orientations
in school-history teaching. The emphasis shifts away from seeking after truth to making
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value-informed choices. In other words, when faced with a plurality of narratives, we
should  select  the  one  that  best  fits  our  values  and  beliefs  because  truth,  as  a  referential
match between narratives and the past, cannot be known. Since uncertainty about the past
evokes the desire for setting some kind of foundations or criteria of adjudication, we leap
back to the issue of canonization of the past – this time in terms of value preferences. The
past is once again rendered static, fixed, and disengaged from lived experience. Past life
and lived experience are treated as merely content that passively awaits to be given some
meaning and which does not at all influence the meaning-making process. This is a
concrete example of how the postmodern arbitrariness of truth, because it remains
attached to the disembodied metaphorical models, does not circumvent the mimetic
distinction between reality and language and reconcile multiperspectivity with lived and
dynamic embodied experience. By contrast, if we propose a different notion of truth,
which treats “multiperspectivity” not as isolated, static snapshots of external, pre-given
reality, but as inseparable from the process of lived, embodied experience of a dynamic
being-in-the-world, where an embodied self is coupled with its environment and co-
creates its reality, then the truthfulness of the past acquires a very different character.
Multiplicity of experiences is no longer a challenge to truth. Instead, the inability to
engage with the process of lived experience becomes the challenge to truth.
It  is  here  that  the  main  problem  emerges.  Imagine  that  I  leave  the  child  with  this  open-
ended answer, hoping that our society will become more tolerant and more forbearing,
since they will know that there are multiple perspectives and that it is possible to handle
the same issue in different ways, without hurting anybody. They leave the lesson without
having fought  over  the issue of  whether  the Constitution of  May 3 is  good or  evil,  right?
They leave smiling. And then the society becomes more positive, right? Everyone will be
tolerant knowing this. But then the question emerges: Which facts can we leave to hang
freely  like  this,  if  these  facts  speak  about  more  serious  issues,  let’s  say,  about  victims,
casualties, unresolved problems in politics? Let’s say, today some politicians say: Should
we demand one Litas from Russia or not50? Should we forgive and be friends with Russia
or should we remain loyal to our principles? To allow the Lithuanian Poles to write their
names in Polish orthography or not? And you see, the question is: To what extent can we
trust  the  child’s  ability  to  understand  these  things?  After  all,  we  will  not  offer  them  as
many sources as a professional receives in order to define one’s truth, one’s position. Due
to the scope of a textbook, I will give him two, three sources. Imagine, everything depends
on what I give him. And what if I am different? What if I give him what I personally like?
Do you understand? It is inevitable – I have written twenty of these textbooks and in each
one of them I can tell my own, […] even though I try to escape this, I try to be as objective
and fair, but…. (P 4: 4:19)
Thus, even if she is open to introducing different interpretations of the past in history
teaching, she insists that there are certain limits to the extent that doubt and uncertainty
about the past are acceptable in the classroom. There are questions, which should be
decided  and  established  as  foundations  or  pillars  of  society:  These  should  not  be  left  to
50 She refers here to the discussions whether Lithuania should demand symbolic reparation from Russia for the damage
and casualties inflicted during the Soviet occupation.
182
HANG FREELY. Leaving them not pinned down, open to free interpretation elicits a sense of
danger for Litvinait?, because not all textbook authors or teachers seek to be fair and
objective and can misrepresent the past. This is where her position comes closer to that of
Brazauskas in highlighting the need to guide pupils’ understanding of the past. The latter
point demonstrates that even though she is tempted to embrace the idea of truth as that
which you believe, she is convinced that fair and balanced judgment of the past constrains
the kinds of narratives that can be told. Fair judgment implies defense of certain
evaluations or assessments of the past, especially in relation to traumatic experiences. Her
insistence that textbooks should contain some value orientations for pupils could be
understood as reappraisal of the belief that different interpretations or perspectives on the
past  are  not  all  equal.  Certain  experiences  afford  meanings,  which  are  not  arbitrary  and
which need to be recognized.
As  a  solution  to  the  predicament  of  uncertainty,  Litvinait? deems national  politics  of
history necessary to establish certain core collective values and beliefs. She is convinced it
cannot be left to the teachers or to textbook authors to decide in order to prevent
tendentious, biased representation of the past. She conceives of a state as a FAMILY UNIT,
WHICH deliberates and agrees on certain key rules, values and beliefs which express the
national VISION.
But, you see, I believe that if there is a state, then there is a state school. What is a state? I
strongly believe that a state is an organization. For me, that is a sacred vision. I want to
believe this. I want it to be like that. And if this is our, your, my organization, we sat down,
huddled  together  into  a  state,  sat  down,  agreed  that  this  will  be  our  state.  And  we  say:
These  are  our  kids.  We  have  to  raise  them.  The  same  way  that  a  father  and  a  mother
deliberated, a child was born to them, they deliberated how they were going to raise him,
what they were going to implant in him. They do not say: Whichever way it goes, it will be
fine. There are visions. I believe we need these visions. (P 4: 4:28)
6.2.3.1 Textbook I: RESISTANCE and decline
Textbook I: Salom?ja Bitlieri???, J?rat? Litvinait?. Lietuva Pasaulyje. Istorijos vadov?lis 8
klasei [Lithuania in the World. History textbook for the 8th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa,
2004.
The textbook is a joint project of two authors, Salom?ja Bitlieri??? and J?rat? Litvinait?,
each of whom wrote four chapters of the textbook. It is important to note that out of the
sections that deal with the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, Litvinait? only authored the parts
leading up to the 1569 Union of Lublin, whereas the subsequent chapters are attributed to
Bitlieri???. In spite of this, I discuss the textbook portrayal of the Polish-Lithuanian history
encompassing the work of both authors, since the collaborative nature of the project
implies coordination of the overall conceptual and thematic integrity of the textbook. I did
not, however, have an opportunity to interview Bitlieri??? as well.
The depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past in the textbook maintains a traditional
emphasis on political history. The Polish-Lithuanian relations are mentioned for the first
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time in the textbook in the context of the 1385 Union of Krewo and the Christianization of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL). The textbook explains that the Union of Krewo
“guaranteed the cooperation of Lithuanians and Poles in various areas. It was particularly
important in the fight against the shared enemy – the Teutonic Order” (117). The author
does  not  delve  into  the  question  as  to  whether  the  Union  meant  a  merger  or  just  a
rapprochement of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, which
constitutes one of the contentious points in historiography. Christianization, as a
consequence of unification with Poland, is also assessed positively, stating that “even
though the baptism did not solve all the problems at once, it opened up many great
opportunities for Lithuania” (118). Pupils are asked to organize a classroom discussion on
whether the Union of Krewo was useful for Lithuania and whether Jogaila, the grand duke
of Lithuania and the king of Poland, made a good decision in choosing to adopt the
Catholic faith.
The role of Poland in Lithuanian history, as described in the textbook, began to shift,
however, when Vytautas became the grand duke of Lithuania in 1401 (vice-regent of the
king in the GDL from 1392). Tensions are said to surface as Vytautas sought to strengthen
the sovereignty of the GDL from Poland. The textbook states that, when Vytautas finally
arranged his coronation in 1430, the Polish nobility prevented the envoys of the Emperor
Sigismund from reaching Lithuania and captured the crown. The arrangements for
coronation and Vytautas’ plan to establish the Kingdom of Lithuania failed. This
constitutes a turn in the narrative when the negative influences of Poland’s involvement in
Lithuanian history begin to outweigh the positive ones. Pupils are prompted to reflect on
why the Poles were against Vytautas’ coronation. An image of Poland as an adversary
neighbor of Lithuania begins to emerge.
The successive rapprochement of Lithuania and Poland is presented by showing how
Lithuania  was  in  dire  need  of  military  support  in  the  Livonian  war  with  Russia.  Poland
accepted to join forces with Lithuania against Russia, but only in exchange for closer
political ties. The Lithuanian aristocracy is introduced as standing strongly against the
increasing unification with Poland, yet the nobility was eager to acquire more rights and
privileges comparable to those of the Polish nobility. The negotiations that took place in
1569 in Lublin, therefore, amount to the defense of the national sovereignty by the
Lithuanian delegation. The textbook concludes that
But  with regard to the GDL, the Union of  Lublin was partly an act  of  coercion.  It  had to
make concessions to Poles, which restricted the independence and statehood of the GDL.
Even though the Lithuanian political sovereignty diminished after the signature of the
Union of Lublin, it nevertheless retained the most important institutions of local
government and the monetary system. Thus, it could continue resisting the rise of Poland’s
influence, while simultaneously being sure that it would support it in the fight with Russia
for Livonia. (196)
The metaphor of RESISTANCE to the outside influence in relation to Poland crops up,
revealing how the unification with Poland is perceived as threatening to the Lithuanian
identity and statehood. In this regard, the textbook carries on the narrative tradition of
Lithuanian historiography. The emphasis is placed on the efforts of the GDL to maintain
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its  sovereignty  and  statehood  in  the  joint  Polish-Lithuanian  state.  It  is  stressed  which
institutions remained separate in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland after the
unification, which is supposed to support the claim that the union did not merge the two
states completely into “one indivisible body” (196). The pupils are asked to “prove that
the GDL maintained autonomy in the joint state” (197).
There  is  one  task  in  relation  to  the  Union  of  Lublin,  which  attempts  to  introduce  the
notion of multiperspectivity by asking pupils to compare two sources, which assess the
Union of Lublin from very different perspectives. The first source is an excerpt from the
speech by Jan Chodkiewicz, the head of the Lithuanian delegation in the Lublin
negotiations, who is against the union with Poland. The source suggests that the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania was coerced into the union against its free will and that the Lithuanian
delegation was deeply distressed by the outcomes of the negotiation. The second source,
an  excerpt  from  a  1613  map  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  by  the  Polish-Lithuanian
cartographer Tomasz Makowski, states, in conflict with the first source, that the
unification was sought by both parties equally, eager to join forces against shared enemies.
The  pupils  need  to  identify  the  differences  between  the  two  sources  and  “discuss  in  the
classroom about the reliability and accuracy of information” (195). They also need to
consider whether this issue is relevant in contemporary times. Since the main authorial
text rather supports the opinion expressed in the first source, students are already steered
to regard the second source as biased and inaccurate. A task of this kind could engage
students  to  consider  the  lived  experience  of  the  authors  of  these  two sources  and  how it
shaped their perception of events, but instead the ocularcentric-optical pursuit of unbiased
truth dominates the comparison of sources. The task emulates the approach of historical
criticism, which primarily aims to untangle bias and distortion from the authentic, original
truth, and sidesteps the issue of what experience had led to these two different opinions
about the significance of the Union of Lublin.
The task thus implicitly teaches the students that the truth is a faithful reproduction, an
accurate repetition of the original past in a source. Truthful knowledge is dependent on
mimesis  as  sameness.  A  truthful  source  maintains  repetitive  accuracy  of  the  original
meaning. In order to understand this, it could be helpful to recall the image of the camera
obscura and  how  it  models  human  cognition  of  an  external,  pre-given  reality.  The
textbook task instructs students to “see” the past as a thing-like substance, which can be
represented truthfully and known through that optical rendering. In order for it to be
knowable or duplicated as an image in one’s mind, the thing-like, factual past needs to be
separated from opinion. Opinion or assessment is conceived as an added, ancillary
element, which at best is not necessary for truth and in the worst case is an impediment to
truth. Opinion is an adornment to cognition rather than a constitutive aspect of interaction
with the environment, which explains why the 19th century principles of historical
criticism require a strict separation of facts from opinion. The sharp separation of facts and
opinions is an inheritance from the 19th century positivist historians who were particularly
concerned to distinguish between the two (Howell and Prevenier 2001, 87).  As a result,
the dominant conception of truth is disembodied and detached from the experiential
process. The camera obscura serves as an implicit metaphorical model for cognition,
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structuring the understanding of reality as external, pre-given, static, and the
understanding of knowledge as a snapshot, an optical duplicate of that external reality.
In describing the centuries following the Union of Lublin, the textbook accentuates
themes of decline, disorder and the gradual fading of Lithuanian statehood, thereby further
fortifying the negative assessment of the Union of Lublin.
Historians call the 17th–18th centuries a period of the greatest decline, because the nobility
were making use of their “golden freedoms” which no other single nobleman had in
Europe. Such freedoms of nobility eventually had led to lawlessness, because it became
impossible to adopt any laws and maintain a basic order in the state. (207)
Anxiously, we have been watching the rapprochment of the GDL with the Kingdom of
Poland and the legal establishment of this rapprochement by the Union of Lublin, and then
the  weakening  statehood  of  the  GDL  and  disorder  as  well  as  continuous  wars  in  the
nobiliary Commonwealth. (223)
The excerpt above constructs the process of learning about the past as WATCHING the
development of historical events, as if on a movie screen. This curious ocularcentric
metaphor  brings  forth  the  distance  of  the  past  events  in  relation  to  the  spectator,  which
nevertheless are being observed with emotional investment, or anxiously. KNOWING IS
SEEING,  but  it  is  a  particular  kind  of  seeing  dependent  on  the  camera  as  a  metaphorical
model for cognition. It implies that temporal change is understood as a sequence of static
snapshots,  static,  fixed  states  of  the  external  world:  first,  the  rapprochement  of  the  two
states; then, the Union of Lublin, followed by weakening statehood, disorder, and wars.
The cognizing self stands aside from it as a distanced spectator. What remains unclear in
this narration is the non-linear process of interrelations and entanglements, of lived
experience that leads to these events.
To sum up, the textbook remains within close proximity of the traditional
historiographical narrative, according to which the Union of Lublin marks the beginning
of the decline in Lithuanian history. The main emphasis falls on political history of
political elites. Attempts to introduce multiperspectivity fail inasmuch as they are
employed for detection of bias rather than enable students to assess the conflicting
accounts in terms of life trajectories of their authors. The particular example of the task
with a comparison of diverging opinions is a useful illustration of how school-history
education, without any explicit clarification of ontological or epistemological issues,
instructs students in particular ways of “seeing” and knowing the past. Camera and optics
serve as the metaphorical models structuring metatheoretical assumptions about the past
and history.
6.2.3.2 Textbook II: Decline and resurrection
Textbook II: J?rat? Litvinait?. Palikimas. Istorijos vadov?lis, Pirmoji knyga, 5 klas?
[Heritage. History textbook. The first book, 5th grade]. Kaunas, LT: Šviesa, 2007.
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The shared Polish-Lithuanian history is touched upon only very briefly and in passing in
this textbook, yet certain themes stand out in the depiction. It mentions that some
Lithuanians lost their national identity, mother tongue and customs, and began to identify
themselves as Polish as a consequence of the Polish-Lithuanian unification. The 1385
Union of Krewo is causally connected to the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. Since
the issue is discussed in a chapter dedicated to the topic of the formation of the Lithuanian
nation, it further contributes to a negative assessment of the implications of the union with
Poland.
It happens that people adopt customs of other tribes. That is what happened to some
Lithuanians. In the 14th century, the grand duke of Lithuania Jogaila married the Polish
princess Jadwiga. The court of the monarch was established in Krakow. Polish fashions,
language, customs began to spread among the Lithuanian nobility. They started to
Polonize. (24)
The outcomes of the 1569 Union of Lublin are assessed negatively, emphasizing that the
abuse of privileges and rights by the gentry led to an increasing chaos and weakening of
the shared Polish-Lithuanian state. A causal connection is established by the textbook
between the rapprochement with Poland and the eventual disintegration of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795, when the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
was taken over by the Russian Empire.
In the context of the 19th century insurrections against Russian rule, the Polish-
speaking Lithuanian nobility is juxtaposed with the Lithuanian-speaking nobility.
The noblemen were resisting, establishing secret societies, organizing insurrections. But
they were defending the Polish language, culture. In Samogitia51 it was otherwise. Here,
the Lithuanian language, customs have survived among both peasants and the majority of
noblemen. The well-educated Samogitian people started the movement for fostering the
Lithuanian language, history, customs – for the revival of Lithuanianness. (24)
The textbook also briefly comments on the interwar conflict between Poland and
Lithuania over the city of Vilnius. Poland and Lithuania are personified as two people
fighting as TO WHOM the city should rightfully belong and who struggle to take it over or
RECEIVE it BACK. The relations between the two countries before the interwar conflict are
characterized as friendly. The conflict is presented in terms of two static divergent
“perspectives”: Lithuanians called Vilnius their capital, whereas Poles likewise thought of
Vilnius as their city. Pupils learn nothing about the process of lived experience out of
which these two different views or perspectives arose (see Section 3.6.2). Such an
approach to multiperspectivity does not provide the means to understand the complicated
past or the reasoning of the other side to the conflict.
The friendship with Poland broke due to an argument as to whom Vilnius should belong.
Lithuanians called Vilnius their capital; Poles – their city. In 1919, the Polish army took
over Vilnius and its region. An argument flared up which cost more than one life to each
51 An ethnographic region in northwestern Lithuania.
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side. In 1939, Lithuania received Vilnius back, but soon afterwards lost its independence.
(44)
FRIENDSHIP between  Lithuania  and  Poland  is  said  to  have  been  restored  after  the  re-
establishment of the Lithuanian independence in 1990. The textbook states that both
countries recognized each other’s rights and territories, thus, including the city of Vilnius
within the territory of the Lithuanian state. Poland is once again personified, noting how it
“helped the young Lithuanian state to stand on its feet, aided in its preparations for joining
NATO” (45). Pupils are asked to explain why it was and remains important for Lithuania
to closely cooperate with Latvia and Poland (45). Cooperation in friendly, peaceful terms
with neighboring states is highlighted as a goal in the arena of international relations.
Even  though  the  textbook  presents  a  very  condensed  overview  of  the  shared  Polish-
Lithuanian past, which mostly includes only basic factual information, the narrative of the
past steers towards a negative evaluation of Poland’s influence in Lithuanian history.
Value judgment is conveyed through a linear narrative sequence of events, by implying
causal connections between the Polish-Lithuanian unification and consecutive decline of
statehood or Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. Analyzing such a narrative creates
the impression that values in a historical narrative are a sole product of linguistic
organization by the author, because we learn nothing from it about how the past was lived
and experienced in embodiment. What strikes me in this narrative is how the factual
information that is provided offers very little understanding of the lived experience of the
events in question. Thus, the only values present in the narrative are the ones built into the
very fabric of reasoning and justification, despite an absence of any explicit words
marking value ascriptions. Pupils learn about a sequence of events that took place in an
externalized past and are implicitly taught to draw causal connections between them, but
they understand little about how people lived and experienced the past.
The negative implications of the political and cultural rapprochement with Poland are
counterbalanced in the overall narrative by stressing the friendship and good terms
between the two states in contemporary times and, particularly, after the re-establishment
of the Lithuanian state. This shows, however, that Poland’s role in Lithuanian history is
assessed exclusively in terms of its impact on the Lithuanian statehood and independence,
which is not surprising considering that the textbook is shaped overall by themes of
patriotism, national belonging, national consciousness, and independence. In this regard,
Litvinait?’s textbook replicates Brazauskas’ textbooks, where the role of Poland in
Lithuanian history was also assessed primarily according to whether it strengthened or
diminished the FOUNDATION of the Lithuanian state and identity. Thus, the shared Polish-
Lithuanian past is narrated in accordance with the Lithuanian historiographical tradition,
which is reflective of the concerns and lived experience of the historians of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.
The idea that pupils should learn from the past (and thus the metaphor of history as a
TEACHER), especially from the struggle for the Lithuanian independence, is instantiated in
the textbook narrative. When drawing lessons from the past, pupils could, for example,
learn to regard Poland as predominantly adverse and unfriendly to Lithuania. And, since,
according to the textbook, history is a scientific pursuit whose claims are based on
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verifiable evidence, they might also conclude that such a negative assessment derives
solely from the facts and has nothing to do with affective, experiential factors when
making sense of the past. That affective, experiential factors do, however, play a role in
shaping historical understanding is revealed by the personification of Poland and
Lithuania when describing the changes, which took place in their mutual relations over
time. Lithuania can be metaphorically conceived as a human being, a person whose
identity has been under threat and damaged by the influence of Poland.
6.2.4 Conclusion
The interview with Litvinait? reveals broader trends in the development of historical
consciousness in Lithuania: the “loss in translation” between experiences of different
generations, the widening gap between the past and the present born out of the
acceleration of change in contemporary life, the future-oriented identity of pupils, and the
diminishing role of the past. School-history education in this context becomes a TOOL in
making  the  past  relevant  again  and  the  precise  way in  which  Litvinait? seeks  to  achieve
this goal is by rendering the past practical and teaching pupils basic skills of historical
literacy. History emerges as a FOUNDATION of useful knowledge and skilss. Historians, in
this context, serve as a model of how to face the BOUNDLESS OCEAN of history. They act as
FISHERMEN, whose tools and skills permit them not to get overwhelmed by the OCEAN and
CATCH THE FISH they need.
Moreover, multiperspectivity is permissible, for Litvinait?, in school-history education
only to the extent that it does not endanger certain core values and beliefs, which make up
the group identity. These core values and beliefs, according to Litvinait?, cannot be left to
the teachers, textbook authors or pupils to decide, but need to emerge from a purposeful
and systematic politics of history at the national level. The state should function, in this
regard, as a FAMILY UNIT, which deliberates and decides which values should be passed on
to the children. In effect, since the relation between language and the past is assumed to be
arbitrary, unwanted interpretations are displaced not because they fail to engage with past
life, for example, but because they do not correspond to the values espoused by the state
and society. Thus, the contents of history education can become entirely dependent on the
value preferences of those, who are in power to make such choices. Furthermore, although
she is convinced that the meaning of certain past events and experiences is not arbitrary,
she is not able to explain why it is so or what the relation between meaning and the past is.
Thus, when faced with a lack of clear principles for adjudication among different
narratives, she prefers to entrench certain meanings by means of the politics of history.
The narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian past in the textbooks closely follows that
established historiographical tradition, evaluating the role of Poland according to whether
it strengthened or diminished Lithuanian sovereignty. Attempts to introduce
multiperspectivity in relation to the Polish-Lithuanian past remain focused on the
identification of bias and accuracy. Pupils need to ascertain the truth rather than synthesize
several divergent accounts into a more encompassing and complex understanding.
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The issues which emerge in the interview – in particular, the problems of historical
truth and multiperspectivity – are particularly discernible in “transitional” societies which
are going through identity transformations. A conception of multiperspectivity as a
collection of arbitrary and relative stances, detached from the process of embodied
experience, elicits renewed interest in setting and re-enacting foundational memory. These
diverse perspectives are understood as isolated, static, mutually exclusive; they are also
equivalent to each other so that a meaningful comparison between them is complicated, if
attainable at all. Different narratives, when they become disembodied through implicit
metaphorical models that shape ordinary reasoning, are reduced to subjective, static
mental snapshots, or PERSPECTIVES.  PERSPECTIVE,  as  a  powerful  and  deeply  entrenched
visual metaphor, structures our epistemological assumptions about knowability of the past.
It forecloses our capacity to take into consideration that our perception, reasoning and
action  are  shaped  by  our  history  of  dynamic  interaction  with  the  world.  Thinking  about
divergent interpretations in terms of the metaphor of PERSPECTIVE hides the significance of
the process in relation to the pattern of perspective.
6.3 Ignas Kapleris
Ignas Kapleris is a project manager in the publishing house “Briedis.” He has done his
Master’s  degree  in  history  at  Vilnius  University  and  has  also  completed  his  doctoral
studies at Vilnius University in 2014 in the discipline of media and communication
studies. He is the main author of the textbook series “Laikas” [Time]. I interviewed him in
December 2013 in the premises of the publishing house “Briedis.”
Analyzed textbooks by Ignas Kapleris:
 Textbook I. Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Rytas Šalna,
Ingrida Šotlandait?-Juzefovi?ien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?. Laikas. Istorijos vadov?lis 7
klasei, I dalis [Time. History textbook for the 7th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis,
2004.
 Textbook II. Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Robertas
Ramanauskas, K?stutis Raškauskas, Lirija Steponavi?ien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-
Mikailien?. Laikas. Istorijos vadov?lis 8 klasei, I dalis [Time. History textbook for the
8th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2005.
 Textbook III. Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Robertas
Ramanauskas, K?stutis Raškauskas, Lirija Steponavi?ien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-
Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos vadov?lis 8 klasei, II dalis [Time. History textbook for the
8th grade, Part 2]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2005.
 Textbook IV. Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Andželika
Laužikien?, Robertas Ramanauskas, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos
vadov?lis 9 klasei, I dalis [Time. History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius,
LT: Briedis, 2006.
 Textbook V. Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Andželika
Laužikien?, Robertas Ramanauskas, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos
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vadov?lis 9 klasei, II dalis [Time. History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 2]. Vilnius,
LT: Briedis, 2006.
 Textbook VI. Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Andželika
Laužikien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos vadov?lis 10 klasei, I
dalis [Time. History textbook for the 10th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2007.
6.3.1 Ignas Kapleris: Historiographical influences
My conversation with Kapleris began from discussing the conception of the textbook
series “Laikas.” I was interested in finding out what kind of ideas shaped the
methodological and didactic approach of the publishing house and its authorial team and
whether there was a clear intention to introduce some changes in relation to what was
available in the school textbook market at the time.
In the interview, Ignas Kapleris made clear that the historiographical school of Vilnius
University and, in particular, the ideas of the contemporary Lithuanian historian Alfredas
Bumblauskas,52 exerted an important influence on his way of thinking about the past.
Several times throughout the interview, Kapleris stressed his wish to overcome the
authority of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences (previously known and still
commonly referred to as Vilnius Pedagogical University) in the field of history education.
Kapleris’s intention was to compete against what he perceived as the dominant position of
the pedagogical approach of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. Kapleris
explains the concept of the textbook series and the historiographical influences that
informed it in the following way:
We  did  not  have  any  specific  strategy,  as  it  is  sometimes  laid  out  in  educational
documents. We acted according to intuition. And there was one thing that the society itself
was changing, we were ourselves such that…Because in school-history teaching the
historicist narrative was ruling, the 19th century Rankean approach, where there is a lot of
“factology” [sic! – R.K.], political history, guys, dukes, kings, and we saw and…I have
myself graduated from a slightly different school, Vilnius University, which perhaps I have
not encountered too extensively, that is the school of Bumblauskas, which offers a slightly
different conception. And in the Lithuanian school-history education these two narratives
are competing: the one of the pedagogical university, in which “factology” rules and, let’s
say, strictly speaking, “Šapokism“, this national, national conception of the Lithuanian
52 Alfredas Bumblauskas is a historian from Vilnius University and a well-known intellectual figure in Lithuania.
Bumblauskas received his doctoral degree in 1987, and was mentored by Edvardas Gudavi?ius. He was formerly a Dean
of  the  Faculty  of  History  and  is  now  head  of  the  Department  of  Theory  of  History  and  Cultural  History  at  Vilnius
University. The field of his influence is not limited to the academic field, as he is also a famous TV personality and has
hosted multiple TV programs over the last two decades. It could be argued that he has exerted a considerable influence
on the national historical consciousness via his strong media presence. This is particularly important considering that,
together with his mentor and predecessor, the Lithuanian historian Edvardas Gudavi?ius, he criticizes the Romantic
patriotic historical narrative of the Lithuanian history that first appeared in the 19th century and proposes a conception of
an integrated Lithuanian history in a European context.
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history, and a different conception, which comes from Vilnius University. Now, until then,
until our “Briedis” [the name of the publishing house – R.K.], there had been exclusively
the dominance of the Pedagogical University. We brought a new trend, we see it from
other textbooks that have been published after ours that we have attained our goals in
certain issues and that teachers have accepted our textbooks, because today we are leaders.
(P 2: 2:5)
He describes his textbook and the pedagogical approach in general as being driven by the
goal to stir students’ interest in and curiosity in relation to the past, to reduce the amount
of factual information and to eliminate the academically inclined presentation of the past.
Later in the interview (2:32), however, Kapleris points out that it is impossible to leave all
the “factology” out of the textbook, since teachers, who make the decision about which
textbooks to use in classroom, would not choose their textbooks for schools. The majority
of secondary school-history teachers in Lithuania, according to Kapleris, have been
educated according to the historicist school of the Lithuanian University of Educational
Sciences. The publishing house has to adjust to their theoretical and pedagogical ideas
about what history is and how it should be taught.
Kapleris noted that rote memorization of factual details and dates did not disappear
from school-history education, because the average age of a history teacher in Lithuania is
above fifty years old. In other words, even if current teacher training programs might
provide new methodologies of teaching, the majority of teachers had received their
pedagogical training, which followed an older model of pedagogical instruction. He
regards this as the reason why history is understood in Lithuanian schools “separately
from the everyday life” (2:32). The latter comment points to a conception of historical
knowledge as a disembodied, static substance, which is disconnected from the past as
lived experience. The “factological” approach to teaching history, with its emphasis on
distanced “states” of political and military history, renders knowledge as a disembodied
content that can be known because of and in its factuality.
The same could be said about the source analysis as it is presented and taught in
school-history  education.  I  mentioned  how  a  typical  task  of  source  analysis  in  “Laikas”
textbooks focused on attentive reading and identification of specific factual information in
the text. Kapleris commented that this approach stems from the established tradition of
methodology in the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. It does not require
contextualizing the source and mostly asks pupils to “EXTRACT information” out of it
(2:44). He regards this as part of a larger phenomenon, namely, taking the natural sciences
as the model for the discipline of history, with an emphasis on observation, empirical
evidence, and description, whereas the “the narrativist history and narration are neglected
in school” (2:44). He perceives this as a problematic trend, because history is “a narration,
a story of a human being” (2:44).
It is crucial to observe the dichotomy that is identified in the interview between the
nationalist master narrative based on the historiography of Adolfas Šapoka and the
alternative narrative of the Lithuanian history proposed by Alfredas Bumblauskas and his
mentor Edvardas Gudavi?ius. The tradition of the Lithuanian University of Educational
Sciences  is  aligned  with  the  interwar  historiography  of  Šapoka,  whereas  the  tradition  of
Vilnius University is aligned with the contemporary historiography of Gudavi?ius and
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Bumblauskas. Hence, the textbook series “Laikas” attempts to perform a paradigmatic
narrative change in school-history education.
This serves as an example of how historiographical narratives shape school-history
education  and  how  the  changes  taking  place  at  the  academic  level  of  history  writing
eventually, with a certain period of delay, find their way into school textbooks. Even
without any explicit, well-defined strategy or concept, the authorial team, particularly its
leader Kapleris, builds the textbook narrative to accommodate the narrative of
Bumblauskas. This illustrates my point that history as a discipline and school-history
education cannot be sharply separated as two distinct fields of knowledge (see Section
3.2). Academic, professional historians bear a significant, even if indirect and sometimes
imperceptible, influence on the presentation of the past in school-history. The narratives
and underlying meta-theoretical assumptions of professional historians are transposed into
school  textbooks,  even  if  this  process  extends  up  to  several  decades  in  order  to  be
noticeable. It is exactly in this sense that historians shape the ways of seeing and knowing
the past. The way historians make sense of the past – assumptions, values, beliefs,
attitudes, experiences that guide their process of meaning-making – comes to shape how a
community  of  people  learns  to  make  sense,  know,  and  assess  the  past  via,  among  other
things, school-history education. School-history education has a wide reach across the
young generation of the national population and this aids it in building shared ways of
seeing the past.
6.3.1.1 Textbook II: Source criticism
Textbook II: Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Robertas
Ramanauskas, K?stutis Raškauskas, Lirija Steponavi?ien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?.
Laikas. Istorijos vadov?lis 8 klasei, I dalis [Time. History textbook for the 8th grade, Part
1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2005.
The introduction notes that the textbook devotes more attention to the development of a
student’s abilities to think historically. Three of the textbook’s chapters are followed by a
new  segment,  called  “Method,”  which  aims  at  instructing  pupils  on  how  to  analyze  and
work with various historical sources (visual and written historical sources as well as maps)
(4).
One of the sections on method offers advice on how to analyze written historical
sources. It is noted that historical events or persons may often receive different evaluations
in the sources and it is therefore important to learn to compare them (69). Three steps
define the analysis of a written source. First, pupils should gather the information about a
source:  when it  was  written;  who the  author  is;  whether  the  author  is  a  contemporary  of
the events described in the source; the purpose for which the source could have been
written; whether the source represents a perspective contemporary to the author’s own
period. Secondly, pupils should analyze how the text is formulated; whether it is possible
to detect certain statements or opinions in it; what the main idea of the text is; whether
statements are contradictory among themselves and whether they are objective. Lastly,
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pupils should search for additional information that either confirms or contradicts the
statements of the text (69).
The  authors  sought  to  convey  a  basic  sense  of  source  criticism  in  a  way
comprehensible to the 8th-graders. However, the outlined sequential steps of source
analysis do not enable pupils to raise questions about how a particular source and a
perspective represented in it link to certain ways of being, thinking and feeling, certain
social, cultural or political processes and phenomena. The provided questions guide pupils
only to analyze the contents of a source as a static snapshot without much regard for lived
experience,  part  of  which  it  is.  The  examination  of  the  authorship  of  a  source  is  mostly
aimed at evaluating the potential truthfulness of claims made in the source, or, in other
words, assessing to what extent the representation in a source can match external past
reality. Thus, the dualist, ocularcentric model of cognition is preserved and implicitly
conveyed to pupils.
6.3.1.2 Textbook III: A moderate take on the Polish-Lithuanian unification
Textbook III: Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Robertas
Ramanauskas, K?stutis Raškauskas, Lirija Steponavi?ien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?.
Laikas, Istorijos vadov?lis 8 klasei, II dalis [Time. History textbook for the 8th grade, Part
2]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2005.
The 1385 Union of Krewo is introduced by stressing that both Poland and Lithuania had
their own interests in concluding an agreement. Both are said to seek military cooperation
in the joint war against the Teutonic Order. The textbook explains that the Polish nobility
expected, by arranging a marriage of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila and the Polish
Princess Jadwiga, to acquire the territories of Volhynia and Podolia which belonged to
Lithuania at  the time. Jogaila thought that,  with the help of the Poles,  he could maintain
the  Lithuanian  sovereignty  in  the  Slavic  territories  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania.
Although it is mentioned that the text of the unification treaty included a statement about
the annexation of the GDL to Poland, the importance of this statement is downplayed. The
textbook claims that, according to historians, the Krewo Union was merely a collection of
Jogaila‘s marital pledges to Jadwiga and that the statement about Lithuania‘s annexation
remained just a promise, but was never actually implemented in practice (185). The Union
of Krewo and the ensuing Christianization of the GDL are presented as positive
developments, which brought about the spread of Western culture and civilization and
which eliminated the moral basis for crusades organized by the Teutonic Order into the
Baltic region (186).
Rapprochement of Poland and Lithuania after the 1385 Union of Krewo eventually led
the two countries to challenge their common enemy – the Teutonic Order – in the 1410
Battle of Grunwald. The interpretation of the event, which is advanced in the main text,
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identifies the maneuver of the multi-ethnic Lithuanian army as a feigned retreat and as the
determining factor in the defeat of the Teutonic knights.53
Pupils are introduced to these two different interpretations of the battle via historical
sources,  which  they  are  asked  to  compare  and  then  identify  key  differences  in  their
statements (191–192). One source is an excerpt from Jan D?ugosz’s chronicle in which he
describes how the Lithuanian army started running away in panic. The second source is an
excerpt from the actual letter found by Ekdahl. It is interesting that the textbook does not
instruct pupils to reflect on this contradiction and its meaning further, to consider why
??ugosz’s interpretation prevailed or why D?ugosz chose to describe the battle as he did.
After the Battle of Grunwald, the narrative of shared Polish-Lithuanian history
continues by describing intensifying bilateral tensions. The textbook provides a detailed
description of how the Polish nobility resisted and tried to actively prevent the coronation
of Vytautas, for this would have meant the loss of Polish influence over Lithuania. A letter
of Vytautas is  quoted where he states this explicitly,  that  Poles were not willing to allow
the coronation to happen and sought to make Lithuania dependent, “to govern it as their
own” (194).
The textbook finally introduces the 1569 Union of Lublin by stating that both states
had their own interests in closer unification (222). The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was in
dire need of the Polish military support in the Livonian war with Moscow. The Polish
nobility, on the other hand, was anxious about the possibility that the GDL might elect its
own separate grand duke, since the King and Grand Duke Sigismund August was
childless, hence, ending the Jagiellonian dynasty. The Polish nobility is also said to have
expected to acquire territorial property and offices in the GDL, which, until then, were
prohibited from obtaining by the Lithuanian Statute, and to have annexed the southern
territories of the GDL. After having stated these primary reasons for the union, the
textbook concludes that “the Poles sought to annex and make Lithuania part of Poland.
The Lithuanians were afraid to lose sovereignty, wanted to arrange an equal union” (222).
The latter statement succinctly sums up the Lithuanian narrative of the Union of Lublin.
The difficult negotiations between Poland and the GDL are described by stressing how
the two sides could not agree on the model of the new state: Poland sought to annex the
GDL to Poland, whereas the GDL resisted this project and sought to conclude a union of
two equal states. The Polish nobility together with the King and Grand Duke Sigismund
August are said to put pressure on the Lithuanians by breaking the pledge of the grand
duke and annexing the southern territories of the GDL to Poland. The textbook explains
53 It needs to be pointed out that the question whether the retreat of the Lithuanian troops was a pre-planned simulated
strategy or an actual withdrawal has been a point of contention between Polish and Lithuanian historiography for
centuries. In the Polish historiography, the Lithuanian tactical maneuver has been interpreted as an actual withdrawal
from the battlefield, yielding to the advance of the Teutonic army. This interpretation originates from the chronicle
written by the Polish historian Jan D?ugosz (1415–1480), who provided a vivid description of how the Lithuanian troops
fled from the battlefield after one hour of fighting (Ekdahl 2010). The long-standing disagreement between Polish and
Lithuanian historians came to a turning point when, in 1962, Sven Ekdahl, a Swedish historian, found a letter in archives
in Germany, disproving the claims of D?ugosz that Lithuanians fled the battlefield of Grunwald, succumbing to the
Teutonic Knights’ pressure. According to Ekdahl, the letter, addressed to the Great Master of the Teutonic Order, was
written by a high ranking military officer several years after the battle. It warns the Great Master about the tactics of a
feigned retreat of the Lithuanian army and reminds that the Lithuanians had used the very same tactics in the Battle of
Grunwald (Ekdahl 2010).
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that  the  Lithuanians  considered  starting  a  war  against  Poland,  but  in  the  end  had  to
conclude that the country was unable to wage two wars simultaneously (223).
A  commentary  of  the  Lithuanian  historian  Zigmantas  Kiaupa  is  inserted  as  a
supplementary source in which he states that
[t]he events of 1569 did not cause unrest, serious resistance. Societies, which lived side by
side and were governed by one sovereign got considerably acquainted with each other, had
things to adopt from each other. Lithuania was worn out by the difficult war with Russia.
Therefore, after the experience of more than one hundred years of close relations with
Poland, the union did not frighten the Lithuanian politicians and the nobility. What was
argued persistently concerned its character; the Lithuanian’s own conception of the union
was defended. (224)
This passage reveals a moderate view of the union where it is stressed that the GDL was
itself interested in concluding the union and that the disagreement was mainly about the
type of the union to be implemented. The overall conclusion that the textbook draws is
that the union made both Lithuania and Poland stronger and enabled both countries to
resist Muscovy more effectively (224). The Union of Lublin put constraints on the
sovereignty of the GDL, but did not abolish its statehood, since the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania continued to preserve its own autonomous territory, borders, laws, judiciary
system, army and treasury (224).
The textbook touches on the topic of Polonization of the Lithuanian gentry by pointing
out that
a person of each epoch has his/her own sense of history. The gentry of the GDL were
thinking in a different way than us. People now understand the Lithuanian nation as
speaking Lithuanian. The gentry of the GDL grounded their Lithuanianness and Lithuanian
patriotism not on language, but on citizenship. (228)
In the 16th century, the gentry of the GDL, who had their origins in different Lithuanian or
Belarusian regions, spoke diverse languages, and had different religions, all identified
themselves as Lithuanian. Even though the gentry largely adopted Polish language, they
made a clear distinction between themselves as Lithuanian citizens and Polish gentry. But
already in the 17th century, as the textbook explains, the Lithuanian gentry nation began to
lose its separate political consciousness. The Commonwealth, and not the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, was increasingly conceived of as the fatherland of the gentry (241). The
Lithuanian gentry no longer resisted their fellow Polish gentrymen, who sought to hold
political office in the Grand Duchy (241).
The rule of gentry in the 17th and 18th centuries is strongly criticized in the textbook.
The gentry is said to be only concerned with maintaining and defending their rights and
freedoms. However, the gentry ignored the interests of the Commonwealth, which
eventually plunged into complete anarchy and political paralysis (242).
The textbook assessment of the Polish role in Lithuanian history acknowledges
explicitly  in  what  ways  Lithuania  benefited  from  rapprochement  with  Poland  and  the
ensuing Europeanization, but it does not shy away from identifying less desirable
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developments and influences after the 1569 Union of Lublin. There is a distinct attempt to
SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS in the portrayal of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past.
6.3.1.3 Textbook IV: SMOOTHING OVER THE CORNERS of the shared Polish-
Lithuanian past
Textbook IV: Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Andželika Laužikien?,
Robertas Ramanauskas, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos vadov?lis 9
klasei, I dalis [Time. History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis,
2006.
The 9th-grade course focuses on Lithuanian and world history during the period from the
end of the 18th century to 1918.
The adoption of the Constitution of May 3 in 1791, the first written constitution in
Europe, is considered as a remarkable achievement, which was significant not only for
Poland, but also for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (40). The textbook explains that even
though the Constitution abolished the dualism of Poland and Lithuania, and referred to the
shared state as the Republic of Poland, the representatives of the GDL protested against
this formulation. Furthermore, they achieved that an addendum be added to the
Constitution, the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which would be adopted shortly
thereafter. The Mutual Pledge reaffirmed the unity and indivisibility of the state, while
consisting of its two united members – the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania. The textbook, thus, underlines that “the Constitution of May 3 is also the
Constitution of the GDL” and since it was translated into the Lithuanian language, it was
the first political document written in Lithuanian (40). This straightforward affirmation of
the Constitution as equally significant to Lithuania is a departure from the traditional
romantic historiographical narrative, according to which the Constitution, which spoke
only of the Republic of Poland, signified the loss of the official state dualism and thus
contributed to the dissipation of separate Lithuanian political consciousness.
Although it is acknowledged that University of Vilnius functioned in the Polish
language in the first half of the 19th century, it is described as “the centre of Lithuanian
culture” (78). The textbook gives a detailed description of Romanticism in Lithuania, how
it encouraged historians, writers, and painters to become interested in the Lithuanian past
and  to  start  collecting  folk  tales  and  songs,  write  works  of  literature  devoted  to  the
Lithuanian  past.  The  fact  that  historical  and  literary  works  were  created  in  Polish  is  not
made problematic. The textbook explains that the educated people typically used Polish
(78) and mentions historical and literary works of Teodor Narbutt, Ignacy Kraszewski, and
Adam Mickiewicz.
Subsequently, the textbook clarifies that the Polish-speaking Adam Mickiewicz,
Juliusz S?owacki, W?adys?aw Syrokomla, perceived themselves as the successors of the
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former  GDL tradition,  as  citizens  and  patriots  of  the  GDL (83).54 The textbooks authors
try to reconcile the old and new forms of the Lithuanian national consciousness by
showing how both of these contributed to the Lithuanian national revival. This is clearly
seen in a table, which identifies the “awakeners of the Lithuanian national consciousness
in  the  first  half  of  the  19th century.” In the table, next to representatives of the
ethnolinguistic Lithuanian nationalism, such as Simonas Daukantas and Motiejus
Valan?ius, we find the names of Polish-speaking Mickiewicz, S?owacki, Syrokomla,
Narbutt, or the representatives of the old Lithuanian patriotism who identified with the
tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (83). Pupils are asked to consider why people,
who originated from diverse places and wrote in different languages (the table provides
information about each “awakener’s” territorial origins and language), all identified
themselves as Lithuanian. They have to indicate how the contemporary conception of the
Lithuanian nationality differs from the conception of the first half of the 19th century (86).
In the section designated to an overview of the most important information of the larger
chapter, pupils are again asked to list the activists of Lithuania, who wrote in Polish, but
celebrated Lithuania (98). This means that the personalities of Mickiewicz, S?owacki, and
Narbutt become important to remember as part of Lithuanian history. I would argue that
this constitutes a concrete example of how the textbook attempts to SMOOTH OVER THE
CORNERS (more on this metaphor in Section 6.3.2) of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past
and, more importantly, how it seeks to convey to pupils the idea of identity as dynamic
movement along a PATH. The paradigmatic narrative change in the textbook seems to
hinge on these two metaphors.
Considering  the  re-evaluation  of  the  Constitution  of  May  3  and  the  Polish-speaking
“Old Lithuanians,” the portrayal of 19th-century Lithuanian history in this textbook is
aligned with the historiography of Alfredas Bumblauskas.55
54 For example, Adam Mickiewicz, although often identified as a symbol of Polish nationalism, cannot be neatly
categorized as an adherent to any of the modern nationalisms. Born in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the present-day
Belarus, he was a citizen of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and thus espoused a different identity constellation.
He saw no contradiction in the fact that he was a patriot of Lithuania, which he considered to be his homeland, but at the
same time expressed his love for Lithuania in Polish, typically exemplified by the following famous passage from “Pan
Tadeusz”: “Litwo! Ojczyzno moja! ty jeste? jak zdrowie; Ile ci? trzeba ceni?, ten tylko si? dowie, Kto ci? straci?.
(“Lithuania,  my  fatherland!  You  are  like  health;  How much  you  must  be  valued,  will  only  be  discovered,  By  the  one
who has lost you.” The textbook “Laikas” for the 9th grade contains a whole separate section about the life of
Mickiewicz and acknowledges the multidimensional nature of his identity.
55 It was Bumblauskas, who first proposed the distinction between the “Old Lithuanians” (senalietuviai) and the “Young
Lithuanians” (jaunalietuviai). “Old Lithuanians” denote the Polish-speaking gentry, loyal to the tradition of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, either in the form of a federation or a unitary state, nevertheless, considering themselves to
be Lithuanian. “Young Lithuanians,” by contrast, based their identity on language and ethnic identity, thus, challenging
the “Old Lithuanians” and their conception of Lithuanianness. The textbook series “Laikas” acknowledges these
differences, yet does not exclude the Polish-speaking gentry from the narration of Lithuanian history.
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6.3.1.4 Textbook V: The SPLIT of the nation
Textbook V: Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Andželika Laužikien?,
Robertas Ramanauskas, Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos vadov?lis 9
klasei, II dalis [Time. History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 2]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis,
2006.
A novelty in this textbook is a separate chapter on the formation of modern Lithuanian,
Polish, and Belarusian nations. The chapter is metaphorically titled “The split nation”
(192–195). It is rich in ideas, arguments, and written and oral sources that reveal identity
transformations of concrete people. The textbook initially describes how the eastern parts
of Lithuania underwent intensive processes of Slavicization. Eastern Lithuanian villages
came under the influence of the Belarusian language due to the territorial proximity of
Belarusian settlements (192). Over time, villagers of Eastern Lithuania developed the so-
called  “simple  language,”  or  “po  prostu,”  which  was  a  form  of  the  Belarusian  language
with a strong admixture of Polish and Lithuanian words (192). According to the textbook,
the Polish language took hold of the urban areas at first, but later spread to countryside
villages through the manors of Polonized nobility and churches. It is claimed that, in the
second half of the 19th century, the Slavicization of villages of Eastern Lithuania
increased twofold (193). It is explained that “peasants could not comprehend that the
change of language changes nationality. They continued to hold themselves as Lithuanian,
former inhabitants of the GDL, hence, “locals” – tutejsi [R.K. – from Polish “locals”].
Only later, convinced by priests and landlords, did they become “simple language”-
speaking Poles” (193).
Written  sources,  which  are  inserted  in  this  chapter,  reflect  different  ideas  as  to  what
comprises the Lithuanian identity. One source, dating from 1863, refers to a Lithuanian as
somebody who believes in freedom, follows the rules of the Third Lithuanian Statute, and
lives in harmony with the Poles (193). Another account from the memoirs of Vincas
Kudirka from the end of the 19th century already presents an ethnolinguistic conception of
identity (193). Students are asked to compare them and detect differences. Yet another
excerpt from an ethnographic interview conducted in 1885 reveals how the identity of an
interviewed shoemaker does not correspond to modern “singular” conceptions of identity
(219). When asked by the interviewer about his “breed,” the shoemaker responds that he is
Catholic. Religion is the primary defining feature of his identity rather than ethnic
belonging. Then the ethnographer specifies that what he wishes to know is whether the
shoemaker is Lithuanian or Polish. The latter replies that he is both. The ethnographer’s
response is “That does not happen. You can either be one or the other,” to which the
shoemaker responds that he speaks both Polish and Lithuanian (219). These sources are
valuable, even if fragmentary, testimonies of the lived dimension of identity and
nationality.  They  reveal  the  complexity  of  identity  transformations  as  experienced  by
different people and as shaped by the imperatives of modern national movements. They
also give a sense of how identity is a dynamic movement contingent upon interaction with
one’s environment rather than a reductive, fixed essence.
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The main axis of the chapter is the relation between the Polish-speaking “Old
Lithuanians” and the Lithuanian-speaking “Young Lithuanians.” It is acknowledged that,
under the influence of Romantic ideas, the activists of the Lithuanian national movement
began to idealize the history of Lithuania before the Union of Lublin and rejected the rich
cultural heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: “The activists of the Lithuanian
national revival rescued the Lithuanian nation from extinction, but, by rejecting everything
that was Polish, they consciously declined the rich heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth” (195). The conflict between Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and the
modern Lithuanian national movement is presented by trying to convey how each of these
internally diverse groups perceived their situation. There is an attempt to avoid a BLACK
AND WHITE rendering of historical processes and to SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS between
conflicting accounts of the past. Since part of the Polish press and Polish-speaking nobility
reacted negatively to the national aspirations of Lithuanians and pejoratively referred to
them as “Litvomaniacs,” the Lithuanians reacted defensively and refused to accept, as
Lithuanian, those who did not speak the language (194). “The Polish-speaking residents of
Lithuania” are said to find themselves at “a crossroads of a painful choice” (194). The
textbook,  however,  clearly  aims  to  shift  the  uniformly  negative  image  of  the  Polish-
speaking Lithuanian nobility and instead provide a more nuanced explanation of their
lifeworld:
The majority of the Lithuanian noblemen were sincere patriots of their country: They
grieved over the destiny of Lithuania; if called a Pole, many got offended. However, it was
difficult  for  them  to  disavow  the  Polish  language,  to  forget  the  past  of  the  noble
Commonwealth. The noblemen were convinced that only they were capable of governing
their future’s destiny. Many could not even imagine that they should share this duty with
the Lithuanian intelligentsia originating from the countryside. (194)
The textbook asserts that a multinational state can endure only under the condition that its
constituent nations trust each other and do not despise each other’s rights (195). The
Poles, however, “did not recognize the right of Lithuanians to decide their own destiny”
(195). The metaphor of PATH emerges in the following passage, which describes how the
Lithuanian nation, as a result, SPLIT into two BRANCHES:
Not being able to decide which path to follow, the nation split. A part of it decisively chose
Lithuanianness and flowed into the Lithuanian national revival and modern Lithuanian
nation. The destiny of those residents, who no longer felt themselves as being a branch of
the same nation, became distant to their people, set differently. They unconditionally
flowed into the modern Polish nation. The reviving nation experienced huge losses because
of this Slavicization; it lost a big part of its society, the intelligentsia. (194–195)
Polish-speaking Lithuanians, which merged into the modern Polish nation, are introduced
as people who were forced to make a choice under unfavorable circumstances, who were
at  a CROSSROADS of  a PAINFUL choice. They envisioned a different PATH for the
Lithuanian nation. Kapleris also used the metaphor of PATH in the interview in a very
similar  sense,  when  talking  about  value  choices  in  the  textbook.  Decisions  on  how  to
make sense of past experience also implies a choice of the PATH to be followed. The “Old”
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and the “Young Lithuanians” came to a CROSSROADS where they had to make a choice,
causing the PATHS to BRANCH OUT in different directions.
The textbook presentation aligns with the intention of Kapleris, as stated in the
interview, to reframe the conception of Lithuanian history, especially in relation to the
shared Polish-Lithuanian past. There seems to be a conscious effort to shift away from the
exclusively negative, accusatory portrayal of the Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and to
empathize (not sympathize!) with their trajectory of experience, to understand how this
experience subsequently shaped their reaction to the rise of the modern Lithuanian nation.
In other words, the textbook combines, in an embodied way, the presentation of divergent
perspectives with a discussion of a process of lived experience out of which it emerges.
The same empathetic attitude applies to the “Young Lithuanians” whose disavowal of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is regarded critically, but introduced as understandable
under the adverse conditions at the time. In fact, the main text and the chosen excerpts
from written and oral sources allow interpreting the 19th century split between
Lithuanians and Poles as to a great extent caused by the inability and unwillingness to
relate to each other’s lifeworlds and lived experience. This lack of metaphorical, partial,
empathetic identification led to a SPLITTING of the nation, transforming the two BRANCHES
of the same nation into two different kinds of nations. Following alternate PATHS
transformed a difference of degree into a difference of kinds. The textbook authors regret
the splitting as a tremendous loss of rich cultural heritage as well as of an important part of
society, thus embracing the Polish-Lithuanian shared past as part of the Lithuanian past.
6.3.2 Ignas Kapleris: Limits of multiperspectivity: Textbook as a GUIDE-POST
Even if Kapleris is generally supportive of multiperspectivity in school-history education,
he is, however, cautious about how far the multiperspectivity can go in the presentation of
the past. In this sense, his understanding comes very close to the views of Litvinait? and,
to some extent, to those of Brazauskas, too, who also believed that pupils do not have the
resources and cognitive capabilities to adjudicate among different evaluations or
narratives. According to this view, textbooks, together with guidance provided by
teachers, should lead pupils in the right direction. The main point is that there are certain
events in the past whose evaluation cannot be left to “hang freely” in the textbook. The
textbook should serve the function of a GUIDE-POST in terms of how certain events should
be assessed or evaluated. Values, in these cases, are not a matter of arbitrary choice
because it has to do with painful or tragic experience.
R.K. It is written in the textbook that we always write history from the present perspective,
that every generation re-writes history and that views on the past change. An observation
was associated with it that “there are things which historians evaluate differently and
therefore one needs to not only learn during lessons why, what, where and when something
happened, but also to critically reason whether the events of history are explained
convincingly.” So if there are different interpretations, how should pupils select among
them?
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Of course, they should look at justification, but still, you see, in the lesson, even when a
pupil chooses, there should be a guide-post for him. A textbook should still say something:
which interpretation? […] Which one is closer to the view of our state? There needs to be a
prompt.  Also,  from the stance of  the teacher,  we also think that  we leave a  space for  the
teacher. Still, the child will not make conclusions on his own, well, maybe he will make,
but there needs to be some sort of direction. Let’s imagine a situation that, for example,
there is a speech about the events of January 13th56 and we put two interpretations. We put
the reminiscences of the people who stood by the TV tower and we put the rubbish of
Paleckis.  A  child  might  not  distinguish  where  the  truth  is.  You  see.  He  was  not  on  the
January 13th by the tower. He did not see all those emotions and how it was. He will read
two analogous texts and he, only unless he asks the parents, can tell what the truth is. (P 2:
2:14)
The example of the events in January 1991 is one of these historical events, which brings
up the question of historical truth particularly forcefully. On the one hand, the meaning
and truth of these events are inseparable from the lived experience of thousands of people
who took part in them.57 On  the  other  hand,  the  most  well-known  case  in  Lithuania  of
opposition to the widely accepted evaluation of the January events in 1991 is Algirdas
Paleckis, the leader of the Socialist People’s Front. He claimed that he had found
witnesses and evidence, which indicated that it was not the Soviet troops, who were
shooting at the people by the TV tower. Rather, he argued that there had been secret
snipers on the rooftop of the TV center shooting at the people, drawing a conclusion that
“our own people were shooting at their natives.”58
If you offer these two interpretations in the textbook as equally plausible perspectives,
according to Kapleris, a pupil may not be able to figure out what the truth is. A pupil did
not experience the events in question, participate in and feel the atmosphere of the events.
A pupil does not have access to many different sources and testimonies to make up his or
her mind. This passage reveals that the process of lived experience, in fact, is seen as the
source of truth by Kapleris. The perspective of Paleckis is, on the other hand, based on a
very different source of evidence. Paleckis relies on ballistic expertise to argue that the
bullets could not have been fired by the Soviet troops on the ground, but Paleckis’
evidence-based justification is completely at odds with the lived experience of the
56 On January 13th, 1991, in the aftermath of the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania, pro-Kremlin
forces, backed by the Soviet military, tried to take power in Lithuania.Lithuanian protesters formed a human shield to
protect a radio and television center from Soviet forces in the capital Vilnius. More than a dozen people were crushed by
Soviet tanks or shot to death, around seven hundred people were injured. Following these attacks, large crowds of people
also formed a shield around the Supreme Council building. Despite columns of military trucks and tanks moving into the
vicinity of the Supreme Council, the Soviet military forces retreated.
57 My understanding is that when Lithuanians speak about the truth of the January events, they usually have in mind the
highly emotionally charged lived truth, the experience which they had undergone by either taking part in the events
directly or closely following the events in the media and feeling distressed.
58 In 2011, Lithuanian authorities had initiated prosecution against Paleckis for his alleged denial of Soviet aggression
against Lithuania. In January 2012, a Vilnius court vindicated Paleckis, but the prosecutor appealed and Paleckis was
sentenced to pay a fine for denying the Soviet aggression of 1991.
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Lithuanian participants. Nor is Paleckis concerned with the lived experience of the events,
when he articulates his narrative. Disembodied evidence stands against the embodied lived
experience in this illuminating controversy over historical truth, which can be compared to
many similar and much more tragic cases of aggression.59
Kapleris continues to elaborate on his notion of historical truth by providing a concrete
example from a history exercise book for 12th-grade pupils (2:15). Pupils are asked to
compare and assess the truthfulness of two texts. The first text is written by a retired KGB
colonel,  Michail  Golovatov,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Russian  Special  Forces  squad
during the January events in Vilnius and who advances the same version of the events as
Algirdas  Paleckis.  The  second  text  is  an  account  of  the  events  as  experienced  by  a
Lithuanian participant who was shot by the TV tower and remained permanently crippled
due to injuries done to his legs. Historical truth acquires a literally embodied, fleshly
nature in this enlightening example where a physical injury serves as a tangible, real link
between the past reality and its narrated meaning. Embodiment in this case attests against
the arbitrariness of interpretation of the past and links memory to life, to lived experience.
Truth is not something that is limited to the capacity of words and sentences, or
propositional statements, to mirror the reality “out there,” but extends to corporeal
experience in which the past is presently felt.
We put a task in the exercise book of “Laikas 12” where they had to distinguish between a
lie and the truth. A text is given of Golovatov that snipers were shooting from the rooftops
of Karolinišk?s60 and  there  is  a  recollection  of  ours,  of  our  Lithuanian,  with  legs  shot
through who became a cripple for an entire life. There he writes concretely, who beat him
and from whom he received a bullet. (P 2: 2:15)
The latter passage in the interview also highlights how problematic the distinction
between facts and values is in our attempts to make sense of the past. The truth of the
January events in 1991 brings up the question whether it is possible to neatly distinguish
between reason and emotion, or thought and feeling, as the entrenched dichotomies of
Western ways of thinking would suggest.61
In the following passage, I further inquire into how the relation between facts and
values in history is understood by the textbook author. The way in which I formulate my
question,  below,  betrays  how  difficult  it  is  to  avoid  ocularcentric  vocabulary.  My
metaphor of LOOKING AT the past is quickly picked up and used by Kapleris in his
59 In this regard, I find that the methodology of the Holocaust studies can be illuminating in the pursuit of truth, with the
emphasis on the experience and testimony of individuals as a significant source of truth about the past, as opposed to
exclusive reliance on disembodied factual information to be assembled into a historical narration.
60 A district in Vilnius in which the TV tower is located.
61 These dichotomies stem from a metaphysical dualism between mind and body and they have a profound impact on
how we regard knowledge of the past (Johnson 2007). On an embodied account of knowledge, affective patterns of our
encounter and engagement with the environment become inseparable from knowledge and underlie the processes of
reason and thought.
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response, which confirms the pervasiveness of the vision-based metaphorical model of
cognition in our everyday metaphysics. In the way I frame the question, we LOOK AT the
past as distanced spectators, but at the same time our glance is not neutral. We LOOK AT
the past normatively, as if through a lens of values we hold to be important. Kapleris notes
that immediately after the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence a VACUUM
formed: Nobody, not even historians, knew how to evaluate the past.
R.K. There are often such narratives which match in terms of facts, but the evaluations are
very different. Are these differences a consequence of a certain kind of wrong, mistaken
interpretation or do they follow from the way in which we look at the past in terms of
values?
Of  course,  there  is  one  thing  how  we  look  at  the  past  in  terms  of  values  and  how  we
evaluate  certain periods,  certain events  of  ours.  […] A vacuum formed after  the recovery
of independence at our place [in Lithuania]. The historians were lost and we did not know
how to evaluate our history. The partisans were bandits in the Soviet period, then they
suddenly became heroes. Which path to choose and how to present this to a pupil? I can
give  a  concrete  example.  We  presented  that  the  armed  resistance  to  the  occupant  is  a
positive thing, but certainly there occurred, as we know, the murders of families. Pupils
have a personal experience having talked to the parents, grandparents, learning that there
were  also  negative  aspects,  but  these  negative  aspects  do  not  grow  over/hide  the
phenomenon itself – the armed resistance toward the occupants. And exactly in such places
we try to find a certain relation to the Soviet reality. Now many say: “It was better to live
in Russian times,” but we try to show, because children did not experience the Soviet
period, that it was after all not better. (P 2: 2:16)
The metaphor of a VACUUM implies  a  void,  a  space  devoid  of  matter,  an  emptiness,
absence, groundlessness. Before new interpretations and assessments emerged, there was a
temporary transitional period of emptiness, without a clear grounding effect of values,
evoking a feeling of being LOST. Values provide grounding and orientation for group
identity and as long as values were not elucidated historians and society were LOST. I find
that Kapleris’s metaphors of VACUUM and being LOST bear a relation to the metaphors of
FOUNDATIONS, ROOTS (Brazauskas) and the BOUNDLESS OCEAN of history (Litvinait?) in
terms of how they highlight the spatial organization of time and the position of the self in
relation  to  that  spatial  time.  Values  serve  as FOUNDATIONS and  as ROOTS which fasten a
person’s identity onto a firm ground, prevent him or her from getting LOST in  an  empty
void, from disappearing into nothingness, from perishing in the BOUNDLESS OCEAN.
Values establish a sense of self, persisting through time, and help cope with change. When
previously officially recognized values are abruptly dismantled, as in the aftermath of the
re-establishment of Lithuanian statehood, it creates a sense of groundlessness and the need
to reconsider what it means to be a Lithuanian. A necessity emerges to make sense of the
trajectory of lived experience in light of the most recent transformation of transaction
between self and environment. Values play a key role in this process of meaning-making
and self-understanding.
Choosing values also means choosing A PATH to follow. If  you convey certain values
in the textbook, you also guide pupils onto a particular PATH. A textbook is a GUIDE-POST
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along a journey of life and cognition. Whereas the metaphors of FOUNDATIONS and ROOTS
imply an association between values and fixation, stasis, or grounding, the metaphor of a
PATH implies dynamic movement. It brings to mind Tim Ingold’s metaphorical association
between a life and a line, along which it is lived:
Life on the spot surely cannot yield an experience of place, of being somewhere. To be a
place, every somewhere must lie on one or several paths of movement to and from places
elsewhere. Life is lived, I reasoned, along paths, not just in places, and paths are lines of a
sort. It is along paths, too, that people grow into a knowledge of the world around them,
and describe this world in the stories they tell. (Ingold 2007, 2)
Lives are lived along paths and so the choice of values does not have to indicate a static
attachment or fixed grounding. Values put you onto a path, but the path is that of growth
and movement: “It is rather a line that grows, issuing forth from its advancing tip rather
like a root or creeper probes the earth” (Ingold 2007, 118). There is a path dependency,
but it does not rigidly pre-determine where you will find yourself along the journey. The
past guides the movement, but the future is open for the process of life. In this
understanding, identity is always in the making: it does not exist as a thing-like substance,
in a fixed and final form. Identity is a verb (Ingold 2015).
The passage above (2:16) also demonstrates that Kapleris reinstates the importance of
the truth of the past as lived experience, but contests the weight or accuracy of certain
memories. As children who go to school today have not personally experienced what it
was like to live in the Soviet period, Kapleris fears that they might be influenced by those
who claim that it was better to live back then than in independent Lithuania. The goal of
his  textbook  is  therefore  to  convey  that  life  in  the  Soviet  regime  was  worse  than  life  in
contemporary Lithuania. Later in the interview, Kapleris also comments that, in this
regard, he is fully aware how textbook writing is not just a commercial activity, but also a
political activity (2:21). By authoring a textbook, Kapleris engages in “information
warfare” (2:21). A textbook is a RETORT to the Russian propaganda, which is widely
disseminated through different media channels (2:21). It is an instrument of “information
warfare,” where the war itself is characterized by Kapleris as a CARD GAME. Since the
other player is not playing by the rules, the reasoning goes, then Lithuania has to adjust
and react accordingly, otherwise it will lose the GAME (2:21).
Mälksoo (2015) characterizes this connection between public remembrance and state
security as “mnemonical security” – the idea that distinct understandings of the past
should be fixed in public remembrance and consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s
stable sense of self as the basis of its political agency” (222). Mälksoo (2015) argues that
securitization and legal juridification of historical memory by means of “memory laws”
only  lead  to  new  security  dilemmas  and  reinforce  historical  animosities.  The  use  of
metaphors, such as “information warfare,” organizes the conflict of historical narratives as
a mutually exclusive, zero-sum game, in which securitization of one narrative is
automatically assumed to negate the security of the other narrative. It enhances attachment
to a rigid, static conception of identity.
In relation to the memory of lived experience, Kapleris acknowledges that, despite the
official praise and “heroization” of the post-war guerilla war against the Soviet regime in
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contemporary Lithuania, some partisans executed brutal actions towards civilians. The
case of armed resistance to the Soviet regime serves as a good example to illustrate how
an embodied account of cognition may serve in handling plurality of evaluations. The
complexity of past reality requires that cognition proceeds in comprehensive terms and
gives emphasis to how individual lived experience(s) relate to larger-scale phenomena or
processes. Rather than having to select one viewpoint, from which to evaluate armed
resistance to the Soviet regime, teachers and pupils would need to comprehend past reality
as a complex system, with multiple diverse experiences interconnecting with each other
and with multiple layers of complexity at which the phenomenon can be examined.
Understanding a plurality of interpretations requires comprehensive thinking skills (being
able to relate parts to wholes, understanding relations and interconnections between them,
identifying different levels of complexity) as opposed to solely differentiative thinking
skills (reduction, specialized focus on isolated parts).
The way in which mimesis as difference, or the arbitrariness of the meaning of the
past, is further dismantled, when one engages the past as lived experience, is discussed in
the following excerpt. The meaning of certain events of the past is not arbitrary, especially
when it has to do with a painful and tragic past.
R.K. This textbook often speaks about objectivity, truth, falsification of facts, but don’t you
think that we should also direct the critical view towards ourselves in terms of how we
evaluate the past? How would you describe the truth?
You see, the objective truth does not exist. That’s one thing. […] You see, what confusion
we would cause. Imagine: a text in a textbook, in which we write in the end: “You know,
dear reader, dear pupils, that which is written here can be interpreted in different ways and
perhaps that which is written here in the textbook is not the truth.” We would cause a light
storm in his mind. So what then is the truth? If he raises some kind of philosophical
questions, he can do very well without the help of textbook authors. He can look critically
at the text and that’s great. But we cannot, let’s say… doubt certain things. About the 13th
of January or other painful moments of Lithuanian history and convey them as a row of
interpretations. Or the Holocaust. In our textbook everything is very well thought out and
given from a certain self-critical Lithuanian perspective. We have a completely new
treatment of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, compared to what there had been in the
previous textbook, purely according to the Šapokian version, that Pi?sudski is equal to
Hitler and Stalin. We presented this, we tried to smooth certain corners out. (P 2: 2:23)
Kapleris  is  in  agreement  with  both  Brazauskas  and  Litvinait? arguing  that PAINFUL past
cannot be interpreted in just any way one wishes to make sense of it. The experience of the
Holocaust or January the 13th, 1991, is too tragic to relativize it by arguing that it can be
emplotted  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  I  would  argue  that  the  limits  of  interpretation
derive from the concrete embodied experience of these events, which is not just a
fabricated internalized mental image, which is separate from the reality out there and,
therefore, treated as subjective, unreliable, and relative. Meaning-making which derives
from the body and which is lived in the flesh illuminates the limitations of the postmodern
and disembodied truth as difference. The meaning of the PAINFUL past  is  a  bodily-lived
meaning. The past, which is PAINFUL cannot be understood as an externalized,
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disembodied spatial terrain which has nothing to do with the cognizing self. The PAINFUL
past is part of the self as a process. Although pain can sometimes be seen as a purely
bodily phenomenon and, hence, as pre-linguistic and without any meaning, the fact that
we make sense of the past using the metaphor of pain shows that sensation and emotion,
percept and concept combine in the experience of pain. Pain is a physiological and an
emotional experience. Pain is permeated by meaning and pain can be shared: “Although
everyday-world language has trouble describing the lived experience encountered […], if
it is allowed to metaphorize pain, then it becomes adequate to the task” (Jackson 1994,
214; cf. Bourke 2014). Metaphor does not provide a description of pain, but rather permits
an embodied, affective, experiential understanding of what it feels like – as in, for
example, the metaphor of “seeing stars” to express a sharp, intense pain (Scarry 1985, 30).
Even if pain can obliterate everyday-language and present obstacles to communication in
non-metaphorical ways, pain always has meaning (Jackson 1994, 214).
A defensive, aggravated reaction elicited by contestation or denial of a group’s
PAINFUL past is exacerbated by a commonplace misconception that pain is an essentially
private, subjective experience and, as a result of these qualities, is not real. Defensive
behavior, seeking to acquire formal recognition of particular painful experience on the part
of the sufferer, is then a way of acquiring an intersubjective validation of one’s
experience. It is not a coincidence that Kapleris juxtaposes the January events in 1991 in
Lithuania with the experience of the Holocaust. He uses the Holocaust as a supporting
analogy to convey the normative idea that the painful experience of the January events
cannot be questioned or doubted.62
6.3.2.1 Textbook I: The changing GAZE at the past
Textbook I: Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Rytas Šalna, Ingrida
Šotlandait?-Juzefovi?ien?, Živil? Tamkutonyt?. Laikas. Istorijos vadov?lis 7 klasei, I dalis
[Time. History textbook for the 7th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2004.
The  7th  grade  history  course  focuses  on  ancient  history,  which  is  not  specifically  at  the
focus of my analysis. What interests me, rather, is the introductory chapter, which
describes what history is, what purposes history serves and how historians work.
62 It is as if painful experience lacks reality until it is formally recognized or seen. But as the interview with J?rat?
Litvinait? already revealed, the past, when it is immortalized as an abstracted substance and cemented into a pattern of
invariant reproduction, hoping it would strengthen the group identity, loses its relevance to pupils if it is not re-
interpreted in the face of changing, ongoing experience in the present. The paradoxical effect of rigid fixation of the
truth of the past endangers identity rather than strengthens it; it induces disaffection. At the same time, there remains a
concrete need to make sense of the past as lived experience and to provide a textbook narrative, which would be
inclusive to different (shifting) experiences and memories of the past, but would nevertheless set limits to hate speech
and historical negation. The decision about the limits of inclusiveness cannot be made on the basis of general rules or
standards; it requires that each case be assessed in its particular complexity.
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The very first thing, which the textbook mentions about historians’ interests, is that “it
is  very  important  for  history  specialists  to  lay  out  all  events  and  phenomena  in  a  row,
determine relations, links and follow the development” (6). The metaphors of this
statement reveal a linear conception of temporal change, where all events and phenomena
can  be  located  on  a  straight  line  of  time.  History  is  a ROW of  events.  The  relations  and
links between different events and phenomena can then be mapped in terms of linear
causality.
The textbook seeks to elucidate why history matters and what it can teach, echoing the
pedagogical concerns and aims of Litvinait?, who also stressed how important it is to
explain to pupils how they can benefit from learning history.
A glance/gaze at the past allows one to better comprehend our present. We can evaluate the
present-day life conditions only if we know why they have formed this way and not in
some  other  way.  If  we  want  to  explain  the  origin  of  current  conflicts  and  offer  ways  to
peacefully regulate them, we need to inquire into the causes of such disagreements, which
often hide in the past. By the way, we ourselves, our reasoning and behavior, language and
lifestyle are also an outcome of the long development of humanity. (7)
The first thing that bears attending in this passage is that historians’ efforts to understand
the past are achieved through a GLANCE/GAZE at the past. The Lithuanian word “žvilgsnis”
does not make a clear differentiation between a glance and a gaze. A gaze is more intense,
purposeful  and  inquiring  than  a  brief,  passing  glance.  Since  the  excerpt  describes  an
active, investigative attitude towards the past, I am inclined to interpret the metaphor as
GAZING at the past. What this ocularcentric metaphor implies is that the past is distanced
from the self of the spectator.
On the other hand, the textbook also emphasizes connections between the past and the
present: how the present is shaped by the past and how human beings themselves are an
outcome  of  a  long  process  of  development  that  unraveled  in  the  past.  This  immediately
brings the past closer to the cognizing self and its ways of life. It renders the past present
in a person’s ways of thinking, behaving, and living. The past, then, is not distinctly
separate from the present; it carries on and persists in the present. A tension emerges
between  these  two  different  ways  of  seeing  the  past  in  the  textbook  explanation,  which
distances the past from the cognizing self and, at the same time, weaves the past into the
fabric of the present.
Another instance of how the textbook contests an ocularcentric, spatial, mimetic
understanding of historical knowledge appears in the following passage. Historical
knowledge is compared in a simile to a HUMAN BEING who GETS OLD as time FLOWS. As
the process of life proceeds, knowledge is continuously reshaped. New aspects and layers
of the past become relevant. The same way a human being keeps changing in the process
of  life  and  cognition,  so,  too,  what  is  considered  as  valuable  knowledge  of  the  past
changes. Knowledge emerges out of the process of human development.
The textbook provides a concrete example of how historical knowledge is changing
over time by highlighting that, in the past, the discipline of history mainly focused on
political and military history, or the deeds of “great men,” whereas today historians, it is
underlined, also “see” the history of children, women, and the daily life. The latter aspects
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of the past, however, appear as somewhat secondary or auxiliary to the political and
military history of men: women, children, and the daily life are said to have existed and
lived NEXT TO the important historical events. Heroic deeds are still regarded as the most
important; only now they are supplemented with the “other side” of history.
The textbook encourages pupils to direct a critical gaze at the historically changing
conception of what constitutes important historical knowledge and shifting forms of
pedagogy. Whereas previously the standard learning approach was to HAMMER the dates
of battles or years of rule of kings and emperors, today this kind of knowledge is not
valued as much. Textbook mentions that “if you glanced at a history textbook of your
parents or even an older one, you would be convinced that history was taught differently
earlier” (7). Below the main text, an illustration shows three different history textbooks,
which were and are used in Lithuanian schools from the years 1923, 1972, and 2004,
respectively. Pupils are given a task to talk to their family members and ask them about
how they were taught history.
Historians’ efforts are compared to DETECTIVE work  in  a  simile:  “archaeologists  and
historians like detectives search for footprints of the past, examine, assess them and make
conclusions on the basis of accumulated evidence” (8). The past itself is gone, but it leaves
FOOTPRINTS or trails which historians seek to understand and make sense of. It implies that
the past is gone and what is left is its traces. The passages below specify how exactly
historians pursue their detective work.
Historical sources are needed for a historical investigation of varying scope. Without them,
there would simply be nothing to refer to/“lean on” (a Lithuanian metaphor – R.K.] or
what to investigate. However, the content of sources is often not comprehensive, hard to
understand or even enigmatic. […] Sometimes texts are written with an aim to deceive
other  people,  but  readers  are  not  aware  of  this.  Hence  it  is  important  for  a  historian  to
detect  not  only  the  date  of  the  source,  but  also  to  find  out  whether  their  content  is
convincing. Historians call this kind of work source criticism. (9)
Historical work is said to be unimaginable without historical sources and source criticism.
In Lithuanian, a historian LEANS ON the sources when she refers to them. Sources provide
solid ground to hold onto, to lean on; they serve as a foundation or a basis for further work
and interpretation. Source criticism is followed by comparative analysis of sources seeking
to determine what happened. When the information is lacking from historical sources,
historians-scientists request the help of other related fields, like ethnography or
archaeology. Emphasis is given to primarily textual sources.
Often historians write differently about the same events: Some explain in one way, others –
in another  way.  Everyone can have their  own opinion in a  free society,  which they try to
prove. Such different explanations are called “interpretations.” Scientists discuss debatable
issues in conferences, seminars, or write about them in the scientific press.
In this textbook, there, too, are issues, which historians evaluate differently. Thus one
needs to learn in history lessons not only why, what, when and where something happened.
It is especially important to raise questions, think critically about whether certain historical
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events are explained convincingly, what consequences they had for the next generations,
what their meaning is to us. (9)
Crucially, the textbook points out that historians interpret the past in different ways.
Historians  have  a  right  to  stand  by  their  own  opinion  just  like  everyone  else  in  a  free
society.
The  textbook  shows  a  perceivable  critical  attempt  to  move  away  from  a  form  of
pedagogical instruction, exclusively focused on “factology,” rote memorization of factual
details, and the political history of “great men.” Despite this, certain epistemological and
ethical tensions, which will show markedly in the textbooks for more advanced grades, is
already apparent here in this early introductory chapter of the 7th grade textbook. One of
these tensions has to do with contradictory ways of seeing the past. The metaphors which
are employed in the text either distance the past from the spectator or permit the knower to
engage with the past, to recognize how the past is present. The metaphors conceptualize
the past either as spatially organized, linear, and sequentially segmented change, or as a
complex process of life, which weaves into the present.
6.3.3 Ignas Kapleris: SMOOTHING OVER sharp CORNERS?
Kapleris argued that his textbooks adopt a self-critical attitude towards the past, especially
in relation to the treatment of the Polish-Lithuanian shared history. He sought to SMOOTH
OVER sharp CORNERS and  re-assess  the  role  of  Poland  in  Lithuanian  history.  Countering
the patriotic historiographical narrative of Šapoka means that he needed to re-evaluate the
person of Pi?sudski and question the widespread belief that the meaning of Pi?sudski’s
actions is tantamount to that of Hitler’s or Stalin’s actions. In the interview, I sought to get
insight into what motivated Kapleris to present the 1920 Polish-Lithuanian conflict over
the  city  of  Vilnius  in  a  particular  way.  One  noticeable  feature  of  the  textbook
representation  of  this  conflict  was  that  the  Polish  Chief  of  State  Józef  Pi?sudski  was
explicitly identified as a Polish-speaking Lithuanian nobleman rather than a Pole. In other
words, he was identified as a member of the Lithuanian nation, who, however, envisioned
the future of Lithuania in a different manner and who eventually became a leader of the
independent Polish state. Moreover, one of the exercises in the section of the 10th grade
textbook “Laikas” points out that Pi?sudski is assessed differently in Poland and in
Lithuania and further asks students to speak to their family members about how they
perceive Pi?sudski. When I asked Kapleris what the intention or the didactic aim of this
exercise was, he offered the following explanation:
So that they develop their critical thinking, that for Poles Pi?sudski is of one kind and for
Lithuanians – of another kind. […] On the other hand, in the concrete case of Jogaila, by
means  of  this  question  we  wanted  to  force  them  to  reflect,  because  in  the  Šapoka’s
paradigm  Jogaila  was  a  bad  guy,  black,  and  now  we  see  that  he  brought  Christianity  to
Lithuania, brought the European civilization, and so we want by means of this question
that children would reflect a little, on the change of the image, that they would assess his
role in Lithuanian history more pragmatically. One thing with such questions is that the
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children of Eastern Lithuania learn from our textbooks, too. For them, Pi?sudski if one kind
and in Samogitia he is of another kind. But in principle we want to tell children that he was
not Hitler, nor Stalin, that he is of our own kind, only that he had imagined a different kind
of Lithuania. We wrote about this in the 9th grade that he held himself to be a Lithuanian,
but  in  a  different  sense  than  it  is  understood  now,  not  as  a  speaker  of  the  Lithuanian
language, but as a Lithuanian in a civic sense. (P 2: 2:36)
His approach to the Polish-Lithuanian history is a concrete manifestation of the influence
of the historiography of Bumblauskas. The aim becomes to rehabilitate the role of Jogaila
and Pi?sudski in Lithuanian history and to replace the historiographical paradigm of
Šapoka with the paradigm of Bumblauskas. The effort to reconceive the person of
Pi?sudski as not equal to Hitler or Stalin, but as a Polish-speaking Lithuanian who had a
different  vision  for  Lithuanian  statehood  is  perhaps  the  first  step  in  the  paradigmatic
change of the prevalent narrative. However, it does not in itself guarantee that the
narrative is engaged with the lived experience of Pi?sudski.
However, in the context of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict, I pointed out that
the  same textbook failed  to  mention  certain  aspects  of  the  conflict  that  may change  how
the conflict is perceived by the textbook readers. Namely, I mentioned a secret appendix to
the 1920 Lithuanian-Soviet Russian treaty, which permitted Soviet Russian troops to
freely move across the Lithuanian territory in the simultaneously ongoing Soviet Russian-
Polish war. I found it odd that the textbook failed to mention this secret protocol, since the
historian Bumblauskas, to whom Kapleris refers as the main historiographical influence,
typically puts forward the significance of the protocol in the context of the Polish-
Lithuanian conflict and presents it as a shameful act on the part of Lithuania. In response,
Kapleris proposes his own understanding of the situation.
R.K. I wanted to ask, in the context of this conflict, about the 1920 Lithuanian-Soviet
Russian treaty. The textbook does not mention the secret protocol by which Lithuania
permitted Russia to use its territory during the Polish-Soviet Russian war. This is pointed
out by some historians, including Bumblauskas, as a shameful thing, as something for
which we should be feeling shame in this conflict.
Well, you see, again…Now imagine, […] who ignited this whole conflict? Was it so that
the Lithuanians got together with Russia from the beginning and then signed this secret
protocol? Or was it after all that something had happened already before that? How would
you act if a neighbor came and told: “You know, this is your plot of land, but I think that it
should belong to me.” You would resist him in an armed way, fighting would occur, but
you would see that the forces of the neighbor are much stronger. He is much physically
stronger than you. Nearby there would be one more neighbor, who would say: “Well, you
know,  allow  me  to  walk  through  your  plot  of  land  –  I  will  help  you  to  deal  with  that
neighbor.”  […] You see,  it  is  not  black and white  in  history.  Never  have been and never
will be. (P 2: 2:38)
Poland, Lithuania, and Soviet Russia are metaphorically re-imagined and personified as
NEIGHBORS who  have  a  disagreement  about  the  ownership  of  a  plot  of  land.  This  is  a
recurrent feature in textbook explanations, which I have also identified in the textbook
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authored by J?rat? Litvinait? (Section 6.2.3). Personification of countries shows that
affective, experiential factors shape historical understanding and reasoning. The
narrator/author  makes  sense  of  the  past  –  who  is  guilty  and  who  is  a  victim  –  by
metaphorizing countries as human beings and, specifically in this case, as NEIGHBORS.
Lithuania is a victim because it was a weaker NEIGHBOR and  because  it  did  not  start  the
conflict – Poland did. Soviet Russia is, on the other hand, a NEIGHBOR who observes the
conflict and uses it to his advantage by offering help to Lithuania in exchange for the right
to walk across its PLOT OF LAND, or national territory. The assumption behind this
metaphorical explanation is that countries and their societies are undivided units: Their
individual members are unanimous in their perceptions and judgments. The region of
Vilnius is defined as a PLOT OF LAND, which frames the conflict as being about property of
a territory rather than, for example, about the people who lived on this PLOT OF LAND, their
wishes, experiences and concerns. By emphasizing that history is never BLACK AND WHITE,
that past events cannot be assessed in terms of straightforward value judgments, Kapleris
acknowledges the complexity of the past, yet his own metaphorical explanation seems to
lack nuanced complexity.
In reaction to Kapleris’s comment, I restated my view that I believe that the choice of
whether or not to insert or to omit the fact of the secret protocol of the Lithuanian-Soviet
Russian treaty changes the meaning of the narrative and that it may affect what conclusion
pupils may arrive at after having read the passage, to which Kapleris responded:
You  see,  and  what  conclusion  will  the  student  draw,  if  we  insert  a  sentence  in  the  10th
grade textbook saying that the Lithuanians, while negotiating with the Soviets, adopted a
protocol,  kept  in  secret  from the Poles,  which permitted the Red Army to march through
the Lithuanian territory? It still does not change the essence in the presentation of the topic,
where one needs to talk to a tenth-grader about it in accessible, clear... In academic circles
– great. That should be written. In an academic book, where that questions is analyzed. But
we are talking about entirely different things. I know what you want to say: that often in
Lithuanian textbooks it has been written about this in a biased way, that Poles are bad,
Poles  are  bad,  while  Lithuanians  did  not  assume  certain  faults  of  their  own.  In  our
textbooks it is written about the Polish schools in Lithuania and the like. It is written, but
nevertheless, well, it was not Lithuania which ignited this conflict. It was not Lithuania
which came carrying weapons and so on. (P 2: 2:38)
His  insistence  on  the  fact  that  it  was  not  Lithuania  which  started  the  conflict  and CAME
CARRYING WEAPONS reveals that he puts the blame for the conflict on Poland. He draws a
straightforward dichotomous conclusion about WHO is the perpetrator and WHO is a victim.
In other words, whatever mistakes Lithuania had done in the conflict, such as signing the
secret appendix to the treaty with Soviet Russia, it was, according to him, inevitable under
the difficult circumstances in which Lithuania found itself and it did not justify the actions
of Poland at the time. He adds later that “it seems that small nations have to take the
blame, but the large ones never want to take it” (2:40).
In Poland, on the other hand, he points out, the Polish-Lithuanian conflict is taught in
schools by “giving an ethnic 19th-century map of Lithuania, which indicates that Poles
were living all the way up to Samogitia and that there are no Lithuanians living at all here.
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It is happening in Poland. Should we then beat our chest and say that yes, we are guilty?”
(2:39) The attitude of Kapleris was markedly defensive and annoyed about the injustice
done by Poland as well as about how modern Lithuanian history is being taught in Poland.
It was undoubtedly provoked in part by my own insistence on the topic and his perception
of my views as overly critical and pro-Polish. It was also clear that he felt it was unfair to
demand from Lithuanians that they would feel apologetic or adopt a very self-critical
attitude, when it was clearly not Lithuania, which stirred up the conflict in the first place.
If we reflect on the reasoning of Kapleris, we can see once again how cognition and
reason are not separate from emotion and values. Historical reasoning is shaped by
feelings of victimization, unfairness, and injustice. These feelings are present in the
reasoning even if they may be hidden under the externally neutral language of evidence
and logical justification. I would even raise the question whether the complexity of the
past can really be faced unless we openly acknowledge these underlying feelings that
influence the explanations of the past. Identification of history with a neutral, objective,
logical,  purely  rational  and  evidence-based  discourse  on  the  past,  however,  constitutes  a
real challenge to coming to terms with the emotional, affective aspect of making sense of
the past and cognition, more generally.
6.3.3.1 Textbook VI: NEIGHBORS fighting over a PLOT OF LAND
Textbook VI: Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevi?ius, Andželika Laužikien?,
Živil? Tamkutonyt?-Mikailien?. Laikas, Istorijos vadov?lis 10 klasei, I dalis [Time. History
textbook for the 10th grade, Part 1]. Vilnius, LT: Briedis, 2007.
The 10th grade history textbook tackles the 20th century history, in which the main
controversial event in the shared Polish-Lithuanian history is the interwar conflict between
Poland and Lithuania over the city of Vilnius and its surrounding region in Eastern
Lithuania.  In  the  interview  with  Ignas  Kapleris,  the  discussion  of  the  interwar  conflict
seemed to provoke strong metaphorical associations and feelings about the process,
outcomes, and interpretations of the conflict, despite the overall attempt to SMOOTH OVER
THE CORNERS and avoid an overly negative evaluation of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past
(Section 6.3.2). Poland, Lithuania, and Soviet Russia were metaphorically personified as
NEIGHBORS, who have a disagreement about the ownership of a PLOT OF LAND. Lithuania
appeared to be a victim, because it was a weaker NEIGHBOR and because it did not start the
conflict – Poland did.
The Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict over Eastern Lithuania is described in the
textbook within the context of Poland’s refusal to recognize the right of the Lithuanians,
Belarusians, and Ukrainians to have their own states as well as Poland’s exclusive claims
to the heritage of the Commonwealth (48). Whereas the Lithuanians sought to establish
their own national state, the Poles are said to believe that they were the sole inheritors of
the  Commonwealth  tradition  (48).  Two  Polish  visions  of  the  future  of  Lithuania  are
mentioned: the aim of the National Democrats to annex Lithuania to “Greater Poland” and
the  aim  of  Pi?sudski  to  create  a  federation  led  by  Poland  on  the  basis  of  the  former
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Commonwealth. The textbook quotes Pi?sudski as stating, “Lithuania must be joined to
Poland in accordance with the historical community, religious tradition, and remembrance
of the union” (48). Against this background, it is claimed that “Lithuanians understood
that any kind of merger with Poland would be disastrous. Due to Polonization, the
extinction of the state was impending” (48).
The Polish army first entered Vilnius in 1919, after having expelled the Red Army
troops from the city during the simultaneously ongoing Soviet-Polish war (1919–1921).
Upon entering the city, Pi?sudski declared a bilingual proclamation “To the Inhabitants of
the Former Grand Duchy of Lithuania,” which promised to “create an opportunity for
settling your nationality problems and religious affairs in a manner that you yourself will
determine, without any kind of force or pressure from Poland” (48–49). The proclamation
is evaluated in the textbook as ambiguous because it invited the Lithuanians to refuse the
idea of an independent state. Sharply criticized by the Lithuanian (and Polish) nationalists,
the proclamation did not achieve its aims. The Western European members of Entente
interfered, in order to halt the military clashes of the Lithuanian and Polish armies, setting
a demarcation line between the two countries with Vilnius being assigned to Lithuania.
The  commentary  of  the  textbook  is  that  Poland  “declared  that  it  only  had  territorial
disputes with Lithuania, but was not adverse to its independence. However, it continued to
refuse to recognize Lithuania as an independent state and secretly planned to annex it. J.
Pi?sudski decided to organize a coup d’état in Kaunas, seize power and annex Lithuania to
Poland” (49). The textbook provides a brief description of the failed coup d’état attempt in
the city of Kaunas, where the Lithuanian government took up its residence at the time.
According to the textbook, after the failed coup it became a firmly established opinion that
Poland was its biggest enemy regarding independence (49).
In July 1920, Vilnius again fell into the hands of the Red Army marching westwards in
the ongoing Soviet-Polish war. Since the Polish army crushed the Soviet troops in the
Battle  of  Warsaw,  Soviet  Russia  assigned  Vilnius  to  Lithuanian  control.  The  textbook
acknowledges the merit of Pi?sudski for winning the war against Soviet Russia and, as a
result, contributing to the rescue of Lithuania from impending sovietization already in
1920 (49).
The Polish-Lithuanian conflict, however, continued as the Polish army again is said to
“intrude into our country” (49). The League of Nations interfered in the conflict, halted the
warfare, and forced Poland and Lithuania to sign a peace treaty in Suwa?ki in October
1920. The Suwa?ki peace treaty is usually highlighted in the Lithuanian accounts of the
conflict,  because,  according  to  it,  Vilnius  was  supposed  to  remain  in  the  territory  of
Lithuania. Poland signed the treaty, but, as the textbook explains, “Pi?sudski was a
hypocrite; he knew he would break the agreement” (49).
The textbook goes on to explain the actions of Pi?sudski as hypocritical. The day after
signing the peace treaty, a part of the Polish army declared themselves mutineers and
marched to Vilnius led by General Lucjan ?eligowski. Since Pi?sudski “foresaw that an
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international scandal would arise, he sought to pretend that Vilnius was taken back by
local residents” (50).63
The parliamentary elections of Middle Lithuania are also introduced as a hypocrisy of
the Polish government (52). As diplomatic negotiations between Poland and Lithuania
over  the  status  of  the  Vilnius  region  faltered,  the  parliament  of  Middle  Lithuania  had  to
decide to which country Middle Lithuania should belong. The textbook insists that free,
democratic elections were impossible with the presence of ?eligowski’s troops in the
country,  which  is  why  the  majority  of  Lithuanians,  Belarusians,  and  Jews  boycotted  the
1922 elections (52). It is explained that “the elected Polish deputies spoke in the name of
all  residents of Eastern Lithuania without any authorization and declared that the Vilnius
region was being annexed to Poland” (52). Lithuania protested, but “Western countries
made concessions to the more powerful Poland. The Vilnius region fell under the Polish
state for the first time in history” (52).
What is important in the portrayal of the conflict is that the textbook shows how, after
having had seized Vilnius, ?eligowski’s army did not halt its march and continued to
advance to Kaunas. The Lithuanian army, however, stopped their advance. This
contributes to the overall negative portrayal of Poland in the conflict.
An interesting source is provided in an excerpt from Pi?sudski’s and ?eligowski’s
conversation as described in ?eligowski’s memoirs, wherein Pi?sudski said that “if we
don’t  rescue Vilnius now, then history won’t  forgive us for it.  Even more so,  we have to
fight in order to restore the historical Lithuania. Only the people themselves, with the help
of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Division, can do it. We must organize an uprising” (50). No
questions accompany this source, but it stands as an important text, in that it allows pupils
to  come  closer  to  the  reasoning  and  motivations  of  Pi?sudski,  as  it  was  lived.  It  reveals
how Pi?sudski actually understood the military operation for the takeover of Vilnius as a
rescue mission, as a way to salvage Vilnius by annexing it to Poland. It contrasts with the
presentation  of  the  main  text,  which  only  refers  to  Pi?sudski  as  a  hypocrite  who ignored
the wishes of the Lithuanians and who singlehandedly forced the idea of the federative
union onto Lithuania.
On the other hand, Józef Pi?sudski is portrayed by clearly stating that he “originated
from Lithuania” and by pointing out, by means of an additional source, that he was able to
speak Lithuanian (48).  The same goes for ?eligowski who is said to have originated from
the Vilnius region. However, it is also stated that “L. ?eligowski, who originated from the
Vilnius region, thought that he was implementing the will of the region’s people,
although, as a matter of fact, he represented only the Polish-speaking residents of Vilnius.
The majority of the local Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Jews did not support the march of
the general” (49).
63 This is one of the key disagreements between the Polish and Lithuanian accounts of the interwar conflict. The
Lithuanian account typically emphasizes that Vilnius was seized primarily by the Polish army with only a small share of
?eligowski’s troops coming from the local Vilnius region. The Polish narrative, by contrast, highlights that ?eligowski’s
troops mainly consisted of the local residents. After the takeover of the city, the so-called “Middle Lithuania” was
established in Eastern Lithuania, which the textbook clearly identifies as a marionette state, dependent on Poland.
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Pupils are also asked to look for information on how Pi?sudski is perceived in
Lithuania and in Poland (50). This could potentially provoke discussions on why there
exist such stark differences in evaluation. Pupils are likewise asked to consider and
suggest what could have been done in order to avoid the military conflict of Poland and
Lithuania (50).
The 10th-grade textbook “Laikas” not only provides information on the military and
political aspects of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius, but also includes
a separate chapter, titled “Vilnius – the drama of Lithuania,” which is exclusively
dedicated to discussing the conflict and the ensuing diplomatic war between Poland and
Lithuania. The first thing that stands out while reading this chapter is that already in the
very beginning, in a subtitle, it poses the question “Whose is Vilnius?” (51). The
paragraph dealing with this straightforward question opens up by mentioning the long-
standing multicultural and multinational heritage of Vilnius. It makes mention of the fact
that in the early 20th century the city was predominantly populated by Jews, Poles or
Polonized  Lithuanians,  a  few  Belarusians,  and  Russians,  whereas  the  entire  region  of
Eastern Lithuania is said to have been also affected by strong tendencies of Slavicization
of mostly Belarusian and, less rarely, those of Polish origin. However, immediately after
having stated these facts about the multicultural and multilingual situation of the larger
Vilnius  region,  the  textbook  continues  to  lay  out  a  determined  position  that,  in  terms  of
historical and legal points of view, Vilnius entirely pertains to Lithuania:
Vilnius  has  been  a  multinational  and  multicultural  city,  the  hearth  of  tolerance  for
centuries. In the beginning of the 20th century, in Vilnius there lived mostly Jews, Poles or
Polonized Lithuanians, fewer Belarusians and Russians. The Lithuanians made up the
minority. […] But only for the Lithuanians Vilnius was a historical capital. When the
national revival commenced, the Lithuanianness returned to the city. […] Vilnius was a
part of the Lithuanian national consciousness. The reestablishment of the Lithuanian state
was unimaginable without it.
Until the 20th century, the attachment of Vilnius to Lithuania raised no doubts for anyone.
Changes followed after World War I. Poland, which had never owned/had Vilnius,
declared its  claims on the city.  Neither  in  Vilnius,  nor  in  Eastern Lithuania did the Poles
comprise the majority. Poland also did not have any well-grounded legal or historical
justifications to tear Vilnius away from Lithuania. It was argued that the Vilnius region
belonged to Poland because of the supposedly dominant Polish language in this territory.
But in accordance with international law, the language of the residents of a territory was
not  and  is  not  a  legitimate  basis  for  resolving  territorial  disputes.  In  the  conflict  over
Vilnius, Lithuanians were the weaker, though legally and historically, the legitimate party.
(51)
What is striking about this excerpt, first, is that it exposes a high degree of certainty in the
form of assertion or denial. Hence, it is “only” for the Lithuanians that Vilnius was a
historical capital. The reestablishment of the Lithuanian state was “unimaginable” without
Vilnius. Poland “never” owned Vilnius. The belonging of Vilnius to Lithuania did not
raise doubts “for anyone.” The language of the residents “was not and is not” a basis for
the resolution of territorial disputes. Moreover, the passage employs justifications from
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international law to make its point even more authoritatively, using the sanctioning power
of the legal argument.
The only instance of uncertainty in this passage is the word “supposedly,” but it is used
only to diminish the claim of the opposing – Polish – perspective that appears in the text.
It  is  supposed  to  instill  doubts  as  to  the  truthfulness  of  the  Polish  claims  about  the
dominance  of  the  Polish  language  in  the  region.  The  level  of  assertiveness  reveals  how
historical reasoning is shaped by feelings of victimization, unfairness, injustice, anger, and
hurt. These feelings are present in the reasoning, even if they may be hidden under the
externally neutral language of evidence and logical justification.
The passage further engages the sense of unfairness done to the Lithuanians by using
the metaphorical expression of “TEARING AWAY” in order to convey that Poland tore
Vilnius away by force, unjustifiably. The metaphorical personification of Poland and
Lithuania  as  two  neighbors  of  unequal  power,  who  have  a  disagreement  over  a  plot  of
land, as invoked by Kapleris in the interview, provides insight into the potential reasons
for assertiveness and a sense of injustice which emanates from the textbook. With Poland
unquestionably standing out as a unilateral perpetrator and Lithuania as a victim of
injustice, these clearly defined labels convey a rather BLACK AND WHITE sense  of  the
conflict.
The textbook takes note of the repression perpetrated against Lithuanian associations,
schools, and the press in the Vilnius region after the annexation, but also acknowledges
that the Lithuanian government adopted similar actions towards the Polish minority of
Lithuania (53). It is also stated that one hundred thousand “Polish colonists” came from
Poland to the Vilnius region as part of the measures undertaken by the Polish government
after the annexation to prove that there were no Lithuanians living in the region, only
Poles who had lived there for centuries (53).
During the interwar period, the loss of Vilnius is said to have been strongly mourned,
causing  strong  anti-Polish  sentiments  (53).  The  textbook stresses  that  the  loss  of  Vilnius
united the nation, strengthened the idea of statehood, and encouraged patriotism (53).
The  evaluation  of  the  conflict  and  the  way  in  which  it  affected  the  relations  of  two
historically close nations presents the events as a regrettable incident, which sowed hatred
and fear among Poles and Lithuanians. “Even more painful lessons were needed in order
for friendship to be restored,” according to the textbook (53). The chapter finishes with a
remark explaining that today Poland acknowledges that the decision of Pi?sudski to take
over Vilnius was a historical mistake. The Polish historian Piotr ?ossowski is quoted to
have said that
?eligowski’s action was implemented at the time when, as can be seen from many facts, a
willingness emerged in Lithuania to seek an understanding with the Poles, to make
concessions out of good will, so that Vilnius would remain the capital of an independent
Lithuania. It could very reasonably be said that it was exactly then that the possibilities to
regulate the Polish-Lithuanian question opened up. But the leaders of Poland at the time
did not show even the slightest good will. (53)
However, it is not obvious that there is a unanimous position among Polish historians on
the “Questions of Vilnius.” Whereas pupils are asked to discuss why the takeover of
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Vilnius is today understood as a historical mistake of Poland (53), the questions remain as
to what extent ?ossowski’s stance is representative of Polish historiography in general.
In the overall context of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, the interwar conflict stood
out as the most value-laden, emotionally charged presentation of events in the textbook
series “Laikas.”  The fact that I conducted an interview with Kapleris and was able to
identify metaphors, which manifested in his discussion of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian
conflict, enabled me to recognize the affective, emotional aspects of the historical
narration. The metaphor of two neighbors fighting over the ownership of a plot of land,
which informs Kapleris’s understanding of the conflict, serves as a model to make sense
of and evaluate the conflict. A deep sense of injustice and victimization can be perceived
in the way the conflict is introduced. Instead of encouraging engagement with the
complexity of the conflict, the metaphorization of Poland and Lithuania as NEIGHBORS
place the two countries under unambiguous categories of victim and perpetrator.
It  matters  what  metaphors  we  use  to  think  about  the  past.  In  this  particular  case,  the
metaphor of NEIGHBORS guides one into conceiving Poland and Lithuania as two unitary,
single-minded actors; it sidelines internal diversity and the complexity of views and
opinions. Moreover, since the focus of the metaphor is on the plot of land, or Vilnius and
its surrounding region, it creates an impression that the conflict was purely territorial, that
it could have been resolved as a territorial dispute. The logical reasoning, shaped by the
metaphor, implies that Lithuania had all rights to Vilnius because, territorially, the city of
Vilnius has always been the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; it has always been
within the territory of Lithuania. Metaphor is implicit in the very fabric of reasoning and
justification. However, the metaphor of the plot of land overshadows the complex and
diverse identities of the people who lived in this territory. It obfuscates the ways in which
the local inhabitants perceived and experienced the annexation of the Vilnius region to
Poland.  The  metaphor  enacts  a  separation  between  the  human  inhabitants  and  the
territorial space, between lived, personal space and territorial, externalized space.
The Polish narrative of the conflict, as will be seen in the discussion of the Polish
textbooks, puts much more emphasis on the people who inhabited the territory and
downplays the territorial factor.  Yet,  even  with  this  emphasis  on  the people, the Polish
narrative tends to overlook the non-Polish residents of the Vilnius region, their experience,
and the impact of the long-term process of Polish-Lithuanian relations on the conflict. In
other words, Polish textbook narratives similarly fail to combine a pattern with its process
in their explanations and show the complexity of the conflict. On the other hand, the
Lithuanian narrative acknowledges the multicultural make-up of the region, but
foregrounds the territorial idea of Vilnius as Lithuania’s historical capital. This disparity
is the crux of historical hostility between Poland and Lithuania over the ownership of
Vilnius. The differences in metaphorical models had an impact on mutual
incomprehension, leaving the conflict at a deadlock. The two sides could not come to an
agreement, because they approached the issue in terms of different metaphorical models
framing their reasoning. Poland and Lithuania remained in an official state of war until
1938.
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6.3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, several points need to be highlighted. Firstly, the conception of the
textbook series “Laikas” is informed by an effort to implement a paradigmatic change of
historiographical narratives, to replace the older patriotic narrative of Šapoka with the
more recent narrative of Bumblauskas/Gudavi?ius. In this regard, the educational
background of Ignas Kapleris manifests in the textbook contents. This demonstrates that
the discipline of history and the work of professional historians have an influence on the
textbook contents, the narratives and value orientations presented in them. Professional
history and school-history education are not mutually exclusive fields. Rather,
professional, disciplinary history plays a crucial role in shaping how pupils come to learn
about the past, make sense of it, and assess it. Secondly, there were several indications in
the  interview,  which  revealed  that  metatheoretical  assumptions  of  Kapleris  lean  towards
an embodied understanding of what the past and history are. Historical knowledge should
not be understood, according to him, separately from the life lived because history is a
story of a human being. The truth as lived experience plays an important role in the
pedagogical approach adopted in the textbooks, especially when it is related to the tragic
events in modern Lithuanian history. The meaning of a PAINFUL, tragic past is not
arbitrary since it bears its presence in the bodily experience. Even though he admits that
there is no objective truth, the meaning of a tragic past is not relative or random. Thirdly,
textbooks should function as a clear GUIDE-POST, according to Kapleris, which provide
indications to pupils which PATH to choose, which values and narratives to follow. A
textbook is a signpost which guides pupils, provides orientation, directs them onto a
certain course. The metaphor of PATH implies dynamic movement along the PATH rather
than a fixed, static attachment to a place. It implies movement from one place to another in
the process of life, cognition, and meaning-making. Identity is lived in movement rather
than limited to a concrete spatially circumscribed place.
Even though the textbook series is said to seek to shift away from the political and
military  history  of  the  “great  men”  and  their  heroic  deeds,  it  remains  a  challenging  task.
State treaties, unions, wars, and other political developments dominate the main focus of
the narrative, whereas culture, daily life, and mentality are at best a secondary supplement
to the main plot. Simultaneously, I think that the political and military history could also
be introduced by paying attention to how these events were experienced and lived not just
by the gentry, but also by the peasants or burghers. Pupils could familiarize themselves
not just with depersonalized facts about the functioning of state institutions, but learn
something about how these institutions were experienced by different groups of people.
There are some references to and excerpts from the sources inserted into the textbook,
which address exactly these issues, but they do not amount to a coherent and systematic
approach.
Finally,  the  analysis  revealed  that  affective,  emotional  factors  shape  the  historical
reasoning of Kapleris that are manifest in the metaphors he employs to convey meaning.
In particular, the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict (NEIGHBORS FIGHTING OVER A PLOT
OF LAND) seemed to provoke strong metaphorical associations and intense feelings about
the  process,  outcomes,  and  interpretations  of  the  conflict.  This  was  the  case  despite  the
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overall attempt to SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS and avoid an overly negative evaluation of
the shared Polish-Lithuanian past.
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interviewed Tamošaitis in January 2014 at Vilnius Simonas Daukantas gymnasium, where
he works as a history teacher.
Deimantas Karvelis is a history teacher and an adjunct professor at the Department of
Lithuanian history of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. In 2009, he
defended his PhD, completed externally in Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. He
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 Textbook I. Nerija Kostinien?, Marius Š?avinskas, Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos
vadov?lis 7 klasei I dalis. Serija ”Raktas” [History textbook for the 7th grade, Part 1.
Series “Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2011.
 Textbook II. Stasys Lukšys, Marius Š?avinskas, Manvydas Vitk?nas. Istorijos
vadov?lis 8 klasei, I dalis. Serija “Raktas.” [History textbook for the 8th grade, Part 1.
Series “Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2010.
 Textbook III. Deimantas Karvelis, Nelija Kostinien?, Stasys Lukšys. Istorijos
vadov?lis 8 klasei, II dalis. Serija “Raktas.” [History textbook for the 8th grade, Part 2.
Series “Key”].  Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2010.
 Textbook IV. Rasa Butvilait?, Deimantas Karvelis, Nelija Kostinien?, Stasys Lukšys,
Saulius Pivoras, Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos vadov?lis 9 klasei, I dalis. Serija
“Raktas.” [History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 1. Series “Key”]. Vilnius, LT:
Baltos lankos, 2010, 2012.
 Textbook V. Stasys Lukšys, Saulius Pivoras, Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos vadov?lis
9 klasei II dalis, Serija “Raktas.” [History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 2. Series
“Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2010, 2012.
 Textbook VI. Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos vadov?lis 10 klasei I dalis. Serija
“Raktas.”  [History  textbook  for  the  10th  grade,  Part  1.  Series  “Key”].   Vilnius,  LT:
Baltos lankos, 2011.
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6.4.1 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Academic history vs. school history
Several times throughout the interview, Mindaugas Tamošaitis juxtaposed academic
history and school history as two separate fields guided by different aims, approaches, and
needs. He expressed criticism with regard to school textbook texts written by scholars
from Vilnius University as too academic and often not suited to practical pedagogical
needs (5:4). Reaffirming the opposition between Vilnius University and the Lithuanian
University of Educational Sciences, he explicated that Vilnius University was
representative of “theory”, whereas the University of Educational Sciences stood for
“practice” (5:11). On the other hand, he considers himself both a “theoretician” and a
“practitioner,” which permits him to be more nuanced in writing textbooks (5:11).
Nevertheless,  as  Tamošaitis  explains  in  the  passage  below  (5:5),  the  authorship  of  a
textbook does not require “deep knowledge”; rather, textbook authors need a capacity to
synthesize material. Opposing academically inclined historiography to school-history
education, Tamošaitis made a statement that “there should not be science in textbooks.”
When writing textbooks, one does not need to be… […] It does not require people, who go
very much into depth. When writing a textbook, one needs to see, to have an ability to
synthesize material, of course, to know the historiography, but one need not go into depth.
[…] There should not be science in the textbooks. There should be solely the basis of
science outlined and that is all. Science belongs to higher education. (P 5: 5:5)
His sharp differentiation between history education in secondary schools and academic
history in higher education suggests an idea that school-history education should remain
simple enough in order for pupils to be able to comprehend the material. School history
should not be overloaded by complicated historiographical details or theoretical reflection.
On the other hand, the juxtaposition of “theory” and “practice” reveals an assumption that
if school history remains “simple” enough, it can elude “theory,” as if “simplified” school
history does not underpin certain ontological and epistemological positions or theoretical
approaches. The distinction between theory and practice obscures how “practice”
inescapably involves a certain “theory,” a certain way of thinking about and engaging with
the past.
6.4.2 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: A textbook cannot USURP A MONOPOLY
A major theme discussed in the interview was truth in history. I asked him to elaborate on
these issues, in relation to the introductory chapters in textbooks for the 7th and 11th
grades, which introduce history as a discipline and present how historians approach and
analyze their materials.
I can say that when I am teaching I tell students that usually there is no one single truth, but
there are  facts.  If  there is  a  fact,  a  date,  it  does not  change.  If  we know that  the Battle  of
Grunwald happened, I say, but there are various interpretations [of those facts]. (P 5: 5:6)
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Therefore, while there are diverse narratives and interpretations, which cannot be reduced
to  a  single  truth,  facts  are  truthful  because  they  do  not  change.  The  Platonic  distinction
between what is real, because it is fixed, unchanging, essential, and what is not real,
because it is shifting and transient, can be recognized in this statement. Truthfulness is
linked to stasis. Facts are separate from interpretations: Facts are solid entities onto which
interpretations are imposed or assigned. Cognition of the past is modeled in disembodied
terms, distinguishing between the language of facts, which does mirror the past, and the
language of narratives, which does not directly correspond to the past. Truth is reduced to
disembodied propositional statements about general, static states of the world.
According to Tamošaitis, if there are three different opinions about the same event in a
textbook, the teacher should not tell which one of them is correct (5:7). The pedagogical
aim should be to make pupils comprehend that there is not a single opinion or evaluation
of the event. Subsequently, when pupils recognize the existing diversity of opinions, they
may choose one of them, which they find more agreeable, and should provide
justifications for their choice (5:7). To be unbiased in this context, according to
Tamošaitis, means to approach different opinions about the event without prejudgments
(5:8). What remains unclear, however, is the principle of adjudication that school history
should instill in pupils as they encounter diverse narratives. On what basis should pupils
select a preferred interpretation, especially if a teacher abstains from providing guidance
to pupils? Moreover, this kind of approach of handling multiperspectivity does not enable
pupils to comprehend the relations and interconnections between divergent narratives at a
more systemic level. Pupils are not encouraged to conceive of multiple perspectives as
part of a larger, complex process of life. Rather, they need to select a single interpretation
at the exclusion of others.
When choosing how to assess the past in the textbooks, Tamošaitis claimed that
textbook authors needed to take into consideration the diversity of views on the past
among one’s readership. A textbook cannot USURP A MONOPOLY, to impose a single
interpretation of the past (5:15). In his opinion, therefore, the textbook should try to avoid
very assertive and definitive value judgments of the past; the textbook should remain quite
neutral when it comes to judgments and evaluations of the past (5:13, 5:14). He
understands this as the “RULES OF THE GAME” – an expectation that textbooks should try to
stay moderate in their assessments, or remain “diplomatic” (5:35). Too explicit judgment
should thus be avoided. I challenged him by pointing out that the textbook series “Raktas”
reflects  a  value  stance  on  the  Lithuanian-Polish  political  and  cultural  rapprochement,
aiming to displace the predominantly negative image of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth and that, as a result, the meaning and evaluation of the Union of Lublin is
introduced by stressing the benefits for Lithuania in making the union with Poland.
Tamošaitis responds by arguing that he does not have a straightforward opinion about the
Union of Lublin.
These sort of events, like the Union of Lublin, to be honest, I would not be able to state my
single opinion about it. I would say, there is not one opinion. But there are things like, for
example, the loss of independence in 1940, so there it is like that… […] Who will read the
textbook?  Many  will  read  it  –  so  you  need  to  a  little…Of  course,  there  needs  to  be  an
assessment – all right. But I would say…Because you might condemn yourself in a certain
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sense. You can write a scientific article, everyone has a lot of opinions, many have written
about it, but for the most part nobody reads it. Whereas here we have slightly different
rules of the game.
R.K. So do you say that textbooks should offer a somewhat polished, toned-down version of
the past?
There is a need for diplomacy. Diplomacy. There is a need for diplomacy. (P 5: 5:35)
Hence, not every past event is assessed in textbooks applying the same moderate
perspective. The loss of the Lithuanian independence in 1940, for example, bears a
straightforward negative assessment. This shows that not every opinion is of the same
merit, even if there is a diversity of opinions available. It matters how an opinion is linked
to lived experience of interaction and engagement with others and the world. When I
pointed out my perception that textbooks in the series “Raktas” mostly tend to avoid
stating a clear value judgment or evaluation of the past, Tamošaitis responded that since
there is no single definite and clear assessment of the past, the textbooks should then also
abstain from espousing a certain concrete assessment of the past. According to him,
textbook  author  is  not  a  know-all.  Moreover,  the  authors  who  express  a  straightforward
opinion in the textbooks risk receiving harsh critique.
According to Tamošaitis, another important reason, why textbooks should avoid
explicitly stating value judgments, is the lack of agreement among professional historians.
Tamošaitis insists that if academic historians cannot arrive at a shared evaluation, then
textbooks should avoid putting forward any single interpretation. Tamošaitis juxtaposed
the caution, which informs his attitude on expressing value judgments in the textbooks,
with a straightforward value indoctrination employed in the Soviet textbooks. Soviet
textbooks serve a model of a single-truth approach to writing history. As part of his
pedagogical approach, pupils sometimes receive a task to find and correct mistakes in the
Soviet textbooks in history lessons.
Tamošaitis’ reflection suggests that the stakes involved in choosing to state a clear
value judgment or to express one’s authorial stance on the past are high. The load of
authorial responsibility entails a high risk of fierce criticism, especially if the textbook
aims to break with certain traditions of evaluation of the past.
6.4.2.1 Textbook I: The dichotomy between truth and values
Textbook I: Nerija Kostinien?, Marius Š?avinskas, Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos
vadov?lis 7 klasei I dalis. Serija ”Raktas” [History textbook for the 7th grade, Part 1.
Series “Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2011.
The introductory chapter, which is authored by Mindaugas Tamošaitis, explains the
purpose of learning about history. The author asserts that “only the person, who knows the
past well, especially the history of one’s own family and nation, can comprehend his roots,
be a patriot of his country. It is especially important to hold onto traditions, pay regard to
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the past and learn from it” (7). History is therefore primarily introduced as national
history, which should underpin pupils’ identity and value orientations. History provides
knowledge of one’s ROOTS, initiates a pupil as a bearer of a concrete national tradition.
Knowledge of the past establishes a firmament of identity; provides a solid base for further
development. In this sense, history has a protective function, echoing the metaphorical
associations to history of Juozas Brazauskas.
Appraising Cicero’s dictum, the textbook suggests that pupils can learn from the past.
The terms “past” and “history” are used interchangeably in this context. The textbook
compares history to the life of a single person who is learning continuously in order to
understand how to act (7). In other words, history is metaphorically understood as the life
of  humanity,  which  uses  the  experience  of  the  past  to  orient  its  activities  in  the  present.
The main actor of history is humanity, in parallel to a human being who is the main actor
of his/her life (7).
The essence of historians’ work is described by stressing that
[g]enerally history is identified with the past and it is often claimed that history is a story
about the past of a human being. However, for historians, unlike for literary scholars, it is
very important not only to describe the events, but also to determine their causes, to
ascertain the consequences, generalize and make conclusions. Hence, historians are
concerned with what, how and, most importantly, why things happened in the past. (8)
The  textbook asserts  the  scientific  basis  of  history  as  a  discipline.  History  aims  to  know
the past, which means to analytically comprehend the linear, causal processes of history
and to arrive at generalized conclusions. It is not sufficient to memorize dates and facts –
pupils should seek to understand the past, which is explicated as a capacity to link
important phenomena, explain their causal connections, influence and consequences to
society (10). The textbook further elaborates that pupils should analyze sources, that is,
explain the meaning of a source and justify their opinion about what the sources have to
say (19). When examining the sources, pupils are expected to determine whether
knowledge in a source is reliable. Hence, a critical perspective is deemed necessary, if
pupils want to ascertain whether the author of a source or the witness of an event is not
biased or provides just a partial truth (19–20).
The textbook blends two meanings of history – historical memory and the scientific
discipline of history – without identifying the potential tensions between these two ways
of  engaging  with  the  past.  On  the  one  hand,  the  author  puts  a  lot  of  emphasis  on  how
important it is to know your country’s past and history; how, in order to develop national
consciousness and understand “the ESSENCE of  one’s  nation,”  its  features  and  its  role,  a
person has to take over historical memory and historical experience of previous
generations (9). Historical memory and experience are introduced as possessing a fixed
core, a static ESSENCE that is carried on from one generation to another. The textbook
reasserts that “every nation must know its history,” that “the present is enriched by a well
understood past” (10).
On the other hand, it is stressed that while learning history, “it is very important not to
STUMBLE ‘on the SLIPPERY PATH of patriotism’” (11). According to the textbook, this can
happen if we assess the past by glorifying only our own nation and at the same time regard
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other nations only negatively (11). Thus, pupils are told that “while assessing the events
one should not be guided by feelings (I like or do not like); the assessment should depend
on concrete data and source material.  It  is  necessary to look at  events without bias – one
ought  not  to  sacrifice  truth  for  the  love  of  one’s  nation  and  Fatherland  or  for  any  other
reason” (11).
The ocularcentric metaphor constructs a scientific, disciplinary engagement with the
past as LOOKING AT the  past  without  bias,  objectively.  To  be  unbiased,  to  adopt  an
unbiased historical gaze means to exclude feelings, to suppress “the reflexes that spring
from the body and from the past history” (Bryson 1988, 7) of the viewer. As feelings are
the source of bias, true knowledge – the truth of the past – should be purged from the
bodily feelings.
This positivist, optical dichotomy between truth and feelings, cognition and evaluation
is at odds with the emphasis of the textbook on the value of historical memory for one’s
identity and value orientations. Pupils are both instructed to nurture their attachment to the
national experience of the Lithuanian nation and to adopt a distanced, analytical historical
gaze. What the textbook lacks is therefore an awareness that it promotes two different
ways of seeing the past. It lacks a reflection of how these two different ways of seeing the
past can be combined.
It remains unclear why some feelings towards the past are deemed acceptable, while in
other cases feelings have to be purged from the pursuit of truth, or why some opinions
about the past are more merited than others. While trying to offer and describe a more
nuanced approach to historical understanding that surpasses a simplistic “I like/I do not
like” attitude, the textbook enacts an outdated “truth-value,” “knowledge-feelings”
distinction which stems from disembodied Greek metaphysics. The “I like/I do not like”
attitude is problematic to the extent that it stands for an unwillingness to engage with and
pay attention to past lived experience, and not because feelings are in principle opposed to
the pursuit of truth.
The textbook identifies the reminiscences of contemporaries of certain historical
events as “subjective historical sources” (18). It is explained that such reminiscences often
contain inaccuracies; their authors often exaggerate their own role in the events or
inadequately criticize other personalities. Therefore, original documents, especially legal
documents, government documents are more important because they are not subjective,
according to the textbook (18). On the other hand, echoing the interview statements, the
author asserts that “when learning history one ought to understand that, for the most part,
there is no single truth, that an absolutely objective assessment of examined events is not
possible. It often occurs that the same event is explained differently” (19). Absolute
objectivity is understood as a completely disembodied state of mind, a way of knowing
which is purged clean from bodily experience, feelings, and emotions. Absolute
objectivity is associated with pure truth – the kind of knowledge, which is an “essential
copy” of the world “out there,” a perfectly mirrored, optical inner representation of a
static, pre-given world.
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6.4.2.2 Textbook II: Evaluation of the Polish-Lithuanian union
Textbook II: Stasys Lukšys, Marius Š?avinskas, Manvydas Vitk?nas. Istorijos vadov?lis 8
klasei, I dalis. Serija “Raktas.” [History textbook for the 8th grade, Part 1. Series
“Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2010.
The chapter depicting the period of rule by two grand dukes, and cousins, Vytautas and
Jogaila begins with an introductory question: “Why does the majority of Lithuanians still
today negatively view the Grand Duke of Lithuania and the King of Poland Jogaila?” (72).
The nature of this question shows that the textbook attempts to reframe a long-standing
negative historical evaluation of Jogaila’s role in Lithuanian history. It aims to question
whether this evaluation is justified and whether it needs to be reconsidered.
When Jogaila was offered the crown of the Kingdom of Poland, the textbook explains
that  Poland  had  its  own  interests  in  this  offer:  “Jogaila,  as  a  sovereign  of  Lithuania  and
Rus’, ‘would bring the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a dowry’ and would thereby expand
the territory of the Crown – the Kingdom of Poland” (72). The 1385 Union of Krewo
between Lithuania and Poland is introduced very briefly by pointing out that it entailed
Jogaila’s duty to Christianize Lithuania, defend the interests of Poland and “to annex the
territory  of  Lithuania  to  Poland  for  the  ages”  (72).  The  latter  controversial  promise,  the
textbook indicates, is a point of contention among Polish and Lithuanian historians, who
continue to debate what the term “annex” (Latin term applicare) meant; whether actual
annexation or merely a close rapprochement between the two countries (72). However, the
textbook  then  elaborates  that  the  Union  of  Krewo  did  not  establish  a  shared  Polish-
Lithuanian state; it was, rather, a personal or dynastical union, which permitted Poland and
Lithuania to coordinate and implement foreign policy together, but did not entail a
complete merger (73). The textbook specifies that the Lithuanian Giediminid dynasty
ruled Poland starting from Jogaila to the second half of the 16th century (73).
The 1410 Battle of Grunwald of the joint Polish-Lithuanian army against the Teutonic
Order received a lot of attention in the textbook. It is described how
for  a  long  time,  historians,  on  the  basis  of  the  statements  of  the  Polish  chronicler  Jan
??ugosz, argued that the Lithuanians escaped from the battlefield and that the victory was
only  a  merit  of  the  Poles.  However,  the  Swedish  historian  Sven  Erik  Ekdahl  proved  that
the Lithuanian escape was a great feigned maneuver which dismantled the chasing German
wing and, in this way, determined the end of the battle. (75)
The merits for the victory are attributed to the Lithuanian maneuver, but it is likewise
additionally explained what historical evidence there is for this claim. This shows the
significance  of  this  issue  to  the  textbook  authors,  who  seek  to  prove  the  Lithuanian
interpretation  of  the  battle.  It  reveals  how important  it  is  for  the  Lithuanians  to  disprove
the claims of Polish historiography, but also gives insight into the process of historical
research, when newly discovered sources can significantly alter the narrative. The
textbook introduces pupils to an excerpt from D?ugosz’s “History of Poland,” who need to
assess to what extent the information provided in the source can be trusted (77).
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In a chapter on multinationalism and multiculturalism of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, it is, first of all, explained that the conception of Lithuanian identity changed
over  time  (112).  A  difference  between  a  civic  and  a  modern  ethnic  sense  of  Lithuanian
identity is conveyed by explaining that in the GDL “a Ruthenian nobleman, a Jewish
artisan, a Tatar soldier” – all could identify themselves as Lithuanian, since ethnic
affiliation was not important to one’s national belonging (112). In the same chapter, the
influence of Polonization in the GDL is discussed by stressing that the Polish language
spread mostly through the court of the grand duke, educational institutions and the church
(114). Eventually, the textbook explains, “an interesting consciousness of the Polonized
Lithuanian noblemen formed, who identified themselves as “gente Lituanus, natione
Polonus,”  or  of  “Lithuanian  origin,  Polish  nationality”  (114).  It  is  mentioned  that
Polonization left “A DEEP MARK”  in  southeastern  Lithuania,  where  the  majority  of
residents is Polish (114). However, the textbook specifies that most of them are not Poles,
who arrived from Poland, but the offspring of the Polonized local Lithuanians (114).
6.4.3 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Objectivity
A related issue discussed in the interview was objectivity in history. I indicated that a
specific type of exercise caught my attention in the textbooks, where students were asked
to analyze caricatures depicting a certain event of the past by answering the question as to
whether these caricatures represented the event objectively. I asked Tamošaitis to
elaborate  on  the  intention  of  this  exercise,  namely,  on  the  expected  answer  from  pupils.
The specific caricature that he speaks about in the passage below can be seen in Figure 17.
It  depicts  Mikhail  Muravyov,  a  Russian  imperial  statesman  who  was  appointed  as  a
Governor  General  of  the  Northwestern  Krai  (former  Grand Duchy of  Lithuania)  in  1863
and was in charge of putting down the Polish-Lithuanian uprisings of 1863–1864. Due to
brutal measures he undertook in order to subdue the rebellion, he became known among
the Poles and Lithuanians as “the hangman of Vilnius.” In the caricature, Muravyov is
represented as the sculpture of an angry dog, a loyal implementer of the tsarist policy. The
caption on the structure beneath the statue reads: “To the degenerate of the human race,
hangman  Muravyov  –  a  grateful  Lithuania.”  Tamošaitis  explains  how  students  are
expected to handle the question whether the caricature represents the past objectively.
Whether objectively? The point is that Muravyov is shown – as whom? A hangman. So a
student – recently there was a similar question in an exam – needs to tell what shows what.
[...] The idea goes like this: how much does it have to do with objectivity? The Lithuanians
make a monument, they have made such a caricature, built for him. The point is that it is
enough that a student realizes that he sees a caricature, that Muravyov was a hangman. Did
the Lithuanian nation depict such an event about Muravyov well, correctly, objectively?
Essentially – yes. And practically there is not much more here…In other words, if it were a
university, we can go further. But for a student, especially keeping in mind that this is a B-
level task… (P 5: 5:38)
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Figure 10 Caricature. Image in the Public Domain.
Tamošaitis does not find the rationale of the question about the objectivity of a caricature
debatable. By objectivity, he means accuracy of a representation in the caricature in
relation to the actual events. An objective caricature does not employ deception and
manipulation in his understanding. Accordingly, a caricature depicting Muravyov as a
hangman is objective, because Muravyov implemented a vast scale of repressive measures
against the participants of the 1863–1864 insurrection, many of whom were hanged. The
idea of objectivity could be said to be confounded with truthfulness in this case. What
Tamošaitis seems to have in mind is truthfulness, connected to lived experience, as
opposed to manipulation, which ignores the latter. The term “objectivity” is not suitable,
however, in this context, to the extent that the caricature does not denote a value-free
“view from nowhere.” A perhaps better way to formulate this issue would be to explore
the relation between the caricature, as a pattern of interpretation of events, and the process
of lived experience.
In the following example of an “objective” caricature, objectivity comes to mean an
ocularcentric correspondence between past reality and an image, which is said to be an
identical reflection of the events. Objectivity comes to mean a mimetic correspondence
between a representation and external reality. However, Tamošaitis does not see it as
problematic to claim that a caricature is objective. The vision-based image-schematic
model  of  cognition  shapes  the  reasoning  of  Tamošaitis  about  objectivity  without  him,
however, realizing the full import of this notion.
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I do not have now, but there is a good example. Stalin cuts people. Completely correctly in
the caricature, no question marks. The majority of the Soviet ones [caricatures – R.K.] lie.
For example, [leafs through book and shows the caricature] what is happening? The red
terror is happening; the great purge is happening; Stalin organizes everything. In Lithuania,
a caricature appears which completely identically reflects the events. (P 5: 5:21)
The purpose of caricature analysis, as he explains, is to develop critical thinking skills
(5:20, 5:25), so that when pupils engage with information beyond the history classroom,
they  would  be  able  to  critically  assess  the  accuracy  of  information.  Verification  of
accuracy, identification of bias and deception constitutes a significant aspect of source
analysis in the textbook approach. It is questionable, however, to what extent such
analysis of caricatures prepares pupils to deal with bias and deception, since caricatures
can  be  very  easily  shown  to  bear  a  subjective  imprint  of  their  author.  Analysis  of  a
caricature’s objectivity does not provide a better understanding for pupils about what truth
is or how one should distinguish between truth and lies.
6.4.3.1 Textbook V: Objectivity
Textbook V: Stasys Lukšys, Saulius Pivoras, Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos vadov?lis 9
klasei II dalis, Serija “.”Raktas [History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 2. Series
“Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2010, 2012.
A  curious  example  of  how  the  author  of  the  textbook  chapter  conveys  the  idea  of
objectivity is brought forward in a task, which asks pupils to evaluate an excerpt from a
poem, whether it objectively describes the events of the past (39). As was discussed above
in Section 6.4.3, Tamošaitis does not see it as problematic to pose a question about an
objective representation of the past in a poem or a caricature. He seems to equate
objectivity  with  factual  accuracy.  Thus,  if  the  poem  mentions  that  there  was  a  group  of
Samogitian students in Vilnius University, who promoted Lithuanian national revival, and
this was indeed the case, the poem depicts the events objectively. In formulating the
question this way, he, however, ignores the tension between objectivity in the sense of an
objective “view from nowhere” and a personal, embodied voice of the poem’s author. The
same understanding once again emerges in another task, which asks pupils to evaluate
whether a sculpture, which commemorates the period of the smuggling and distribution of
the illegal Lithuanian press during 1864–1904, objectively represents a historical event
(51). Tamošaitis’ didactic approach is in accord with opinions that he expressed in the
interview, but I would question to what extent it is appropriate to speak of “objectivity” in
relation to works of art that inescapably convey a metaphorical, experiential, and
embodied knowledge of the past and not merely a mimetic, ocular-optic image of the past.
A metaphorical, experiential, embodied knowledge of the past can be factually accurate,
but it does not follow from this that it is “objective.”
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6.4.4 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Polish-Lithuanian past
The conversation eventually moved from the topic of truth and objectivity to the
presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past in textbooks.
If you opened the curriculum and looked, for example, at the Polish-Lithuanian relations in
the 20th century: are they identified separately or not? Pi?sudski is not even mentioned. I
can skip him altogether. I have a right not to mention him at all. […]
R.K. But you choose to mention him.
Why? It is an intention to lift the Poles above, to lift Pi?sudski above. In the sense that he
rescued, he fought against the Bolsheviks, he won. Lithuanians could have had a lot of
problems here. […] In the exam program, for example, Pi?sudski is not even mentioned. So
he [R.K. – a student] does not need to know anything about Poles. I mean, in contemporary
history. He will know about the uprisings in the 19th century, then the national revival
takes  place  and  the  topic  of  Poles  goes  to  the  side.  When  does  the  conflict  resume?  It
resumes  during  the  First  World  War,  then  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  follows,  then  the
War of Independence follows, and then the conflict over Vilnius. That is all. And later in
1939. Afterwards, in the second half of the 20th century the Poles do not appear at all.
There is nothing about it in the curriculum.  (P 5: 5:37)
The above excerpt illustrates well how shared Polish-Lithuanian past is introduced in the
curriculum  as  well  as  in  the  textbook  as  a  linear  sequence  of  static  states.  Thus,  the
conflict over Vilnius between Poland and Lithuania can be depicted in textbooks without
explaining how different perspectives of Poles and Lithuanians related to the long process
of lived experience. Pattern can be separated from process: the 19th century history of the
Lithuanian national revival and the interwar conflict over the city of Vilnius become
chapters that are too distinct in the textbook outline of the past. Historical development is
introduced as a sequence of patterns, of synchronic “slices” of development rather than as
a process of interrelations, junctions, and entanglements. The complexity of the event is
lost and, simultaneously, the ability to comprehend how different perspectives relate to
each other and to the process of lived experience and interaction.
During the interview, I mentioned that his 10th-grade textbook mentions the secret
protocol accompanying the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian treaty in 1920, whereas in the 12th-
grade textbook this is not mentioned anymore. I ask him to comment on this change. My
question leads him to briefly state his assessment of the interwar conflict between Poland
and Lithuania.
You see, I can say that sometimes it happens like this, it is a matter of editing, a matter of
layout. Sometimes you need to shorten, to delete some things. […] I always mention the
1920 treaty. I mention the 1926 September Moscow non-aggression pact and I write what
the Lithuanians do. It is written in the textbook that the Lithuanians are the same. They are
the same, only the point is that it is a weak state, it got it in the neck. It suffered and so it
gives an impression that  we are victims,  whereas they are like that.  But  if  we had been a
powerful, strong state, we might have inflicted suffering on others. It is difficult to say. In
other words, both states made the same move, and we were not saints either. (P 5: 5:31)
230
Tamošaitis perceives both sides of the conflict as equivalent to each other, despite the fact
that Poland was a more powerful state. Lithuania is personified in a metaphorical idiom,
recognizing the loss of Vilnius as GETTING IT IN THE NECK. He refuses to see the
Lithuanians as VICTIMS or SAINTS in the conflict, implying that the conflict does not give
in to simple value dichotomy between a victim and a perpetrator. There seems to be, once
again, the avoidance of straightforward value judgments, which informs his overall stated
approach to textbook authorship.
6.4.4.1 Textbook VI: The interwar conflict
Textbook VI: Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos vadov?lis 10 klasei I dalis. Serija “Raktas.”
[History textbook for the 10th grade, Part 1. Series “Key”].  Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos,
2011.
The interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict over the city of Vilnius is tackled in a chapter
focused on the Lithuanian Wars of Independence. The conflict is contextualized by
explaining that at the end of the 19th century Lithuanians and Poles developed different
visions of future statehood.
The Polish and Lithuanian gentry attempted for the last time to restore a shared Polish-
Lithuanian state during the 1863–1864 Uprising. In the 8th-9th decades of the 19th
century, the heralds of the Lithuanian national revival Jonas Basanavi?ius, Jonas Šli?pas,
Vincas Kudirka did not accept the idea of a shared Commonwealth and began declaring
that Lithuanians and Poles “are not on the same path.” The majority of Polish politicians
could not imagine the reestablished Poland without Lithuania, and therefore they did not
want to hear anything about the 1918 Act of Independence of Lithuania; when the
opportunity arose, they planned to annex Lithuanian territory to Poland. The vision of
Pi?sudski was that of a federative state, consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and
maybe Belarus. (89)
In  this  brief  passage,  we  learn  that  there  were  two  main  sides  to  the  conflict  –  the
Lithuanians  and  the  Poles  –  who  disagreed  about  the  future  of  the  Lithuanian  state.
Development of a separate national consciousness meant a forking of paths, when the
Lithuanians proclaimed that they were not on the same PATH as the Poles anymore. They
sought an independent national existence without federative ties to Poland. The Poles, on
the other hand, ignored the will of the Lithuanians to change the direction of movement.
The Poles remained on the old PATH and remained attached to the idea of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. The conflict of Lithuanians and Poles is then a conflict of
diverging PATHS as different ways of being. Identity appears not to be fixed or static, but
as a dynamic movement along a line (Ingold 2007). A positive influence of this paragraph
is that it connects the interwar Polish-Lithuanian disagreement with the process of
developments in the 19th century. It enables an understanding of history as a process of
interconnections, entanglements, as well as divergence.
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In terms of factual description, the textbook does not fail to mention the secret
appendix to the 1920 Lithuanian-Soviet Russian peace treaty. By the peace treaty, Soviet
Russia recognized the right of Lithuania to the city of Vilnius, but the secret appendix
permitted Russian troops to use Lithuanian territory during the simultaneously ongoing
Polish-Soviet Russian War (89). The textbook explains that recognition of Vilnius to
Lithuania was not a friendly gesture of Soviet Russia. Bolsheviks expected to win the war
with Poland and take control of Lithuania.
As Soviet Russia lost the war to Poland, the Polish troops once again started advancing
on  Lithuania.  With  the  interference  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  textbook  emphasizes,
Poland and Lithuania finally signed a treaty in Suwa?ki in October 1920, according to
which Vilnius remained with Lithuania (89). It is stressed that Poles broke the agreement
while the participants of negotiations were still in Suwa?ki. The Polish government
pretended that it had nothing to do with the Polish army, led by General ?eligowski, but
“it was not true” (89). The Polish army seized Vilnius and “began breaking deep into
Lithuanian territory,” but its advance was halted by the resistance of the Lithuanian troops
(89).
The  textbook avoids  any  explicit  evaluation  of  Polish  actions  during  the  conflict.  As
Tamošaitis pointed out in the interview (Section 6.4.2), he does not want to USURP A
MONOPOLY,  to  impose  a  single  interpretation  of  the  past.  Instead,  he  seeks  a  “diplomatic
way” to present the events, to tone down sharp value judgments. This rather neutral
presentation may also have to do with his refusal to perceive Poland and Lithuania as,
respectively, an evil perpetrator and a saintly victim (Section 6.4.4). Both sides of the
conflict are equivalent to each other for him, despite the fact that Poland was a more
powerful state.
Despite an attempt to link the interwar conflict with the 19th-century development, the
focus is on the factual details of the military conflict. Little attention is devoted to an
explanation of how Poles and Lithuanians perceived and experienced the conflict,
acknowledging also the internal diversity of views on both sides of the conflict. Emphasis
on the concise, fact-oriented information does not allow for an understanding of why the
conflict broke out.
6.4.5 Deimantas Karvelis: A GIANT ABYSS between professional and school
history
One of the first issues to be discussed in the interview was changes in the presentation of
Lithuanian history, introduced in the textbooks, as compared to earlier textbook series. I
wanted to know if Karvelis sought actively to introduce some modifications in the
chapters that he authored.
R.K. Did you want to purposefully change something in the presentation of these topics,
which you wrote yourself?
Yes. Firstly, one should not hurry to make revolutionary changes. The first thing from
which  one  needed  to  start,  it  is  clear,  that  is,  to  scrupulously  take  into  consideration  the
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current history curriculum in Lithuania. Obviously, one should not digress from it, even
though I am of an extremely critical opinion about it, but because it is a normative act, on
the basis of which the textbooks should be constructed, so whether you want it or not – you
need to lean on it. But when you take concrete historical topics, periods, undoubtedly, then
there  is  a  lot  of  change,  as  compared  with  earlier  textbooks,  because  it  is  not  a  secret  –
those, who write history textbooks in Lithuania, they do not follow the most recent
historiography, the most recent scientific achievements. The problem identified by
Alfredas Bumblauskas twenty years ago – a giant gap between historical science and
history didactics – this abyss is still here. Those, who create textbooks, should solve this,
because neither scientists, nor teachers can solve it themselves. A textbook can be an
intersection,  as  one  German  historian  put  it,  that  a  history  textbook  can  become  either  a
creator of new myths, or it can become an autobiography of national history. (P12: 12:3)
Karvelis emphasized that the GIANT ABYSS between professional, disciplinary history and
school-history education can only be overcome by textbook authors, who are responsible
for following the most recent historiography and translating the findings of historians into
textbook contents. A textbook, ideally, for him, is an INTERSECTION between professional
history and national memory. Just like Seixas (2016) and Levesque (2016), he envisions
history education as being located in between disciplinary history and memory. If it is well
connected to both of these fields of knowledge, it can become an AUTOBIOGRAPHY of
national history. The nation is personified by Karvelis, in this regard, as a unitary subject
whose past experience can be rendered into an autobiography.
Karvelis  pointed  out  many  problems  in  the  current  history  curriculum.  Firstly,  he
believed that the ratio between Lithuanian and world history in the curriculum was
inadequate, placing too much emphasis on world/European history. He expressed this as a
phenomenon born out of “going down on bended knees to the European Union, not even
comprehending what this European identity is” (12:5). Inclusion of a broad scope of topics
on European history into the curriculum, according to Karvelis, is an expression of
obsequiousness  or  servility  to  foreign  culture,  of  lacking  a  strong  identity  of  one’s  own.
Lithuanian and world/European history are perceived as mutually exclusive rather than as
interrelated.
Another problem in the curriculum, according to Karvelis, is too much of a focus on
political history, at the expense of cultural, social history, history of everyday life, “which
are very relevant in the West” (12:5). This shows that the West is not only despised for its
overwhelming influence, but also serves as a measure and a model of historiographical
developments. Emphasis on the cultural, social, everyday aspects of the past should be an
example to be emulated for the officials responsible for a national history curriculum. By
contrast, the history of everyday life currently “falls into some textbooks merely as an
exotic episode” (12:5) without a systemic approach at the level of national educational
policy development.
Although  the  curriculum  stands  as  an IMMOVABLE normative basis (12:5) for
instruction, Karvelis encourages his pupils to engage with the textbooks critically. Pupils
are given tasks to find factual historical mistakes in the text and need to correct them.
Karvelis uses several religious metaphors to convey that a textbook is not immune to
criticism, that it is not the Bible.
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But when I read and myself work at school with this textbooks, I find also things which
can be improved, changed in other colleagues’ texts. There are even factual mistakes.
Sometimes, one task I like to give to pupils is: Find two historical mistakes, two nonsenses
on this page, and everybody searches for them. A textbook is not a biblical text, which
should not be read critically. It is the main text – a catechism for a pupil, but not the Bible.
(P12: 12:16)
6.4.6 Deimantas Karvelis: Conflicting interpretations and objectivity in
history
The passage below contains several religion-based metaphors and examples, specifically
centered on the conflict between catholic and protestant faiths in the Middle Ages. This
subject arose in our conversation when I asked Karvelis how he deems it appropriate to
present controversial historical topics in textbooks, which receive different evaluations in
historiography.
R.K. In your chapters, out of these two textbooks, there are topics, which receive
controversial evaluations. How, in your opinion, should such value conflicts be presented
to pupils?
They should be presented by introducing all conceptions. For example, if early history is
narrated,  it  is  always  written  that  there  is  Darwinism,  but  creationism,  the  theory  of
creation is further related as a legend. If the 19th century emergence of political ideologies
is written up, irrespective of political conjecture in Lithuania, all ideologies should be
presented with their values, without any axiological meaning making, what is good, what is
bad. […] Or when you write about the conflict between Reformation and Counter-
Reformation, you will not find it in any other textbooks, but mine that, as also Gudavi?ius
points out, Vilnius University was created as the headquarters of the Counter-Reformation
– to annihilate the Reformation. If you write about the Renaissance, so write not only about
Da Vinci, but also about the Medici and the Borgias’ crooked Florence, write about the
dark and the light sides, write about both sides of history. I think that both sides should be
presented, avoiding axiological evaluation, because the historian should not take up
prophesying and offering the final judgment. They should simply show, as Ranke says in
the 19th century, “the way it was.” […] I am a supporter of showing history the way it was.
[…] If you write about Mindaugas, write about everything, how he created the state
through the corpses. If you write about Vytautas, write not only about Grunwald, but also
about  how  he  shamefully  escaped  from  the  Battle  of  the  Vorskla  River.  To  show  that
history is not black and white, day and night, that it is colorful. (P12: 12:18)
The  above  passage  shows a  conflation  of  two different  contexts  to  convey  a  point  about
multiperspectivity. The issue of competition between religious Creationism and the
secular theory of evolution has to do with two models of explanation, in which both aim to
explain the same phenomenon of life. On the other hand, the issue of presenting BOTH
SIDES – THE DARK AND THE LIGHT – of history has to do with including different lived
experiences as part of the more complex process of life into a historical narrative.
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Since all interpretations should be presented as equivalent to each other, avoiding
value judgments, Karvelis argues that Creationism should be introduced on a par with
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Creationism and Darwinism are, for him, two conceptions
that should be equally represented in the textbooks, without an axiological judgment,
which he sees as implicit in treating Creationism as a legend. In his view, Creationism is
treated as a legend not because it fails to explain the process of life adequately, but
because of implicit, subjective value judgments. The textbook, according to him, should
not show preference for either of these theories. This is a concrete example that it is
problematic to handle diversity of interpretations as a collection of distinct subjective
patterns or perspectives, without evaluating the process out of which these perspectives
emerged. As a result, Karvelis views different interpretations as equivalent to each other in
a relativist manner, which implies that neither of them can be deemed more adequate to
understand  the  phenomenon  of  life.  For  him,  they  are  merely  two  absolutely  relative
points of view.
If we are trying to understand the phenomenon of life, evaluation of different
perspectives – according to how well they can fulfill this task – becomes crucial.
However, an attempt to understand the complexity of past reality is quite another issue,
where varied lived experiences are what this past reality is woven of. Thus, in an
embodied  sense,  if  we  wrote  a  history  of  beliefs  about  the  origins  of  life,  in  such  a
narrative we could include both creationist and evolutionary ideas. This, however, still
does not mean that we would have to, as historians, regard both of these strands of ideas as
equally merited. In an embodied sense, history is inclusive of divergent experiences in the
past, but, since history is still always written in the context of our present-day knowledge
and accumulated experience, understanding of past ways of life does not preclude their
evaluation. Thus, just as Karvelis himself argues, history should not only praise the
Lithuanian King Mindaugas for establishing the state, but likewise acknowledge the
violence, which this act required. A historian can understand this violent practice of state-
creation in its own historical context and, simultaneously, evaluate it in terms of present-
day customs and experience.
Karvelis assumes that portraying THE  DARK  AND  THE  LIGHT  SIDES of history equals
historical objectivity. This kind of approach is certainly inclusive, but it does not imply an
objective POINT OF VIEW. An objective POINT OF VIEW “from nowhere” (Nagel 1986)
cannot be attained to the extent that it implies a disembodied viewer, uninfluenced by her
own embodied, lived experience. The very idea of identifying THE DARK AND THE LIGHT
SIDES of history already implies a value-laden engagement of the historian with complex
past reality.
Karvelis is a Rankean in the sense that he understands objectivity as an abstention
from judgment rather than disinterested neutrality. As it was discussed in Section 3.3, for
Ranke, the historian is not in a position to pass judgment, since the final judgment is the
prerogative of God. The historian’s objective approach to the past therefore needs to
disclose the existing order of things as intended by God. However, Ranke differentiated
between good and bad developments in the past on the basis of his own conservative
political preference for states and national order, which enabled him to judge which were
healthy,  good developments  and  which  were  to  be  rejected  as  harmful  and  negative.  His
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own contemporary context and lived experience shaped the way he engaged with and
evaluated the past. Even though Karvelis may not want to make final judgments, he is
likewise making judgments about THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of history.
In the interview, I inquired to what extent Karvelis belived it was possible to eliminate
all the traces of one’s own value preferences from the text.
R.K. I understand that one needs to introduce all sides – positive and negative, different
historical perspectives – but is it possible to not reveal, express your own perspective at all
through your text? You still identify more with one value position rather than another. Do
you think it is possible to avoid this?
If  you  write  a  scientific  text,  you  need  to  avoid  that,  but  it  is  very  difficult  to  do  that,
because you are presenting your own position as a historian. You belong to a certain
historiographical school, a movement. Your worldview is sooner or later seen by
everybody, but if you cannot solve this question, this challenge, which you mention, when
you write a textbook, then you should better not touch the writing of textbook. Because
you write a text, in which there should be as little as possible of the human factor, because
this text will be read by a person, whose historical memory is only under formation, and if
you hammer your own things there, you will hammer new historical myths and stereotypes
into his head, and this is at best unforgivable, at worst a criminal action […]. (P12: 12:19)
In the passage above, Karvelis again seems to have in mind abstention from judgment
rather than disinterested neutrality when he speaks of preventing the HUMAN FACTOR from
appearing in the textbook. He is, however, aware that it is difficult, if not unattainable to
ensure complete objectivity, to completely eliminate the HUMAN FACTOR. The fact that the
embodied presence of the author/historian in the text is identified as the HUMAN FACTOR
reveals that objectivity is understood as a disembodied way of seeing, a way of seeing
without a spectator. The HUMAN FACTOR is a source of error, which must be put under
control, if not completely removed.
Karvelis  believes  that  in  cases  where  a  textbook  depicts  events,  which  receive
controversial historiographical interpretation, it should show the variety of different
opinions (12:19). On the other hand, matters, which are already settled among historians,
can be explained in a straightforward way. As an example of a controversial event, I
brought up the topic of the Constitution of May 3, which was adopted in 1791 in the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Lithuanian historians do not agree whether May 3
deserves to be commemorated as a day important to the Lithuanian nation.64
R.K. As an example, there is the Constitution of May 3. You ask in the textbook why, since
2007, the evaluation of this event has changed in Lithuania. It is an event, which is really
64 Traditionally, the Constitution of May 3 was regarded negatively since it eliminated the dual character of the
Commonwealth and did not mention the name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania anymore. Recently, however, some
historians, such as, for example, Eligijus Raila, have argued that the Constitution deserves to be commemorated in
Lithuania not only because it did not eliminate the autonomy of the GDL, but also because its adoption proved a high
degree of civic consciousness in Poland and Lithuania.
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evaluated controversially by Lithuanian historians, and there is no consensus. So how
should this event be introduced in the text?
[…]  Well,  the  question  about  the  Constitution  of  May  3  –  it  is  not  a  question  for
discussion; it is clear. I can even explain why these discussions take place. We restored our
independence a long time ago. The science of history had already experienced its
Renaissance a long time ago, but for many years, nobody even thought about May 3. Poles
celebrated for three days. We never even mention it. But when our historians started going
to Poland, to receive funding from different foundations, when the historians of the old
Vilnius University began to receive orders from Poland and go down on bended knees, to
write  pro-Polish  texts,  and  so  the  Constitution  of  May  3  came  back,  that  it  is  also  our
Constitution. Even though it is not our Constitution. It was the constitution of the
Commonwealth, in which the name of Lithuania disappeared and if it had finished this
way, the statehood of the GDL would have been completely annihilated. And the Mutual
Pledge of the Two Nations, which was signed in October, Poles attached it because of
screaming and opposition of the Lithuanian gentry, but it does not really mean anything.
There are other aspects. Why did the famous Lithuanian historians of the interwar, which
did research on the GDL – Ivinskis, Šapoka – were they fools? The masters of the Soviet
era – Tyla, Jurginis, Lukšait? – they never raised this question, because this question was
clear to them. (P12: 12:20)
For Karvelis, the evaluation of the Constitution of May 3 is not a matter of discussion. He
asserts the traditional view that the Constitution was not “ours,” because it did not mention
the name of Lithuania and weakened the statehood of the GDL. In the passage below, he
also emphasizes that the Poles “sought in all times to ABSORB US, SUCK  US  IN.” This
metaphoric expression constructs the narrative of shared Polish-Lithuanian history by
underscoring the threat of being engulfed and swallowed. Lithuanian historical narrative
becomes  a  story  of  a  fight  for  survival  and  resilience.  The  values,  which  inform  this
interpretation, are the preservation of the Lithuanian language, culture, and national
continuity.
So,  the  Constitution  is  written  in  Polish.  Looking  from  different  sides,  there  is  no
Lithuanianness in  it.  There is  no talk about  civic  rights  in  it.  There is  talk only about  the
expansion of the rights of the townspeople in it, but there were not many cities in the GDL.
[...]  I  am neither  for  nor  against  the celebration of  May 3.   […] But  keeping in mind the
Polish aspirations of statehood in the beginning of the 20th century, how they wanted the
restoration  of  a  federative  state  and  in  all  times  wanted  to  absorb  us,  suck  us  in,  and  the
statehood  of  the  GDL  never  equaled  the  Polish  one  in  its  weight…  So  to  have  a
perspectival, not retrospective, dream that the Constitution of May 3 could have led to a
salvation of the Titanic, which is the Commonwealth, is empty illusions. Me?islovas Ju?as
has said it beautifully: It was the testament of a perishing state. A state, which is already in
a coffin; those, who wrote it, covered themselves with it. (P12: 12:21)
The Commonwealth was a perishing TITANIC, which could not have been rescued by the
Constitution, according to Karvelis. It was written in Polish and did not contain any
“Lithuanianness”  in  it.  As  a  result,  he  does  not  see  why  it  should  be  commemorated  or
celebrated by the Lithuanians. On the other hand, he also adds that when the topic of the
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Constitution is presented in history lessons, its positive side, namely the spread of the
ideas of Enlightenment in the Polish-Lithuanian sphere, needs to be acknowledged
(12:22).
When I probed further to understand how he understood objectivity in history, he
referred to the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga’s saying that “physics is the most precise
science, while history is the least precise one” (12:28). In the passage below, he explains
that the textbook is a “FIFTH MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS,” which
implies that it is very far removed from past reality and does not offer a faithful
reproduction of what happened. Truth is defined on the basis of a correspondence theory
of truth, using an optic metaphor of an accurate, mimetic reflection in a mirror. Perfectly
accurate and objective historical knowledge would ideally exclude any presence of an
embodied knowing subject, leaving the reflection undisturbed. Historians’ work
necessarily distorts past reality because they need to FILTER it THROUGH themselves.
When  you  read  someone’s  written  historical  text,  in  this  case  a  textbook,  it  is  already  a
third mirror in the kingdom of distorting mirrors. History is, was sometime ago. Then it
was fixed in the sources – second mirror. Then a historian took this source, filtered through
himself – third mirror, wrote his historiographical narrative – fourth mirror, and someone
took it and attemtps to write a textbook on this basis, to present in a simple way to people –
fifth mirror. So then I imagine objectivity in school very simply: to be able to selectively
choose the most important, undebatable historical facts, which are primary and the most
important, suitable, needed for the baggage of historical knowledge. And in critical
interpretations one should not hanker after and seek for objectivity, because it cannot be
there. Objectivity is only possible in facts. As Ranke said, to write history the way it was.
And when a historian takes up the role of a prophet and begins to evaluate, draw
perspectives and so on, this is no longer history. (P12: 12:28)
Objectivity, Karvelis asserts, is only possible in facts, which are free of value judgment.
As a result, caricatures, for example, are subjective in principle, rendering the question
about the objectivity of caricatures impossible (12:25). On this point, he seems to disagree
with his colleague Tamošaitis. When I pointed out that there may be different kinds of
facts, some facts being very concrete and others based on generalization, he elucidated his
opinion by quoting the historian E. H. Carr, who has said that “not every fact of the past is
a historical fact, but only that which is SEEN BY the historian’s EYE” (12:29). Thus, he is
willing to acknowledge the influence of the knower on the historical knowledge.
6.4.6.1 Textbook III: The controversy of the union
Textbook III: Deimantas Karvelis, Nelija Kostinien?, Stasys Lukšys. Istorijos vadov?lis 8
klasei, II dalis. Serija “Raktas.” [History textbook for the 8th grade, Part 2. Series
“Key”].  Vilnius, LT: Baltos lankos, 2010.
The  chapters  of  the  textbook  which  I  discuss  in  this  section  are  authored  by  Deimantas
Karvelis.
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A chapter on the 1569 Union of Lublin begins with an introductory question asking
pupils  to  reflect  on  why,  even  today,  the  majority  of  Lithuanians  assess  negatively  the
Union of Lublin (68). The textbook describes the interests held by each side in seeking
closer unification. The Lithuanian gentry is said to urgently require military support from
Poland in the Livonian war with Russia. They also sought to acquire the same rights and
privileges as the ones possessed by Polish nobility (68). The Polish nobility, on the other
hand, leaned towards the idea of closer union with Lithuania, because they “fostered a
hope to annex the Slavic territories of the GDL” (68). They likewise needed an ally in the
war with the Ottoman Empire and, since King Sigismund August was still childless, it
posed a threat that after his death the Polish-Lithuanian union would disintegrate (68–69).
The opposition between Poles and Lithuanians in relation to the terms of the union is
described by stressing that Lithuanians feared that the union would undermine the
sovereignty and separate status of the GDL (69). In this context, the textbook expresses a
strong value judgment of the decision of Sigismund August to annex the southern
territories of the GDL to Poland: “Sigismund August resolved to take an unpredictable
step by which he showed that after all he tended to support the Polish terms. According to
his decisions, several Slavic GDL territories […] were annexed to the Kingdom of Poland.
What was achieved by heroic fight and diplomacy of Algirdas, K?stutis and Vytautas was
given to the Poles by a single stroke of a pen by the last Gediminid” (69). The hard work
and effort of the Lithuanian grand dukes at taking hold of the southern territories is
juxtaposed to the negligent act of Sigismund August. Since it is stressed that he was the
last member of the Lithuanian Gediminid dynasty, it adds more weight to the disloyal,
irresponsible nature of his decision.
As in most other textbooks, the author lists which institutions were merged and what
remained separate after the Union of Lublin in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is
pointed out that the Lithuanian state continued to exist after the Union, but its
independence was significantly limited (72). The negative evaluation of the Union and its
consequences prevails in the textbook. The author claims that “doors were opened up
widely for the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility which started in 1385” (72).
Polonization is metaphorically imagined as an external threat, an unwanted visitor, to
whom the DOORS WERE OPENED WIDELY by the Union. It implies that if until the Union the
Polish cultural impact could still be controlled, the Union broke down the defensive
shield. The use of metaphors suggest a sense of vulnerability of Lithuania against
imminent  Polonization.  The  meaning  of  the  Union  is  explicitly  associated  with  a  loss  of
protective, defensive shield and a weakened, vulnerable state of being. It suggests that had
Lithuania not concluded the Union with Poland, it could have remained strong and
resilient.
The textbook refers to the opinion of the fiercest opponents of the Union of Lublin –
the noble magnate family Radvila – who held the Union to be a “funeral and annihilation
of the free and independent state” (72). The textbook further explains that “the goal of
Poland to completely annex the GDL to the Kingdom and eliminate the historical name of
the Lithuanian state became a threshold which was difficult to overcome in all the
subsequent history of mutual relations of both states” (72). This commentary portrays
Poland as an adversary state continually seeking to annex and culturally assimilate
239
Lithuania. The entire shared history of Poland and Lithuania is reduced to Poland’s
relentless aim to overcome and annihilate Lithuania. Pupils are asked to identify positive
and negative consequences of the Union to Lithuania (73), but there is not a single
positive outcome for Lithuania of the Union mentioned in the main text of this chapter.
The Union of Lublin is presented as a turning point, a THRESHOLD in Lithuanian history,
which OPENED THE DOORS for an eventual decline of Lithuanian statehood and
sovereignty.  These  features  of  presentation  of  the  Union  render  a  continuation  of  an  old
historiographic narrative tradition, stemming largely from the 19th century and the
interwar period, according to which the Union of Lublin is “the beginning of the end.”
In a subsequent chapter, however, the unilaterally negative evaluation of the Union of
Lublin is somewhat countered. The textbook explains that “some historians of Poland and
Lithuania hold the opinion that the nobility democracy was merely ostensible and spread
chaos in the state” (76). The latter view is challenged by referring to the opinion of the
Lithuanian historian Ju?as, who argues that such critical views of the noble democracy are
ungrounded and “based on emotions and thickened dark colors” (76). The noble
democracy is said to be an advantageous phenomenon for Lithuania after the Union of
Lublin, for it provided opportunities for preservation of independence of the GDL (76). A
lot of space is allocated to showing how the GDL managed to preserve its separateness
and partial independence in the Commonwealth, both in the main text and through the
chosen additional sources (77–79). The textbook comments that “there is no evidence that
the Lithuanian gentry would have opposed the union with Poles – they held it to be a
sacred thing. But there is also no evidence that the Lithuanians would have renounced the
matters of their state. It was continuously underlined that Vilnius is the capital of
Lithuania – Metropolis Lituaniae” (77). The textbook thereby comes to the conclusion that
“the nobility democracy was the best thing which could have happened in the political life
of Lithuanians before the separatism of individual magnate families […] and an aggressive
policy of foreign states began to erode the political  system of the state.  Thus,  it  is  not in
vain that the primary period of the noble democracy is called by historians the golden age”
(78).
6.4.6.2 Textbook IV: The Constitution of May 3
Textbook IV: Rasa Butvilait?, Deimantas Karvelis, Nelija Kostinien?, Stasys Lukšys,
Saulius Pivoras, Mindaugas Tamošaitis. Istorijos vadov?lis 9 klasei, I dalis. Serija
“Raktas.” [History textbook for the 9th grade, Part 1. Series “Key”]. Vilnius, LT: Baltos
lankos, 2010, 2012.
The chapters of the textbook, which I discuss in this section, are authored by Deimantas
Karvelis.
The introductory question to a chapter on the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth  starting  from  the  second  half  of  the  17th  through  the  18th  century  asks
pupils to consider “why the Polish culture increasingly overpowered the Lithuanian
magnates”  (72).  As  an  important  factor  in  Polonization  of  the  Lithuanian  magnates  and
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gentry, the textbook indicates the 1697 decision to adopt the Polish language as an official
legal language throughout the entire Commonwealth and, hence, in the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania as well.
In the main text, the Constitution of May 3 is introduced by pointing out that Lithuania
was mentioned in the text of the Constitution not as a federative member of the
Commonwealth,  but  merely  as  one  of  the  provinces  of  the  state  (111).  Yet,  it  is  equally
stressed that all social strata of the Lithuanian society supported the Constitution and that
it  was  translated  into  Lithuanian,  thus,  becoming  the  first  official  state  document  in  the
Lithuanian language (111). An additional source (a contemporary historian’s commentary)
included at the end of the main text further entrenches the claim that the Lithuanian
society positively viewed and supported the Constitution of May 3 (115). The Lithuanian
gentry is said to support the Constitution even more than their Polish “brothers” (115).
Lastly, pupils need to consider why in Lithuania until 2007, unlike in Poland, the day
celebrating the Constitution of May 3 had not been commemorated (116). They are told to
inquire why the situation changed in 2007 (116).
6.4.7 Conclusion
There is a perceptible contrast between the textbooks in the series that were co-authored
by Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis in terms of how they handle the Polish-
Lithuanian past. Tamošaitis adopts a more moderate tone and avoids USURPING A
MONOPOLY with explicit value judgments, whereas Karvelis is more outspoken on, for
example, the negative influences brought on by the Union of Lublin, which OPENED THE
DOORS WIDELY for Polonization. In the case of Tamošaitis, the moderate attitude propels
him to personify Poland and Lithuania as two individuals, neither of whom is a complete
SAINT or  perpetrator.  In  the  interwar  conflict,  both  sides  are  equaivalent  to  each  other  in
their mindset and actions.
While other Lithuanian authors maintained that textbook should provide certain
guidelines on how the past should be evaluated and direct pupils towards a preferred
interpretation, Tamošaitis is more cautious about this issue. In his opinion, a single
interpretation  can  only  be  applied  to  such  events  as  the  loss  of  national  independence  or
the struggle for freedom. In other cases, textbooks and teachers should avoid explicit
judgment on the past and seek to LOOK AT the past  without bias.  Moreover,  even though
Tamošaitis was averse to delving more deeply into “theoretical” issues in school
education, the discussion above, nevertheless, reveals that the textbook outline of contents
and exercises implies an unconscious choice of epistemological assumptions, which are
not well understood by the textbook author. In particular, confusion pertains to the use of
the term “objectivity,” which Tamošaitis unproblematically employs in relation to the
depiction of the past in caricatures.
Likewise, Tamošaitis separates between facts, which are truthful, because they are
stable and fixed, and interpretations, which cannot be shown to be truthful, because they
are changing. This Platonic distinction implies that he upholds a disembodied model of
cognition, with its characteristic conceptualization of truth as a match between a static
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image and the world. This reliance on Greek metaphysics cannot offer any conceptual
tools for dealing meaningfully with multiperspectivity and diverse interpretations of the
past. Tamošaitis expects his pupils to adjudicate among divergent interpretations, select
one  of  them  and  offer  justifications  for  their  choice.  However,  he  is  not  able  to  clearly
articulate the principles on which this choice should be made. This kind of approach,
where pupils need to select only one interpretation, likewise does not encourage them to
comprehend how different interpretations relate to each other and out of what process of
lived experience they emerge.
Karvelis’s thinking about the past and history seems to be informed by an
ocularcentric, optical model of cognition and its respective metaphors. In this
understanding, historical truth and objectivity depend on suppression of the HUMAN
FACTOR to the extent that it is possible. A historian should abstain from judgment and
instead convey the past as it really happened, namely, by showing THE GOOD AND THE
BAD, THE  DARK  AND  THE  LIGHT  SIDES of history. By reporting BOTH of these SIDES of
history, a historian can expect to remain objective. A textbook, in this context, is the FIFTH
MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS, which explains why pupils should learn
to question the contents of the textbook.
On the other hand, Karvelis is selective about which events of the past should be
regarded as controversial and requiring the acknowledgment of multiple interpretations.
Thus, according to him, the Constitution of May 3 should not cause contention, because it
was a TESTAMENT TO THE PERISHING TITANIC, or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
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Chapter 7. Metaphor analysis of the Polish school-
history textbooks and interview transcripts with the
authors
In this chapter, I will present the analysis of the Polish school-history textbooks and
interview transcripts with their authors. Five textbooks authors and their textbooks will be
introduced in consecutive sections of the chapter: Halina Manikowska, Micha? Tymowski,
Jolanta Choi?ska-Mika, Robert ?niegocki, and Piotr Laskowski. This list of textbook
authors and their respective textbooks does not constitute an exhaustive selection of
textbook narratives and publishing houses in Poland. However, this group of authors
illustrates  the  variety  of  presentation  of  the  past  and  encompasses  some  of  the  most
popular textbook series on the market. Each section merges the analysis of an interview
and textbooks (co-)written by the author.
The chapter begins with a section dedicated to historian Halina Manikowska, who co-
authored one of the first history textbooks after the fall of the communist regime in
Poland. She has collaborated with two publishing houses: WSiP and “Wydawnictwo
Szkolne PWN.” WSiP is the largest Polish educational publisher producing textbooks,
supplementary books, methodical materials, and multimedia. WSiP was established in
1945 as the state publishing company of Poland. It has been a privately held company
since 2004. “Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN,” on the other hand, was founded in 1997 and
specializes in publication of school textbooks for learning of foreign languages. The two
textbooks, discussed below, both focus on the history of the Middle Ages.
Historian Micha? Tymowski has worked exclusively with the publishing house WSiP.
Three of his textbooks, examined below, focus on the history of the Middle Ages.
Historian  Jolanta  Choi?ska-Mika  was  in  charge  of  the  group  that  prepared  a  new
history curriculum during 2007–2008. All three textbooks, co-authored by her, have been
published by the publishing house WSiP. Their chronological scope ranges from the 16th
to the 20th century.
Historian and history teacher Robert ?niegocki is an author and a co-author of the
textbook series for upper secondary schools, published by the publishing house “Nowa
Era.” “Nowa Era” was established in 1992 and is one of the largest publishers in Poland,
producing textbooks and other educational materials.
Historian and history teacher Piotr Laskowski is one of the authors of an original
textbook series, which combines the subject of history with the study of Polish language
and literature, cultural studies, civic education, philosophy, and ethics. The series has been
published by “Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN.”
7.1 Halina Manikowska
Halina Manikowska (b. 1950) is a Polish historian, specializing in the Middle Ages. She is
a professor at the Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History of Polish Academy of Sciences.
One of her co-authored textbooks “Historia 1 ?redniowiecze,” first published in 1989 by
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WSiP, the largest publishing house for textbooks in Poland, received a total of twelve
reprints (1989–2000). Another textbook “Historia dla Maturzysty. ?redniowiecze,” first
published in 2003 by “Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN,” was reprinted six times (2003–
2008). I interviewed Manikowska in June 2014 at the Institue of History of the Polish
Academy of Sciences.
Analyzed textbooks co-authored by Halina Manikowska:
 Textbook I. Halina Manikowska, Julia Tazbirowa. Historia, ?redniowiecze. Podr?cznik
dla klasy I liceum ogólnokszta???cego. [History, The Middle Ages. Textbook for the
1st year of lyceum. 11th edition. 1st edition in 1989]. Warsawa, PL: WSiP
(Wydawnictwo Szkolne i Pedagogiczne), 1999 (pierwsze wydanie 1989).
 Textbook II. Halina Manikowska, Historia dla maturzysty, ?redniowiecze. Szko?y
ponadgimnazjalne, zakres rozszerzony. Pierwsze wydanie 2003. [History for a
Graduate, the Middle Ages. For upper secondary schools, extended scope. 1st edition
2003.] Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2007
7.1.1 Halina Manikowska: Historians’ BAGGAGE
In the beginning of the interview, Halina Manikowska pointed out two main reasons,
which, according to her, play the main role in shaping textbook writing practices. The first
of these has to do with endurance of certain schematic, established ways of depicting the
past, which textbook authors maintain. The very fact that ways of presenting and
organizing the knowledge of the past persist reveals the continuity of certain attitudes and
conceptualizations of past reality and the cognizing self. Persistance of ways of depicting
betray a continuity of ways of seeing the past, or, as Manikowska identifies it, a continuity
of VISION. Manikowska observed that even when alterations in the curriculum occur, they
do not displace the settled patterns and formulations. Authors use earlier textbooks as an
example and reproduce the narrative with minor revisions or modifications. Importantly,
professional historians (as opposed to history teachers) constitute the majority of school-
history textbook authors in Poland.
Firstly, a characteristic phenomenon for textbooks is conservatism, the endurance of a
certain scheme. It results from this that, apart from exceptions, textbooks are written by,
well, especially now, professional historians, because they do not have money not to throw
themselves at textbooks, but sometime ago they were written rather by teachers or people
who had behind them experience in school. In relation to this, there is in textbooks, this is
not  a  flaw  of  textbooks,  there  is  something  like  continuity  of  culture,  of  vision.  A
significant part of textbooks is dependent on earlier textbooks. It means that one looks at
what was and even when there is a curricular change, certain things endure; in short, they
are almost plagiarized. (P13: 13:1)
The lack of innovation in history textbook writing is tightly connected to continuity of
certain established models of shaping the narrative which, when reproduced in consecutive
textbook projects, amount to a distinctive way of seeing, or a VISION. A VISION could be
interpreted  in  this  context  as  a  convention  that  sediments  over  time through repeated  re-
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enactment into forms of cultural memory (Assmann 2010), or fixed, static ways of relating
to the past. It implies that professional historians embody a particular VISION of textbook
writing, which delivers a narrative focused on political history and facts about states of the
world  in  the  past.  History  education  becomes  a  means  to  maintain  cultural  continuity,  a
ritualized re-production of a cultural canon, a function of preserving fixed national
identity.65
This brings us to the second feature of textbooks, which, according to Manikowska,
concerns the influence of nation-oriented, patriotic education on textbook authors, most of
whom are professional historians. She underlined that until very recently, the nation-
focused, patriotic approach was the mainstream form of school-history education in
Poland. History as a discipline had traditionally been an integral element in nation-state
and identity building processes. Hence, historians, having being shaped by nation-oriented
school  education  as  well  as  professional  education,  come  to  textbook  writing  with  a
certain BAGGAGE,  which  impacts  the  way  they  conceive  of  the  task  of  textbook  writing.
BAGGAGE here denotes a similar idea to what I mean by the influence of lived experience
on the ways of seeing, knowing, and depicting the past. Lived experience shapes the
cognizing self of history-textbook authors and affects how they see the past.
And the second phenomenon is a generational phenomenon, which sometimes endures for
two or even three generations, especially in relations with neighbors, which are important
for national identity, and are an important element in building national identity. So, until
the revolution, let us call it like that, or the turn in humanities towards minorities… That is
to say, fetishization of national minorities and the turn, multiculturalism, that is one turn,
and the second turn is appraisal of minorities. But until that moment, or until very recently,
this  identity  was  being  built,  it  was  shaped  at  school  in  whole  Europe.  History  was  an
important element in building state and national identity. In relation to this, a professional
historian entered research with this baggage. He was already shaped. (P13: 13:3)
Manikowska identified two possible waysto be RELEASED from the BAGGAGE, or ways to
achieve a shift in the accustomed nation-oriented focus in history. A historian may commit
to a conscious ideological choice or embrace a certain scientific TURN. The danger, as she
explains, in choosing one of these paths is, however, to lose any possibility of the
objectivity in one’s relation to the past. Seeking to escape one extreme side of the
spectrum, a historian may TILT TO AN OPPOSITE SIDE. This implies her conviction that
historians should stick with the middle ground and avoid leaning to either extreme side.
Historians should be balanced and fair, which can be achieved only if they equally avoid
nationalist pathos and resignation from truth and reality.
65 In contrast, I view cultural continuities and routinized practices as forms of “entanglement” rather than as rigid,
imposed models that completely determine historians-authors’ practices (Hodder 2012). Historians’ ways of writing
textbooks can be regarded as a result of their particular entanglements of lived experience and ideas they have
encountered.
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And  release  from  it  [the  baggage  –  R.K.]  is  related  to  some,  I  do  not  know,  either  an
ideological choice or espousal of some scientific turn, and then it happens that one tilts to
another side, or, in other words, is not able to in general, if objectivity exists in historical
research, in which I do not believe, I do not believe, I do not believe. There is nothing like
objectivity in humanities because it is impossible to reduce it to “two and two is four,”
even though some say that “two and two is five.”  (P13: 13:4)
Even though historians should strive for a balanced attitude towards the past, Manikowska
firmly objected that there could be objectivity in history. Objectivity, which she likened to
a reductionist, simple, measurable, mathematical formula, does not apply to the field of
humanities. Historians should steer away and hold on to the middle road between demands
for detached objectivity and outright manipulation or distortion of those who would claim
that “TWO AND TWO IS FIVE.”
7.1.2 Halina Manikowska: Avoidance of leaning to either SIDE
Her response spurred my interest to comprehend how she conceived of truth in history.
Manikowska showed her awareness of the arguments of postmodern theory
inhistoriography, which, as she underlined, disengaged from past reality and posited a gap
between the historian and the past. The past, in this argument, is gone and all we have are
representations of the past whose truthfulness or capacity to match the past accurately
cannot  be  known.  Historical  knowledge  bears  no  link  to  past  reality.  According  to
Manikowska, to verify the truth of historical knowledge, in a postmodern argument,
means to verify the truth of the text. Historical knowledge is reduced to linguistic content,
a disembodied representation. A recurrent trope in Manikowska’s position is the need to
keep to the middle path or middle ground, avoidance of leaning to either of the TWO
extreme SIDES. Hence, her epistemological orientation reasserts the need to maintain a
“central” predisposition.
R.K. But how then can we talk in this case about truth? How do you understand it?
If you please, you know that in postmodernism one verifies texts, but not the truth of
reality. Hence, a historian does not at all reach something, which could be called…
R.K. And do you believe in this?
I  believe  that  we  are  able  to  reconstruct  reality,  but  we  do  that  using  an  entire  modern
apparatus of our possibilities and, let us say, central predisposition. That is to say, I do not
want  to  [lean  –  R.K.]  to  this  or  that  side.  We  do  it  constantly  in  a  sense  like  chroniclers
(simile)  of  earlier  epochs.  That  is  to  say,  we  are  reconstructing  it,  this  reality  for  our
purposes. (P13: 13:5)
Implicitly, Manikowska upholds optic metaphorics in her assertion that historians can
reconstruct past reality. Reconstruction of the past implies a process of reproduction of a
faithful, accurate duplicate image of past reality, of what once was. A representationalist
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theory of mind informs epistemology of reconstruction and assumes a stable, fixed, pre-
given world, which can be known by means of the sameness between our depiction and
the past. A simile used by Manikowska to compare historians to CHRONICLERS, who
reconstruct the past for present-day purposes, however, indicates that she does not espouse
an objectivist stance and admits that contemporary interests and values shape history. She
referred to contemporary purposes as present-day realities or issues, which can only be
explained by tracing their origins and development in the past (13:6). Manikowska,
however, cautioned against using history for purposes, which were too closely connected
to concrete ideological beliefs. She conceded that contemporary needs and historians’
backgrounds played a significant role in shaping historical knowledge, but reasserted the
epistemic value of balance and a middle ground.
Reality, for Manikowska, is something that HIDES BEHIND sources  and  can  be
UNCOVERED by  a  skillful  historian.  Following  the  logic  of  these  metaphors,  past  reality
and sources are distinct from each other. The past is not present in the sources themselves,
but rather is concealed BEHIND them. World and word, past reality and language are
distinct. In the excerpt below, she underlines once again that there cannot be an objective
truth of the past because past reality is too complex and our access to it too imperfect in
order to be able to encompass it all in a historical representation.
I  am not  a  postmodernist.  In  relation to this,  I  think that  reality  hides behind sources and
that we uncover this reality. Every generation does it a little differently and a little more
widely. But there is not something like objective truth or material truth because, if we are
not able to encompass contemporaneity, because there are too complex processes and our
knowledge is too imperfect in relation to this, thus, this concerns the past even more. (P13:
13:7)
I inquired whether she deemed it appropriate that epistemology of historical knowledge
would be made part of school-history education. Manikowska enthusiastically supported
this idea, but insisted that questions of historical truth need to be addressed by teachers
rather than textbooks. Textbooks, in her opinion, can provide materials for a classroom
discussion about historical truth and different ways of understanding the past, but the main
responsibility falls on the teacher to engage pupils with such meta-theoretical questions.
Textbooks, in order to be effective and comprehensible to pupils, need to be as simple as
possible and free from what she calls “manipulation” (13:9). Manipulation, in this context,
means certain evaluative framework or model of explanation, which is underpinned by
distinct values. However, as she herself notes, textbooks cannot avoid laying out some
“manipulations” because authors need to make certain choices about how to synthesize,
make sense of and present the past. The presence of the author in the text muddles up the
objective representation of the past; it is a source of error and potential deception. Some of
these  manipulations  are  an  outcome  of  a  national  curriculum  and  others  are  dictated  by
authors’ personal views, beliefs, and predispositions (13:9).
Manikowska’s conviction is that the past needs to be studied in order to comprehend
the present. In the excerpt below, she makes a statement that the past is present in
contemporaneity. Hence, it is not something completely detached from the present, but
rather interwoven into contemporary times. This is an element of an embodied way of
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thinking in Manikowska: Pattern in the present embodies the past process of life.
Simultaneously, she notes that the past can be used to legitimize the present, which both
enables us to understand how the present is shaped by the past and how the past may be
abused for present day purposes, or manipulated.
R.K. Should we talk to pupils about this at school, about the epistemology of history?
Obviously. Obviously, because, for me, this is in general one of the basic didactic tools.
That is, discussing about what practicing history is. Because it allows understanding more
easily, what overview of contemporaneity is. […] This is an extremely essential field and it
has  always  been  regarded  this  way,  because  the  past  is  present  in  the  present.  It  is  an
element of the present. Even more, since a very long time ago, since the moment when it
was born,  history is  an element,  which legitimizes the present.  Hence,  there is  no way to
resign from it, one only needs to know what tools there are of this legitimation. It allows us
to  understand  the  present,  what  manipulations  there  are,  we  could  put  emphasis  on  that.
(P13: 13:8)
I pointed out, however, that perhaps very few teachers make an effort or are capable of
bringing epistemological issues to their pupils’ attention. Manikowska identifies the
prevalence of male students studying history in universities as the root cause of this
situation. The discipline of history is, in her opinion, too much constrained by interests
and preferences of men who are only passionate about traditional political and military
history and place too much emphasis on factual details (“factography”) (13:10). Other
areas of past life and different approaches to doing history are, on the other hand,
marginalized. Traditional masculinity shapes the discipline of history along these lines,
which, in turn, affects the kind of history that is taught in secondary schools.
7.1.2.1 Textbook II: The disciplinary approach
Textbook II. Halina Manikowska, Historia dla maturzysty, ?redniowiecze. Szko?y
ponadgimnazjalne, zakres rozszerzony. Pierwsze wydanie 2003. [History for a Graduate,
the Middle Ages. For upper secondary schools, extended scope. 1st edition 2003.]
Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2007.
The textbook series “Historia dla maturzysty” is intended for years 1 to 3 of lyceum
(upper secondary level of education). The textbook on the Middle Ages is used by pupils
in the first year of lyceum. The structure of the textbook differs from many other
analogous textbook options in that it consists of six large thematic parts, each dedicated to
a different area of human activity and presenting an integrated course of European and
Polish history. After the introductory part dealing with sources from the medieval period,
other chapters examine the Middle Ages in European history, power, politics, and
development of states, economy and society, culture and spirituality and, finally, Latin
Europe and other civilizations. The textbook is not focused on political and military
history, but rather seeks to introduce different facets of social life in the Middle Ages.
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Sections on Polish-Lithuanian history, however, appear mostly in the largest of the six
textbook chapters on power and politics.
The narration of the past is interspersed with the author’s commentary on those aspects
of the past, which continue to raise historical debate.66 Throughout the main textbook, the
author explicitly indicates to pupils when knowledge of a certain event or phenomenon is
only hypothetical and when there is enough historical knowledge based on sources to
make certain claims or generalizations. The author adopts a disciplinary approach to
history teaching and uses conditional language that marks to what extent given knowledge
can be considered reliable. Instead of simply stating the facts, she attempts to demonstrate
to pupils how historians assess evidence and engage in historical reasoning.
7.1.3 Halina Manikowska: Novelties in the depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian
past
The second half of the interview focused on the textbooks authored by Manikowska and
the particular depiction of the past, especially of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, found
in them. I was interested to find out whether she sought to introduce certain concrete
modifications in the established textbook narrative, in order to present a new interpretation
or  new  factual  information.  This  question  is  particularly  relevant  knowing  that  she  was
preparing the first textbook in the late 1980s, which had to present an alternative vision to
the  communist  interpretation  of  the  past.  The  first  objective,  which  Manikowska  set  for
herself, was to include more non-political history into the narrative and counter the
imbalance of an overly male-oriented historical focus. The second aim had to do with her
identification with and belonging to the Warsaw Historical School, as opposed to the
Cracow School. In practice, this meant a shift in emphasis from nationally-oriented
historiography to an interpretation of Polish history as part of the broader scope of
universal history.
The  alterations  in  the  depiction  of  a  shared  Polish-Lithuanian  past  stemmed  from
Manikowska’s research on the subject. As she explained in the extract below, she sought
to show that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland were two separate
states before the Union of Lublin. As a result, the earlier 1385 Union of Krewo cannot be
interpreted as implying a merger of two states or annexation of Lithuania to Poland.
Claims about the meaning of the Latin term “applicare,” used in the treaty of Krewo,
arguing that it legitimized Lithuania’s incorporation into Poland as one of its provinces
only show aggressive Polish pretensions, which are, however, not based on past realities.
As she explained later in the interview, she sought to demonstrate in the textbook what a
huge  country  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  was  territorially  and  how  complex  it  was
66 For example, one of such controversial topics concerns the implications of the Gniezno convention that took place in
the year 1000 in Poland. Some historians maintain that the convention signified a de facto coronation of the Duke of
Poland Boles?aw the Brave, whereas other historians argue that the elevation of Boles?aw to the “family of kings” in the
convention only meant that he received the right to nominate bishops (101). Two different interpretations are presented,
pointing out that the second argument is more dominant among historians.
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administratively prior to the Union of Krewo, as compared to Poland. As a result, Poland
did not have any capacity to incorporate or annex Lithuania.
Above all, I want to put a markedly bigger emphasis on non-political history, to lighten the
burden from what was a nightmare of textbooks, from factual details. From factual details
which are, in addition, conceived in the way that we do mostly battles. Hence, to show
women at  least  a  little  but,  I  am not  a  genderist,  I  am not  interested in it,  but  this  did not
exist  at  all.  […]  Because  I  come  from,  I  am a  grandchild  of  the  Warsaw School,  not  the
Cracow School. […] It means that the history of Poland is only a part of universal history.
And also certain corrections in the case of Polish-Lithuanian relations, this ensued from my
research  experiences.  […]  I  wanted  to  underline  that  until  the  Union  of  Lublin  we  are
dealing with two separate states, not to move the reality of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth to the Middle Ages […]. I meant to show that there were two separate
states and that the whole problem of “applicare” is a problem of pretense, aspirations, and
in a sense an aggression of the Polish side. (P13: 13:12)
Another novelty in the narrative was to stress that Poland concluded the Union of Krewo
with its biggest enemy at the time (13:16) and to show that the Union demonstrated the
diplomatic and political skills of Jogaila who managed to redirect the anti-Lithuanian
attitude of Poland towards a joint anti-Teutonic Polish-Lithuanian military policy. Jogaila
was, in this interpretation, not a traitor of the Lithuanian nation, but rather worked in
Lithuania’s interests (13:17).
During the communist period in Poland, school-history textbooks barely mentioned
Lithuania or any disagreements about the past between Poland and Lithuania, especially in
relation to the interwar conflict and the infamous “Question of Vilnius.” As Manikowska
explained, it was not permitted to TOUCH the topic of Vilnius and the territorial
disagreement in the textbooks in the postwar period (13:19). This made her textbook
narrative of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past even more original.
In the excerpt below, Manikowska counters the historiographical depiction that Polish
gentry introduced slavery and practiced a colonialist policy towards local peasants of the
Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania.  Her  argument  is  based  on  a  claim  that  serfdom  was  equally
established in Poland and imposed on Polish peasants as well. Moreover, she underlined
that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was governed by Lithuanian, not Polish, gentry who,
however, adopted the Polish language and customs over time. When discussing this issue,
she, for the first time, refers to Poland and Poles using the first person plural pronoun
“we.”
However, the problem of Polish-Lithuanian relations was covered over completely,
covered for the simple reason that the Soviet Lithuanian Republic with Vilnius came into
being and any questions were not allowed at all – Vilnius, what the demography of Vilnius
was  before  the  war:  Poles,  Jews,  and  only  in  the  third  place  –  Lithuanians.  It  was  not
allowed  to  touch  this  at  all.  One  needs  to  remember  that  there  was  no  Lithuania  in  the
textbooks. Later, there is the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. […] Lithuania was in the
hands of the Lithuanian gentry, Lithuanian gentry. Of course, they Polonized but they were
Lithuanian gentry, they behaved like Poles, everything nice. However, even today there
appears in the consciousness something that Daniel Beauvois wrote twenty or twenty-five
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years ago, that we practiced a colonialist policy and introduced slavery. Only that slavery
was also in Poland,  that  is,  peasants  were subjected or  in  slavery.  And one more thing.  It
mattered for me to put into thought what an enormous country Lithuania was territorially
and how complex. Nobody wrote about this, for example. […] (P13: 13:19)
7.1.3.1 Textbook I: CONTACT of the West and the East
Textbook I. Halina Manikowska, Julia Tazbirowa. Historia, ?redniowiecze. Podr?cznik
dla klasy I liceum ogólnokszta???cego. [History, The Middle Ages. Textbook for the
1styearof lyceum. 11th edition. 1st edition in 1989]. Warsawa, PL: WSiP (Wydawnictwo
Szkolne i Pedagogiczne), 1999 (pierwsze wydanie 1989).
The narrative of the textbook is chronological, descriptive, and fact-oriented. The
emphasis mostly falls on the large-scale processes and development of political, social,
economic,  and  cultural  structures  in  Poland  and  Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Social,
economic and cultural history receive as much attention as political and military history.
Each chapter ends with a segment “Have you remembered?” which lists questions
indicating the most important information to be remembered by pupils. For each chapter,
there  are  also  special  questions  and  exercises  for  the  analysis  of  maps,  illustrations,  and
written sources.
A part of the chapter on the 1387 Union of Krewo is dedicated to a brief description of
Lithuanian history until the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The section describes the
establishment and territorial development of the Lithuanian state in the 13th century. Just
as Manikowska indicated in the interview, the textbook emphasizes that the Lithuanian
state was territorially very large as well as ethnically diverse (175).  It is noted that
Lithuanians were a minority in their state, thus, underlining an ethno-linguistic
understanding of identity (175). The textbook comments that in terms of the level of
civilization, the Ruthenian inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were more
advanced than the Lithuanians (175).
It is indicated that both Poland and Lithuania had a shared interest in making the
union, namely, they both sought to unite against the threat of the Teutonic Order (176).
Another reason for Lithuania to seek closer cooperation with Poland was Christianization,
which Lithuania was more willing to receive from Poland than the Teutonic Order (176).
The Union of Krewo is introduced by pointing out that the terms of agreement mentioned
the adjoining of Lithuania to Poland. However, the textbook explains that the latter
promise was interpreted differently by Jogaila and the Polish nobility. The Latin term
“applicare” was understood by Jogaila as a merger of two states under his rule, whereas
the Polish nobility interpreted it as an incorporation of Lithuania to Poland (176).
Different interpretations of the union terms are introduced.
Following the union, Poles are said to demand that Lithuania would be annexed to
Poland, but “this had never been achieved due to resistance of the Lithuanians, who
interpreted the Krewo agreement differently and underlined the separateness of Lithuania.
[…]  The  Lithuanian  state  was  too  powerful  to  be  completely  subordinated  by  Poland”
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(177). The Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas is briefly mentioned in one sentence as a
cousin of Jogaila who became Jogaila’s deputy in Lithuania and ruled the country until his
death (177), but nothing is said about Vytautas’ separatist policy or his aims of coronation
as the King of Lithuania.
The Polish-Lithuanian Union is assessed in the textbook very positively as an event
which permitted Poles and Lithuanians to jointly eliminate the danger of the Teutonic
Order and which led to an emergence of the powerful and territorially largest state in
Europe (178–179). The union is said to contribute to the cultural development in the vast
territory of the state and allow for Western Christian culture to spread in Lithuania (179).
The Union of Krewo is metaphorized as a “CONTACT of  the  West  and  the  East,”  which
gave a specific character to Polish culture, RADIATING to neighboring countries (179).
The description of the 1410 Battle of Grunwald points out that the Lithuanian and
Russian troops, led by Vytautas, started the assault, defeated the Teutonic infantry, but
then “had to shift back from the counterattack of the Teutonic heavy cavalry” (184).
Polish troops, on the other hand, clashed with the Teutonic army on the left flank and
withstood the attack (179). The Polish attack and the return of the Lithuanian army to the
battlefield are said to have led to the victory. The Lithuanian retreat is not discussed in a
more detailed way, nor is it identified as a special maneuver aimed at confusing the army
of the Teutonic Order. However, the contribution of both Lithuanians and Poles to the
victory in the battle is clearly acknowledged.
The textbook does not engage issues of memory and interpretation of the discussed
Polish-Lithuanian past in either country, or enter into a discussion of how the events were
perceived or experienced by their contemporaries. It presents the main facts in a
predominantly descriptive and concise manner, avoiding the expression of opinion,
judgment or polemics, at least in the chapters dealing with the Polish-Lithuanian past. In
this sense, the style of the textbook can be said to represent an avoidance of
“manipulation,” or of the presence of the subjectivity of the author, against which
Manikowska cautioned in the interview. Even though she criticized the fact-driven
approach to history teaching, based on memorization of factual details, the main text of the
textbook is still dominated by a “dry” fact-oriented depiction, which may limit a pupils’
capacity to understand and make sense of the past. It could be said to follow the tradition
of writing history as a national narrative of political history. The aim of the textbook
seems to be to provide a generalized, “objective” depiction of “what happened,” of states
of the world in the past, employing the third-person way of seeing the past as if “from the
outside” and without introducing the lived dimension of the past.
7.1.3.2 Textbook II: Polish-Lithuanian unification
Textbook II. Halina Manikowska, Historia dla maturzysty, ?redniowiecze. Szko?y
ponadgimnazjalne, zakres rozszerzony. Pierwsze wydanie 2003. [History for a Graduate,
the Middle Ages. For upper secondary schools, extended scope. 1st edition 2003.]
Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2007
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An  innovation  of  this  textbook  in  its  depiction  of  the  Polish-Lithuanian  past  is  that  the
author introduces clashes between Poland and Lithuania in the 14th century, before the
union, over the territories of Rus’ which both Poland and Lithuania sought to annex (136).
It is pointed out that Poland’s relations with Lithuania became a problem of great
importance for the Polish King Kazimierz Wielki, who expected to Christianize and
subordinate pagan Lithuania to the archbishopry in Gniezno (136). The section presents a
brief overview of the development of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 13th and 14th
centuries (135–136). Lithuania is introduced as a strong, ethnically and confessionally
diverse state created by pagan Lithuanians.
The textbook tackles the topic of the Union of Krewo in a novel way by pointing out
that, for Poland, the Union meant, among other things, a reorientation in foreign policy
and a rapprochement with, until then, hostile Lithuania (142). The Union resolved the
problem of military conflicts with Lithuania over the Ruthenian territories. For Lithuania,
the Union signified “opening to the influence of the West” (142). It is mentioned that
Jogaila’s pledge to incorporate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Poland was to become a
quarrelsome issue between the two states (141). The separatist attitudes of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania are emphasized. The textbook explains that the unions of Poland and
Lithuania during the 15th century “had the nature of a rather loose connection between
two separate states” (143).
Lithuania is said to play a major role in the Polish-Teutonic relations after the Union of
Krewo. The interests of the Grand Duke Vytautas and the King Jogaila matched in this
regard as both of them sought to fight the Teutonic Order in an armed attack on the Order
(143). The Battle of Grunwald is depicted extremely briefly, avoiding more detailed
descriptions of its process and involvement of Polish and Lithuanian troops. However,
Jogaila  emerges  as  the  main  leader  of  the  Polish-Lithuanian  army,  whereas  the  name  of
Vytautas is mentioned only in relation to the peace agreement signed with the Teutonic
Order.
The military success of Poland was not, however, fully exploited. […] The peace
agreement which was sworn in 1411 in Torun provided the return of Samogitia to Vytautas
(after his death, it was meant to return to the Teutonic knights), to Poland – the return of
the  Dobrin  Land,  arbitration  in  a  dispute  over  border  territories,  and  payment  of  a  very
high compensation. (144)
Hence, Lithuania is not even mentioned as one of the victorious parties to the conflict. The
defeat of the Teutonic Order is presented as a military success of Poland, rather than as a
joint victory of both Poland and Lithuania.
The attention that is paid to different interpretations and debates of historians in the
textbook in relation to some other events or phenomena of Polish and European medieval
history does not extend to the depiction of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past. The textbook
does not delve into explaining in more detail the different interpretations of the Union of
Krewo and the Battle of Grunwald. Especially in the case of the Battle of Grunwald, the
role of the Lithuanian army is downplayed. The implication can be drawn that these issues
are considered, perhaps unsurprisingly, much less relevant in the overall context of Polish
history by the textbook author. They are perceived as not requiring further elaboration and
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discussion. Simultaneously, authorial intentions to modify the description of the Union of
Krewo by inserting new factual information are clearly discernible. The authorial impact
is likewise visible in the disciplinary approach throughout the textbook, based on the
methodology of the Annales School, with its emphasis on social, economic, and cultural
history.
7.1.4 Halina Manikowska: Evaluation of the past
Our conversation took a turn when I asked Manikowska whether she sought to
consciously emphasize certain values in her textbooks. In other words, my intention was
to understand how she deals with the evaluation of the past and her own values when
trying  to  stay  balanced  and  fair.  Her  response  revealed  a  very  specific  definition  of
empathy,  which,  for  example,  does  not  match  my  own  understanding  of  empathy  as
resting on a cognitive capacity for “as if-ness” of metaphoric thought (Modell 2003;
Section 3.6.1). Defined this way, empathy requires the acceptance of a paradox, where a
person is capable of imaginatively identifying with people in the past and their worldview
and simultaneously recognizing difference and alterity of the past. For Manikowska, on
the other hand, empathy is synonymous with total identification and sameness, which is
why she regards empathy as unsuitable in the discipline of history. Empathic identification
leads to anachronistic relation to the past. Empathy, according to her, prevents historians
from  seeing  the  past  as  it  was  lived  and  experienced,  because  we  judge  the  past  on  the
basis of our contemporary moral standards. However, I would argue that this is not
empathy but, rather, first-person projection on the past, which, I agree with her, does not
permit us to understand the past.67
For Manikowska, empathy is not a second-person, partial identification, which leaves
room  for  a  sense  of  alterity.  She  perceives  empathy  as  a  first-person  projection  of  the
researcher’s own values. To do that is unfair to the past, because people in the past cannot
speak back and defend themselves. Although she identified empathy with philosophical
posthumanism, it remains unclear what she meant by this connection, because sometimes
she critically referred to humanism and other times to posthumanism. She firmly
underlined her strong adverse relation to humanism, which she regarded as totalitarian and
“overflowing with pride.”
For Manikowska, values express subjectivity of a knowing self which should be kept
under control to prevent it from intervening too much in the process of cognition.
67 As I argued in Section 3.6.1, when one adopts the understanding of empathy not as total identification, but as a partial,
metaphoric identification, the problem of how to combine empathy and judgment/evaluation of the past shifts. One can
both empathize with a person in the past and, recognizing them as a human being of a different context and experience,
judge or evaluate their actions as based on their own moral system. Empathy does not necessarily undermine the sense of
difference, alterity, and critical detachment; rather, empathy needs to be carefully combined with them. An embodied,
relational understanding of an empathic imagination allows one to both regard the experience of people in the past on
their own terms and acknowledge how the actions of these people may be unacceptable to the investigator in light of his
or her experience and contemporary social and cultural environment.
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That  is,  what  values? […] I  have a  certain moral  vision,  let  us  say,  of  history.  Because I
come from the school… My master was Benedykt Zientara. That is important, because that
was one of the most objective, if in quotation marks “objective,” historians. In the sense
that he warned against anachronism. In other words, I cannot write that wife beating was a
moral wrong, if it was not a moral wrong.
R.K. In those times?
Yes.  I  can  write  that  they  beat  their  wives  and  that  there  was  no  sympathy  and  that  was
natural, but I cannot condemn them for beating their wives.
R.K. Even if we always write history from a contemporary point of view?
In this moment, we are in posthumanism and posthumanism promotes empathy. I reject it
because it is such a manipulation of the past. Because how can they defend themselves? It
is unfair towards the past. How should the past defend itself? […] I cannot impose on the
past my moral system. My obligation is to recreate this moral system and show what ends
it  served.  It  happens that  it  was criminal,  it  served crime.  That  was the Third Reich.  […]
(P13: 13:20)
Her  duty  as  a  historian  is  to  show  whether  a  certain  custom,  a  behavior  pattern  was  a
typical element of that culture, in which case it cannot be condemned as a moral ill. If, on
the other hand, it was a deviation at the time, then it can be judged negatively (13:22). The
past needs to be evaluated strictly on its own terms. This is how she conceives of
“objectivity” in the practice of history.
As a concrete example of how the judgment of the past works in the case of modern
Polish-Lithuanian history, she commented on the interwar conflict between Poland and
Lithuania. Her emphasis falls on the need to understand (and I would interpret this as
empathizing with) the reasoning of the people who lived at the time, their worldviews and
experience which shaped how they perceived the situation. Hence, she underlines that
Polish society could not imagine a separate Lithuania,due to hundreds of years of a shared
past. Only when you comprehend their reasoning, can you begin to point out how these
people did not take certain things into account or were mistaken in their judgments. There
is a hint of embodied reasoning in her reflection, when she asserts that a judgment must
pursue close familiarity with lived reality, a lived context, and reasoning of the people
involved in the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict. She is convinced that if the reasoning
of the Polish people is properly understood, Polish military intervention could be seen,not
as an attack against Lithuania or the Kaunas government, but as dictated by attachment to
a certain vision of the shared past.
What is the situation in Lithuania atthe beginning of the 20th century? It is not so obvious
that a Lithuanian nation exists. It is obvious that a Lithuanian fatherland exists, but it is not
obvious that there exists…The same will be with Belarusians, which were created by the
Radziwill family. Lithuanians had a better past, they had an elite and had history, also had
??ugosz from whom they could findsupport that they were descended from the Romans.
They had all those things. But that is not obvious. Hence, one would need to show that this
was not an attack on Lithuania, on Kaunas, that it was not an attack on Lithuania, […] and
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it is not an outcome of some extreme Polish nationalism or chauvinism. One only needs to
remember that we have behind us 400 or 300 years of shared history and, for these people,
a separate Lithuania was unfathomable. Because, of course, there are extreme nationalists,
that is another issue. On the other hand, what is important is to show real reasoning of
those people and then we can discuss – they were mistaken, or they did not take that into
account. But if I evaluate this, I make a mistake by not showing the reasoning. But
suchreasoning does not appear either in Lithuania, or in Poland. (P13: 13:23)
What is important, according to Manikowska, is that this reasoning of people in the past
would be shown on both SIDES of the conflict (13:24). Metaphorically structuring the
conflict as split into two sides can possibly conceal positions and opinions, which do not
neatly fit into two opposed categories, thus, preventing compromise and aggravating
conflict. However, she also added that internal diversity of views and opinions among
Lithuanians and Poles needs to be demonstrated by, for example, showing how the ideas
of Polish nationalists differed from those of Pi?sudski, who did not uphold nationalist
beliefs (13:24). When I pointed out that Polish school-history textbooks addressed this
issue in a very brief, schematic, fact-oriented explication of the disagreement,
Manikowska responded by underlining that this stems from a certain mythology and a lack
of knowledge about Polish-Lithuanian relations in the past (13:25). In addition, if one
looks at joint Polish-Lithuanian historiographic accounts, there is not a shared POSITION on
the past (13:25). I would raise a question whether there can be and whether there needs to
be a shared, stable POSITION on the past. Perhaps it would bemore important to encourage
mutual understanding and acceptance of different lived experiences, comprehend the
reasons why people experienced the past in very different ways rather than seek a single
account of the past. More importantly, Manikowska attributes blame to the Lithuanians for
this  lack  of  agreement  about  the  past.  Lithuanians  are,  in  her  view,  not  yet  ready  to  talk
about the past.
It follows from this mythology, lack of education. That is, one needs to remember that
these are not specialists. It is a difficult problem which requires familiarity with the
Lithuanian side as well. If you look at these joint works, certain Polish-Lithuanian
syntheses,  there  is  not  a  shared  position.  And  I  would  say  that  the  blame  lays  in  this
moment more on the Lithuanian side. I am not talking about school textbooks, only works.
Lithuanians are not yet ready to be able to say… (P13: 13:25)
As she further explains, “We had already mourned over Lithuania a long time ago and
there is nothingmore to discuss. Lithuanians do not realize that nobody wants to integrate
them, to take them. (Laughter)” (13:26). The problem with Polish historiography on the
interwar conflict, according to her, is that from a complete condemnation of Pi?sudski and
the Polish military intervention during the communist period, Polish historians TILTED TO
the completely opposite side, portraying him as a hero, whose actions are unequivocally
glorified. The trope of a balanced middle ground as a desirable quality and epistemic
virtue for historians is repeated in the metaphor of aPENDULUM,  which  she  employs  to
express the fluctuations of evaluations in Polish historiography from one extreme SIDE to
another.
256
Throughout the entire communist period, we had to spiton the Second Polish Republic in
the textbooks. In relation to this, “Chief, lead to Kaunas!” was presented exceptionally as a
crime. Pi?sudski was a criminal. There are these pendulums. It will return sometime later to
the middle, soon, I hope. […] That is, that is also a reaction of the latest historians to the
fact  that  it  was  needed  to  change  the  perspective  and  show that  it  was  not  like  that.  But
instead of showing how it was, this pendulum went to the other side. (P13: 13:29)
7.1.5 Conclusion
Even though the use of metaphors throughout the interview was low, the trope of the
middle ground or MIDDLE PATH was repeatedly evoked during the conversation, which
shows that it had a structuring effect on her way of thinking about the practice of history.
Historians, according to Manikowska, should not TILT TO EITHER SIDE. In order to access
the truth, according to her, the past should be seen on its own terms. Manikowska
accepted that the historian’s background, experience, beliefs, and values (BAGGAGE) play a
role in history writing to some extent, but cautioned against anachronistic judgment of the
past on the basis of present-day moral values. Although Manikowska described the latter
phenomenon as a consequence of empathy, I sought to show that what she means by
empathy is a first-person projection of personal ideas and values on the past rather than
empathic imagination.
According to Manikowska, history textbooks should avoid “manipulations” as far as it
is possible, although she readily admitted that it is impossible to completely avoid some
“manipulation” because textbook authors need to produce a synthesis, make sense of the
past and, therefore, make some choices about how they should depict the past. Describing
the personal input of authors, seeking to make sense of the past, as “manipulations”
reveals a negative evaluative judgment of an author’s “subjective” presence in the
narrative. The subjectivity of the author is perceived in opposition to the reality of the
past, which is externalized and objective. The knowing self should preferably be kept
under control, if it cannot be completely detached when it engages in the reconstruction of
the past reality that HIDES BEHIND SOURCES. The analysis reveals a hold of implicit
metaphors and image schemas underlying the subjective-objective dualism and the mind-
world gap, which inform her meta-theoretical assumptions, even if the overall use of
metaphors is low.
On the other hand, there is a hint of embodied reasoning in Manikowska responses,
particularly when she argues that an understanding of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict
requires understanding the reasoning of people in the past and what experience has shaped
their perception and behavior. She insists that a textbook should present BOTH SIDES of the
conflict.
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7.2 Michał Tymowski
Micha? Tymowski is  a Polish historian and a professor of the University of Warsaw. His
areas  of  specialization  encompass  history  of  Africa,  history  of  the  Middle  Ages  and
political anthropology. In 2005, Tymowski was awarded the Commander’s Cross of
Polonia Restituta, conferred for outstanding achievements in the field of science. I
interviewed Tymowski at the Institute of History of the University of Warsaw in June
2014.
Analyzed textbooks co-authored by Micha? Tymowski:
 Jolanta Choi?ska-Mika, W?odzimierz Lengauer, Micha? Tymowski, Katarzyna
Zieli?ska. Historia. Pozna? Zrozumie?.Podr?cznik dla liceum i technikum. Cz??? 1.
Zakres podstawowy [History. To Know and Understand. Textbook for upper
secondary schools, Part 1. Basic level]. Warszawa, PL: WSiP, 2009 (third edition).
 Tadeusz Cegielski, W?odzimierz Lengauer, Micha? Tymowski. Ludzie,
Spo?ecze?stwa, cywilizacje. Historia: Staro?ytno?? i ?redniowiecze. Cz??? I.
Podr?cznik dla liceum ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i technikum
[People, Societies, Civilization. History: Ancient history and the Middle Ages. Part 1.
Textbook for upper secondary schools]. Warszawa, PL: WSiP, 2002.
7.2.1 Michał Tymowski: Overwhelmed by individual facts
The  conversation  with  Micha? Tymowski  delved  straightaway  into  the  question  of
different interpretations of the past in school-history education. Tymowski emphasized
that there is a certain misalignment between professional history and school history in this
respect. It is likely that some pupils may struggle to understand diverse narratives about
past events. He perceives this situation as one of the biggest challenges facing school-
history education. School history, on the one hand, should draw pupils’ attention to
differences in interpretation of the past, but simultaneously needs to provide basic factual
knowledge. According to him, school history needs to find an approach which would
permit expanding pupils’ knowledge, including diverse evaluations and narratives, without
burdening them with too much factual material. The possibilities for dealing with different
narratives in school history are also narrowed down by the curriculum and the limited time
that is allocated to a concrete topic. All these factors add up to a complex dilemma of how
to adjust the curriculum and history-teaching approach in order to achieve different goals.
Later in the interview, Tymowski pointed out that, due to the limitations of the
curriculum, he was forced to diminish the chapters on culture in one of his textbooks
(15:21). Similarly, the scope of the curriculum makes the introduction of diverse
interpretations problematic. As Tymowski explains in the excerpt below, Polish school-
history curriculum encompasses both Polish and world history from the ancient history to
the 20th century. In practice, this means that time devoted to a single topic is very small,
leaving little or no possibility to discuss how this topic is perceived and interpreted by
different communities. By contrast, the history curriculum in England or France is theme-
or problem-oriented, which is more conducive to bringing up and discussing controversial
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issues. Even though there was an attempt in Poland to change the curriculum into a more
problem-oriented format, the proposal was met with resistance from proponents of the
existing curriculum model, according to which the entire history of Poland is taught in
schools (15:30).
He further elaborated his position on the history curriculum by employing the
metaphor of a GRAIN ELEVATOR. History teaching, according to the existing curriculum, is
like  a GRAIN ELEVATOR, which POURS facts on pupils and overwhelms them by the
multitude of individual facts. There is no possibility to raise a discussion, because pupils
DROWN under the weight of factual information. Simultaneously, he acknowledges that, in
order for a discussion to succeed, pupils do need to possess basic factual knowledge. But
Tymowski was not optimistic about the likelihood of different interpretations being taught
in school history. In addition to political resistance to changes in history teaching, he
pointed out that it was questionable to what extent teachers were prepared to navigate
different interpretations of the past and encourage nuanced discussions on such issues.
[...] There is no way to obtain this teaching about everything. Because the facts
overwhelm. It is as if someone got to a grain elevator and grains were poured on him, he
will not come out anymore, no one will do anything, because they will drown in these
specks,  which are so many.  Therefore,  it  is  a  great  problem as to how to teach history in
order to get to the skill of discussion. The discussion must be based on some facts, because
otherwise, when one doesn’t know anything, it’s very easy to discuss. Then there’s no
problem. Hence, one should learn something. On the other hand, it’s even a political
problem, not only an educational-cultural or psychological one. […] It will not be an easy
process. Not easy with respect to political resistance, with respect to the quality of teacher
personnel, which carries out such debatable problems not everywhere. […] (P15: 15:31)
7.2.2 Michał Tymowski: Depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past
Tymowski underlined that the Lithuanian narrative of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past
springs from the 19th century, from the context in which the modern Lithuanian nation
was emerging. A negative evaluation of the union with Poland is an outcome of the 19th
century Lithuanian way of looking at the past, shaped by values, needs, and interests
which prevailed at the time. He stressed that the perception of the union in the Middle
Ages by the politically defined Lithuanian nation was not the same as in the 19th century.
Evaluations depend on the lived context and experience. The Polish POINT OF VIEW of the
union is, on the other hand, positive and based on a certain sense of nostalgia for the
greatness of statehood in the past. As Tymowski explained, he put a lot of emphasis on the
Polish-Lithuanian Union in his textbooks, considering it to be an event of extraordinary
WEIGHT,  since  Polish-Lithuanian  unification  and  the  establishment  of  a  shared  state  is  a
precursor to the attempts to BUILD the European Union.
It is at any rate varied and surely not medieval or modern factors that determine it, but such
an  evaluation,  let  us  say,  from the  point  of  view of  the  19th  and  20th  centuries.  That  is,
from the point of view of the formation of modern nations and that, which the union meant
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from the point of view of formation of, for example, the Lithuanian nation in the long
scale, overa long time period. […] Poles maintained a positive evaluation and a certain
longing  for  the  greatness  of  the  state,  which  was  a  state,  something  we  today  call  “The
Republic of many nations.” […] On the other hand, it raises a certain nostalgia, hence, it is
also a contemporary point of reference, from the point of view of Polish evaluations. How
interesting… It was an extraordinarily interesting political, social, and cultural experiment,
interesting in every way, even from the contemporary point of view again. […] It is an
event of extraordinary weight. […] (P:15: 15:2)
I drew Tymowski’s attention to the fact that Polish textbooks, especially those published
in the 1990s, tended to refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth simply as “Poland.”
He explained this phenomenon as stemming from Polish identification with the
Commonwealth. However, according to him, it is increasingly understood in Poland that
the “Republic” was a much more complex state and should not be equaled to Poland
(15:17).
I mentioned that Tymowski’s textbooks stood out in the way they explicitly sought to
underline the separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the union with Poland.
Tymowski explained that it was necessary to show to pupils that even though the Union of
Krewo was an attempt of incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, it was impossible to
implement. Political elites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania preserved their sense of a
separate identity even after they had become linguistically Polonized. On the other hand,
Tymowski’s main approach to portraying the Polish-Lithuanian union was to compare it
to other analogous dynastic unions in the context of Europe. A comparative approach
allowed him to identify the unique stability and continuity of the Polish-Lithuanian union.
When considering the Polish evaluation of the union, he pointed out that despite the
overwhelmingly positive general assessment, he likewise wanted to point out some
negative or risky consequences of the union for Poland, such as becoming involved in the
wars with Moscow (15:4).
[…]  I  posit  a  question  –  what  was  it  that  the  union  of  Poland  with  Lithuania,  or  of  the
Crown,  the  Kingdom,  with  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  turned  out  to  be  so  stable?  It
could not be merely a dynastic phenomenon. There should have been some kind of deep
processes which entailed the stability of such a union. I discuss different unions, not only
the unions of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. […] But in each case I posit this
problem against the general background of unions in Europe and the particularity of this
union against this background. […]Later we contemplate, posit an issue to pupils that the
first union – Krewo – was, as a matter of fact, an incorporation. It was “applicare.” But it
turned out to be impossible in general and that is an emphasis of separateness of
Lithuanian state. It could not be incorporated. It was another organism, organized in
another way, socially different, and other most different traits. […] (P15: 15:4)
Tymowski’s consistently comparative approach enabled him to illustrate the positive
aspects  of  the  union  with  Poland  for  Lithuania.  As  he  explains  in  the  excerpt  below,  the
union created favorable circumstances for stability and continuity of Lithuanian statehood.
The adoption of Catholic Christianity, as one of the conditions of the union, distinguished
Lithuanians from the Orthodox population and safeguarded it against the attacks of
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Christian knights. A comparison of Lithuanians with other Baltic tribes, which did not
adopt Christianity and perished, permits one to argue that, according to Tymowski, the
Polish-Lithuanian union had a positive influence on Lithuanian sovereignty and statehood.
Tymowski argued that a significant aspect of the pedagogical approach should, therefore,
be to show the consequences of the past in contemporary times – to make history relevant
to pupils who live today and may find it difficult to comprehend how the past is linked to
the present. This is what makes history ALIVE,  as  opposed  to DEAD history, which only
outlines factual information for memorization and recollection, but does not explain how
the past manifests in the present. Revealing hints of embodied thinking, Tymowski
explained that what makes history ALIVE is  to  show  how  the  past  is  present  in
contemporary life, how its consequences are woven into the fabric of the present.
If it has to do with the beginning of the union, but also with its consequences until today, I
wrote  about  the  problem  of  Catholicism.  Hence,  from  the  point  of  view  of  Polish
evaluations, adoption of Catholicism by the still pagan Lithuanian elite was an important
factor in the long scale for the formation of the Lithuanian nation. That is how we imagine
it and these are two points of reference. Firstly, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had huge
areas with an Orthodox population[…] They could Ruthenize Lithuanians. Catholicism
created a possibility of distinction. […]. Among the Balts, those who didn’t Christianize,
perished. In other words, the baptism of Lithuania, and the union was one of the conditions
of baptism of Lithuania, is to a certain degree a possibility of its continuity. [...]I show
these differences, but I show them not just against the background of mutual relations, but
in terms of what happened in Europe. […] I think it’s best and it can make contemporary
pupils interested, because it needs to have some… Otherwise it’s dead for pupils. What can
it mean for a young person in Poland, if he is not especially interested in history? It seems
to them that the union didn’t leave any traces in this moment. We are a completely
differently shaped state in terms of ethnic, territorial, and any other aspects. […] (P15:
15:6)
7.2.2.1 Textbook I: Maintaining separateness in the union
Textbook I: Jolanta Choi?ska-Mika, W?odzimierz Lengauer, Micha? Tymowski, Katarzyna
Zieli?ska. Historia. Pozna? Zrozumie?.Podr?cznik dla liceum i technikum. Cz??? 1. Zakres
podstawowy [History. To Know and Understand. Textbook for upper secondary schools,
Part 1. Basic level]. Warszawa, PL: WSiP, 2009 (third edition).
The textbook conforms to the basic level history curriculum of the first year of upper
secondary school. It encompasses ancient history and history of the Middle Ages and
presents a unified course of Polish and world history. Micha? Tymowski authored three
chapters of this textbook, which depict the Early, High, and Late Middle Ages.
The  Lithuanian  state  is  first  introduced  in  a  section  on  states  of  East  and  Central
Europe in the 14–15th centuries. The textbook explains that Lithuanians established their
state in the 13th century with a capital in Vilnius (300). As the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
was increasingly threatened by attacks of the Teutonic Order, the Lithuanian Grand Duke
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Jogaila is said to have decided to Christianize Lithuania and make a union with the
Kingdom of Poland in 1385 (301). Christianity, adopted from Poland, incorporated
Lithuania into the field of Western culture and distinguished the Lithuanian elites from the
Ruthenian Orthodox population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (301, 314). Catholic
Christianity “restrained the influences of eastern culture in Lithuania” (314).
The textbook, first, shows that both sides had their own weighty interests in
establishing the union. Apart from the shared threat of the Teutonic Order, the Lithuanian
gentry are said to seek to acquire the same rights and privileges possessed by their Polish
counterparts (314). The union also strengthened the position of Jogaila, whose rule was
contested in dynastic conflicts in Lithuania (314). The Polish Church likewise held an
interest in the union, which led to new administrative positions in Lithuania (314).
Although, as the textbook explains, the Union of Krewo stipulated the incorporation of
Lithuania into Poland, it soon became obvious that merger of two such different states and
societies  was  not  possible  (315).  Lithuanians  are  said  to  strive  toward  maintaining  their
separateness from Poland. The textbook also mentions Vytautas as the person who best
expressed the Lithuanian desire for sovereignty by his eventually successful attempts to
become the Grand Duke of Lithuania (315).
The textbook’s attention to the separateness and sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania is further exemplified by a relatively lengthy depiction of the rule of Casimir
Jagiellon. The Lithuanian gentry broke off the union with Poland when they independently
elected Casimir Jagiellon as the grand duke of Lithuania in 1440 (322). Casimir Jagiellon
wanted to strengthen the separate status of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When the Polish
gentry, seeking to renew the union with Lithuania, proposed Casimir Jagiellon as King of
Poland, he accepted the throne, but guaranteed the Lithuanian gentry that offices in
Lithuania could only be taken by the Lithuanians and that the territory of the Grand Duchy
could not be modified (315).
Hence, the textbook depicts the union of Poland and Lithuania as a bond between two
separate states, which nevertheless were becoming increasingly similar in terms of
administrative and institutional arrangements. The textbook pays attention to the
Lithuanian view of the union with Poland and describes the efforts of Lithuanians to
preserve the sovereignty of their state. The presentation of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past,
however, remains limited in scope to fact-driven political and military history of medieval
states.  This  perhaps  can  be  explained  as  an  outcome  of  the  wide-ranging  scope  of  the
curriculum, which means that the textbook authors do not have enough room to delve
beyond a brief, generalized description of the most important facts of political Polish-
Lithuanian history. This mode of presentation, however, creates an effect, where the past
appears distanced and abstract, detached from the people who took part and experienced
the  events  in  question.  Far  from  bringing  the  past  into  “life,”  the  mode  of  the  textbook
presentation increases the distance between the past and pupils.
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7.2.2.2 Textbook II: The union in the wider European context
Textbook II: Tadeusz Cegielski, W?odzimierz Lengauer, Micha? Tymowski. Ludzie,
Spo?ecze?stwa, cywilizacje. Historia: Staro?ytno?? i ?redniowiecze. Cz??? I. Podr?cznik
dla liceum ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i technikum [People, Societies,
Civilization. History: Ancient history and the Middle Ages. Part 1. Textbook for upper
secondary schools]. Warszawa, PL: WSiP, 2002.
Michal Tymowski’s sections on the history of the Middle Ages consistently contextualize
the presentation of Polish history against the wider European background. Medieval
realities of Central and Eastern Europe, whether political, economic or cultural, are
compared to those of Western Europe. Introducing the union, Tymowski points out that
the Polish-Lithuanian union can be evaluated not only from THE POINT OF VIEW of Poland
and Lithuania, but also by comparison to other similar unions of medieval states in Europe
(325–327). The textbook provides a definition of a dynastic personal union in the Middle
Ages and then offers different examples of such unions in medieval Europe, ranging from
the Kalmar Union of Sweden, Norway and Denmark to the Castile-Aragon Union. In each
case, the aim is to demonstrate how a particular union functioned in practice and what its
main features were. The center of attention is not so much on the factual details, but the
phenomenon of medieval dynastic unions as such.
Importantly, the textbook describes the changing nature of the Union after 1385
enacted by the 1401 Union of Radom and Vilnius and the 1413 Union of Horod?o, which
increased Lithuania’s autonomy (328–329). It is noted that the separateness of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania was increasingly emphasized in the subsequently signed documents of
the union (328). On the other hand, the cultural ties between Poland and Lithuania grew
stronger, as Lithuania adopted the Polish system of political and administrative institutions
(329). The growing similarity between the two states is said to have been a slow process,
which nevertheless “created a more solid and durable basis for the union of both states
than merely a personal union” (329). The textbook emphasizes that the Polish-Lithuanian
Union was one of the most long-lasting unions in Europe.
Tymowski underlines that Polish-Lithuanian unification and the adoption of Catholic
Christianity by Lithuania enabled Lithuanians to differentiate their identity from the
Orthodox Ruthenian population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whose size exceeded
the ethnically Lithuanian population (333). The influence of Polish political, cultural,
religious norms and practices on Lithuania is acknowledged, but the textbook also does
not fail to mention the cultural influences reaching Poland from the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania (334), which distinguishes this textbook from its counterparts.
Lastly, textbook discusses positive and negative consequences of the Union for Poland
and Lithuania. Some of these consequences of the union are said to reach the modern
history of Poland and Lithuania, illustrating how the past is present, how it is woven into
the fabric of contemporary times. Importantly, the textbook mentions that the 19th century
brought about negative evaluations of the union by the modern Lithuanian nation (337),
which  perceived  the  union  as  the  main  cause  of  the  Polonization  of  Lithuanian  political
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elites. The difference between the Lithuanian and Polish evaluation of the union is
indicated.
To conclude, this textbook stands out both in terms of its meta-theoretical assumptions
and its concrete presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past. It metaphorically
conceptualizes the past as a process of change and continuity rather than as a static space
to be reconstructed. The authors sought to go beyond the usual presentation of historical
methodology focused exclusively on source criticism (identification of bias, assessment of
veracity,  and  the  authenticity  of  sources)  and  extended  it  with  examples  of  practical
application of other methodological approaches that contemporary historians use.
Presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in this textbook unequivocally departs
from an established fact-oriented narrative tradition. The factual information is included in
the depiction, but the author clearly sought to focus pupils’ attention on the phenomenon
of medieval unions as such and show how the Polish-Lithuanian union figures in the
European context. Lithuania’s interests in the union receive as much attention as those of
Poland. Lastly, the textbook acknowledges diverse and changing evaluations of the union
in Poland and Lithuania. Pupils are made aware of the fact that evaluations of the
Lithuanian gentry, who were contemporaries of the union, differed from the evaluations,
which emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries together with modern nationalist
movements.
7.2.3 Michał Tymowski: Pursuing truth
I asked Tymowski to elaborate on what ideas he sought to convey in the introductory
textbook chapters, which depict history as a disciplinary, scientific pursuit. His response
puts  a  lot  of  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  historians  study  reality,  which  does  not  exist
anymore. This is what, according to Tymowski, defines the peculiarity of history as a
discipline. Hence, the past is woven into the present, but simultaneously it is absent.
However, the examples of sources, which he employed to ground his argument, suggests
that his way of thinking about the past is nevertheless shaped more by the idea of the past
as woven into the present. For example, he spoke about language as a historical source,
which can provide historians information about life in the past and which, likewise,
through linguistic continuity, connects the present to the past. Lastly, Tymowski sought to
emphasize that historians attempt to reconstruct the past, but knowledge of the past is
always conditional and open to debate, modification, questioning. The past cannot be
known completely, totally.
I wanted to show pupils that, if I offer them different knowledge about history, it derives
from the reconstruction of history through historical sources. History is a very peculiar
science because,  on the one hand,  we relate  to  reality,  but  this  reality  does not  exist.  […]
when it comes to history, it’s reality which does not exist, and I wanted to put this into
thought to the pupils, that we investigate it only through what remained. And I write that
sources remained,  these sources are  typically considered as  written sources,  but  there are
different ones, there are archaeological and linguistic sources alike. Many persisted in
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language. One can investigate language; one can investigate its chronology, formation,
different influences and so on. […] (P15: 15:7)
Although pursuing truth is important to him, no historian can claim that he or she has
achieved the final, ultimate truth (15:8). As a result, it is important to show that there are
different POINTS OF VIEW on the past. Crucially, recognition of differences in interpretation
“builds a possibility of rapprochement. We will not come to the truth” (15:8). Getting to
know different interpretations of the past creates a potential for mutual understanding. A
distinct (embodied) POINT OF VIEW is,  therefore,  not  an  obstacle  to  understanding,  but  a
prerequisite for knowledge. It is impossible to achieve a single, final truth, a faithful
mimetic copy of past reality. Rather, historical knowledge depends on an embodied
relation to past reality.
Tymowski distinguished between the truth of factual propositions and the truth of
assemblages of facts. A propositional statement can be true or false. It is relatively easy to
establish  whether  a  propositional  claim  is  truthful,  i.e.  matches  the  reality  of  the  past.
However, Tymowski explained that since most historians go beyond individual facts and
pursue the truth of large-scale processes and conjectures, which Tymowski equated to
assemblages of facts, truth, understood as a single image of the past, becomes impossible
to attain.
We investigate facts and it is relatively easy to [establish – R.K.] truth in reference to facts.
Something either happened or did not happen. On the other hand, a historian is not content
with this. There is a neopositivist stance in historiography, but it doesn’t suffice for
historians. Hence, they try to investigate processes, conjectures, that, which Braudel called
longue durée, or some phenomenon which goes throughout centuries. The Polish-
Lithuanian union was just such a phenomenon over the longue durée. It changed its
character and so on, but it persisted through centuries. But accumulation of facts, these
assemblages, which are processes, phenomena, conjectures or even the longue durée, this
is a controversial thing. When it comes to facts, we need not discuss – whether the Battle
of Grunwald was or wasn’t. But its evaluation can be varied, its influence on the following
events. When it comes to the longue durée,  there  is  much  material  for  varied  views.
(P15:15:9)
7.2.3.1 Textbook II: The past in the present
Textbook II: Tadeusz Cegielski, W?odzimierz Lengauer, Micha? Tymowski. Ludzie,
Spo?ecze?stwa, cywilizacje. Historia: Staro?ytno?? i ?redniowiecze. Cz??? I. Podr?cznik
dla liceum ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i technikum [People, Societies,
Civilization. History: Ancient history and the Middle Ages. Part 1. Textbook for upper
secondary schools]. Warszawa, PL: WSiP, 2002.
The textbook is intended for the first year of upper secondary schools. It combines Polish
and world history and encompasses ancient and medieval history. Micha? Tymowski is the
author of the fourth part of the textbook on the Middle Ages.
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The  authors  emphasized  in  the  preface  that  their  aim  was  not  only  to  deliver
knowledge defined in the curriculum, but also to teach pupils how to independently shape
an IMAGE of the past and formulate value judgments (8). According to them, history is not
“a COLLECTION of ready-made FORMULAS,” which need to be memorized. Rather, history
is a “creative area, open to the intellectual needs of a contemporary person” (8). The
textbook states that “a PICTURE of the past,” which is shaped by historiography, changes
with time, since the questions we pose to the past change (8). Hence, historiography is
presented as closely linked to present-day interests, views, challenges and position of the
historian in his or her society. The present-day context and experience shape history
writing through the questions we pose to the past. Historical knowledge emerges in the
textbook depiction as open-ended, constantly evolving, and open to discussion.
Moreover, the contents of the textbook are not explicitly focused on political history,
but rather, as the textbook title already suggests, on people, societies, and civilizations. A
lot of attention is paid to economic, cultural history, history of religion, which are not
treated separately from each other or from political history, but are combined in the
textbook chapters. The authors justified this arrangement of the textbook materials by
arguing that politics, economics, and culture did not function as distinct and isolated areas
in the past, just as they are interwoven in the life of contemporary societies (9). Polish
history is presented as part of the history of European civilization, which illustrates how
Tymowski put into practice his approach of contextualization, which he inherited from his
master, Polish historian Marian Ma?owist.
The introductory chapter on history as a discipline, authored by Tadeusz Cegielski, a
colleague of Micha? Tymowski, stands out from other analogous textbooks in that it tries
to bring history closer to pupils, to show its relevance in terms comprehensible to pupils.
The textbook raises the point that by investigating the past, we can pose questions to the
present (14). For example, history can explain why they, pupils, speak Polish and not
Latin  or  German,  or  why  they  wear  jeans  and  sweaters  and  not,  like  the  Greeks  in
antiquity, woolen tunics. By posing such questions, the author seeks to show how the past
can explain and manifest in the present. The past is depicted not as a pre-given, static
space to be reconstructed, but as a process of change and continuity. To illustrate this
point, the textbook reveals connections between the popularity of jeans today and various
aspects of cultural, political, and social history, which contributed to jeans becoming such
a widely used item of clothing. Moreover, the textbook explains how jeans could be used
as a historical source in the fields of cultural anthropology and semiotics (14). The
example of jeans demonstrates the interconnectedness of different spheres of life in the
past and present. It also reveals how an object can serve as a rich source of information
about the past, how the past is present in ordinary things of everyday use. Jeans, as an item
of clothing, can connect pupils to the past.
Furthermore, the textbook discusses cyclical and linear conceptions of time (17–19). It
is illustrated how the widely accepted conception of time in a given society is closely
connected to its lifestyle and culture. Pupils need to reflect on why, for example,
mechanical  clocks  did  not  have  a  minute  hand  for  a  long  time after  their  invention  (20).
Engagement with things from the past can reveal something about the life of people in the
past, their ways of thinking and being. The past is, in other words, embodied in things
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from  the  past.  Pupils  are  also  asked  to  reflect  on  their  own  conception  of  time,  their
relation to the past and the future, to consider when and why the second hand of clocks
became necessary (23). The main text, sources, and exercises contribute to the idea that
the conception of time is not given or static and that it is very much dependent on lived
experience, contemporary needs and interests of people, and the societies of which they
are a part.
In terms of an evaluation of the past, the textbook cautions pupils against committing
an anachronism, when, for example, an 11th-century event is evaluated in terms of values
and  beliefs  of  the  19th  or  20th  centuries  (22).  Hence,  as  the  textbook explains,  the  wars
waged against Czechs in the 12th century by the Duke of Poland Boles?aw the Brave can
be anachronistically regarded by a contemporary Polish historian as a positive
phenomenon from a nationalist POINT OF VIEW,  whereas  a  Czech  historian  sees  the  same
events negatively (22). The author notes that an event should be assessed from a POINT OF
VIEW contemporary to that event. Consequently, the territorial annexations implemented
by Boles?aw the Brave appear as a mistake, since they received a reprisal of the Emperor
of the Holy Roman Empire, but the textbook also draws attention to the fact that territorial
annexations and plundering need to be understood as a typical state practice in early
feudalism (22). The textbook emphasizes that the task of historians is not so much that of
evaluation,but of an explanation of facts and phenomena (23). On the other hand, it is the
reader, who is supposed to assess the knowledge provided by historians in terms of his or
her personal values (23). The manifestation of historian’s own values in assessment of the
past is treated as an instance of subjectivity, which should be kept under control, but
which is nevertheless inevitable to a certain extent because “history is a FUNDAMENTAL
part of our culture. Culture is BUILT on the BASIS of values. The problem is, however, what
values we choose. Our evaluation will depend on this choice” (22). The textbook, thus,
suggests that it is crucial to be aware of our own values and beliefs in our investigation of
the past, but simultaneously encourages pupils to comprehend the value system of the
people in the past rather than project contemporary values onto the past, anachronistically.
In terms of a methodology of historical research, the textbook introduces comparative,
philological and statistical methods used by historians (26–27). Emphasis is placed on
specific rules of historical methodology, which enable historians to make sources “SPEAK”
(26). Instead of merely describing the procedures of source criticism and analysis, the
textbook provides concrete examples of what source analysis would mean in the case of a
medieval  chronicle  as  well  as  in  the  case  of  a  history  of  jeans,  where  researchers  face  a
challenge of great multitude of diverse sources (27–30). The textbook draws attention to
practices of falsification of sources by noting that this constitutes an especially acute
methodological problem for the historians of the 20th century (30). Examples of
falsification of “the IMAGE of the past” are provided from the history of the Soviet Union
as well as Nazi Germany, such as the retouching of photographs or the distortion of past
reality in propaganda materials (30).
The last phase of historical research, or historical synthesis, is said to be the most
complicated with regard to various theoretical problems, which may arise at this stage
(35). The textbook cautions that each historical hypothesis needs to be formulated in a
way, which would allow verifying its truthfulness (35). Hypotheses should avoid
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ambiguity and should be articulated in simple and precise language (35). On the other
hand, the textbook also acknowledges that:
Formulating final conclusions, or synthesis, a historian must also remember that they
depend on methods adopted by him. Investigating some problem by means of two
methods, we obtain two different conclusions. There is nothing wrong in this, if we posit
that a single simple truth about our world does not exist. Reality created by a human being
is always complex, therefore, individual research methods unveil only some elements and
aspects of life. History needs to be understood, not swotted up. (35)
The textbook authors acknowledge that there is not a single truth and explain that different
conclusions of historians are an outcome of different methodology and models of
explanation. A chosen model can only provide knowledge about a particular aspect of a
complex past reality.
7.2.4 Michał Tymowski: Values in history writing
Tymowski’s own way of seeing and relating to the past has been shaped by his
background, education, lived experience. In the passage below, he described his two major
intellectual influences – the Polish historian Marian Ma?owist and the French historian
Jacques Le Goff, to whom he refers as his MASTERS. Drawing parallels to the organization
of medieval craftsmanship, he perceived himself as an apprentice of his masters, whose
scholarly attitudes, methods, practices, and values he acquired during his education. This
ensures that a certain continuity of scholarly behavior and ideas persists through time. For
example, Tymowski remarked that he inherited his attention to the comparative method
from his Polish master who always deemed it necessary to investigate Polish history by
contextualizing it within the European history. Like Manikowska, he was shaped by the
methodology, attitudes, and dispositions of the Warsaw School. Tymowski sought to pass
on this comparative method both to his university students and school pupils by devoting a
lot of attention to comparison and contextualization in school-history textbooks. This
shows how academic history bears an influence, via the embodied presence of the author,
on textbook contents and a manner of presentation of the past.
Yes,  I  am a historian of  Africa.  I  have been educated in seminars  on the Middle Ages in
Poland and France. In Poland, my master was, over here I have his portrait, that is Marian
Ma?owist.[…] Hence, my history of Africa is entangled in universal history. It is not only
investigations of Africa itself, but comparative, different processes and so on. […] Later I
studied with Le Goff, Jacques Le Goff died now, I was in his seminar in Paris. […] Later I
switched over to political anthropology, to types of states, types of pre-state organizations.
[…]I have very often, and you saw this in the case of the union with Lithuania, a
comparative gaze. I showed other European unions, I showed it in a comparative way. I
inherited this comparative method from my master, he taught me that. To examine each
phenomenon in the context of similar phenomena. He investigated the history of Poland
but he never distinguished it from European history. He considered that the history of
Poland does not exist by itself.[…] (P15: 15:20)
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In the passage below, Tymowski articulates the idea that values, which stem from lived
experience of the historian or author, inevitably enter historical knowledge. Historians
cannot BREAK AWAY from values, because it would mean BREAKING AWAY from their own
person. Certain values had persisted IN HIM through the years, while others changed,
because he changed as a historian. Hence, values are not static, relative, and isolated from
lived experience. His values are very much connected to his lived environment and
academic background. The changes in the discipline of history effected changes IN him as
a historian and his POINT OF VIEW. He underlined that history was interesting only to the
extent that it is connected to contemporaneity, himself, and his recipients, which implies
that history should not be regarded in isolation from embodied lived experience, whether
of the author or the readers. Simultaneously, however, a historian can and should be aware
of the otherness of the past, of how the values of the people in the past differed from
contemporary values. The historian’s ability to recognize the alterity of the past need not
be compromised by his or her embodied presence in historical knowledge. He
distinguished the influence of anthropology as particularly conducive to the work of
historians seeking to understand the life of people in the past and its alterity.
You know, there is no way to set us free from this. That is, we are people of the 20th, I am
more of the 20th, but likewise of 21st century and certain values, which are in me, are
valuable for  me,  are  important  for  me,  and there is  no way to set  us  free from this.  It’s  a
great dilemma for a historian concerning evaluation, which inevitably results from his
formation.  […]  As  I  look  at  the  beginnings  of  my  work,  there  are  certain  things  which  I
have kept, which persist in me. But I learned many new things, something, which I did not
know. Or I bump into some discussions, which change my point of view. Hence, it is not
so that a man is unchanging. I think that these changes, which arose in me, are visible even
in  the  books  I  wrote.  Hence,  there  is  no  way  to  break  away  from  myself.  It  is  a  great
dilemma if history is an art or science. […] A lot has changed in historical science and,
hence,  in  me.  But  there  is  a  certain  set  of  values,  which  we  value.  It  is  an  extremely
difficult thing. Perhaps it is even impossible to break away from it. When I write, I am as I
am. The only thing which I can understand and try to understand is that, for example, the
values of people in the Middle Ages were other. To penetrate them is very difficult. But
here anthropology helps, because anthropology, or science about the culture of man, shows
its changeability. […] (P15: 15:26)
Tymowski  drew  attention  to  differences  in  how  historians  related  to  Africa  in  the  19th
century and today. These divergences show very clearly how the background and lived
context of the cognizing self affects the nature of historical knowledge that is produced.
The questions historians pose reveal values, attitudes, and practices they bring to the
research process. Values are inevitably part of the research process because they are tied
to  the  lived  experience  of  the  inquirer.  In  this  regard,  Tymowski  maintains  an  embodied
understanding of historical practice.
[…] The point is that the way we are entails the kind of questions we pose to the past. If
we see the importance of the role of women, not only the role in the family, but also social,
political,  every  kind,  today,  so  we  ask  what  it  was  like  in  the  past.  We  can  respond
differently, but this question occurs to us. Hence, we will not break away from our time.
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We can say that we cannot at all know what questions historians will pose in one hundred
years, because we do not live in one hundred years. They have, will have some ideas,
which the same way as we ask about certain things, whereas a 19th century historian has a
conception of civilizing of backward people. And they look at Africa from the point of
view of  civilizing.  […]  Hence,  if  you  ask  me  about  a  system of  values,  it  is  built  in  me
through the social, national, ethnic, European groups to which [I belong – R.K.]. It depends
on the feelings which are in me and which indicate circles with which I identify. […] (P15:
15:27)
Amidst the multitude of values and different interpretations of the past, the role of the
ministry, according to Tymowski, is to provide a certain direction, a framework for history
education, which would take into account different views. It should not outline a single,
narrowly conceived interpretation, but it should nevertheless indicate a direction on what
kind of values are important to encourage through school history (15:23).
Tymowski’s concluding remark perhaps best summarizes his idea of the purpose of
history.  History,  for  him,  is  a FOUNDATION for getting to know and understand the
otherness of people. History provides resources for mutual understanding and empathy to
the extent that it is OPEN to diversity.
[…] History is a foundation in relation to other people, to other different cultures. It seems
to me that this is the most important aim for the future – to open history to diversity. (P15:
15:37)
7.2.5. Conclusion
Tymowski stood out in his embodied understanding of the historian’s relation to historical
knowledge and past reality. What makes historical knowledge ALIVE, according to him, is
its ability to reveal how the past is present, how the past is woven in contemporary life.
Historical knowledge should bear a link to life, both past and present. It should not DROWN
pupils in innumerable, static, DEAD facts.
Tymowski underlined that history writing is inevitably shaped by present-day values,
which enter historical knowledge through an author’s background and lived experience.
Values are not static or relative; rather, they change together with the cognizing self. They
are a reflection of changes taking place in the life of the cognizing self. To try to eliminate
values from historical knowledge would equal an attempt to BREAK AWAY from one’s self.
Objectivity, as a completely detached, disembodied relation to the past, is not possible.
This does not mean, however, that truth is irrelevant to historians or that each narrative is
as good as any other narrative. It only suggests, for Tymowski, that one single, final truth
is  not  attainable.  As  long  as  history  prepares  pupils  to  be  open  to  different  narratives  of
experience, it can provide resources for mutual understanding and empathy. In this sense,
history emerges as a FOUNDATION for encountering the otherness of people in the past.
His engagement with the Polish-Lithuanian past is shaped by his comparative
approach, which propels him to compare the Polish-Lithuanian union to other analoguos
medieval unions in Europe. Instead of focusing on national PERSPECTIVES, his scholarly
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approach, inherited from the university training, focuses his attention on the meaning of
the Polish-Lithuanian union in the wider European context.
7.3 Robert Śniegocki
Robert ?niegocki is a Polish historian and a history teacher in the Zamoyska and
Modrzejewska Lyceum in Poznan. He is a graduate of the Adam Mickiewicz University in
Poznan. ?niegocki is an author and a co-author of the textbook series for upper secondary
schools, published by the publishing house “Nowa Era.” The textbook series has been
very successful. According to ?niegocki, approximately a quarter of Polish high-school
pupils were studying from this textbook series during its years of publication. The first
edition of the series, published 2002–2004, went through ten impressions by 2013. I
interviewed ?niegocki in September 2014 via Skype.
Analyzed textbooks authored and co-authored by Robert ?niegocki:
 Textbook I. Marek Kami?ski, Gra?yna Panko, Robert ?niegocki. Historia:
?redniowiecze. Podr?cznik dla I klasy liceum ogólnokszta???cego, liceum
profilowanego i technikum. Cz??? 2 [History: the Middle Ages. Textbook for the 1st
year of upper secondary schools. Part 2]. Pozna?, PL: Nowa era, 2010
 Textbook II. Marek Kami?ski, Robert ?niegocki. Historia od Renesansu do czasów
napoleo?skich. Podr?cznik dla II klasy ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i
technikum. Cz??? 1 [History from the Renaissance to the Napoleonic times. Textbook
for the 2nd year of upper secondary schools. Part 1]. Warszawa, PL: Nowa Era, 2010
 Textbook III. Robert ?niegocki. Historia. Burzliwy wiek XX. Podr?cznik dla III klasy
ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i technikum [History. Tumultuous 20th
century. Textbook for the 3rd year of upper secondary schools]. Warszawa, PL: Nowa
Era, 2010
7.3.1 Robert Śniegocki: History education should enable one to understand
the present
?niegocki described his conception of history teaching as focused on the development of
pupils’ skills and the capacity to understand the contemporary world. Instead of
overwhelming pupils with innumerable factual details and dates, it is more important, for
?niegocki, that pupils are able to understand historical processes and how the past relates
to the present.
The point is perhaps to understand the contemporary world. Today. What is happening
here? This is perhaps the most important, because going into excessive historical details is
not always readable to a pupil. […] Understanding, understanding certain processes – how
it looked back in the day, how it once functioned and whether it may be eventually useful
today.  But  that  is  very  disguised,  that  is,  I  do  not  communicate  that  directly,  but  try  to
disguise it in certain information. (P17: 17:2)
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When, later in the interview, I asked him how he would teach history if he had complete
freedom to adopt a preferred approach, ?niegocki reiterated the emphasis on the purpose
of history teaching in enabling one to understand the present. History teaching should not
be  an  end  in  itself,  but  rather  a  means  to  better  comprehend the  contemporary  world.  In
consequence, he would shift the thematic weight of the curriculum from the ancient
history and history of the Middle Ages to the history of the 19th and 20th centuries, which
offer, according to him, more insights into contemporary times.
I would partially reduce the materials which concern very old history, or ancient history,
the Middle Ages. I would leave only that which is indispensable for understanding the
present, because, for me, the most important aim of teaching history is not to solely teach
about history, but to teach in such a way that we could understand the current time. Hence,
some materials are, in general, unnecessary for me of this kind about the Middle Ages. I
would focus on the 19th, 20th century and would compel pupils as much as possible to
independent thinking. To reduce the factual material in favor of thinking, understanding
certain phenomena. (P17: 17:23)
In terms of the pedagogical approach that seeks to develop historical thinking and
understanding, I asked ?niegocki how he presented history as a discipline and its most
important features to pupils. In the excerpt below, ?niegocki explains that pupils need to
realize  that  historical  knowledge  should  be  based  on  a  variety  of  sources.  An
epistemological dimension is important in this explanation. Pupils need to differentiate
subjective  and  objective  information  in  a  source,  which  means  that  they  are  required  to
identify bias and subjectivity in a source. ?niegocki, thus, reiterates the standard historicist
emphasis  on  the  “historical-critical  method”  –  verification  of  sources,  issues  of
authenticity and veracity. Pupils become acquainted with a mode of the discipline of
history as it functioned in the 19th century.
From the very beginning, I try to indicate that history must really be based on sources, on
different  type of  sources,  that  history cannot  be based on a  single formulation,  because it
may not be authentic or it may be unreliable, because it is subjective. From the very
beginning, I try to show that it is important that they would understand that there can be
different points of view. Sometimes, the matriculation exam looks as though here, for
example,  there  are  questions  added  as  to  whether  a  source  is  objective  and  then  a  pupil
must ascertain on the basis of who wrote it, when it was written, whether it is objective or
not. (P17: 17:4)
7.3.2 Robert Śniegocki: Objectivity in the midst of different interpretations of
the past
I asked ?niegocki to elaborate on how he understands what objectivity in history is. He
lists questions that pupils should apply in a standard source analysis that are meant to help
assess the authenticity and veracity of a source. Objectivity is a lack of bias, prejudice,
propagandistic manipulation. The aim of source analysis is to discover bias-free, truthful,
objective information about the past. ?niegocki employs an ocular-optic metaphor to
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convey  the  subjectivity  of  sources,  which  deal  with  national  histories.  As  he  points  out,
nation-based prejudices are the most fixed, static form of subjective GAZE on the past. The
structuring implication of this metaphor is that there exists an objective past, which is
detached from the viewer/knower and his or her subjective understanding of it. The
objective past is the only past that concerns historians and that constitutes the goal of their
research. The purpose of source analysis is to overcome the subjectivity of sources that
prevents the knower from getting at the objective past.
We look at the date of publication of a given source. Theoretically, the closer to a given
event,  the more objective a  source is.  Furthermore,  could the author  write  the truth? Was
he not under some pressure? Further, did he want to write the truth? Is what he wrote not
by any chance some propagandistic work? And on the basis of all of this a pupil is capable
of answering questions more or less independently. Then there are analyses of texts: Which
prejudices  does  a  person  get  rid  of  with  most  difficulty?  It  results  from  this  that,  for
example, it is most difficult to get rid of prejudices towards nations. That is, if we like
some nation, then we like it. If we do not like it, we do not like it. It is even easier to get rid
of bias towards ideology, towards historical figures. A subjective gaze on the history of
nation – it is quite strongly fixed. (P17: 17:5)
However, reviews of his textbooks made ?niegocki realize that objectivity is very hard,
even impossible, to achieve. As he explains in the passage below, the reviewers disclosed
that he had noticeable political views, which manifested in the textbooks through the
choice of facts, textual and visual materials, as well as their arrangement. Implicitly,
?niegocki’s political sympathies surfaced in the textbook contents through, for example,
the number of pictures of the Chief of State, Józez Pi?sudski, as compared to those of the
leader of the National Democrats Roman Dmowski. But, should textbooks actually aim to
efface any traces of value judgment and preference? What kind of message would such a
textbook convey to pupils?
I would argue that a textbook author, who purports to treat each ideological position or
opinion completely equally, evades the very cognitive task of historical thinking, which is
expected from pupils. Textbook authors should set an example of how to evaluate the past
adequately: to pay due regard to different ways of being, thinking, and acting in the past in
its own context; but, such authors should likewise acknowledge the ways certain positions
may be more justified than others. Criteria and reasons for evaluation need to be spelled
out. Textbooks should teach historical thinking by concrete examples in the depiction of
the past.
It seemed to me, I used to think in my naiveté that I am very objective. On the other hand,
there were reviews which suggested that I have very pronounced political views, which
surprised me a little, but after their analysis I arrived at a conclusion that, indeed,
something like that came about perhaps. The choice of facts itself, of texts already
immediately suggests that I have certain political views. And only then I found out that it
suffices  to  look  through  my  book  and  it  is  known  that  I  have  such  and  such  views.  For
example, that I like Pi?sudski, but I do not like the nationalists, Dmowski, for example.
And  I  say:  OK,  it  makes  sense,  it  is  visible.  And  I  was  surprised,  because,  for  example,
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there were more pictures of Pi?sudski than of Dmowski. To be honest, it made me realize
that it is difficult to practice objectivity. I wanted to, but it didn’t come out. (P17: 17:8)
In circumstances when we are faced with different narratives about the past, an important
issue becomes how to decide which interpretations or narratives should be included into
textbooks. By posing this question to ?niegocki, I managed to get a better grasp of his idea
of  objectivity.  In  order  to  practice  objectivity,  the  aim for  him as  an  author  is  to ESCAPE
evaluation of the past and to show, where it applies, different POINTS OF VIEW. He admits
that it is, however, difficult to step out of one’s self and assess one’s own bias or
prejudice. To be objective, to him, does not mean that one completely eradicates the
presence of the subjective viewer/knower in historical knowledge. Rather, the
viewer/knower presents his or her VISION,  which  he  tries  to  explain  and  justify.  As
?niegocki admits, objectivity, as such, does not exist. In practice, such strict objectivity,
cleansed from any traces of subjectivity, would amount to not more than a CALENDAR, a
COLLECTION of dates. Objective knowledge only provides information about static states
of the world, disembodied factual information, which, however, does not enable historical
thinking and understanding. Moreover, even history written as a CALENDAR filled  with
dates, through its particular selection of dates, can express a specific and, thus, not an
objective POINT OF VIEW.
This  is  problematic.  (Laughter).  That  is,  it  would  be  best  if  it  was  my  version,  no,  but  it
will not work out. I hope that I escaped this – not to evaluate. I tried to, where there were
doubts, I tried to show different points of view, but I don’t know if I succeeded. Someone
else should assess it, as if from outside. I already said: the cat is out of the bag, I have more
views, more arguments in favor of Pi?sudski than against. I was convinced that I was
objective, it seemed that… They detected that it wasn’t so.
R.K. By the word “objective,” do you mean that there is a balance?
I tried, yes, because objectivity as such in general does not exist. That is, if we did that, it
would be a collection, a calendar with dates and nothing more, and even the choice of dates
itself would be subjective. On the other hand, I tried to show such a version, such a vision
and attempted to sort it out. (P17: 17:11)
?niegocki supported the idea that pupils should learn about the nature of historical
knowledge, but pointed out that the chronological scope of the Polish history curriculum is
an obstacle to teaching history in a more reflexive way. This issue was likewise identified
by other textbook authors. The main problem is that pupils need to learn about the past
“from beginning to end.” They are expected to assimilate a lot of factual information from
both Polish and European/world history, which means that little time and capacity are left
to engage in discussion of different interpretations. What he consistently attempts to do in
history lessons is to note to pupils how historical knowledge may be shaped by
contemporary political interests.
But, first of all, there’s a problem, because there’s typically little time in school. History
teaching is very extensive. From the beginning to contemporaneity. We teach about the
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U.S. and Poland. Time may be lacking for a proper analysis. But here it’s sometimes called
the politics of history. I try to attract attention to the fact that, sometimes we are speaking
about history, when really, we are speaking about the present. (P17: 17:6)
?niegocki is aware of contemporary interests and values in historical knowledge as a more
general phenomenon. He likens it metaphorically to an ideological WAR, where history is
used as an instrument of warfare. For example, the choice of topics in an annual History
Olympiad in Poland, a national history competition for pupils, reflects well the current
political preoccupations and interests. The ongoing war in Ukraine informs the thematic
focus of questions in the Olympiad. This can also be observed in history textbooks, which
devote increasingly more attention to the history of China, in relation to the growing
global influence of China (17:7).
?niegocki  noted  that  he  sees  how  confused  pupils  become  when  they  are  faced  with
several different interpretations of the same event. Nevertheless, he sees it as an important
task of history education to make pupils aware that historical knowledge is not,
metaphorically speaking, SACRED WORDS or THE BIBLE.  Pupils  can  and  should  learn  to
question the historical knowledge that they receive. They should realize that historical
interpretations are not static, that they keep changing and that historical OPTICS change
from generation to generation. He uses the latter powerful optical metaphor to convey the
idea of the subjectivity of vision. In other words, historical interpretation and meaning of
the past depend to a great extent on the position of the viewer, on the angle at which he or
she observes the past.
Below, ?niegocki explains how he discusses divergent interpretations with pupils. The
main idea is to demonstrate that there are different ways to make sense of the same event.
In a standard exercise, pupils are required to assess an event or phenomenon by finding
arguments in favor of and against that event/phenomenon. On the basis of these, pupils
then need to formulate their own opinion on the matter. This exercise, however, is focused
not so much on considering how and why people interpreted the past differently, but on
arriving at a judgment of a particular event/phenomenon. In other words, if pupils analyze
divergent interpretations of the American Civil War, they do not necessarily engage with
the question of why and how people on both sides of the conflict came to uphold such
views and values.
I see in pupils of lyceum that when they realize it is possible to look at one thing from four
points of view, they already get into a fit, do not know what to do. On the other hand, I
think that at the level of lyceum we ought to explain to pupils that there are problems with
sources  and  that  there  may  be  different  evaluations  of  the  same  event.  I  think  it’s  very
necessary. That they would not treat a historical text, which they sometimes received, as a
religious Bible, that those are sacred words. They must see that even optics change
sometimes from generation to generation. We see certain things completely differently.
[…]
R.K. How do you do this in practice during a lesson?
Sources. Sometimes on the basis of sources, exercises. It is possible to do this obviously by
telling normally. But I try, for example, to do it with sources, I show different sources on
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the  same  [event  –  R.K.]  from  different  points  of  view.  […]  Most  frequently  from  our
Polish history really. For example, it concerns the Warsaw Uprising and the evaluation of
the Warsaw Uprising, of the communist government. For example, why did the Poles
support some communists and not others? The problem of collaboration during World War
II  in  some  societies,  how  it  looked,  how  it  is  evaluated  from  the  point  of  view  of
Frenchmen.  […]  The  American  Civil  War,  the  problem  of  slavery  in  the  US  is  shown
differently in historical sources. It seemed to be unambiguous – slavery in the US – but it
could also be evaluated differently. The 19th century colonialism. And then we have such a
nice question, which appears somewhere there – “consider.” And then pupils need to find
arguments for, arguments against, and then still to express their own opinion. […] (P17:
17:10)
I noted, however, that there were instances in his textbook, where an event or behavior of
a person raises controversies and had been interpreted differently in Polish and Lithuanian
historiographies, but this diversity is not represented in the textbook. The concrete case
concerns the person of Janusz Radziwi??, a powerful 17th century Lithuanian magnate
who, in 1655, amidst the wars with Moscow and Sweden, took the decision to break the
Polish-Lithuanian Union and signed a treaty with Sweden, thereby establishing the
Swedish-Lithuanian  Union.  In  the  textbook,  pupils  are  given  a  task  to  write  a  formal
accusation of Janusz Radziwi?? as a traitor of the Republic: “Using freely chosen
publications or the Internet, find examples of anti-state activities of some magnates and
write a speech, in which you accuse […] Janusz Radziwi?? of betrayal.” I quoted this task
to  ?niegocki  as  an  example  of  a  very  clear  value  judgment  of  a  historical  figure,  whose
deeds otherwise cannot be assessed univocally. ?niegocki argued that the textbook
permitted  a  pupil  to  form  a  different  opinion,  but,  as  further  analysis  shows,  this  is  not
really the case. Thus, the textbook teaches pupils to judge him as a traitor, but does not
guide them to understand the lived experience of Radziwi??.
The discussion of this controversy, however, brought up another issue concerning
presentation of the past in fictional literary accounts. ?niegocki noted that the Polish
opinion of Janusz Radziwi?? had been traditionally shaped by the historical novel The
Deluge by Nobel Prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz, in which the Lithuanian nobleman is
portrayed particularly negatively because of his supposed treason and alliance with the
Swedes.  The  novel  was  also  later  made  into  a  film  under  the  same  name  by  Jerzy
Hoffman.  ?niegocki  explained  how he  attempted  to  show that  a  literary  depiction  of  the
past by Sienkiewicz does not correspond to the actual past – that Sienkiewicz’s vision was
shaped by his creative ideas more than by a concern for accuracy. However, I would add
that  a  one-sided  emphasis  on  the  fictionalization  of  the  past  in  artistic  works,  while  it  is
necessary for the development of critical thinking, omits an important aspect of historical
thinking. Namely, pupils need to realize that a biased presentation of the past in
Sienkiewicz’s novel can also constitute a valuable historical source for different kinds of
enquiries  about  19th  century  Romanticism in  Poland,  the  ideas,  values,  and  influence  on
historical memory of this movement.
R.K. I know that Janusz Radziwi??….
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…is taken from the point of view of Poles as a traitor. I sought to write there somewhere
that his point of view could be different. On the other hand, there is an additional problem
here  that  sometimes  we  give  out  exam  questions  also  on  the  basis  of  literature.  That  is,
such tasks are awarded many points, where a pupil is able to use knowledge of history, but
also knowledge of literature. And we have The Deluge, where this Janusz Radziwi?? is
shown in an almost singularly negative way, almost. On the other hand, here, from this
angle, it was about examining these figures. Use the knowledge, which you can search for
in sources.
R.K. Yes, there was a task to compare a fragment of The Deluge and then a description of
the historian Adam Hirsten.
How it seemed according to his opinion.
R.K. So I understand that the aim was to show how a literary description may not
correspond to the truth.
Precisely. Completely different or partially different than a literary description.
Sienkiewicz had, firstly, different sources. Secondly, he had some kind of a vision, which
he wanted to show and this real description would be completely different. Then we have
the same in a film of Hoffman, where this feast is charged very patriotically. In reality, it
looked a little differently. And we try to attract attention to this, so that pupils would not
take The Deluge of Sienkiewicz as a historical source, because it is only an artistic vision.
It would be good if they noticed it, learned it. (P17: 17:9)
I posed a question to ?niegocki regarding the names used in textbooks when referring to
the Polish-Lithuanian state, which, as I pointed out, is often called “Poland” or the “Polish
Republic” in Polish textbooks. ?niegocki considered this practice as unequivocally faulty
in that it obscures the multicultural nature of the Polish-Lithuanian state. As he explains
below, such usage often results not from the intentions of textbook authors and historians,
but from the decisions of language editors, who, not knowing the difference of meaning
between “Poland” and “the Republic of the Two Nations,” replace the terms in order to
avoid  the  repetition  of  the  word  “Republic.”  They  follow  a  tradition  of  using  these  two
terms interchangeably, which ?niegocki likens to a CARBON PAPER producing copies IN
THE BRAIN. Such usage is habitual, automatic, and does not provoke major hesitation.
It’s not so much historians, but experts of Polish language who corrected the word
“Republic” to “Poland.” Because this word was repeated. What kind of word should I have
used, right? I couldn’t use the word “Poland,” if it was the Republic of the Two Nations.
And I  suspect  that  sometimes there might  be a  carbon paper  in  the brain that  it  had to be
“Poland” simply. […] From a grammatical point of view, I had to use the word “Poland.” I
said,  sorry,  but  from  a  historical  point  of  view  it  is  garbage.  […]  It  is  such  a  tradition,
which, sorry, is perhaps better to dispose of, isn’t it? (Laughter). I heard myself that, for
example,  the Hetman Chodkiewicz occurs  as  a  Polish hetman at  this  moment.  That’s  one
thing, sorry, but not really, no. There were such ideas for the purity of language, in order
not to repeat the word “Republic.” There is some kind of battle and the “Polish army” won,
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but I say, sorry, there were Poles and Lithuanians, and Curonians, and surely a few other
nations were found there, so it is does not fit. (P17: 17:13)
7.3.2.1 Textbook I: The Polish-Lithuanian union from different POINTS OF VIEW
Textbook I. Marek Kami?ski, Gra?yna Panko, Robert ?niegocki. Historia: ?redniowiecze.
Podr?cznik dla I klasy liceum ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i technikum.
Cz??? 2 [History: the Middle Ages. Textbook for the 1st year of upper secondary schools.
Part 2]. Pozna?, PL: Nowa era, 2010.
The textbook is intended for the first year of upper secondary school, both at a basic and
advanced level of teaching. It encompasses the history of the Middle Ages in Poland and
Europe.
The topic of the 1385 Union of Krewo in the textbook is preceded by a brief section on
the history of Lithuania in the 13th–14th century. Pupils learn that “Lithuanian pagans
comprised a minority in their state, stood on a lower level of civilization than the
conquered Christian population of Ruthenia” (156). However, the increasingly threatening
presence of the Teutonic Order in the shared neighborhood of Lithuania and Poland is said
to  have  given  a  spur  to  the  personal  union  of  the  two states.  The  textbook explains  that
Jogaila, both of whose Lithuanian and Polish names are introduced, agreed to the union
terms and promised to baptize Lithuania, adjoin Lithuania to Poland and retrieve lost
Polish territories (157). The resistance of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas to
unification with Poland is extensively described. The textbook notes consecutive treaties
between Poland and Lithuania signed in Vilnius, Radom and, finally, Horodlo, in 1413,
which established the separateness of the Lithuanian state, governed by Vytautas, who
remained, nevertheless, subject to the King and the Grand Duke Jogaila (157).
Moreover, pupils are provided with a commentary of the Polish historian Jerzy
Ochma?ski (1933-1996) on the meaning of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in Krewo (160).
Upon reading the excerpt, pupils need to explain the meaning of the Latin term
“applicare,” used in the text of the Krewo agreements, and find fragments in the
historian’s commentary, which confirm that it was originally planned to incorporate
Lithuania into the territory of Poland (158). It is notable that Ochma?ski counters in his
commentary Polish historians who “are generally inclined to consider that Lithuania, by
force of the Krewo agreement, lost not only its sovereignty, but also its separate statehood,
that it became a province of Poland” (160). He provides arguments why it is incorrect to
interpret the Union of Krewo in this way and underlines that the word “applicare,” which
historians tend to regard as suggesting incorporation, remained “a dead sign on the
pergament, while the actual mutual relation of the two states was decided by life” (160).
Hence,  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania,  even  in  the  union  with  Poland,  remained  a  state
governed by Lithuanian themselves (160).
This is a telling example of how a specific interpretation of a professional historian
becomes the basis for a school-textbook narrative. Through this example, textbook authors
want to explicitly show pupils the divergencies of interpretation of the past among
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historians in Poland, namely, that the past can be viewed differently and that some of these
narratives are more justified than others. It is a practical example of how historical
knowledge is open to discussion and does not constitute SACRED WORDS, to use
?niegocki’s metaphor. Pupils are made to realize that historical interpretations can be
questioned.
Moreover, one of the questions after the main text asks pupils to evaluate the position
of Vytautas towards the Polish-Lithuanian union from the POINT OF VIEW of  Poles  and
Lithuanians and to find positive and negative effects of his politics (158). This is also an
interesting task from a methodological point of view. Pupils are required to take different
perspectives and apply skills of cognitive empathy, aiming to see the same situation from
the point of view of Poles and Lithuanians. Pupils can learn that the same event can elicit
very different meanings and assessments, depending on the position of a person. On the
other hand, the task does not push further and does not encourage pupils to think why
Lithuanians and Poles perceived the situation in such different terms, what experience led
to these divergences. In addition, a question could be raised about how the perception of
people in the past differed from contemporary assessments of the union in Poland and
Lithuania.
The textbook devoted considerably much space to discussing the Polish-Lithuanian
conflict with the Teutonic Order, which culminated in the 1410 Battle of Grunwald (161–
164, 167–168). Pupils are given an additional source – a description of the course of the
battle by the 15th century Polish chronicler Jan D?ugosz, which depicts how Lithuanian
troops, unable to resist the attack of the Teutonic knights, escaped from the battlefield
(167). Hence, the victory is presented as the sole accomplishment of the Polish army and
the leadership skills of Jogaila. The textbook does not explicitly counter this interpretation
of  the  battle  by  D?ugosz,  nor  does  it  mention  anything  about  the  maneuver  of  the
Lithuanian army. The only allusion to the fact that the Lithuanian army returned to the
field appears in an illustration, which depicts the movement of the Lithuanian army during
the  two  phases  of  the  battle;  but  in  no  way  does  itelaborate  or  explain  this  issue  to  the
pupils (164).
The failed attempt of Vytautas’ coronation is described and contextualized completely
differently from the Lithuanian accounts. In the textbook, it is presented as a political
maneuver of the King of Hungary and a candidate to the throne of the Holy Roman
Empire Sigismund, who sought to divide Jogaila and Vytautas by proposing to the latter
the crown of Lithuania (166). The motivation of Sigismund is explained as that of revenge
for Jogaila’s support shown to the Husites. Hence, the coronation is framed primarily as a
plan of Sigismund rather than as an independent goal of the separatist politics of Vytautas.
Lastly, a striking feature of the narrative is that the authors identify Jogaila as primarily
a Lithuanian, who, as a result, “put the interests of Lithuania in the first place” (166). That
is, the textbook considers Jogaila’s politics, even after he had become the King of Poland,
to  express  loyalty  to  the  interests  of  the  Grand  Duchy.  This  strongly  contrasts  with  the
Lithuanian portrayal of Jogaila as a traitor, who prioritized his dynastic interests over the
interests of Lithuanian statehood. Polonization of political elites and the gradual
weakening of Lithuanian sovereignty are typically blamed on Jogaila’s decision in the
established Lithuanian narrative. In this Polish textbook, however, Jogaila’s decision to
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agree to the union with Poland is regarded as a choice beneficial to Lithuanian statehood
and sovereignty.
The textbook contains multiple exercises (throughout and not merely in chapters on the
Polish-Lithuanian past), which engage pupils with divergent historical interpretations as
well as perceptions of a certain event by its contemporaries. In this regard, pupils are
acquainted with the idea that the past (reality) can be interpreted and assessed in many
different ways and that historical knowledge can be questioned. This coincides with
?niegocki’s opinions expressed in the interview. However, as the above analysis
demonstrates, certain omissions, arrangement and the particular framing of facts alters the
meaning considerably and changes the narrative. There are significant disparities between
the portrayal of the past in this textbook and Lithuanian textbooks. On the other hand, the
depiction of the Union of Krewo is very promixate to the Lithuanian narrative.
7.3.2.2 Textbook II: The evaluation of the past is constantly changing
Textbook II. Marek Kami?ski, Robert ?niegocki. Historia od Renesansu do czasów
napoleo?skich. Podr?cznik dla II klasy ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i
technikum. Cz??? 1 [History from the Renaissance to the Napoleonic times. Textbook for
the 2nd year of upper secondary schools. Part 1]. Warszawa, PL: Nowa Era, 2010.
The textbook is intended for the second year of upper secondary level. It encompasses the
period of modern history starting from the geographical explorations of the 15th century
until the beginning of the 19th century.
The textbook upholds its approach to introduce pupils to divergent interpretations of
the past by historians. Pupils are offered two opinions of Polish historians on the same
aspect of foreign policy of the King and the Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old (76–77).
Upon  reading  the  commentaries  of  the  two  historians,  pupils  learn  that  one  of  them
strongly  criticizes  the  political  priorities  of  Sigismund  I,  whereas  the  other  historian,
belonging to a younger generation, curbs those criticisms and explains how difficult it is to
pass a singular, unambiguous value judgment. He notes that “a judgment is, hence,
difficult and fluid, because the issue, which is discussed, is continuously alive in its
effects”  (77).  Pupils  are  acquainted  with  the  idea  that  since  the  effects  of  the  past  in  the
present are constantly changing, so are the meanings and judgments of the past not fixed
and singular. Meaning and assessment of the past changes over time, depending on the
experience of its consequences. The past emerges not as a distant and externalized space,
but as a process, the influences of which can be felt and experienced in the present; the
past is thus interwoven into the present. Since the main text that precedes
historians’commentaries does not outline any clear-cut value judgments on this matter
either, the opinions of historians can actually prompt a more nuanced analysis and
discussion among pupils.
The 1569 Union of Lublin is introduced in the context of the Executionist movement
in the Kingdom of Poland, which demanded the complete unification of Poland and
Lithuania (78). Simultaneously, Lithuania found itself in a difficult geopolitical situation
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at the time. It is explained that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania needed Polish military
support in an ongoing war with Moscow and, thus, had to take into consideration the
possibility of a closer union (78). The textbook vividly depicts the dissonance in attitudes
towards the union in Lithuania. Whereas the magnates were firmly against the closer
union ties with the Kingdom of Poland, it was in the interests of the Lithuanian middle
gentry,  who, by way of the union, could acquire more rights and emancipate themselves
from subordination to the magnates (78). The textbook author acknowledges that the
negotiation process between Polish and Lithuanian delegations over the terms of the union
was  particularly  difficult  (79).  The  decision  of  Sigismund  August  to  exert  pressure  and
break the resistance of the Lithuanian magnates by annexing a part of the territory of the
Grand  Duchy  to  Poland  is,  however,  identified  as  a  legal  right  of  Sigismund  as  a
patrimonial ruler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (79). One of the tasks, addressed to
pupils, asks them to explain why Lithuanian magnates were against the union (80).
The  most  interesting  aspect  of  the  presentation  of  the  Union  of  Lublin  is  the
accompanying source, which follows the main text. It is an excerpt from a commentary of
the  Polish  historian  Juliusz  Bardach  on  the  historical  consequences  of  the  Polish-
Lithuanian union (81–82). Importantly, some sentences from Bardach’s opinion are
transposed into the main text of the textbook almost word for word. Bardach’s evaluation
of the union outlines positive and negative effects of the union on Poles, Lithuanians and
Ruthenians (later Belorusians and Ukrainians), stressing that each of these national groups
experienced certain advantages and drawbacks of the union. Bardach notes that even
though Lithuanian political elites became linguistically and culturally Polonized, they did
not lose a sense of separate political consciousness and defended the political and legal
subjectivity of the Grand Duchy in the union with Poland (82). Pupils are asked to identify
all positive and negative nuances of the union and provide their own evaluation (80).
Overall, the evaluation of the Union of Lublin in the textbook is quite nuanced. It
conveys the same idea, which we have seen in the above case of the foreign policy of the
Sigismund I the Old, that it is impossible to pass a singular, decisive and static judgment
on the past. Pupils can learn to appreciate the complexity of divergent assessments, which
vary depending on the point of view taken. Bardach likewise reflects on divergent
meanings and assessments of the union in terms of what processes it brought forward
immediately afterwards as well as looking from a contemporary point of view. By way of
Bardach’s opinion, pupils are given a concrete example of historical thinking and
interpretation.
The main text of the textbook mentions very briefly that, in 1655, during the Swedish
occupation  of  the  Commonwealth,  the  Hetman  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  Janusz
Radziwi?? signed an agreement of the union with Sweden, thereby, abolishing the union
with Poland (155). It is explained in a caption containing biographical information on
Radziwi?? that  he  is  seen  as  a  traitor  in  Poland,  whereas  in  Lithuania  he  is  held  in  high
esteem as a hero (157). Moreover, pupils are given the task to write an accusatory speech
directed at Radziwi?? and his anti-state activities (162). Hence, a negative evaluation of
Radziwi?? prevails in the textbook. Pupils are not confronted with different perceptions
and experiences of the same situation by Radziwi?? and his Polish contemporaries, which
would perhaps enable them to understand the roots of the conflict more easily.  The same
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applies to the contemporary judgments of Radziwi??: Pupils learn that evaluations in
Poland and Lithuania are polarized, but not the reasons for such divergences.
In addition, an interesting task, which relates to Radziwi?? and the Swedish-Lithuanian
union in 1655, asks pupils to reflect on a fragment from the historical novel The Deluge by
Henryk Sienkiewicz. The novel is well-known for its negative portrayal of Radziwi?? as a
traitor of the Republic and its ideals. Pupils, however, are provided with a commentary of
the Polish historian Adam Kersten, who points out that the novel is a “WEAVE of truth and
fabrication,” in which fabrication comes to the fore (163). Kersten explains that past
reality was much less dramatic than how it is presented in the novel. On the other hand, he
does not suggest that the evaluation of Radziwi?? is too one-sided or exaggerated. The
point of this exercise is to convey the idea that literary accounts of the past should not be
trusted as a reliable source of historical knowledge, that literature is fiction, whereas
historical accounts provide verified facts. This sharp distinction between fact and fiction,
history and literature has its roots in a positivist approach to history. It would be useful to
show pupils how the historical novel, even if it does fail to provide accurate historical
information, may serve as a valuable source of insights into the values and ideas that
prevailed in 19th-century Polish Romanticism. This would allow for a more nuanced
understanding of how fiction relates to past reality, of how the past is embodied in works
of fiction.
The  chapters  depicting  the  history  after  the  Polish-Lithuanian  union  consistently  use
the terms “Republic” and “Polish-Lithuanian state” to refer to the Commonwealth. Even
when the 18th century is described all the way to the partitions of the Commonwealth at
the end of the century, the textbook adheres to these terms and avoids referring to the state
as “Poland,” which distinguishes it from other analogous textbooks.
The textbook mentions that the Constitution of May 3 abolished the division of the
Commonwealth into the Crown and Lithuania and introduced a shared title of the state –
Poland (274). However, the author clarifiesthat the Constitution was soon followed by the
adoption  of  the  Mutual  Pledge  of  the  Two  Nations,  which  guaranteed  half  the  seats  in
institutions of central government for the Lithuanians. Importantly, the textbook
underlines that “in practice, the previously existing federative union was maintained”
(275). In contrast to many other Polish textbooks, the continuing duality of the state is
acknowledged and emphasized.
Overall, the textbook contains numerous tasks, where pupils are required to engage
with different evaluations and interpretations of the past, compare divergent opinions of
historians, discuss about the past with others, and adjudicate among different accounts. A
strong didactic idea, upheld throughout the textbook, is that the past can be evaluated
differently and that, furthermore, evaluation is not static or fixed and tends to change with
time. The textbook includes excerpts from texts of professional historians, which are
selected in a way so as to convey the idea that historical knowledge is open to debate and
can be contested. Opposing views on the same matter of two historians are frequently
introduced. Nevertheless, presentation of certain historical events points to different
interpretations, but does not encourage pupils to reflect on why people perceived the
events in different ways. The authors clearly sought, however, to integrate the Lithuanian
interpretation of the past in most topics related to shared Polish-Lithuanian past.
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7.3.3 Robert Śniegocki: The interwar conflict
Although Polish pupils are aware that there was a conflict between Poland and Lithuania
in the interwar years, very few know more about the reasons, course, and perception of the
conflict by Lithuanians and Poles (17:17). Only about two persons from a class may know
something about General ?eligowski and his fake mutiny (17:17). Pupils are generally
aware that there was a conflict, but not how it “looked concretely” (17:17). ?niegocki
pointed out that Polish textbooks typically present the Polish-Lithuanian conflict as part of
the Polish-Bolshevik war, where the Lithuanians are identified as adversaries of the Polish
state. However, Polish aggression towards Lithuania, such as a failed coup d’état in
Kaunas, organized by the Polish Military Organization, is very seldom, if at all,
mentioned. He is cognizant that a particular choice of facts alters the meaning of a
narrative. ?niegocki explains such omissions are partially determined by the technical
limits of textbooks and the obligation to keep textbooks relatively thin and light.
We most frequently attach this to the Polish-Bolshevik war, the formation of the eastern
border. Practically in all textbooks it is shown as an element of the Polish-Bolshevik war.
Then it is picked up that the Lithuanian side is written into the list of adversaries of Poland,
which  were  situated  there  somewhere.  But  I  tried  to  show  it  more  or  less,  I  hope,
moderately objectively in terms of facts. […]There is always theproblem of which facts to
select,  in  order  not  to  dim  the  picture,  and  then  I  considered  whether  to  remember,  for
example, the attempts to overthrow the Lithuanian government by Poles in 1918, which
inflamed relations very strongly. Even if it’s three additional sentences, five sentences, an
entire thicker book is made, which may not be functional for pupils. We always must
choose some fragments, unfortunately, and this impedes understanding sometimes, it
impedes, it is a fact, but technical possibilities are quite limited. (P17: 17:18)
7.3.3.1 Textbook III: The Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict
Textbook IV. Robert ?niegocki. Historia. Burzliwy wiek XX. Podr?cznik dla III klasy
ogólnokszta???cego, liceum profilowanego i technikum [History. Tumultuous 20th
century. Textbook for the 3rd year of upper secondary schools]. Warszawa, PL: Nowa
Era, 2010.
The textbook is intended for the third year of upper secondary schools. It resumes the
chronological narrative from 1918, or the end of World War I, and presents the history of
the 20th century.
The Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict is introduced in a chapter, entitled “The fight
for the eastern border” (30–38). Firstly, the textbook introduces two divergent conceptions
of Józef Pi?sudski and Roman Dmowski on how the issue of Poland’s eastern borders
should be resolved (30–31). Pupils learn that the federative conception of Pi?sudski
envisaged Poland in its ethnic borders, in the neighborhood of independent Lithuania and
Ukraine, which would nevertheless be connected to Poland in federative ties. He is said to
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anticipate an establishment of a federation “under Polish dominations, on the model of the
Union of Lublin” (30).
Roman Dmowski, on the other hand, was in favor of an incorporationist conception,
according to which, the eastern territories, which were inhabited by a large population of
Poles, had to be directly incorporated into Poland, for they could easily be Polonized (30).
Pupils are given a task to organize a debate between supporters of these two conceptions,
in which they evaluate their main features (36).
The Polish-Lithuanian conflict is primarily contextualized in relation to the
simultaneously ongoing Polish-Bolshevik war. The textbook draws attention to the fact
that, in the beginning of 1919, Bolsheviks entered Lithuanian and Ukrainian territories
(31). Polish troops, however, gradually ousted the Bolsheviks from Lithuania in spring of
1919 and took over the city of Vilnius, where Pi?sudski is said to announce his Manifesto
to the Inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania (31). In the Manifesto, he
promoted the idea of an independent Lithuania, linked to Poland in federative ties, but
Lithuanians “did not agree to these plans, fearing another attempt of Polonization and
imposition of political and economic superiority” (31).
The actual conflict between Poland and Lithuania is described in a single paragraph,
which  relates  that  when the  Bolsheviks  took  control  of  Vilnius  again  in  July  1920,  they
assigned the city to Lithuania (36). However, “when Lithuanians took an adverse position
towards the Poles, Pi?sudski decided to adjoin Vilnius, which lay in his native region, to
Poland” (36). However, since the Polish minister of foreign affairs already acknowledged
that Vilnius belonged to Lithuania in the Spa conference, Pi?sudski “could not take over
the city by force in order not to complicate relations with the states of the Entente” (36).
Consequently, he is said to have organized a fake mutiny, led by General ?eligowski,
whose troops pretended to revolt against the Polish government and took control of
Vilnius in October 1920. The general announced the establishment of a new state, called
Central Lithuania, which was annexed to Poland in 1922.
Pupils are provided a very brief, fact-oriented description of the conflict, which,
however, does not explain at all why the conflict emerged in the first place. The narrative
gives an impression that the conflict arose simply because “Lithuanians took an adverse
position towards the Poles,” ignoring the long and complicated history of mutual relations.
Because of the predominantly chronological narrative arrangement, the textbook fails to
contextualize the conflict by discussing the long-term processes of identity transformation
in  the  19th  century  and  the  rise  of  modern  national  movements  in  the  territory  of  the
former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Whether it is intentionally or unconsciously omitted, it
diminishes the role of the Lithuanian nation and state as an independent, autonomous
agent, which likewise had its own interests and took an active part in the unfolding events.
The  textbook  focuses  on  the  Polish-Bolshevik  war,  but  “forgets”  to  clearly  differentiate
Bolshevik interests from Lithuanian interests.
One task in the textbook asks pupils to evaluate the conduct of Poles from the POINT OF
VIEW of Poles, Lithuanians, and the states of the Entente (37). It is questionable, however,
to what extent this exercise really permits pupils to understand the Lithuanian POINT OF
VIEW, since there is very little information provided about that. An excerpt from the
memoirs  of  General  ?eligowski  in  the  textbook,  however,  provides  a  rich  source  for
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understanding how the general experienced the events, of how he perceived himself as a
Lithuanian, ready to fight the Bolsheviks and liberate Vilnius. It would be a great source
for a Lithuanian history textbook. It certainly gives access to the lived past, but only
partially, since the past as lived and experienced by the Lithuanians is largely omitted
from the textbook.
7.3.4 Conclusion
The  interview  reveals  one  clear  discrepancy  between  the  aims  of  history  education  and
practical approaches adopted to attain these aims. Pupils are expected to develop skills of
historical thinking and to be able to deal with and adjudicate among different
interpretations of the same event. In order to cultivate these skills, however, they are
primarily familiarized with the 19th-century historicist methodology of verification of
source authenticity and veracity, identification of bias and prejudice, differentiation
between objective and subjective sources. Textbook exercises, which engage pupils with
different  interpretations,  require  them  to  formulate  an  evaluation  of  a  particular
event/phenomenon rather than comprehend why and how people made sense of the events
differently.
The “historical-critical” method, with its sharp separation between objectivity and
subjectivity, facts and values, fact and fiction, reveals its limitations, however, when
?niegocki admits that “objectivity, as such, does not really exist.” If it did, it would
amount  to  a CALENDAR of  dates  at  most,  but  even  then  the  choice  of  dates  already
indicates the presence of the cognizing self in historical knowledge. The term
“objectivity” is habitually used, although it is acknowledged that an actual disembodied,
detached “view from nowhere” is not possible. Nevertheless, ?niegocki used multiple
optical metaphors when talking about truth and subjectivity: He spoke of changing
historical OPTICS, different POINTS OF VIEW,  and  the  hold  of  the  subjective GAZE on the
past.
?niegocki supported the idea that pupils should be introduced to different
interpretation of the past, but, like other authors, he reiterated the limitations of time and
space dictated by the curriculum. Importantly, textbooks, authored by ?niegocki,
demonstrate that the past can be evaluated differently and that, furthermore, evaluation
changes with time. Contrasting opinions on the same matter of two historians are
frequently introduced. Nevertheless, in some cases, the presentation of divergent
interpretations does not encourage pupils to reflect on why people perceived the events in
different ways. The author clearly sought, however, to integrate the Lithuanian
interpretation of the past in most topics related to shared Polish-Lithuanian past.
7.4 Piotr Laskowski
Piotr  Laskowski  is  a  historian,  an  archaeology  graduate  of  the  University  of  Warsaw,  a
lecturer at the University of Warsaw, a history teacher and a co-founder of the Jacek
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Kuro? Multicultural Secondary School in Humanities in Warsaw. He is also an author of
“The Sketches of the History of Anarchism” (in Polish) and “War machines: George Sorel
and strategies of radical political philosophy” (in Polish). I interviewed Laskowski in June
2014 at the Jacek Kuro? Multicultural Secondary School in Humanities in Warsaw.
Analyzed textbooks co-authored by Piotr Laskowski:
 Textbook I. Krystyna Starczewska, Ewa Korulska, Piotr Laskowski, Anna
Dzierzgowska, Barbara Nartowska, Marta ?ugowska, Tytus Izdebski. ?wiat
?redniowieczny.  Klasa  I  dla  gimnazjum,  Cz??? II  [The  Medieval  World.  Year  1  for
gymnasium, Part 2]. Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2005.
 Textbook II. Krystyna Starczewska, Anna Dzierzgowska, Piotr Laskowski, Karolina
Makowiecka, Marta Makowiecka, Krzysztof Chmielewski. ?wiat Nowo?ytny:
Renesans, Barok. Klasa II dla gimnazjum, Cz??? I [The Modern World: Renaissance,
Baroque. Year 2 for gymnasium, Part 1]. Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne
PWN, 2003
 Textbook III. Krystyna Starczewska, Anna Dzierzgowska, Piotr Laskowski, Karolina
Makowiecka, Marta Makowiecka, Marta ?ugowska, Krzysztof Chmielewski. ?wiat
Nowo?ytny: O?wiecenie, Romantyzm. Klasa II dla gimnazjum, Cz??? II [The Modern
World: Enlightenment, Romanticism. Year 2 for gymnasium, Part 2]. Warszawa, PL:
Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2003
 Textbook IV. Krystyna Starczewska, Anna Dzierzgowska, Piotr Laskowski, Karolina
Makowiecka, Marta ?ugowska, Marta Makowiecka, Krzysztof Chmielewski. ?wiat
Nowoczesny: od Po?owy XIX wieku do II Wojny ?wiatowej. Klasa III dla gimnazjum,
Cz??? I [The Modern World: from the Second Half of the 19th century to WWII. Year
3 for gymnasium, Part 1]. Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2001
7.4.1 Piotr Laskowski: Approach to history teaching
The textbook series, co-authored by Piotr Laskowski, stands out in the Polish history-
textbook market by its innovative pedagogical approach. The subject of history is
combined in the textbook with the study of Polish language and literature, cultural studies,
civic education, philosophy and ethics. Hence, the textbook is not strictly limited to the
field of history. Topics of history are introduced not solely in a traditional chronological
narrative, but are likewise integrated with the study of, for example, literary and
philosophical texts or works of art from the same historical period. The study of the past is
not separated from the totality of cultural and social phenomena of a given historical
epoch. In the excerpt below, Laskowski explains the source of this textbook conception,
which has been strongly influenced by his own experience as a pupil in the First
Communal High School “Bednarska” in Warsaw, where education was guided by the idea
of coordination of all humanistic subjects.
Similarly, Laskowski wanted to dissolve sharp divisions between humanistic
disciplines in the textbook. It was important, for him, to convey the idea that certain
processes and ideas manifest simultaneously in different fields of life. In the textbook, this
idea is communicated by dividing the materials into different but overlapping “WORLDS”:
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“WORLD of facts,” “WORLD of  ideas,”  “WORLD of  emotions,”  “WORLD of imagination,”
“WORLD of creation.” An additional philosophical and ethical commentary on a given
historical period is inserted in chapters “In Search of Truth” and “How to Live?”
Nevertheless,  the  “WORLD of facts” remains the main part of the textbook, intended
specifically for the study of history.
The  idea  is  from  practice.  In  general,  the  idea  was  born  in  the  head  of  Krystyna
Starczewska, or the organizer, in 1989, of the first school in Poland that was not state-run,
the First Communal High School “Bednarska.” From the beginning, one of important ideas
was the idea of the coordination of all humanistic subjects. That is, what was very faulty in
the earlier instruction was that literature went separately, history separately, there was no
philosophy at all, one thing did not go with another, did not suit each other […]. Hence,
such an idea so that the humanities would be a totality, so that the specificity of different
disciplines could be shown, but simultaneously knowing that if something is happening in
history, then something is happening in literature, something in art, something in
philosophy. This was a basic idea of the “Bednarska” school, from which I graduated as a
pupil. When verified in practice, it functioned very well. […]Here, characteristically, there
is not a part “history,” “literature,” “philosophy,” but there are only different worlds. And,
obviously, “the world of facts” is rather a world for a historian, but “the world of ideas” is
already  a  little  for  a  historian,  a  little  for  a  philosopher,  and  also  a  little  for  a  teacher  of
literature. […] (P16: 16:1)
This kind of pedagogical approach requires teachers to coordinate their progress along the
chronological  axis  of  the  curriculum,  in  order  to  make  sure  that  more  or  less  the  same
historical period is being studied in lessons of different subjects. This enables teachers to
indicate connections between different areas of human activity. As a consequence, the aim
of  education  is  not  memorization  and  reproduction  of  facts,  but  an  ability  to  see
connections between, for example, the philosophy of Hegel, Romantic literature, and the
uprisings of the 19th century. Pupils need to recognize the interconnections between
different fields and the manifestation of certain ideas in concurrent areas of human
activity. This kind of pedagogical approach counterbalances the mental procedure of
analytical differentiation with comprehensive thinking in terms of how each fragment is
part of a larger cohesive whole.
That  is,  that  when  I  do  Romanticism,  the  19th  century,  Romantic  uprisings  in  history,  I
show how it is in literature, that there was Byron, that Byron had written “The Giaour,”
that this Byron died in Greece. And now we have here history of the revolution in Greece,
uprisings in Greece and so on, and soon you will read this Byron or you have already read
Byron,  it  is  this  Byron,  the same one.  This  is  the context  of  these actions.  It  is  doable.  It
really requires from teachers two things: agreement on how we do it and awareness of
what others are doing in order to be capable of pointing out to pupils these points where
there will be a connection. […] (P16: 16:2)
Laskowski’s  conception  of  history  as  a  discipline,  which  he  would  likewise  want  to
convey to his pupils, is that history is continuously in the process of making and change.
The  focus,  interests  and  methods  of  history  are  not  fixed,  nor  are  they  isolated  from
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broader developments taking place in society. It is particularly crucial, for Laskowski, to
show  pupils  that  history  is  a FORM OF SPEAKING about the past, which is politically
ENTANGLED or engaged. In this sense, history manifests as language, as a particular
discourse, which functions on the basis of certain rhetorical devices and is ideologically
motivated. Pupils are expected to identify political aims, which HIDE BEHIND different
ways of speaking about the past.
To my comment that modern professional history itself arose as a discipline, which
assisted nation-state building, Laskowski responded by drawing attention to the
transformations of the discipline in the 20th century and its shift away from the political
past. By contrast, school-history education has not undergone the same shifts and
maintains its focus primarily on political and military pasts. For Laskowski, this
constitutes an unforgivable abuse of history and an injustice towards past life. His
emphasis that history should provide knowledge about how people felt and thought in the
past reveals the importance of the lived past and experience in his approach to doing
history. Depersonalized, abstracted facts about events and processes in the past do not take
priority over what people thought and how they felt about these events and processes.
However, it realized this, went through important transformations in the 20th century in
order not to be this, but textbook history remained this. It, in general, does not realize that
there was the Annales School  in  France,  that  there  was  microhistory.  That  it  has  simply
changed in the 1950s–1960s, that already nobody really writes history in such an archaic
way,  nobody writes  history like this.  It  is  like from the 19th century.  And such history is
not  good.  Dangerous,  criminal  in  principle,  it  is  an  abuse  of  history,  and  that  is  also  not
true about history. Simply, if we understand history as a science about how the people in
the past felt and thought, the people of the past who are not politicians of the past, then we
must pose research questions in a completely different way. We have to search for
completely something else. (P16: 16:21)
Laskowski wishes that school-history education would correspond to the history of the
discipline as it is practiced today. Pupils would need to engage with at least fragments of
certain of the most important theoretical texts and would become acquainted with
contemporary historical methods and disciplinary attitudes. Moreover, history education
needs to be IN TOUCH with contemporary life, reveal how studying the past can help pupils
understand certain mechanisms that occur in their own lives. History education likewise
needs to nurture the capacity for empathy and dialogue with people different from
ourselves, a capacity, which Laskowski describes as “stepping into someone else’s shoes.”
I would really wish that history corresponded to what historical sciences are today. It
means, in this sense, that there would perhaps not be textbooks, that at least fragments of
historical works would be read, especially of those which are groundbreaking,
revolutionary, that they would be explained, why they look like that, a piece of Braudel, a
piece of Emmanuel Le Roy Laudurie about Montaillou, a piece of Ginzburg, a piece… I
can name many here. Hence, that it would all the time consist in informed workshops,
informed methods, that this science has its own method, that is, self-reflexive, that it
reflects what it tells, about whom it tells and why it tells in such and not another way. This
is  perhaps  the  most  important  thing.  And,  secondly,  what  you  called  ethics  of
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communication, that it would be in touch with contemporary people and lives, that they
could feel that this is important for them, that it would give something to them in their life,
that it would give them something on an existential plane, that it would be a dialogue with
people who are different from us, that is, an effort to understand them in good will, that it
is an effort to enter into somebody else’s shoes, but also that it is a recognition of certain
social mechanisms. […] (P16: 16:25)
7.4.2 Piotr Laskowski: Multiple PERSPECTIVES on the past
Laskowski does not subscribe to the idea of an unbridgeable categorical gap between
history as a linguistic representation and past life. He does not isolate history as language
in his thinking from history as lived experience. History should seek to recover the VOICES
of people in the past who were silenced, ignored, excluded from the mainstream narrative,
in congruence with the project  of Walter Benjamin, to whom Laskowski refers as one of
his main theoretical influences. Laskowski foregrounds the ethical task of history as a
discipline – to give VOICE to those who have been left out of the mainstream narrative,
which has been typically focused on the deeds of the WINNERS of history. Hence,
Laskowski does not posit a sharp distinction between language and the past, representation
and reality. History does have access to past life, if it delves beyond the narrative of state
and nation and recognizes a diverse array of PERSPECTIVES available for looking at the
past.
In this  sense,  this  textbook is  already a little  outdated.  We wrote it  quite  a  long time ago
and it has already changed for me a little. If we wrote it today, it would be more radical.
It’s polite and I have such an impression that it’s rather, rather, from my current point of
view, already too conservative and too subordinated to the curricular and state pressure. I
would want that they knew that history in continuously in a process of making. I mean that
it  is  a  certain  form of  speaking  about  the  past  and  that  it  is  politically  entangled  form of
speaking about the past. It means that we always speak about the past today and we usually
speak with some aim. So that  they simply knew what  aims hide behind different  ways of
speaking about  the past.  Moreover,  I  would want  to  induce them to a  realization of  some
such historical project of Walter Benjamin, or of such a project, in which we are obligated
to, speaking pompously, fulfill the expectations of those whose voice was taken away in
the past.  It  means to pay attention in general  and to search for  the voice of  these people,
who were the losers of history, not winners. In this sense, there are too many narratives of
winners and too few narratives of losers. Certainly, we would include today much more
feminist perspectives, postcolonial perspectives and perspectives which are much more
sensitive to political entanglement. (P16: 16:4)
For an illustration of his argument, Laskowski picked up one of his textbooks and opened
a chapter on the so-called GOLDEN Age of Poland, or the 16th century. During the Golden
Age, Poland became one of the largest and most powerful states in Europe. The prosperity
of the state and cultural advancement were unmatched in later national history. However,
the  focus  on  the  state  and  its  elites  effectively  hides  the  history  of  peasants,  whose
situation worsened during the GOLDEN Age (16:5). The textbook narrative is, therefore,
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not an objective account of what really happened, but a partial and value-laden perspective
on the past, which foregrounds the history of political elites at the expense of the VOICE of
peasants, who were forced into serfdom and lived in poverty (16:5). Laskowski is critical
of his own textbooks in this respect as too moderate, conservative, and too subjected to the
narrative of the state.
He would, therefore, like to modify his textbooks by showing more clearly that the
state-oriented narrative is only one of the PERSPECTIVES on the past, one way of looking at
the past, which foregrounds certain elements and neglects others. Pupils need to
comprehend that there can be multiple PERSPECTIVES on the past and that the default state-
oriented narrative currently exists AT THE EXPENSE of a more inclusive PERSPECTIVE that
takes into consideration the lives of ordinary people in the past.
Here, there are almost no peasants at all. That is, there is no story about who pays for this
Golden  Age,  what  their  situation  is,  what  changes  for  them.  It  changes  to  their
disadvantage. It is a paradox that the narrative from the perspective of authority and
nobility is a narrative about how this time is the most beautiful. From the perspective of the
peasants it was much more beautiful in the 14th century. They lost so much freedom and
so many liberties. (P16: 16:6)
Ocular metaphors likewise enable Laskowski to argue against the possibility of objective
history, which, for him, meant a history free from political ENTANGLEMENT.  As  he
explains, what is SEEN in history is always SEEN for a reason. The vision of the historian is
always limited by his or her PERSPECTIVE, which determines the nature of historical
representation. A historian can never SEE everything. The metaphor of PERSPECTIVE
foregrounds the subjectivity of vision. The supposedly objective historical depiction is,
therefore, only one of the PERSPECTIVES. The critique of objective history reveals that
SHIFTING THE GLASS LENS simultaneously transforms the narrative about the past. The
effect of the optical metaphors on reasoning about cognition is that they circumscribe
epistemological reflection within the limits of the subject-object dualism and the mind-
world gap. The historian, imprisoned within her subjective perspectival angle, is distanced
from the objective world. The optical metaphors, if they serve as the sole imagistic basis
for reasoning, prevent one from conceptualizing cognition as a process in which a
dynamic cognizing self is coupled, interacts, and co-creates reality with one’s
environment.
It is simply about constricting attention instead to the fact that what we see in history, we
see for  some reason.  We never  see everything,  right? Hence,  it  is  not  about  evaluation in
the sense that somebody was good, somebody was bad, acted well, acted wrongly. It is
rather about saying, showing how glasses shift. I would rather contest a thesis that we can
have objective knowledge about facts, free from entanglement, as in “it was like that.”
Because this “it was like that” is always seen from some perspective. I do not want to say
that there are no facts, but that they yield to being laid into different stories, into different
narratives. And such a narrative that there was such and such king and he concluded such
and such truce, such and such union, won such and such war, it is a very specific way of
seeing and a  very specific  story.  And likewise history is  a  representative science.  Such a
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history represents a very limited social group, a very limited point of view and very many
people are simply not to be found in such history. (P16: 16:7)
7.4.2.1 Textbook I: The Polish-Lithuanian Union
Textbook I. Krystyna Starczewska, Ewa Korulska, Piotr Laskowski, Anna Dzierzgowska,
Barbara Nartowska, Marta ?ugowska, Tytus Izdebski. ?wiat ?redniowieczny. Klasa I dla
gimnazjum, Cz??? II [The Medieval World. Year 1 for gymnasium, Part 2]. Warszawa,
PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2005.
The textbook series combines the subjects of history, Polish language and literature,
philosophy, and civic education. The contents consist of several WORLDS: the WORLD of
facts, which provides the basis for history education; the WORLD of ideas, which allows
the organization of historical facts, and connects them to the culture of a given epoch; the
WORLDS of imagination, emotion, and creation offer fragments of literary texts and
reproductions of works of art, which support the teaching of Polish language and
literature. The WORLD of facts covers the largerst part of this particular textbook, focused
on  the  period  of  the  Middle  Ages.  The  textbook  is  intended  for  the  first  year  of
gymnasium, or grade 7.
The textbook introduces the 1385 Union of Krewo as advantageous to both Poland and
Lithuania (154). In particular, it is stressed that the union strengthened both states against
the threat of the Teutonic Order, which sought to dismantle the union by any means (154).
The textbook notes that Jogaila committed himself to incorporating Lithuania into Poland,
among other things, and that all these obligations were fulfilled within a year of signing
the union treaty (153). Explanation, thus, suggests that Jogaila did, in fact, annex
Lithuania to Poland, which is not accurate, but the textbook authors chose not to discuss
the  nuances  of  the  particular  status  of  Lithuania  in  the  union  with  Poland.  On  the  other
hand, as the narrative proceeds, pupils learn that consecutive treaties, signed by Poland
and Lithuania, established the sovereignty of Lithuania and Vytautas as the Grand Duke of
Lithuania (155). Jogaila, despite his superior status to Vytautas, only held a formal title as
the ruler of both states (155).
Apart from a descriptive narrative of the main text, the authors inserted an excerpt
from the chronicle of Jan D?ugosz, in which he describes Jogaila’s appearance,
personality, attitudes and daily lifestyle (153–154). The questions, which follow the
source, do not require pupils to engage critically with the source or reflect on the veracity
of the provided information. Pupils are rather asked to consider what information about
the culture and customs of the period this fragment of the chronicle can provide (154). The
focus on Jogaila’s experience and daily life counterbalances the fact-oriented description
of political history.
The contestation of narratives in relation to the Polish-Lithuanian union emerges in the
textbook  only  in  relation  to  the  Grand  Duke  Vytautas.  Pupils  learn  that  it  is  difficult  to
find a street named after Jogaila in Lithuania today (155). By contrast, Vytautas is widely
celebrated as a national hero (155). The textbook explains that, looking from the
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Lithuanian POINT OF VIEW, it is not surprising, as Vytautas sought to dissolve the union
with Poland and strengthen Lithuanian sovereignty (155).
The authors visibly sought to enliven the text by, for example, paying attention to the
age difference between the Polish princess Jadwiga and Jogaila or by remarking how food
was prepared for the Polish and Lithuanian armies in anticipation of war with the Teutonic
Order. Nevertheless, the textbook does not digress from the PERSPECTIVE of political elites
and focuses exclusively on the political and military history of the Polish state.
7.4.3 Piotr Laskowski: Theoretical discussion in history education
Discussion about historical truth occupies an important part of history education in
Laskowski’s pedagogical approach. Pupils get acquainted in lessons with certain
theoretical texts on historiography, such as, for example, fragments from the work of
Hayden White and Carlo Ginzburg. In the context of Poland, his approach to teaching
history constitutes a big exception. The effect of this approach, as Laskowski explains, is
that pupils once again begin to enjoy learning history because they rediscover historical
knowledge as a LIVING, ongoing discussion rather than DEAD information, which one must
memorize. Theoretical discussion emphasizes the open-endedness of historical knowledge.
By contrast, knowledge of the past presented as a given, fixed narrative does not
encourage curiosity in pupils. If everything that can be known about the past has been
already researched, discovered, and described in a history textbook, what is the point of
continuing the inquiry? Pupils lose motivation to engage with history. The idea of a
textbook as a medium of historical knowledge conveys the impression that historical
knowledge is fixed, DEAD information. It creates an impression that information presented
in a textbook is objective, safe, universal, authorless knowledge, which does not require
further questioning, reflection, consideration.
R.K. Do you speak with pupils in history lessons about historical truth?
Yes, yes. Above all.
R.K. In what sense? How do you explain it to pupils and how do they take it?
They take it well. At last they can like history, because it is alive then. The problem with
school  history  is  that  the  way  it  is  presented  in  school,  it  is  dead.  It  means  that  it  is  not
known what to learn it for. Everything is known. Everything has been told and one needs
to learn it by heart. Only the insane would want to do something like this, and here it turns
out  that  there is  a  discussion and that  it  is  alive.  We read a  lot  with them new theoretical
texts – Hayden White, in general, such texts, which try to set…
R.K. In history lessons?
Yes, yes. Fragments of White, “Microhistory” of Carlo Ginzburg, because I love it very
much. Today I am after a lesson on postcolonial theoretical text in historiography. They
see how it works and then they can take it away, take a textbook and look what is
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happening here, what is played out here, why something is written in one way and not
another, what it results from. It is important that they would know that a textbook is not
authorized knowledge, because a textbook is a beastly thing. I do not know if in general
they should be written, because a textbook simulates that it is the truth which needs to be
assimilated and then enunciated. And meanwhile a textbook is always from a certain
position and this textbook is only a section, a conceptualization. But it is the worst possible
formula, because the idea of a textbook is an idea where there is no person of an author,
which pretends that it is some indisputable standard for all.
R.K. The omniscient voice.
But we know that  it  is  not  like that.  In this  sense,  in  general  textbooks do not  need to be
written,  one  only  needs  to  read  historical  books.  Perhaps  it  is  like  that.  I  am  inclined
towards the latter. (P16: 16:8)
I asked Laskowski how his pupils, having this broader awareness of contemporary
theoretical debates and divergent historical perspectives, handle history exams, where their
knowledge may not accommodate the nature of exam questions focused on retrieval of
factual information and single correct answers. Writing an exam is much like WRITING A
SONNET, Laskowski explained. The analogy conveys the idea that pupils approach the
exam and its rules as a certain literary genre, to which they need to accommodate in order
to pass it. Laskowski’s teaching approach determines that they no longer take the official
narrative for granted. Passing the exam, hence, does not mean that you know history well.
It solely means that you have mastered the rules of a peculiar literary genre, although you
do not really identify with the way this genre frames reality. Theoretical reflection
enhances a capacity for critical thinking.
It  is  simply  a  certain  practical  exercise.  They  must  now  determine  what  narrative  state
demands from them and do the exercise as if they wrote a sonnet. There are certain frames
and  one  needs  to  fit  into  these  frames  with  full  awareness  that  this  is  a  certain  literary
genre.  When  a  sonnet  is  written,  there  must  be  rhymes.  When  a  history  exam  is  written
(laughter), there must be certain words, terms and an outlook on history. But they don’t
already consider that they know history when they have written the matriculation exam.
They have a feeling that one thing has nothing in common with the other. Writing of an
exam does not mean that I know history and I understand it. And knowing something like
this is a success. (P16: 16:9)
Laskowski spoke particularly critically about the system of history exams in the Polish
education system, which, according to him, has little in common with humanistic thinking.
Tests, which require a standard answer, are seemingly a more objective way to measure
the knowledge of pupils. The problem with tests is, however, that they do not measure the
skills that humanistic disciplines, such as history, impart. Reduction of historical thinking
to memorization and reproduction of factual information misconstrues the purpose of
history learning. The current system of examination, Laskowski underlined, reveals a
symptomatic avoidance of the question: Why do we learn history? In his view, a much
more suitable form of examination would be a historical essay, which pupils could even
write at home, but in the supervision of teachers, with whom they would need to discuss
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the topic during the writing process (16:11). They would need to reflect on a chosen
historical topic and later publicly defend their work at school.
He contested the potential accusations that pupils from the provincial schools would be
incapable of handling such a form of teaching and examination. In his opinion, mass
education should be maintained at a high level in order to prevent it from reproducing and
deepening the inequalities between the schools at the center and periphery of the country.
The point is that if the average level of education is of low quality, good education
becomes a privilege, accessible only to pupils that come from families of a higher socio-
economic status. Laskowski expressed a strong regret that Poland adopted an Anglo-
Saxon model of history education, which is, in principle, competitive, individualistic, test-
oriented, and does not incline pupils toward cooperation (16:14).
7.4.4 Piotr Laskowski: Ethics and evaluation
I noted, during the interview, that Laskowski’s textbooks stood out by their strongly
ethical character. The presentation of historical knowledge openly included discussion of
morality, ethical issues, and values. The authors did not hide, but rather openly
acknowledged their value preferences in relation to the past. For example, I pointed out
that his textbook constitutes a great exception in the way it takes a critical stance towards
the National Democrats and their leader Roman Dmowski, their ideas and actions.
Contrary to the widely established belief that a textbook should seek to stay objective and
eradicate any traces of an author’s personal attitudes and values, the textbook clearly
voices the authorial understanding and judgment of the past. Laskowski underlined that
there  is  no  history  that  would  be  free  of  values  and  ethical  issues.  There  is  no  objective
history as such, including his own narrative.
However, the purpose of speaking critically and problematizing the xenophobic ideas
of the National Democrats, for Laskowski, was not so much to condemn Roman Dmowski
and his supporters, but to reveal to students the mechanism of xenophobia as such, which
is what links the past to the present. In other words, the aim of talking about xenophobia is
sociological rather than ethical, even if the latter is present in the textbook, too. Laskowski
wants his pupils to understand the mechanism of xenophobia so that they would be able to
recognize the workings of this mechanism not only in the past, but in their daily life, too.
This is what constitutes the continuity between the past and the present and the relevance
of learning history. Understanding the past can simultaneously equip pupils to understand
themselves and their environment better. History provides tools for making sense of
contemporary life. For Laskowski, understanding and analysis of these social processes
cannot be sharply separated from values and moral education. Teaching history cannot be
reduced to strictly value-free scientific pursuit; understanding, analysis, and moral
sensitivity are integral parts of the process of education.
[...] It seems to me that there is no history free from some kind of ethics [...]. And in this
sense, I rather believe in honesty, that is, in telling what I say quite clearly, that is, defining
“yes, this is my outlook on these issues.” And it also seems to me that history, especially
on the gymnasium level, must have formative dimensions really. It means that it must
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explain certain social mechanisms. As, for example, the mechanism of xenophobia. And it
unfolds like this exactly that the National Democrats and Roman Dmowski in Poland
understood this mechanism superbly, used it, politicized it. And now it isn’t possible to
talk about it in some other way than by simply exposing this structure. It means that some
kind of a pattern functions here. In this sense, it perhaps came out more ethically, but it had
to be more sociological. It had to show, there is obviously some evaluation, but it generally
had  to  show  what  group  dynamics  there  are,  how  this  happens  in  general.  That  there  is
some “other,” that somebody establishes, constructs this “other,” then does something with
him, so that they would understand that there are certain processes to which they submit
themselves, not only on the country level, but in the school classroom. It is a micro-
community, there is everything here, all social processes are found in the classroom: rich,
poor, others, misfits. So that they would understand, that they would read history as a
certain tool for understanding what is happening with them as individuals, as social beings,
what this society is. Ultimately, that the ideal would be that they read history in order to
understand why it is so that when they go on a trip and sit on a bus, the cool ones always
sit in the back, the nerds always sit in the front, and the quiet ones always sit in the middle.
That these are some kind of social structures and history permits us to study them, it is an
empirical  science  for  studying  this,  how  this  is  happening.  And  in  this  sense,  it  is
upbringing. […] There is no upbringing separate from teaching. (P16: 16:15)
7.4.4.1 Textbook II: Beyond the history of political elites
Textbook II. Krystyna Starczewska, Anna Dzierzgowska, Piotr Laskowski, Karolina
Makowiecka, Marta Makowiecka, Krzysztof Chmielewski. ?wiat Nowo?ytny: Renesans,
Barok. Klasa II dla gimnazjum, Cz??? I [The Modern World: Renaissance, Baroque. Year
2 for gymnasium, Part 1]. Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2003.
The textbook is intended for the second year of gymnasium and encompasses the period of
modern history from the end of the 15th until the 17th century.
The textbook reflects Laskowski’s sensibility towards the peasant issues in the Middle
Ages. For example, the chapter on the system of government during the 15th–16th
centuries  does  not  fail  to  mention  that  the  gentry,  which  ruled  the  country  together  with
the king, profited from the free work of peasants (64). In the late medieval period, the
situation of peasants significantly worsened in Poland, as they lost their freedom and
became a property of the gentry, forced to work in their land (64). Not having to pay
peasants for their labor, the landowners could produce cheap grain, which was highly in
demand in Western Europe (64). The textbook, thus, provides a more nuanced description
of life in the Middle Ages, which is not limited to the history of political elites. Pupils are
asked at the end of the chapter to reflect whether the term “Republic,” which means “a
common thing,” characterizes well the political arrangement of Poland (69). The textbook
encourages pupils to think critically about the exclusion of and limitations imposed on the
peasantry and the burghers by the gentry.
The textbook contains multiple instances, where decisions, values and attitudes of the
people  in  the  past  are  reflected  from  a  contemporary  point  of  view  of  civic  values.  The
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author invites pupils to evaluate the rationale of the people of the past. This textbook
approach consistently combines history education with ethical reflection, demonstrating
that a sharp division between facts and values is not sensible. For example, it depicts the
love of King Sigismund August for Barbara Radziwi?? and their secret marriage, which
was vehemently opposed by the Polish gentry. Pupils, then, need to consider whether the
choice of the king to prioritize his right to love and happiness over responsibility for the
state was a correct decision (76).
The textbook does not dwell in too much detail on the 1569 Union of Lublin. It is
briefly mentioned that King Sigismund August decided to introduce changes in the union
terms between Poland and Lithuania, against the wishes of the Lithuanian magnates (83).
Until then, as the textbook explains, the union between the two countries was quite loose
and dependent on the person of the monarch (83). In light of the fact that Sigismund
August did not have offspring, the union was bound to break away after his death (83).
Therefore, with support of the gentry, he implemented the necessary political and
administrative arrangements for a closer union of Poland and Lithuania. The textbook
explains which institutions became shared and which remained separate in the Republic of
the Two Nations after the union (85). At the end of the text, the author asks pupils to
consider why the Lithuanian magnates were against the union and the politics of the king
(85).
The textbook brings to attention that, not only Poles and Lithuanians lived in the
Republic, but also Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Cossacks, Jews, Dutch, and Scots (86–89).
Pupils learn, for example, that Ruthenians, who were mostly peasants and burghers
subjected to the control of the Polish magnates, sought, unsuccessfully, to attain certain
rights and freedoms, which made the region of Ukraine and Ruthenians increasingly grow
apart from Poland (87). Ruthenians could not perceive the Republic as “their own state”
(87). The depiction imparts criticism of the Polish gentry, its unwillingness to come to
terms with and dismissive attitudes towards other religious and ethnic groups in the
country as a factor which, over time, contributed to the weakening of the state due to
internal conflicts.
The family of Lithuanian magnates, the Radziwi??, appears in a negative light in the
textbook, as traitors of the Commonwealth (148). The textbook foregrounds the misdeeds
of Janusz Radziwi?? and his supporters, who broke off the Polish-Lithuanian union,
concluded a union with Sweden instead and, finally, signed an agreement with other
enemies of the Commonwealth, by which they agreed to divide its territory (148, 158–
159). It is introduced as an example of private interests of the magnatry winning over the
shared interests of the Commonwealth.
In the context of the 17th century, the textbook increasingly begins to refer to the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as “Poland.” The two terms “Republic” and “Poland”
are used interchangeably without making the meaning of the term “Poland” explicit.
Laskowski agreed in the interview (Section 7.5.5) that this usage is incorrect, but results
mostly from a wish to simplify the text and avoid repetition of the same term.
To sum up, the textbook follows the curricular focus on political and military history
of Poland. Nevertheless, the authorial presence and influence on the narrative can be
detected through the emphasis on the lives of marginalized groups of society, engagement
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with ethical issues, emphasis on multiculturalism, tolerance, civic engagement and
patriotism. A distinguishing feature of this textbook is the stress on the ethical reflection
on the deeds of the people in the past, which most other textbooks typically tend to avoid.
In this regard, these textbook authors do not subscribe to a sharp differentiation between
facts and values. They perceive the teaching of history as a means for development of
civic responsibility and moral sensitivity in pupils. However, the ethical reflection on the
past is not always accompanied by a dialogue with the past. In other words, evaluation of
the past in terms of civic values is not counterbalanced by an attempt to understand the
rationale of the people in the past as resulting from their own lived experience and context
of  the  times.  Identification  with  the  past  tends  to  prevail  over  the  sense  of  alterity.  The
Polish-Lithuanian differences in interpreting the past, on the other hand, are touched upon
minimally and do not attract too much attention from the authors.
7.4.5 Piotr Laskowski: Depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past
I  brought  attention  to  the  fact  that,  in  relation  to  the  Polish-Lithuanian  interwar  conflict,
Laskowski’s textbook barely mentions it. The issue of the sham mutiny organized by
General ?eligowski appears only in the margin of the textbook page. Pupils do not learn
about how differently Lithuanians and Poles perceived the conflict at the time and why.
As Laskokwski explained, a particular portrayal of Pi?sudski in the textbook resulted
from the organizing opposition of the narrative, where Dmowski and Pi?sudski are
contrasted to each other as polar opposites. Laskowski acknowledged that it was a
conscious rhetorical strategy to introduce Pi?sudski as a hero and, thus, other SIDES of his
ideas and actions, which would evoke a more critical reception, were not included. Since
the textbook series was intended for gymnasium, the guiding assumption prevailed that the
representation of Pi?sudski could be made more nuanced and ambiguous in textbooks
intended for upper secondary level. Laskowski agreed, however, that a textbook should
introduce different PERSPECTIVES on  the  interwar  conflict  and  encourage  pupils  to
understand where such divergent interpretations stem from, in particular how they are
affected by the political ideologizaton of the past. What this demonstrates, however, is the
influence of the author in shaping the textbook narrative.
If a textbook as a form, because as I say, it is perhaps in general a redundant form, but if it
needs to be,  it  would be nice that  there would show up in Polish textbooks a  selection of
how it was once written about it in Polish textbooks and how it is written in Lithuanian
textbooks. And then these young people can reflect on why it is like that, on what this
difference of perspectives depends, whether we can determine and what we would have to
determine; if it is only about facts, or if it also serves something. […] But different
ordinary sides of Pi?sudski had been annulled on this level of gymnasium. In agreement
with a thought that he can be made more complicated on the level of lyceum, that on this
level of gymnasium it is perhaps worthwhile to sharpen the opposition Pi?sudski-Dmowski.
[…] But undoubtedly it would also be worthwhile to show it already here, how it is told
differently and for what reasons it is told differently. In order to disclose these positions
even more. […] And then it would be much more critical towards Pi?sudski. There is no
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point in establishing one narrative, because there is never one narrative and there, where it
is, it is encumbered by authority. (P16: 16:16)
It also interested me how Laskowski perceived the commonplace references to the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth in the textbook as “Poland.” His own textbook identifies the
state as “Poland” starting already from the 17th century. While Laskowski admitted that
this usage is undoubtedly incorrect, he noted that it had more to do with finding a more
elegant linguistic arrangement than with a conscious historical judgment. The names
“Republic” and “Republic of the Two Nations” are too long to be used repetitively in the
text. Thus, various authors face a common challenge of finding other, more succinct terms
to replace them with. Laskowski agreed though that attention to Lithuanian sensitivities
required authors to avoid using the term “Poland.” He added that, for example,attention to
the Polish-Ukrainian contestation of the past was stronger in the textbook than towards the
Polish-Lithuanian disagreements. The authors were more sensitized to the Ukrainian
PERSPECTIVES and sought to present them in a nuanced way. The representation of the
Polish-Lithuanian relations in the past, on the other hand, remained subject to the
traditional narrative.
It seems to me that it is not a tradition, but a certain type of simplification which depends
on the fact that the name “the Republic” is already long, whereas “the Republic of the Two
Nations” – even longer.  From what  I  remember,  it  did not  work out  for  us.  However,  we
attempted, tried to use the term “Republic” as the correct one.
R.K. But it is usually used interchangeably.
It  is  obviously  incorrect.  It  was  not  Poland,  it  was  the  Republic  and  it  was  of  the  Two
Nations. It seems to me that here it is rather about a certain simplification. It means that it
is difficult to write, all the time to introduce the “Republic.” Honestly (pause), well, yes, it
would be better to write the “Republic,” it is clear. (P16: 16:17)
The crucial thing about the Polish-Lithuanian past is, however, that the majority of
ordinary  people,  who  were  peasants  and  who  were  not  part  of  the  political  elites,  felt
neither as Poles, nor as Lithuanians. Laskowski underlines in the excerpt below that the
preoccupation with Polishness or Lithuanianness is determined by the nation- and state-
oriented tradition of history writing. This approach to the past ignores that peasants, who
were  not  given  a VOICE and whose experience is not included into the narratives of the
political elites, preoccupied themselves with very different issues. The dominance of
political history in the school curriculum equals, for Laskowski, a MURDER of history as a
discipline and of moral sensitivity in pupils. They receive a very limited understanding of
what  history  is  about  and  how  it  can  be  written.  They  do  not  learn  about  the  life  of
ordinary  people  in  the  past.  Aware  that  history  education  remains  a  tool  of  the  state,  he
nevertheless envisions a kind of school-history education, which would expose political
manipulation and abuse of history.
I will say it radically. It seems to me that in general we should depart from the state key. It
means that, in my understanding, such a confrontation would serve to show that history
298
organized  by  the  state  is  always  a  false  history.  It  means  that  it  serves  circumstantial
political  goals.  What  I  said  about  Benjamin  and  the  history  of  subjected  classes,  of  the
subaltern, which did not have a voice, they didn’t feel to be either Poles, or Lithuanians.
Their problems were completely other problems. I would like to have a history of peasants,
a history of Jews in Central Europe, whereas histories of how one elite did not like another
elite  (laughter)  interest  me less.  […] But  I  think it  is  difficult  to  accept  and quite  radical.
But I simply consider that such circumstantial politicality of history, politics of history, the
use of history through school as an instrument of civic formation is murdering history, is
destroying moral sensitivity. It has always been exchanged for the idea that this is “us,”
“ours,” and so on. Hence, I would want a kind of history, it’s difficult to conceive of it in
school, which is obviously an apparatus of the state and has to conform to the needs of the
state, but I would wish for a history exposing that. It means, a history which shows that
these historical pretensions, historical rights, historical invoices, faults and injustices, in
some cases it needs to be told that they are a real suffering of concrete people and in some
cases they serve mean political aims. […] (P16: 16:20)
7.5.5.1 Textbook III: Giving VOICE to marginalized groups
Textbook III. Krystyna Starczewska, Anna Dzierzgowska, Piotr Laskowski, Karolina
Makowiecka, Marta Makowiecka, Marta ?ugowska, Krzysztof Chmielewski. ?wiat
Nowo?ytny: O?wiecenie, Romantyzm. Klasa II dla gimnazjum, Cz??? II [The Modern
World: Enlightenment, Romanticism. Year 2 for gymnasium, Part 2]. Warszawa, PL:
Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2003.
The  textbook  is  a  continuation  of  the  curriculum  for  the  second  year  of  gymnasium.  It
encompasses a period from the beginning of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th
century.
In congruence with the narrative of the preceding textbook, the terms “Poland” and
“Republic” are used interchangeably, when the textbook describes the 18th century. The
narrative tells of the history of political elites from a visibly contemporary point of view.
The Polish gentry and magnates are condemned for their narrow-mindedness, corruption,
irresponsible behavior, ignorance of state interests, and lack of religious tolerance. The
attitudes of the gentry are repeatedly used as a counterexample for an indirect ethical
commentary on the importance of civic values and duties.
The authors likewise took the initiative to problematize the concept of the “Polish
nation” and its meaning in the 18th century. The textbook elucidates that, until the mid-
18th century, the citizenry of the “Polish nation” was limited only to the gentry who had
the right to participate in state governance (95). An excerpt from the text of a Polish social
and political activist, belonging to the Enlightenment movement, shows, however, that
already at the end of the 18th century a new conception of the Polish nation was emerging
(95). The Polish nation, according to the Enlightenment thinkers, had to encompass all of
society, including the burghers and peasants. The quoted passage likewise expresses the
critique of the gentry and its control of power. Pupils need to reflect why “those, who live
without privileges, […] will be indifferent to the fate of the nation and to its name” (95).
299
Thus, the textbook attempts to include the perspective of marginalized groups in society.
By bringing to attention the disenfranchisement of the majority of the population, the
textbook authors try to consistently combine historical knowledge with civic education.
The description of the Constitution of May 3 receives a lot of attention in the textbook.
However, the nuances regarding Lithuanian sensitivities and the territorial-administrative
arrangement of the state do not enter the focus. The textbook puts more emphasis, for
example, on the fact that peasants did not benefit much from the Constitution, despite the
fact that they constituted 90% of the population (107). The majority of the gentry could
not conceive of peasants as equal citizens of the state, which is metaphorically identified
as the “ACHILLES’ HEEL of the Polish revolution” (106). In opposition to these
conservative views of the gentry, the textbook praises the ideas of Tadeusz Ko?ciuszko,
who is said to firmly support the idea of the revolution of all the strata of the Polish nation,
including people of other religious and ethnic groups (107).
The textbook thereby merges historical knowledge with civic education. Various
events and historical figures are employed in the text for an ethical commentary seeking to
set certain behaviors and attitudes as an example of responsible and sensible civic conduct.
The textbook sets an aim to shed light on the situation of marginalized groups in society.
To the extent that it is permitted by the curriculum, the textbook authors clearly strove to
enlarge the scope of the narrative of political elites by including some information about
the status of peasants, religious and ethnic minorities. This is consistent with Laskowski’s
emphasis on the need to give VOICE to groups whose experience has been traditionally
neglected in history.
7.5.5.2 Textbook IV: Giving VOICE to the marginalized groups
Textbook IV. Krystyna Starczewska, Anna Dzierzgowska, Piotr Laskowski, Karolina
Makowiecka, Marta ?ugowska, Marta Makowiecka, Krzysztof Chmielewski. ?wiat
Nowoczesny: od Po?owy XIX wieku do II Wojny ?wiatowej. Klasa III dla gimnazjum,
Cz??? I [The Modern World: from the Second Half of the 19th century to WWII. Year 3 for
gymnasium, Part 1]. Warszawa, PL: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 2001.
The textbook encompasses the period from the second half of the 19th century to 1939. It
is intended for the third year of gymnasium.
A novelty in this textbook is consideration of other nations, which lived alongside
Poles, in the so-called “Polish lands” of the former Commonwealth. It constitutes an
exception among the totality of Polish history textbooks. Although the authors do not
discuss the national movement of Lithuanians and Lithuanian-Polish relations, they, for
example,  problematize  the  Ukrainian-Polish  relations  and  refer  critically  to  the  sense  of
superiority and contempt of Polish landlords towards the Ukrainian peasants (70).
Ukrainian  adversity  towards  Poles  is,  therefore,  explained  as  resulting  from  the
unwillingness of Polish landlords to acknowledge Ukrainians as a separate nation and to
provide them with basic freedoms and rights (70–71). Instead of schematically introducing
the  Ukrainian-Polish  conflict  as  a  clash  of  two  nationalisms,  the  textbook  engages  the
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deeper social issues and attempts to reveal the rationale of Ukrainians. In this regard, the
textbook once again takes an ethical stance to show the point of view of marginalized
groups in history.
The two leading figures of modern Poland, Roman Dmowski and Józef Pi?sudski,
receive a very different evaluation in the textbook. Roman Dmowski, the idealogue and
leader of the right-wing party of National Democrats, is presented as a controversial
figure, who justified brutality and violence for the sake of national interests and who
perceived relations between nations in terms of a fight for survival (73). The claims about
Dmowski’s views are supported by quotations from his books. It is noted, however, that
for many Poles, Dmowski became the highest and most respected authority at the
beginning of the 20th century (72). The textbook claims that Dmowski’s ideas undermined
the best traditions of Polish patriotism: “To the extent that the earlier fighters for Polish
freedom wanted cooperation with Jews, Ruthenians, or Lithuanians, dreamed about a
revived, tolerant Republic of many nations, Dmowski considered these traditions to be an
expression of weakness” (73).
The  socialist  Pi?sudski,  by  contrast,  appears  in  an  extremely  positive  light  and  is
presented as a national hero, whose understanding of patriotism differed tremendously
from that of Dmowski’s. Pi?sudski based his vision of an independent Poland on the
tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, supported the idea of a federation of
the former nations of the Commonwealth, and stood in favor of democratic principles,
universal voting rights, equal rights for all citizens, free compulsory public education, a
minimum wage, and social insurance (76).
The portrayal of Pi?sudski as a national hero, who maintained the best traditions of
Polish patriotism and upheld progressive values, takes special importance, keeping in
mind that it was Pi?sudski, who was responsible for shaping Poland’s eastern border,
including the border with Lithuania. The textbook claims that Pi?sudski wished that
independent Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine would come into existence to the east of
Poland  (136).  In  other  words,  he  expected  that  these  countries  would  enter  a  federation
with Poland. The textbook quotes Pi?sudski arguing that “one cannot think about the
independence of Poland without the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland,
Ukraine, and Belarus” (136).
The fight for Poland’s eastern borders is framed in the textbook as the fight between
Poland and Soviet Russia. In this vein, the textbook explains that when, in 1919, the Red
Army took control of Vilnius and Kiev, Pi?sudski “decided that it is time to act – only the
containment of the Bolshevik offensive could save independent Lithuania and Ukraine”
(137). When the Polish army pushed the Boshveiks out of the city of Vilnius, “Lithuanians
were afraid that Pi?sudski wanted to incorporate Vilnius into Poland. They demanded a
clear affirmation that Vilnius will be the capital of an independent Lithuania. But
Pi?sudski – a native-born Vilniusian – did not want to give such an affirmation” (137).
What is striking is that the final military take-over of the city of Vilnius and its region
by Polish troops in 1920 is not even mentioned in the main text. Pupils learn that the
troops of General ?eligowski staged a fake mutiny, under Pi?sudski’s command, and that
the region was soon after incorporated into Poland – in six sentences inserted on the
margin of the page as supplementary information (139). The ethical reflection, which is
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emphasized throughout the textbook, does not accompany the presentation of the interwar
Polish-Lithuanian  conflict.  The  description  focuses  only  on  the  Polish  point  of  view and
presents the events in a fact-oriented, descriptive manner. Since the emphasis falls on the
Polish-Soviet war, it is difficult to comprehend the roots of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict
in the interwar period. The attitudes and rationale of the Lithuanians in the conflict are not
introduced in the textbook.
The textbook combines historical knowledge with social critique and civic education.
In agreement with Laskowski’s conception of history education, the textbook seeks to
include the experience of peasants, of ethnic and religious minorities, into the overall
narrative of national history. While the authors brought the Polish-Ukrainian relations into
focus,  the  Polish-Lithuanian  relations  in  the  aftermath  of  the  demise  of  the
Commonwealth, however, do not receive much attention in the textbook.
7.4.6 Conclusion
Laskowski’s vision of school-history education is radical in the Polish context. The
driving idea of his pedagogical approach is to enable pupils to recognize the limitations of
the traditional state-oriented historical narrative, which effectively ignores and silences the
VOICE of ordinary people in the past. Giving VOICE to the LOSERS of history, attention to
their experience is as much an ethical task as it is a task of understanding the past. Thus,
history education becomes a means to STEP INTO SOMEONE ELSE’S SHOES.
History as embodied life and history as disembodied language intermingle in
Laskowski’s reasoning. Pupils need to learn to recognize political manipulation and
ideologization of the past – the way history is rendered into a FORM OF SPEAKING about the
past, a discourse, a disembodied form. Nevertheless, history also has access to past life, if
and when it delves beyond the history of political elites.
A key feature of Laskowski’s approach to teaching history underscores the open-ended
character of historical knowledge. Engagement with theoretical debates reveals to pupils
historical knowledge as part of a LIVING process of debate and reflection, as opposed to
DEAD, fixed information designed for memorization. Pupils come to appreciate the
ongoing transformation of the discipline of history itself, its methods, attitudes and
dispositions of historians towards the past.
Attention to theoretical reflection on history enables Laskowski as well as his pupils to
recognize the PERSPECTIVAL nature of historical representation. What is SEEN in history is
always SEEN at a certain static angle of view.
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Chapter 8. Discussion
Implicit metaphorical models of cognition that are embodied in the way textbooks present
the past have been examined in Chapters 6 and 7. I was particularly interested in the
implicit image-schematic models of cognition that authors and textbooks employ as they
conceptualize what the past, history, truth, objectivity, and knowledge is. Crucially, the
models of cognition are not solely manifest in explicitly stated metaphors, but reveal
themselves indirectly – in the default ways the information is organized, in the
methodological and epistemological emphases. What became evident is that the
disembodied model of cognition prevails in
 the  way  textbooks  make  sense  of  truth  and  objectivity  (focus  on  veracity,  accuracy,
bias and subjectivity; a dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity);
 the way textbooks instruct pupils to deal with divergent interpretations of the past
(reductive separation of pattern and process; seeking to determine which interpretation
of the available ones is correct in order to reject the others, rather than seeking to
integrate conflicting accounts into a more encompassing explanation; focus on the
facts and lack of engagement with divergent lived experiences);
 a sharp dichotomy between fact and fiction;
 the focus on political and military history of the state/nation and an exclusion of lived,
experiential past from the textbook narratives;
 the arrangement of narrative as a linear sequence of static states.
I will survey the findings of the analysis in four consecutive sections, which, respectively,
focus on the conceptualization of truth and objectivity, the use of multiperspectivity,
organization of a narrative, the presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past in textbooks, and
the main metaphorical themes that emerged in the analysis.
8.1 Truth and objectivity
Engagement with diverse perspectives puts the questions of truth and objectivity at the
forefront of historical analysis. However, as the analysis demonstrated, a comparison of
and reflection on diverse narratives lacks nuance, if it is practiced by placing an emphasis
exclusively on identification of bias and subjectivity, verification of truth claims,
assessment of accuracy of information, differentiation between facts and opinions. In
Table 2 below, I offer an overview of the ideas expressed by the Lithuanian textbook
authors on truth and objectivity.
Table 2. Truth and objectivity: Lithuanian authors
Truth and objectivity
Juozas
Brazauskas
To be objective means to acknowledge the obvious facts. These
facts are clearly seen, known, and constitute the truth, which is
opposed to myth. The discordance between the memories of lived
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experience and factual truth is a confounding problem, if truth is a
singular copy of past reality.
??rat?
Litvinait?
Truth is that which you believe about the past. However, the
relativity of truth of the past elicits a need for firmly grounding certain
value  orientations.  The  emphasis  shifts  away  from  seeking  truth  to
making value-informed choices. A fair judgment of the past constrains
the kinds of narratives that can be told. Fair judgment implies defense
of certain assessments of the past, especially in relation to traumatic
experiences.
Ignas
Kapleris
The objective truth does not exist, but the meaning of a painful past
is not arbitrary. Acknowledging the importance of the truth of the past
as lived experience is important, but this still leaves room for doubt on
the weight or accuracy of some memories. Textbooks should guide
pupils towards the truth, if several interpretations are presented.
Mindaugas
Tamošaitis
There is not a single truth, but there are facts, which do not change.
Truthfulness  is  linked  to  stasis.  If  there  is  no  single  definite  and  clear
assessment of the past, the textbooks should also abstain from
espousing  a  particular  assessment  of  the  past.  It  is  important  to LOOK
AT the past without bias. An objective caricature represents the events
in the past truthfully. Verification of accuracy and identification of bias
are crucial for determining truthfulness.
Deimantas
Karvelis
THE DARK AND THE LIGHT – both SIDES – should be presented in
textbooks without an evaluative judgment in order to ensure
objectivity. Objectivity entails preventing the HUMAN FACTOR from
appearing in the textbook. Objectivity is only possible in facts, which
are free of value judgment. The textbook is a “FIFTH MIRROR IN THE
KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS”; it is very far removed from past
reality and does not offer a faithful reproduction of what happened.
The majority of the interviewed Lithuanian textbook authors underscores the importance
of historical truth and objectivity (Table 2). Juozas Brazauskas, Mindaugas Tamošaitis,
and Deimantas Karvelis, in particular, associate truthfulness and objectivity with the
historical facts, which are fixed, stable, free from the HUMAN FACTOR and,  as  a  result,
objectively true. In other words, they separate facts from interpretation, where the latter is
more conducive to divergent views and, consequently, less capable of being truthful.
Truthfulness is linked to stasis – to what is unchanging and supposedly exists
independently of human perception (see Chapter 2).
Tamošaitis  underlines that  there is  not a single truth,  but there are stable facts,  which
are truthful and which can be verified. Therefore, verification of accuracy, identification
of bias and deception constitutes a significant aspect of source analysis in his textbooks.
Karvelis emphasizes that objectivity is only possible in facts, which are free of value
judgment. For him, objectivity entails presenting THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of an
event or a phenomenon. In order to be objective, the historian should abstain from
judgment and show the good and the bad aspects of the past.  Brazauskas emphasizes the
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weight  of  facts,  but  is  nevertheless  aware  of  the  difficulties  in  establishing  what  is  true,
when objective history is juxtaposed with memories of lived experience, which
contaminate a distanced, objective view of the past.
Ignas Kapleris and J?rat? Litvinait?, on the other hand, speak about truth and
objectivity in relation to multiple interpretations. Both of them find it important to
highlight that even though absolute objectivity or the single truth does not exist, fair and
balanced judgment of the past can nevertheless bring one closer to truthful knowledge of
the past. Textbooks, authored by Kapleris, particularly underscore the ongoing
significance of critical and comparative source analysis. Both Kapleris and Litvinait?
stress that the truth of certain painful or traumatic experiences of the past cannot be
doubted or made arbitrary.
The views on historical truth and objectivity of the Lithuanian authors and their Polish
colleagues overlap to a great extent. Table 3 below offers a summary of the ideas held by
the Polish authors on this topic. Halina Manikowska, Micha? Tymowski, Robert
?niegocki, and Piotr Laskowski all underline that absolute, self-effacing objectivity and
the single historical truth do not exist or are impossible to attain in the discipline of
history. Nevertheless, Manikowska and ?niegocki, in particular, note that balanced, fair
judgement of the sources and scientific procedures of investigation ensure that historical
knowledge produced by historians is verifiable. Manikowska reiterated several times
throughout the interview the need for historians to stick with the middle ground and avoid
TILTING TO any extreme SIDE in the evaluation of the past. She associates truthfulness and
objectivity with what she described as central predisposition. She likewise emphasizes that
historians should aim to evaluate the past on its own terms and avoid judgment on the
basis of contemporary values and beliefs.
Piotr Laskowski, on the other hand, stands out from the group in his emphasis on the
subjectivity of the historian’s GAZE and its impact on the narrative. He does not contest the
existence of facts, but, for him, it was more important to stress the open-endedness and
partiality of historical knowledge. Laskowski explained that theoretical discussion about
historical truth, as opposed to a static, fact-oriented narrative, facilitated pupils’ interest in
the past, brought historical knowledge TO LIFE.
Just  as  their  Lithuanian  peers,  Polish  authors,  such  as  Tymowski,  ?niegocki,  and,  to
some extent, Laskowski differentiated between the absolute, distanced, objective
truthfulness of static individual facts and the subjectivity of more encompassing, complex
interpretations or conjectures. Above the level of individual facts, historians’ subjectivity
inevitably enters the knowledge produced, because historians highlight only certain
aspects of the past, while ignoring others. They arrange the factual information and insert
a particular kind of narrative that depends on their PERSPECTIVE on the past and imbues the
facts with meaning. For example, Tymowski stressed that one should distinguish between
the truth of factual propositions and the truth of assemblages of facts. While it is relatively
easy  to  establish  the  truthfulness  of  the  former  (whether  a  statement  matches  the
exteriorized past), the truth status of larger-scale conjectures is more complicated to
ascertain.
Table 3. Truth and objectivity: Polish authors
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Truth and objectivity
Halina
Manikowska
Absolute objectivity does not exist in humanities. There cannot be an
objective truth of the past because the past reality is too complex and our
access  to  it  too  imperfect.  However,  historians  should  stick  with  the
middle ground and avoid leaning to either extreme side. Historians should
be balanced and fair. Reality HIDES BEHIND sources  and  can  be
UNCOVERED by a skillful historian. The past needs to be evaluated strictly
on its own terms.
Micha?
Tymowski
The pursuit of truth is important, but no historian can claim that s/he
has achieved the ultimate truth. There are different POINTS OF VIEW on the
past. A distinct POINT OF VIEW is not an obstacle to understanding, but a
prerequisite for knowledge. One should distinguish between the truth of
factual propositions and the truth of assemblages of facts. A propositional
statement can be true or false. But most historians go beyond individual
facts and pursue the truth of large-scale processes and conjectures, in
which it is impossible to attain a single IMAGE of the past.
Robert
?niegocki
In  order  to  practice  objectivity,  the  aim is  to  avoid  evaluation  of  the
past and to show different POINTS OF VIEW.  It  is  difficult  to  step  out  of
one’s self and assess one’s own bias. The viewer/knower presents his or
her VISION, which s/he tries to explain and justify. Absolute objectivity
does not exist. In practice, it would amount to not more than a CALENDAR,
a collection of dates. Objectivity is a lack of bias, prejudice,
propagandistic manipulation. The aim of source analysis is to discover
bias-free, truthful, objective information about the past.
Piotr
Laskowski
The VISION of historians is always limited by their PERSPECTIVE,
which determines the nature of historical representation. The supposedly
objective historical depiction is, therefore, only one of the PERSPECTIVES.
The critique of objective history reveals that SHIFTING THE GLASS LENS
simultaneously transforms the narrative. We cannot have objective
knowledge, completely free from ENTANGLEMENT. Theoretical discussion
emphasizes the open-endedness of historical knowledge. Discussions
about historical truth bring historical knowledge TO LIFE.
An aforementioned emphasis on verification of truthfulness and accuracy in textbooks can
be observed in tasks, which present pupils with two contrasting sources, asking them to
evaluate whether the claims made in the sources are accurate and reliable. The emphasis
on verification is detectable in tasks which require pupils to consider, for instance,
whether a poem and a caricature “represent past events objectively” (e.g., the Lithuanian
textbook  series  “Raktas,”  Section  6.4),  or  whether  a  film  or  a  painting  depicts  the  past
accurately (e.g., the Polish textbook “History from the Renaissance to the Napoleonic
times,” 7.3.2.2). This approach can be useful in certain cases, in particular, when pupils
learn to critically assess propaganda materials and identify manipulations, omissions and
selectively presented facts, but it is not sufficient for teaching pupils how to make sense of
diverse interpretations of the past.
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However, the application of the latter method of adjudication reveals that the
metaphorical model of cognition based on the distinction of world and (disembodied)
mind still implicitly prevails in school-history education. Pupils are taught to focus on
those aspects of representation that can be reliably shown to match or falsify past reality.
A  problem  occurs  when  this  model  of  truth  as  a  static  optical  match  between  distanced
world and contents of the mind is assumed to express a universal epistemological
standard. An exclusive emphasis on veracity and factual accuracy fails to address
differences of interpretations and meanings that depend not on factual inaccuracy, but on a
complex  process  of  lived  experience  out  of  which  these  particular  patterns  of
interpretation emerge.
Identification of inaccuracies and bias in sources may be useful in cases of forgery and
falsification, but it does not prepare pupils to comprehend subtler differences of
interpretation, which extend beyond issues of a straightforward, optical match between
language and the past. Crucially, it does not assist pupils in making sense of why one
interpretation may be more truthful than another and/or how they relate to each other, in
cases when both interpretations rely on the same factual information. Importantly, pupils
are not taught to consider how the past is present, how it is embodied in sources, even
those that are not factually accurate, and what these sources can reveal about past life. For
this reason, the lack of conceptual tools for handling and making sense of plural
perspectives in school history remains a significant issue.
Extending Seixas’s (2016) and Levesque’s (2016) conceptual schemes (see Chapter 2)
in an embodied approach, it could be argued that disciplinary critical scrutiny of evidence
and memory are two complementary ways of knowing, which are embedded within a
larger systemic feedback loop between embodied lived experience and social and material
environment. The feedback loop describes the relation of structural coupling (see Section
3.5) between embodied individuals and the environment, within which people move and
act, to which they respond, and which shapes them (see, for example, Muszysnki 2017,
Chapter  2).  In  a  static  sense  of  (optical)  accuracy,  the  disciplinary  approach  can  correct
certain distortions of memory. When we complement the static accuracy with a dynamic
aspect  of  complex  processes  and  relations,  memory  and  lived  experience  can  serve  as  a
record of prior developments and interactions with the environment.
When faced with more nuanced divergences of narratives, textbook authors and
teachers are deprived of conceptual means or resources to explain to pupils how one is to
assess  such  divergences  in  relation  to  each  other,  or  why  one  narrative  may  be  deemed
more truthful than another. The shortcomings of the dualistic, disembodied model of
cognition come into full view once, in the wake of the linguistic turn, the realization arises
that the relation between language and life, word and world, knowledge and reality is not
that of straightforward optical sameness. However, since the dualism between world and
(disembodied) mind, past reality and language of historical narratives continues to be
assumed in postmodern philosophy of history at a meta-theoretical level (Section 3.4), an
epistemological argument collapses into a relativist position. Postmodern philosophy of
history seems to suggest that, in attempts to adjudicate among narratives, the emphasis on
truth should be replaced by an emphasis on value-based deliberation and ethical choice.
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This shift, for example, finds its concrete manifestation in Lithuania in calls for a
systematic, organized national politics of history, which would determine core state values
and beliefs for shaping textbook representation and interpretation of the past. The latter
position was adopted by J?rat? Litvinait?, who was acutely aware of how her own
authorial judgment and interpretation weighed in heavily on textbook representation of the
past. In effect, this may lead to a situation, where, since the relation between language and
the past is assumed to be arbitrary, unwanted interpretations are displaced not because, for
example, they fail to engage with past life, but because they do not correspond to the
values espoused by the state and society. Thus, the contents of history education can
become entirely dependent on the value preferences of those, who are in power to make
such  choices.  The  postmodernist  fixation  on  the  form  of  language  and  imposition  of
meaning on the passive content of the past, paradoxically, may materialize into practices,
which are contrary to the aims of postmodern thinkers, keen to displace objectivized
accounts of the past.
8.2 Multiperspectivity
The analysis has demonstrated that a plurality of historical narratives constitutes an
important challenge to school-history education, which is expected to provide truthful
knowledge about the past. Even though the interviewed school-history textbook authors
and teachers in both Lithuania and Poland are generally willing to insert different
interpretations of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past into textbooks, significant obstacles
remain to such a textbook approach.
An extremely broad thematic and chronological scope of the curriculum severely limits
the possibilities of textbook authors and teachers to examine any single topic in a more
complex way. The curriculum imposes a format of narration, which introduces the past as
a linear sequence of distanced events rather than as a complex process of life. Moreover,
since political history of states and nations still prevails in the curriculum, the lived,
experiential past is largely excluded from the textbook contents. This significantly
diminishes possibilities to include accounts of different experiences of the past, however.
The prevalence of political and military history also demonstrates that school-history
continues to be taught in the tradition of cultural memory (Chapter 2; Assmann 2010,
2011). School-history is expected to consolidate and preserve the foundational knowledge
about the group’s past and to rise above the impermanent, subjective apparitions and
impressions (Tamm 2008, 2013). The ways in which pupils are trained to cope with
multiperspectivity reveal that the focus is on knowledge understood as a static object
rather than on the process of relations and interactions that are reflected in such knowledge
(Chapter 2). The entanglement (Hodder 2012) in static, visual modes of conceptualization
is thereby extended and bestowed by shaping pupils’ ways of thinking about the past.
In teaching about conflicts and disagreements in the past, a particularly problematic
approach is to introduce distinct perspectives (patterns) without explaining the processes
of  lived  experience,  out  of  which  these  perspectives  arose.  One  of  the  entailments  of
disembodied meta-theoretical premises, which assumes a separation between language and
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world and between pattern and process, is that an engagement with divergent narratives
can be reduced to a “I have my history, you have yours” approach. This approach reduces
different interpretations to subjective “appearances,” which are relative, isolated, static
and figuratively framed. The analysis may be focused on identifying similarities and
differences between divergent interpretations, but does not link these patterns to a process
of lived experience. However, if pupils do not come to understand a particular pattern of
viewing  the  past  in  terms  of  the  process  of  its  instantiation  and  organization  over  time,
other people’s experience in the past may remain opaque and unrelatable. In order to make
sense of multiple divergent perspectives, pupils need to learn to recognize how they have
emerged over time and how they are entangled in a complex process of past life.
An exception among the analyzed Lithuanian textbooks was the 9th grade textbook
“Laikas,” which attempted to explain the 19th century conflict between the “Young
Lithuanians” of the national revival movement and the Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians”
by connecting this conflict to the process of lived experience of both groups. Pupils could
learn to empathize with the trajectory of experience of both groups and to understand how
this experience subsequently shaped their reactions to each other. In other words, the
textbook combined, in an embodied way, the presentation of divergent perspectives with a
discussion of a process of lived experience out of which the perspectives emerge. The
main text and the accompanying excerpts from sources allowed interpreting the 19th
century split between Lithuanians and Poles, to a great extent, as being caused by the
inability and unwillingness to relate to each other’s process of lived experience. In Table 4
below,  an  overview  of  the  Lithuanian  authors’  understanding  of  the  use  of
multiperspectivity in school-history education is provided.
Table 4. Multiperspectivity: Lithuanian authors
Multiperspectivity
Juozas
Brazauskas
The teacher should introduce different interpretations and steer
pupils towards a preferred interpretation. Multiperspectivity, however,
is not demanded in the exams. Two PERSPECTIVE WINDOWS from which
to look at the Lithuanian history: the WINDOW of the national,
Lithuanian, history and the WINDOW of  the  world.  The  two WINDOWS
are mutually exclusive. LOOKING AT the past from the WINDOW of the
world poses the threat of disappearing in the big frame.
??rat?
Litvinait?
Multiperspectivity can be incorporated at an upper secondary level
of education. Authors bear a huge responsibility in shaping pupils’
ideas about the past by the way they introduce multiple narratives.
When faced with a plurality of narratives, pupils should select the one
that best fits their values and beliefs. There are limits to the extent that
uncertainty about the past is acceptable in the classroom. A national
politics of history is necessary in order to establish core collective
values and beliefs that shape society’s future.
Ignas
Kapleris
Multiperspectivity in school-history is welcome, but one should
remain cautious about its use in the classroom. Textbooks and teachers
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should serve the function of a GUIDE-POST in  terms  of  how  certain
events should be assessed, especially when the past events in question
have to do with painful or tragic experience.
Mindaugas
Tamošaitis
Pupils should be made aware that there could be multiple
interpretations of the past. The teacher or a textbook should not USURP
A MONOPOLY and impose a single narrative. Pupils need to compare
different interpretations, choose one of them and provide justifications
for their choice. The textbook should avoid very assertive judgments.
Deimantas
Karvelis
The textbook should introduce all interpretations and avoid passing
judgment. In cases where a textbook depicts events which receive a
controversial historiographic interpretation, it should show the variety
of different opinions. However, matters, which are already settled
among historians, can be explained in a straightforward way.
All the interviewed Lithuanian authors agreed that multiperspectivity – introducing
different interpretations of the same events – should be incorporated in school-history
education, particularly when the interpretation is contested among professional historians
(Table 4). However, all authors underlined that there are limits to the use of
multiperspectivity in the classroom.  For example, as the interview with Ignas Kapleris
illustrated (Section 6.3.2), the lived experience of tragic or painful events, does not lend
itself to being emplotted in a number of different ways. The limits of interpretation derive
from embodied experience of these events, which, if it is included into a narrative,
illuminates how meaning is lived and afforded by embodiment rather than solely
determined by narrative impositionalism. The textbooks should, according to Kapleris,
guide pupils towards a particular preferred interpretation.
??rat? Litvinait? upheld a slightly different position that multiperspectivity is
permissible in school history to the extent that it does not endanger certain core values and
beliefs, which make up the group identity. These core values and beliefs, according to
Litvinait?, cannot be left to the teachers, textbook authors, or pupils to decide, but need to
emerge from a purposeful and systematic politics of history at the national level. Juozas
Brazauskas, likewise, expressed his opinion that the teacher should steer pupils and help
them identify the interpretation, which is more justified. He was not convinced that pupils
would be able to adjudicate among various interpretations on their own. The interview
with Brazauskas, however, also revealed how thinking of different interpretations in terms
of static perspective “WINDOWS”  may  prevent  pupils  from  conceiving  the  complexity  of
the past life. The relation between different perspectives may be perceived as mutually
exclusive and negative.
Mindaugas Tamošaitis emphasized that the textbook and the teacher should strictly
avoid imposing a single narrative or interpretations on pupils. Textbooks, in his view,
should avoid explicit value judgments and assertive opinions about the past. Pupils should
become acquainted with multiple interpretations, compare them and make a justified
choice among them. Deimantas Karvelis, on the other hand, acknowledged that all
interpretations should be introduced in the case of controversial issues, but the interview
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with  him  likewise  revealed  that  he  refused  to  identify  certain  events  of  the  past,  which
presently raise debates among professional historians, as controversial.
The interviewed Polish authors (Table 5) were unanimously supportive of including
diverse interpretations of the past into textbooks, particularly if they are introduced at an
upper secondary level, when pupils are mature enough to engage with and make sense of
competing accounts. Halina Manikowska underscored the idea that engagement with
different narratives should entail an understanding of the reasoning of people in the past,
which acknowledges their experiences and lived context. She maintained the idea that
textbooks should explain the Polish-Lithuanian conflict by familiarizing pupils with lived
experience and perceptions of past peoples. However, Manikowska admitted that such an
approach to explanation of the conflict is not implemented in Poland, where the shared
Polish-Lithuanian past is mostly presented in a very concise, fact-oriented, and descriptive
manner.
Micha? Tymowski welcomed the introduction of multiple perspectives into school-
history education, but admitted that an extremely broad scope of the curriculum limits the
possibility of such a pedagogical approach. He pointed out that history, to the extent that it
is  open  to  different  narratives  of  experience,  can  provide  resources  for  mutual
understanding and empathy.
Robert ?niegocki and Piotr Laskowski both stressed the obligation to introduce pupils
to multiple points of view on the past and demonstrate to pupils that a textbook narrative
does not offer an exhaustive knowledge of the past. In this regard, they reiterate the views
of the Lithuanian authors Deimantas Karvelis and J?rat? Litvinait?, who similarly
emphasized that pupils should realize that a textbook does not constitute a sacred and
indispensable source of historical knowledge. Laskowski laid emphasis on the need to
show pupils that the default state-oriented textbook narrative excludes the lives and
experiences of ordinary people. ?niegocki argued that pupils should learn to question the
knowledge presented in the textbook and realize that historical interpretations are
constantly shifting in accordance with the change of OPTICS from one generation to the
next. On the other hand, concrete examples of how multiperspectivity is practiced in
?niegocki’s textbooks reveal that they rather concern judgment of particular events in the
past (for or against) than understanding of different lived experiences, reasoning and
perceptions of people in the past.
Tymowski’s position was likewise reminiscent of Litvinait?’s belief that the role of the
government in history education is to provide a particular direction with regard to value
orientations. He emphasized that such official guidelines should provide a vision or a
framework for history education, but simultaneously encompass multiple points of view.
Table 5. Multiperspectivity: Polish authors
Multiperspectivity
Halina
Manikowska
Historians need to examine and portray the reasoning of people on
both SIDES of the conflict. Historians need to understand the reasoning of
the people who lived in the past, their worldviews and experience which
shaped how they perceived the situation.
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Micha?
Tymowski
School-history should draw pupils’ attention to differences in
interpretation of the past, but simultaneously needs to provide basic
factual knowledge. Getting to know different interpretations of the past
creates a potential for mutual understanding. It is important to show that
there are different POINTS OF VIEW on the past. The role of the ministry is
to provide a certain direction for history education, which would take
into account different POINTS OF VIEW. It should not outline a single
interpretation, but indicate a direction on what kind of values need to be
encouraged through school-history.
Robert
?niegocki
It is important that pupils would understand that there can be
different POINTS OF VIEW. An author is obliged to avoid evaluation of the
past and to show, where it applies, different POINTS OF VIEW. History
education should make pupils aware that historical knowledge is not
SACRED WORDS. Pupils should learn to question the historical knowledge
and realize that historical interpretations are not static, that historical
OPTICS change from generation to generation.
Piotr
Laskowski
Pupils need to comprehend that there can be multiple PERSPECTIVES
on the past and that the default state-oriented narrative currently exists at
the expense of a more inclusive PERSPECTIVE that takes into
consideration the lives of ordinary people in the past. History education
should teach dialogue with people different from ourselves and resurrect
the VOICES of the silenced.
8.3 Narrative organization
The presentation of history as a linear sequence of static states, that is devoid of a lived,
experiential past, does create the impression of a narrative, in which values and meanings
are solely a product of narrative organization of factual material. When history writing
attempts to present objective knowledge about the past or ignores the past that is lived in
embodiment, it has few means to counter the postmodern critique that meaning is made in
history solely through narrative impositionalism (e.g., White 1974, 1999; Munslow 2003,
2006a, 2006b; Section 3.4.2). This is evidenced in historical narratives that are principally
organized in terms of the developments of the nation and state and that ignore diverse
lived experiences of its population.
In such cases, the postmodern critique of history writing is justified to the extent that
such disembodied historical narratives have little to offer to prove otherwise. The problem,
however, is that the postmodern philosophy of history, because of its own implicit reliance
on a disembodied model of cognition, assumes all history writing, in principle, to be
removed from past reality (as discussed in Section 3.4). It scales up a partial textual
phenomenon  to  be  representative  of  the  whole  field  of  history  writing.  An  embodied
approach to history writing can encompass and extend the postmodern philosophy of
history by revealing the effects of embodiment on the way historians make sense of the
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past, but likewise by showing that the meaning of the lived, experiential past does not
have to depend completely on historians’ emplotment and narrativization.
The effects of textbook narratives that downplay or ignore the lived, experiential past
demonstrate why a sharp opposition between history and memory, as discussed in Chapter
2, is counterproductive. That is, why such a sharp opposition between history and memory
is unhelpful, if the aim is to understand, in contrast to an optical sense of static
correspondence, how a past reality can relate to a historical text. History, on the one hand,
requires an experiential, embodied memory of lived experience; memory of lived
experience,  on  the  other  hand,  can  benefit  from  a  disciplinary  emphasis  of  history  on
critical engagement with diverse sources. In other words, history and memory are
interdependent and mutually supportive, rather than antithetical to one another as is
sometimes assumed. What is meant here by the notion of memory, moreover, is not the
essentialized, static, foundational and canonical memory that is often employed by state
apparatuses and which imposes its own fixed image on the body (Assmann 2011). Rather,
dynamic and embodied memory of lived experience is diverse and fluid, not uniform and
fixed. Taking into account the past as lived in a narrative may reveal the ways in which the
meaning of the past is not an arbitrary product of narrative organization.
The focus on divergent interpretations illustrates well how an embodied approach to
making sense of the past may serve in handling a plurality of evaluations. The complexity
of past reality requires that cognition proceeds in comprehensive terms and emphasizes
how divergent lived experiences relate and contribute to larger-scale phenomena or
processes. That is, how individual threads of lived experience interconnect to produce the
patterns, shapes and textures that themselves form the overall weave, or the process of life,
and which, in multiple ongoing feedback loops, shape those individual threads (Varela,
Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Capra 2003). A plurality of interpretations demands that
we recognize the multilayered complexity of past reality and link patterns (perspectives) to
processes (lived experience) in our analysis.
Comprehensive thinking skills are those that enable identifying relations between
individual parts as well as between these parts and the wholes they form, understanding
relations and interconnections, and identifying different levels of complexity. Such skills
are opposed to merely reductive analysis and permit the comprehension of a plurality of
interpretations. This is no impediment to truth, understood in terms of such complexity.
On  the  other  hand,  when  we  rely  exclusively  on  a  linear,  static,  reductionist  way  of
thinking that is intrinsic to a disembodied model of cognition, we think about knowledge
in terms of static entities, isolated parts, enclosed, “inner” mental images or snapshots.
Accordingly, we are led to scrutinize perspectives as the focus of our specialized
analytical attention. But we struggle to see such perspectives as part of the multilayered
process of life.
In an embodied approach, instead of having to select one viewpoint from which to
evaluate an event, teachers and pupils would need to comprehend past reality as a complex
system, with multiple diverse experiences interconnecting with each other and bringing
forth larger-scale processes and phenomena, whose effects loop back to shape individual
lives. School history needs to encourage mutual understanding and acceptance of different
lived experiences and help pupils comprehend why people experienced the past in very
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different ways rather than necessarily seeking a single account of the past. Thus, a
conception of the past as a process of life forces the narrator to engage with a multilayered
complexity  of  the  past  –  multiple  patterns  and  their  respective  processes.  In  order  to
handle successfully the plurality of interpretations, the concept of complexity is of
paramount importance.
A striking, though not an unexpected, finding of the analysis was that textbook
narratives, both in Lithuania and Poland, largely omit the lived, experiential past from
textbook narratives of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past. This could partially be explained
by the nature of the history curriculum in both countries, which encompasses an extremely
large amount of information. The scope of the curricula is very wide and encompasses
“all” history from pre-historic times to the 21st century, which prevents any kind of more
meaningful engagement with the past beyond a brief, fact-oriented and superficial
depiction of the most important, typically political, history.
Political and military history still prevails in the depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian
history, in both Poland and Lithuania. In this regard, I agree with Piotr Laskowski’s
critique of school-history education, which, unlike professional history, has not yet
transcended its 19th-century inherited fixation on political history. The linearity of a
narrative sequence of static states of the world, combined with an enduring overall
emphasis on political history, renders the complexity of the past process of life invisible.
Moreover, if history is modeled as a collection of disembodied facts about generalized
states of the world, it likely leaves pupils indifferent to the past, since there is little in such
a history that could engage pupils with an experiential, embodied, lived dimension of that
past.
As  long  as  school-history  textbooks  depict  the  shared  past  in  terms  of  a  linear,
disembodied narrative and a strictly nation-oriented perspective, integration of multiple
narratives  of  experience  will  remain  a  challenge.  What  Polish  and  Lithuanian  textbooks
share is the disembodied, linear, reductive model of the past. Where they differ is in the
perspective they prioritize at the expense of other perspectives. Complexity does not enter
the picture of the past, because the very structure of the textbook narrative prevents pupils
from thinking about the past in terms of a complex process of life that accommodates
different narratives of experience.
8.4 The presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past
In the analyzed Lithuanian textbooks, it is possible to observe a slight shift towards a more
balanced portrayal of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past and Poland’s role in Lithuanian
history. The textbooks of Juozas Brazauskas illustrate the narrative of the early 1990s,
where the themes of threat, resistance, and defense of sovereignty predominate. Poland
and Poland’s role in Lithuanian history are assessed in these textbooks primarily
according to whether they strengthened or diminished the FOUNDATION of the Lithuanian
state and identity. Polonization of the Lithuanian political elites is depicted as evoking the
threat of MELTING AWAY, whereas the Union of Lublin is said to contribute to the gradual
decline of Lithuanian statehood.
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Compared to the textbooks from the 1990s, textbooks published after 2000 reevaluated
the impact of Polish-Lithuanian unification and shared statehood in less negative terms.
The history textbook for the 9th grade “Laikas” of the publishing house “Briedis”
(Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3) stand out in this regard by a more nuanced evaluation of the
Polish-Lithuanian unification. This reveals an influence, even if delayed, of shifts in
historiographical debates on the contents of history textbooks.
The negative evaluation of Poland’s role in Lithuanian history, however, still figures in
Lithuanian textbooks, even though authors avoid asserting explicit judgments. In
particular, the Union of Lublin and the interwar conflict remain contentious topics. For
example, two textbooks, (co-)authored by ??rat? Litvinait? (6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2),
exclusively  characterize  Lithuania’s  unification  with  Poland  after  the  15th  century  as
threatening the Lithuanian identity and statehood. Textbooks underline that the Union of
Lublin was partially an act of coercion. One of Litvinait?’s textbooks (6.2.3.1) accentuates
themes of decline, disorder and the gradual fading of Lithuanian statehood in the centuries
following the Union, thereby further fortifying a unilaterally negative assessment of the
Union of Lublin. On the other hand, FRIENDSHIP between Lithuania and Poland is said to
have been restored after the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence in 1990. The
textbook (6.2.3.2) states that both countries recognized each other’s rights and territories,
thus,  including  the  city  of  Vilnius  within  the  territory  of  the  Lithuanian  state.  Poland  is
personified, noting how it “HELPED the YOUNG Lithuanian state to STAND ON ITS FEET.”
In the textbook series “Laikas” (6.3), co-authored by Ignas Kapleris, an attempt can be
observed to SMOOTH OVER sharp CORNERS and re-assess the role of Poland in Lithuanian
history. The textbook assessment of the Polish role in the Lithuanian history
acknowledges explicitly in what ways Lithuania benefited from the rapprochement with
Poland and the ensuing Europeanization, but less desirable developments and influences
after  the  1569  Union  of  Lublin  are  also  mentioned.  The  adoption  of  the  Constitution  of
May 3 in 1791 is presented as a remarkable achievement, which was significant not only
for Poland, but also for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Importantly, the conflict between
Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and the modern Lithuanian national movement in the
19th century is presented by seeking to explain how each of these internally diverse
groups perceived their situation. Polish-speaking Lithuanians, who merged into the
modern Polish nation, are introduced as people who were forced to make a choice under
unfavorable circumstances, who were at a CROSSROADS of a PAINFUL choice. The textbook
combines, in an embodied way, the presentation of divergent perspectives with a
discussion of a process of lived experience out of which these perspectives emerged.
On  the  other  hand,  the  interwar  conflict  elicited  strong  emotions  both  during  the
interview  with  Kapleris  and  in  the  textbook  presentation  of  the  series  “Laikas.”  The
textbook narrative asserts that Lithuanians were the weaker, but legally and historically
the legitimate side of the conflict, whereas in the interview, Kapleris made sense of the
interwar conflict over Vilnius by personifying the two countries as NEIGHBORS who fight
over a PLOT OF LAND.
Lastly, the textbook series “Raktas” (6.4), co-authored by, among others, Mindaugas
Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis, encompasses a diverse jumble of assessments of the
Polish-Lithuanian past. The depiction of some events of the past, such as the 1385 Union
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of Krewo or the interwar conflict, avoid any explicit positive or negative evaluation. Just
as Tamošaitis explained in the interview, he avoided asserting a strong judgment and
sought neutrality in the textbook narrative. Despite an attempt to link the interwar conflict
with the 19th-century developments of national consciousness, the focus is on the factual
details of the military conflict. In the case of the Union of Krewo, the textbook (6.4.2.2)
suggests to pupils, however, that Jogaila’s promise “to annex the territory of Lithuania to
Poland for the ages” has been a matter of discord among Polish and Lithuanian historians,
who debate what the term “annex,” or “applicare,” meant. Unlike in Polish textbooks, the
textbook (6.4.2.2) from this series also attributes the merits for the victory in the Battle of
Grunwald to the Lithuanian maneuver.
The  sections  of  the  series  “Raktas,”  written  by  Karvelis,  on  the  other  hand,  espouse
stronger value judgments of the past. The negative evaluation of the Union of Lublin and
its consequences prevails in the textbook. The author claims that “DOORS WERE OPENED UP
WIDELY for the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility which started in 1385” (6.4.6.1).
The Union of Lublin is presented as a turning point, a THRESHOLD in Lithuanian history,
which OPENED THE DOORS for an eventual decline of Lithuanian statehood and
sovereignty. On the other hand, the noble democracy is said to be an advantageous
phenomenon for Lithuania after the
Union of Lublin.
A general tendency that can be
observed in the analyzed Lithuanian
textbooks, with the exception of the
textbook series “Laikas,” is that the
Union  of  Lublin  stands  out  as  the
point in history, marking the
beginning of the decline of Lithuanian statehood. In the narrative sequence, the medieval
glory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is gradually diminished by closer rapprochement
with the Kingdom of Poland, which ultimately leads to the loss of sovereignty. The nation
is, however, redeemed from extinction in the 19th century with the emergence of the
national revival movement.
In the analyzed Polish textbooks, there is a shift toward showing more explicitly that
different ethnic and religious groups inhabited the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The
textbooks of Halina Manikowska interpret the Union of Krewo as a reorientation in Polish
foreign policy and a rapprochement with, until then, hostile Lithuania. The Polish-
Lithuanian Union is assessed in the textbook (7.1.3.1) very positively as an event which
permitted Poles and Lithuanians to jointly eliminate the danger of the Teutonic Order, and
which led to an emergence of the powerful and territorially largest state in Europe.
Jogaila’s pledge to incorporate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Poland is said to have
become a quarrelsome issue between the two states (7.1.3.2). However, the textbook
explains that the unions of Poland and Lithuania up until the 1569 Union of Lublin were
based on a loose connection between two separate states (7.1.3). Moreover, the textbook
(7.1.3.1) acknowledges the contribution of both states to the victory won in the Battle of
Grunwald against the Teutonic Order.
The theme of decline following the
1569 Union of Lublin stands out in the
narratives of the analyzed Lithuanian
textbooks.
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Micha? Tymowski’s textbooks stood out in the way they explicitly sought to underline
the separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the union with Poland. As an author,
he aimed to show pupils that the political elites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania preserved
their sense of a separate identity even after they had become linguistically Polonized. The
textbooks (7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2) explain that Polish-Lithuanian unification and the adoption
of Catholic Christianity by Lithuania enabled Lithuanians to differentiate their identity
from the Orthodox Ruthenian population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
In this sense, the union with Poland is presented as a favorable development which
guaranteed stability and continuity of Lithuanian statehood. The presentation of the
Polish-Lithuanian Union in the textbooks (7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2) unequivocally departs from
an established fact-oriented narrative tradition. The factual information is included in the
depiction, but Tymowski clearly sought to focus pupils’  attention on the phenomenon of
medieval unions as such and show how the Polish-Lithuanian union figures in the
European context. Nevertheless, the textbook (7.2.2.2) acknowledges diverse and
changing evaluations of the union in Poland and Lithuania. Pupils are made aware of the
fact that evaluations of the Lithuanian gentry, who were contemporaries of the union,
differed from the evaluations, which emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries together with
modern nationalist movements.
The textbooks of Robert ?niegocki encourage pupils to consider different
interpretations of the same events. For example, the Union of Krewo is introduced by
familiarizing pupils with the historians’ debate about the meaning of the term “applicare”
(7.3.2.1). Pupils likewise need to evaluate the position of Vytautas towards the Polish-
Lithuanian union from the point of view of Poles and Lithuanians and to find positive and
negative effects of his politics. The textbook (7.3.2.1) devoted considerably much space to
discussing the Polish-Lithuanian conflict with the Teutonic Order, which culminated in
the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. Pupils are given an additional source – a description of the
course of the battle by the 15th century Polish chronicler Jan D?ugosz, which depicts how
Lithuanian troops, unable to resist the attack of the Teutonic knights, escaped from the
battlefield. Hence, the victory is presented as the sole accomplishment of the Polish army
and the leadership skills of Jogaila. The textbook does not problematize this interpretation
of the battle in light of the latest historical findings, nor does it mention anything about the
maneuver of the Lithuanian army (7.3.2.1).
?niegocki presents the 1569 Union of Lublin in the context of the Executionist
movement in the Kingdom of Poland, which demanded the complete unification of Poland
and Lithuania (7.3.2.2). The textbook vividly depicts the dissonance in attitudes towards
the union in Lithuania. The textbook author acknowledges that the negotiation process
between  Polish  and  Lithuanian  delegations  over  the  terms  of  the  union  was  particularly
difficult. Pupils are familiarized with the commentary of the Polish historian Juliusz
Bardach on the positive and negative effects of the union on Poles, Lithuanians and
Ruthenians (7.3.2.2). Bardach notes that even though Lithuanian political elites became
linguistically and culturally Polonized, they did not lose a sense of separate political
consciousness and defended the political and legal subjectivity of the Grand Duchy in the
union with Poland.
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Another distinct feature of ?niegocki’s textbook series is that the chapters depicting
the  history  after  the  Polish-Lithuanian  union  consistently  use  the  terms  “Republic”  and
“Polish-Lithuanian state” to refer to the Commonwealth. Even when the 18th century is
described all the way to the partitions of the Commonwealth at the end of the century, the
textbook adheres to these terms and avoids referring to the state as “Poland.” Furthermore,
even when the Constitution of May 3 is depicted, the author clarifies that the Constitution
was soon followed by the adoption of the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which
guaranteed half the seats in institutions of central government for the Lithuanians.
Importantly, the textbook underlines that “in practice, the previously existing federative
union was maintained” (7.3.2.2). In contrast to other Polish textbooks, the continuing
duality of the state is acknowledged and emphasized.
Lastly, the textbook (7.3.3.1) contextualizes the interwar conflict between Poland and
Lithuania in relation to the simultaneously ongoing Polish-Bolshevik war. The actual
conflict between Poland and Lithuania is described in a single paragraph, which relates
that when the Bolsheviks took control of Vilnius again in July 1920, they assigned the city
to Lithuania. Pupils are provided a very brief, fact-oriented description of the conflict,
which,  however,  does  not  explain  at  all  why  the  conflict  emerged  in  the  first  place.
Because of the predominantly chronological narrative arrangement, the textbook fails to
contextualize the conflict by discussing the long-term processes of identity transformation
in  the  19th  century  and  the  rise  of  modern  national  movements  in  the  territory  of  the
former Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
The textbooks co-authored by Piotr Laskowski adopt  a  novel  and  more  inclusive
perspective on the history of peasants, religious and ethnic minorities, whose voice he is
eager to insert into the textbook narrative. As he argued in the interview, the majority of
ordinary  people,  who  were  peasants  and  who  were  not  part  of  the  political  elites,  felt
themselves neither as Poles, nor as Lithuanians. Laskowski underlined that the
preoccupation with Polishness or Lithuanianness is determined by the nation- and state-
oriented tradition of history writing. However, in terms of the narrative of the Polish-
Lithuanian past, the textbook does not depart much from an established narrative focused
on the history of political elites. The textbook (7.4.2.1) introduces the 1385 Union of
Krewo as advantageous to both Poland and Lithuania. In particular, it is stressed that the
union strengthened both states against the threat of the Teutonic Order, which sought to
dismantle the union by any means. The 1569 Union of Lublin is introduced rather briefly,
laying emphasis on the fact that it constituted a closer political and administrative
rapprochement of the two states (7.4.4.1). In the context of the 17th century, the textbook
increasingly begins to refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as “Poland.”
The description of the Constitution of May 3 receives a lot of attention in the textbook
(7.5.5.1). However, the nuances regarding Lithuanian sensitivities and the territorial-
administrative arrangement of the state do not enter the focus. Keeping to its thematic
focus, the textbook puts emphasis, rather, on the fact that peasants did not benefit from the
Constitution, despite the fact that they constituted 90% of the population.
A distinctive feature of the presentation of the 19th century in the textbook (7.5.5.2) is
that it takes into consideration other nations, which lived alongside the Poles, in the so-
called “Polish lands” of the former Commonwealth. Although the authors do not discuss
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the national movement of Lithuanians and Lithuanian-Polish relations, they, for example,
problematize the Ukrainian-Polish relations and refer critically to the sense of superiority
of Polish landlords towards the Ukrainian peasants. On the other hand, what is striking is
that  the  final  military  take-over  of  the  city  of  Vilnius  and  its  region  by  Polish  troops  in
1920 is not even mentioned in the main text (7.5.5.2). Pupils learn that the troops of
General ?eligowski staged a fake mutiny, under Pi?sudski’s command, and that the region
was, soon after, incorporated into Poland – in six sentences inserted on the margin of the
page as supplementary information. The description focuses only on the Polish point of
view and presents the events in a fact-oriented, descriptive manner. Since the emphasis in
the narrative falls  on the Polish-Soviet  war,  it  is  difficult  to comprehend the roots of the
Polish-Lithuanian conflict in the interwar period. The attitudes and rationale of the
Lithuanians in the conflict are not
introduced in the textbook.
In the analyzed Polish textbooks,
the authors sought to depict the shared
Polish-Lithuanian  past  not  just  from
the nation-oriented perspective, but
also from the European and social
class perspectives. Nevertheless, the nation-focused political history prevails in the
textbook narratives. The sovereignty and separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in
the union with Poland are widely acknowledged. However, since the emphasis is primarily
concentrated on the political and military past, textbooks devote little to no attention to the
lived, experiential past, or to how people in the past experienced and perceived their
situation. Attention to how the past was lived would inevitably require authors to show
different perspectives and experiences of Poles and Lithuanians of the shared past. This is
a particularly acute problem in depictions of the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict. The
textbook presentation of the conflict in Poland is concise, fact-oriented, and descriptive.
Textbooks do not engage the questions of how and why Lithuanians and Poles perceived
the situation in such divergent terms, out of what process of experience these differences
emerged.
This overview reveals the differences and consistencies in the interpretation of the past
both  between  and  among  Lithuanian  and  Polish  history  textbooks.  Despite  certain
similarities and encompassing patterns, there exist important in-group divergences in the
presentation of the past among the analyzed Lithuanian as well as Polish textbooks.
8.5 Metaphorical themes
In addition to the ocularcentric metaphorical model of cognition, which implicitly shaped
the presentation of historical knowledge, there were other metaphors, which played a role
in influencing the authors’ reasoning about and portrayal of the past. The source of these
metaphors was the authors’ personal and family memory, the social environment with
which they engaged, the historiography they read, university studies, the influence of
specific teachers or mentors. A particular textbook rendition of the past inevitably carries a
The analyzed Polish textbooks
encompass a wider range of thematic
perspectives.
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stamp of these authors’ lived experiences, all of which shape their individual ways of
interpreting and presenting the past. Even though the curriculum structures the contents of
a textbook, it leaves a lot of room for these authors’ personal choices as to how the past
should be introduced and which aspects of it should be highlighted. Table 6 below lists the
main metaphors of each textbook author.
Table 6. Metaphors
Metaphors
Juozas
Brazauskas
RESISTANCE, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION FOR IDENTITY, TREE,
ROOTS, MELTING AWAY, MARCHING, EXTINCTION, RESURRECTION,
LOOKING FROM THE WINDOW
??rat?
Litvinait?
BOUNDLESS OCEAN, FISHERMEN, BOUNDLESS KINGDOM, WORLD
OF THE PAST, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE,
OBSERVING THE PAST, STATE AS A FAMILY UNIT, PERSPECTIVE
Ignas
Kapleris
TO SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS, BLACK AND WHITE IN HISTORY,
TEXTBOOK AS A GUIDE-POST, A VACUUM, INFORMATION WARFARE, A
CARD GAME, PERSPECTIVE, THE SPLIT NATION, TWO  BRANCHES  OF
THE NATION, TWO PATHS, NEIGHBORS FIGHTING OVER A PLOT OF
LAND, PAINFUL PAST
Mindaugas
Tamošaitis
USURP A MONOPOLY, RULES OF THE GAME, TO LOOK AT events
without bias, ROOTS, DIFFERENT PATHS, POLAND AND LITHUANIA AS
PERSONS
Deimantas
Karvelis
A GIANT ABYSS, GOING DOWN ON BENDED KNEES, TEXTBOOK AS A
CATECHISM, FIFTH MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING
MIRRORS, PERSPECTIVE, showing BOTH SIDES – THE DARK AND THE
LIGHT – of history, COLORFUL PAST, THE HUMAN FACTOR, POLAND
WANTED TO ABSORB US, A THRESHOLD IN HISTORY, DOORS WERE
OPENED WIDELY, THE TITANIC
Halina
Manikowska
A continuity of VISION, A BAGGAGE, PENDULUM, TILT TO AN
OPPOSITE SIDE, HISTORIANS AS CHRONICLERS, REALITY HIDES BEHIND
SOURCES, BOTH SIDES of the conflict to be shown
Micha?
Tymowski
CURRICULUM AS A GRAIN ELEVATOR, DROWNING IN FACTS, ALIVE
AND DEAD history, POINT OF VIEW, AN IMAGE OF THE PAST, historians
cannot BREAK AWAY FROM THEMSELVES, FOUNDATION for
understanding the otherness of people of the past
Robert
?niegocki
POINTS OF VIEW, A GAZE ON HISTORY, assess AS IF FROM OUTSIDE,
A VISION, HISTORICAL OPTICS, TEXTBOOK IS NOT A CALENDAR OF
DATES, SACRED WORDS, A CARBON PAPER IN THE BRAIN
Piotr
Laskowski
OVERLAPPING WORLDS, HISTORY EDUCATION AS A DIALOGUE
WITH PEOPLE DIFFERENT FROM US, STEPPING  INTO  SOMEONE  ELSE’S
SHOES, VOICES OF THE SILENCED, PERSPECTIVES, SHIFTING THE GLASS
LENS, WAYS OF SEEING THE PAST, LIVING AND DEAD knowledge
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Several key thematic groups of metaphors emerge from the above list: organic,
ground/groundlessness, spatial, ocular-optic metaphors, and metaphors that are based on
senses other than that of sight.
Organic: TREE, ROOTS, RESISTANCE, EXTINCTION, MELTING AWAY, TWO BRANCHES OF
THE NATION, POLAND WANTED TO ABSORB US, TO SUCK US IN, ALIVE AND DEAD HISTORY,
LIVING AND DEAD KNOWLEDGE.
Organic metaphors were particularly dominant in the interview and textbooks of
Brazauskas. However, they likewise emerged in the textbooks of Kapleris and the
interviews with Karvelis, Tymowski, and Laskowski. In both Brazauskas and Karvelis, the
organic metaphors are used in relation to the theme of national vitality that is in danger of
being annihilated or overwhelmed. The perception of menace of disappearing, melting
away, diluting, dissolving is at the same time associated with the need for strong
FOUNDATIONS, which would ground the identity, ensure the resistance to upROOTing
influences, and maintain the boundary between self and other. Accordingly, the endurance
of the boundary between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the
shared state features prominently in the textbook narrative of Brazauskas. If the boundary
is blurry or permeable, the FOUNDATION may be WASHED OUT and the identity can become
DILUTED. MELTING AWAY becomes synonymous with death, non-being, which explains
why the textbook narrative is laden with strong emotional value, even if the count of
explicit metaphors is low throughout the textbook. In the case of Karvelis, the metaphor of
ABSORBTION likewise indicates the perception of threat associated with the fragility and
permeability of the boundary between self and other. The organic metaphors of
Brazauskas and Karvelis further correlate with a shared trait of reasoning in that both
authors expressed their reservation towards European-cosmopolitan identity and values.
Particularly for Brazauskas, European values threaten the stability of the traditional
Romantic vision of the nation, which he seeks to preserve in his pupils.
In the case of the Polish authors, organic metaphors were rare and manifested solely in
the context of making sense of the liveliness of historical knowledge. Both Tymowski and
Laskowski associated DEAD knowledge with detached, objective factual information that
needs to be memorized, whereas LIVING knowledge reveals how the past is present in its
consequences. DEAD knowledge is fixed and static (ocularcentric) (see Section 3.2),
whereas LIVING knowledge is continuously in the process of making.
Ground/groundlesness:  HISTORY AS FOUNDATION for identity, MELTING AWAY,
HISTORY AS FOUNDATION of useful knowledge, BOUNDLESS OCEAN, BOUNDLESS KINGDOM,
A VACUUM, USURP A MONOPOLY, DROWNING IN FACTS, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION for
understanding the otherness of people of the past.
The metaphor of FOUNDATION was used in several meanings that highlighted divergent
priorities and interests of textbook authors and history teachers. Thus, while, for
Brazauskas, history exerts its grounding effect as a FOUNDATION for identity, Litvinait?
rather underlines the instrumental value of history as a foundation of useful, practical
knowledge. The grounding effect of the metaphor of FOUNDATION contrasts in Brazauskas
with his perception of the threat of disappearance or EXTINCTION. Laskowski, on the other
hand, places the metaphor of FOUNDATION in a completely different context that  seeks to
engage with rather than to isolate oneself from otherness. The interrelated themes of
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grounding and groundlessness also manifested in relation to assessing and making sense
of  the  past,  when  Kapleris  uttered  the  metaphor  of  a VACUUM to  convey  the  absence  of
clear value stances in relation to the past in the beginning of the 1990s. Identifying values,
thus, allows facing the disorienting, groundless state of VACUUM in  the  aftermath  of
ideological shifts. The overwhelming groundlessness likewise strongly reverberated in
Litvinait?, who proposed that the BOUNDLESS OCEAN of the past can only be faced by
skilled historians as FISHERMEN.
Spatial:  BOUNDLESS OCEAN, BOUNDLESS KINGDOM, WORLD of the past, OVERLAPPING
WORLDS.
Metaphorically  structuring  history,  the  past,  time  as  a BOUNDLESS OCEAN of  facts,  a
BOUNDLESS KINGDOM or a WORLD spatializes the temporal dimension. The processual and
embodied character of temporal change is obscured. The past is then located outside of a
human life: it is distanced from the time of one’s life, or time embodied through lived
experience. Spatializing of time or the past may reflect a deeper underlying ocularcentric
image-schema, where an observer is watching the past laid out spatially at a distance
(Section 3.2). However, when time or the past is a place, the temporality and embodiment
of lived experience are concealed. In turn, historical knowledge can then be
conceptualized as an IMAGE of the past, a flattened snapshot of the geographically laid out
past, a copy of a distanced WORLD. Time turns into a chronological succession of
snapshots (Sections 3.2 and 3.4).
Ocular-Optic:  LOOKING FROM THE WINDOW, OBSERVING THE PAST, PERSPECTIVE, TO
LOOK AT events  without  bias,  FIFTH MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS,
showing BOTH SIDES – THE DARK AND THE LIGHT –  of  history,  BLACK AND WHITE IN
HISTORY, COLORFUL HISTORY, VISION, POINT OF VIEW, AN IMAGE OF THE PAST, A GAZE ON
HISTORY, HISTORICAL OPTICS, assess AS IF FROM OUTSIDE, SHIFTING THE GLASS LENS, WAYS
OF SEEING THE PAST.
The most abundant group of metaphors was ocular-optic metaphors, which surfaced in
every interview and/or textbook. These metaphors are the tip of an iceberg – the
underlying, implicit ocularcentric metaphorical model of cognition (Sections 3.1 and 3.2),
on which the conceptualization of truth, objectivity, multiperspectivity as well as
organization of the narrative content rest, as discussed in Sections 8.1–8.3. Ocular-optic
metaphors are based on a particular schematization of the knowing self and its
(dis)engagement with the environment. They conjure an idea of the knowing self as a
static observer, who is imprisoned within the subjective-objective dualism (Crary 1990;
Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Hence, the knowing self is a distanced objective spectator who
observes the world as if from outside or a subjective viewer, who cannot really know the
world and who solely imbues what she or he sees by way of a relative, figuratively framed
meaning. The ocularcentrism invokes the epistemological quest for bridging the gap
between the “inside” and the “outside” of cognition.
Other senses: TO SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS, PAINFUL PAST, VOICES OF THE SILENCED.
In contrast to sight, other senses served as a metaphorical source domain only very
rarely. However, it is exactly those metaphors, based on senses other than sight, that turn
the readers’ attention to the lived dimension of the past. For example, the readers are
encouraged to recognize the sense of the past, whose pain can be presently felt and
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inhabits one’s body (Section 6.3.2). The past cannot be PAINFUL outside of a body,
however, which feels it (e.g., Jackson 1994). Alternatively, the readers may be encouraged
to engage with the sound of the VOICES OF THE SILENCED. Among similar metaphors, based
on other sensory domain sources, is the touch metaphor. Used to convey the idea of
avoiding “sharp,” antagonizing depictions of the past, in order TO SMOOTH OVER THE
CORNERS, this metaphor evokes the sense of touch. However, in this case, what is being
SMOOTHED OVER is not the past, but rather narratives told in the textbooks.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion
The  main  goal  of  this  work  has  been  to  demonstrate  how  vision-based,  implicit
metaphorical models continue to shape default assumptions in school history about what it
means  to  know  the  past.  The  effect  of  the  endurance  of  the  disembodied,  static,
ocularcentric model of cognition is that the act of knowing the world continues to be
conceived in terms of mimesis – making of (re)presentations as mental images, which are
detached from the world/reality/past. The principle of mimesis obscures the role played by
the body in cognition.
A disembodied, metaphysical distinction between mind and world entails that
narratives can be conceptualized either as “inner” representations of external reality or as
presentations, whose meaning is defined in terms of internal relationships between
symbols  within  a  formal  system.  In  the  former  case,  a  representation  is  assumed to  be  a
mentalistic mirror image of the externalized reality; in the latter case, a presentation bears
no  link  to  the  world  outside  the  formal  system  of  symbols.  In  both  cases,  the
conceptualization of meaning is metaphorically structured by the spectatorial image-
schema of cognition, which implies the distinction between reality and representation,
matter and mind, language and reality, subject and object, “inside” and “outside” of
cognition. The dualistic assumption leads to two concurrent epistemological solutions: one
can either seek to bridge the gap by means of optical mirroring or, if optical truth is not
attainable, to distance the world and define meaning within the confines of disembodied
mental construction.
As I sought to demonstrate, in order to conceive of knowledge as inner mental
snapshots  that  are  distanced  from  the  world,  one  needs  to  ignore  the  role  played  by  the
body in cognitive experience. Sight, the sense that is most capable of detachment, has
come to dominate philosophical conceptualizations, effectively hiding the dynamic and
embodied experience in cognition. What has escaped our awareness is how visual
metaphors, at an implicit meta-theoretical level, has exerted a tremendous influence on
what questions, theories and methodologies we build and what kind of knowledge these,
in  turn,  lead  us  to.  I  have  argued  that  a  reevaluation  of  an  entrenched  metaphysical
assumption of a divide between world and word is urgently needed. This model of
cognition, dominant as it has been in Western philosophy, has marginalized the embodied
and world-involving nature of mind and cognition.
The theory of enactive embodiment challenges the assumption that cognition is an
internal representation of an external, pre-given world and opposes the dualism of mind
and world. Enactive embodiment offers a radically altered, more broadly defined
conception of cognition, which maps the relation between the cognizing self and world in
terms of a process of dynamic interaction. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993 [1991])
propose to regard cognition as embodied action – “an enactment of a world and a mind on
the basis of a history of the variety of actions that  a being in the world performs” (9).  In
this understanding, perception is not a passive internalization of information, but an active
process  –  it  implies  a  dynamic  process  of  doing  and  acting  in  the  world.  The  process  or
history of embodied (inter)action shapes the cognizing self and its ways of making sense
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of  the  world.  The  process  of  cognition  or  interaction  with  the  world  is  embodied  in  the
pattern of perception.
When applied to the discipline of history, enactive embodiment holds important
theoretical and methodological implications. Past reality becomes conceived not as an
externalized static space “out there,” but rather, as a past process of life, the materiality of
which is weaved into the present. The process of past life is embodied in the present and
can be encountered as such in the present – in ways of being, living, seeing, in subtle and
often unnoticeable manifestations of the persistence of the past.
I have proposed the metaphor of the weave to make sense of the complexity of the
process of life. The weave constitutes a material embodiment, an emergent product of the
process of becoming or weaving. Threads (lived experience), through their particular
entanglements, bring forth patterns, textures and shapes, which make up the materiality of
the overall weave (past process of life). Examining the complexity of the weave, one can
both identify the knots, textures and patterns in the weave, as if from outside, and follow
the entanglements of individual threads (lived experience) that both produce the patterns
and are organized by them.
Both the patterns and individual threads are part of the same complex weave,
intermeshed and interconnected. The past reality is, accordingly, not a linear sequence of
static states along a chronological axis, but a process of interrelations, junctions and
entanglements that shape the patterns the weave takes. Larger-scale structures of social
life, in this understanding, come to be viewed as patterns that come into shape over time
by way of human activity and that simultaneously organize the environment of embodied
interaction. Such interaction, moreover, affects the dynamic trajectory of individual
threads.
These structures can be conceived as dynamic systems of linkages between human
experience, things and ideas rather than as rigid, static “wholes.” An embodied approach
to history, therefore, requires that inquiry into larger-scale processes and phenomena of
the shared past would be combined with an engagement of processes of diverse lived
experiences on a smaller scale. Appreciation of the complexity of the past process of life
entails due recognition of the ways in which the past can both be shared and lived in terms
of individual experiential trajectories.
The  cognizing  self  (historian),  who  makes  sense  of  the  weave,  its  patterns,
entanglements and threads, engages with its shapes and textures and makes meaning that
is as much dependent on the weave as on the experiences, categories, concepts and
metaphors of the cognizing self. The meaning is brought forth in the process of
engagement between the weave (or its particular dimension) and the embodied cognizing
self. The meaning of the past, then, is neither a completely arbitrary, subjective, “inner”
figuration, nor is it an objective representation of the pre-given, context-independent
meaning  of  reality.  In  this  regard,  we  can  speak  of  two levels  of  embodiment  in  history
writing: the embodiment of the historian who makes sense of the past  and the embodied
nature of past life, with which the historian engages.
The complexity of the past process of life encompasses divergent lived experiences
that dualist metaphysics fails to take into account. As I demonstrate in my analysis, when
ways of thinking about knowledge and truth are framed by dualist metaphysics, divergent
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experiences of people, both individuals and groups, become a confounding problem. The
metaphysical notion of truth does not accommodate varied and often conflicting narratives
of experience. It fails to make sense of the truth in relation to the divergent lived past. The
contribution  of  this  dissertation  is,  therefore,  to  specifically  show  how  the  rethinking  of
the truth of the past in embodied terms opens up potential new avenues for conceiving of
historical truth and for teaching it in school-history textbooks. Further research is required
to  propose  concrete  ways  in  which  enactive  embodiment  could  be  applied  in  history
writing and history teaching. However, this dissertation can be considered as a first step in
seeking to propose new ways of engaging with the past and making sense of it.
An embodied approach to history, I am convinced, can be of particular merit in
processes of post-conflict reconciliation, where opposing parties typically fail to engage
with divergent narratives of experience of a shared past. My project shows that in order to
be able to achieve reconciliation, a larger emphasis should be placed not on attempts to
nail down the truthful facts, but on efforts to understand and relate to different processes
of  lived  experiences  that  have  generated  the  conflict.  Attention  to  metaphor  can  be  of
particular help in this context, as research on metaphor use offers ample evidence that a
crucial factor in reconciliation is readiness to engage with a different experiential
framework by partaking in other people’s metaphors. Metaphorical identification does not
entail that people need to agree with or justify a different lived past; it only implies a
capacity to empathically engage with and understand a divergent narrative of experience
and how it forms a part of an encompassing weave of past life.
My research on school-history textbooks and their authors has shown that attention to
the lived, experiential past in school history in Poland and Lithuania remains very scarce,
if acknowledged at all. Priority continues to be assigned to the political and military past
of states and nations and to the factual information about general states of the world in the
past. The analysis has revealed that when the lived dimension of the past is obscured in
textbook narratives, it becomes, in fact, possible to argue that the meaning of textbook
narratives is primarily, if not exclusively, dependent on the historians’ emplotment and
narrative organization of factual content. Thus, an unexpected finding of my examination
of textbooks is that attention to the lived, experiential past is what can expose the non-
arbitrary and non-mimetic connections between past life and history.
I have argued that attention to embodiment can provide conceptual tools for history
teachers and history textbook authors for how to handle the diversity of interpretations of
the past in school narratives. As the analysis has shown, textbook authors are generally
willing to include divergent accounts of the past into textbooks. However, they face
significant challenges to achieving this task effectively due to curricular restrictions, but
likewise due to an implicit adherence to a disembodied, vision-based and vision-generated
metaphorical model of cognition.
The  latter  manifests  in  textbooks  by  an  exclusive  priority  given  to:  evaluation  of
accuracy; identification of bias and subjectivity in sources; reduction-driven analysis of
diverse interpretations through adjudication of which one is correct and which one is false
(while simultaneously ignoring the question of how these conflicting accounts could be
synthesized into a more encompassing account); chronological arrangement of history as a
linear sequence of static and depersonalized states (events); and the exclusion of a lived,
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experiential past from textbook narratives. The unconscious adherence to a disembodied,
ocularcentric model of cognition in textbooks prepares one for a critical scrutiny of truth-
claims in sources, but leaves pupils completely unprepared to make sense of divergent
interpretations in relation to the lived process of experience out of which they emerged.
Authors of textbooks fail to equip pupils with the tools and ways of thinking about the
complexity of the past process of life, in which diverse lived experiences intermingle,
intermesh, and constitute a crucial dimension of the past.
I am convinced that the post-truth world that we are told to be living in requires a
closer look at embodied lived experience because hearing and reading someone talk about
their lived experience, seeing their facial expressions and bodily gestures reveals
something crucial about the lived dimension of truth, whose meaning can be perceived
even if one does not agree with the expressed ideas and opinions. To ignore the lived,
experiential past is to lose the potential for understanding another person and where they
are coming from. That understanding is the beginning of a realization about the
complexity  of  the  process  of  life  and  of  how  we  are  all  shaped  by  our  own  histories  of
interaction with our respective environments.
In short, we need to move past the static, vision-based thinking about truth in terms of
atomistic, subjective perspectives vis-à-vis the objective world of reality. This kind of
reasoning, based on visual metaphorical models, inevitably leads either to a static relativist
polarization  of  the  “you  have  your  narrative,  I  have  mine”  kind  or,  alternatively,  to
attempts to transcend the lived dimension altogether, reducing truth to what can be
claimed to be objectively shared facts. Neither of these options can offer effective tools for
navigating the diversity of interpretations, because they inherently fail to take into account
the lived experience that is at the root of different perspectives.
In conclusion, what we need to strive for is an understanding of how humans can have
a world in common and simultaneously live it in terms of their own particular histories. It
is in this sense that an understanding of truth requires an understanding of complexity.
Until such a time when truth can be understood in all its complexity, various conflicts and
tensions that divide us rather than unite us will continue to gnaw away at the edges of our
societies, if not at their cores. Feeding such conflicts in the name of reductive, relativistic
truths, however, denies the conciliatory potential that understanding such complexity
offers.
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Appendix 1
The Outline of the Interview Questionnaire
 Should different historical interpretations of the same event or phenomenon be
introduced  in  school  textbooks  and  if  so,  in  what  manner?  According  to  what
principles should it be decided which interpretations/narratives to include in school
textbooks? What should the relation be between school history and different historical
narratives?
 How do you understand the concept of historical truth? How could the truthfulness of
competing claims and/or narratives be measured? Should pupils be acquainted in
school-history lessons with the epistemology of history? If so, in what manner? Is such
knowledge relevant and accessible to pupils?
 How do you understand the concept of objectivity in the discipline of history? What
constitutes an objective historical depiction? What role does objectivity play in school
history, if any?
 Should school-history textbooks promote certain values? If so, which values have you
sought to emphasize in your textbook(s)? What is the relation between values and
factual information in school history?
 What is the key purpose of school-history education? What skills and knowledge are
the most important for pupils to acquire from school-history education? What kind of
understanding of history as a discipline should pupils receive from school-history
lessons?
 How free were you in constructing the textbook narrative? Did you seek to modify a
certain existing interpretation, to present a counter-narrative, or to make the account
more complex with new facts? What historiographical references did you rely on?
What challenges and experiences have you encountered in the process of writing a
textbook?
 If you had an opportunity, would you revise anything in your textbook(s)? If so, what?
 Do you perceive the presentation of certain topics in Lithuanian/Polish school-history
textbooks problematic (conceptually or methodologically)? What would you change in
the presentation?
 Do you have an ideal model of a school-history textbook? If so, what features
distinguish it? If you had complete freedom in authoring a textbook, what would it
look like?
 What feedback have you received about your textbook(s), including reviewers and
schoolteachers? How do you assess the textbook review practices in your country?
How much did you have to change, modify your text, if at all, for the text to be
accepted?

